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מדינת ישראל

תעודות למדיניות החוץ של מדינת ישראל, מאי — ספטמבר 1948

מדינת ישראל
גנזך המדינה

תעודות למדיניות החוץ
של מדינת ישראל

כרך ראשון

14 במאי — 30 בספטמבר 1948

ערך: יהושע פרוינדליך

ירושלים תשמ״א

נדפס על־ידי המדפיס הממשלתי
בדפוס "המקור", ירושלים תשמ"א

התוכן

מפות

הקדמה

הכרך שלפנינו הוא ראשון בסדרת הכרכים של תעודות למדיניות החוץ של מדינת ישראל והמשך לכרך התעודות המדיניות לתקופה דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948.* העקרונות המנחים שהדריכו את העורכים בבחירת התעודות לכרך המקדים תקפים גם לגבי הכרך הזה; בכרך מובאות בעיקר תעודות העוסקות במדיניות החוץ של מדינת ישראל, אך נכללות בו גם תעודות הדנות בענייני רכש, גיוס כספים, אספקת דלק, עלייה ומדיניות כלפי המיעוט הערבי, כאשר לנושאים האלה יש השלכות ישירות על מדיניות החוץ והדיון בהם הוא במסגרת ניהולה של מדיניות זו.

התעודות נבחרו מתוך מספר גדול מאוד של תעודות שנשתמרו מאותה תקופה, במגמה לתת כיסוי רחב ורצוף לבעיות, לשיקולים, למגוון הדעות ולעיצוב המדיניות בנושאים המרכזיים של מדיניות החוץ. עניינים שאינם נמנים עם הנושאים המרכזיים של מדיניות החוץ הוארו על־ידי תעודות מייצגות, ובעזרתן גם יוכל הקורא לאתר את התיק או סדרת התיקים העוסקים בנושא. השיקול אם הטיפול בנושא הנידון הביא לתוצאות משמעותיות או בנות־קיימא, או אם הנושא הוא בעל חשיבות לטווח ארוך, לא הובא בחשבון בדרך־כלל בבחירת התעודות. כך, למשל, נכללה בכרך סדרת תעודות העוסקות בצורת זימונה של ישראל לשולחן מועצת־הבטחון, נושא שהיה בעל חשיבות רבה למעמדה הבינלאומי של מדינת ישראל בחודשים הראשונים לקיומה והעסיק הרבה את משרד־החוץ באותה תקופה, אף שמנקודת־הראות של היום הוא עלול להיראות שולי. עם זאת אין העורכים רשאים להתעלם לגמרי מהשיקול הזה והם חייבים לשמור על יחס נאות בין המקום המוקדש לנושא מסוים לבין חשיבותו בפרספקטיבה היסטורית. העורכים מודעים לחשיבותו של תיעוד שעניינו תכנון מדיניות ודיונים פנימיים והתייעצויות במשרד־החוץ, אך מספר התעודות מסוג זה המצויות בתיקי המשרד הוא קטן יחסית. אין ספק שהדבר נובע בין היתר מכך שמדינת ישראל היתה נתונה במאבק על קיומה ואנשי המשרד לא התפנו לשיקולים ארוכי טווח. זאת ועוד: עיצוב המדיניות, במידה שנעשה התמקד בעיקר מחוץ למשרד־החוץ — בדיוני הממשלה ובדיונים פנים־מפלגתיים. הפרוטוקולים של ישיבות הממשלה טרם נפתחו לעיון, אבל מידע מתוכם שימש את העורכים בהכנת הערות ומראי־מקום. התעודות המתפרסמות בכרך זה נמצאות רובן ככולן בתיקי משרד־החוץ ובתיקי נציגויות ישראל בחוץ־לארץ. תיקים אלה שמורים כולם בגנזך המדינה. תעודות אחדות לוקטו מתוך מקורות אחרים, כגון תיקי המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית בירושלים, השמורים בארכיון הציוני המרכזי, ארכיון בן־גוריון וגנזך וייצמן.

* גנזך המדינה והארכיון הציוני המרכזי, תעודות מדיניות ודיפלומטיות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, ירושלים תש"ם

סדר התעודות. התעודות מובאות בסדר כרונולוגי. תעודות שחוברו או נשלחו בהמשכים סודרו על־פי התאריך המוקדם ביותר. מברקים סודרו על־פי התאריך הידוע המוקדם ביותר — תאריך חיבור המברק, תאריך שיגורו, או, בהעדרם של אלה — תאריך קבלת המברק. דו״חות על דיונים ושיחות שובצו על־פי תאריך חיבור התעודה ולא על־פי מועד הדיון או השיחה. דו״חות שתאריכי חיבורם אינם רשומים, מיקומם נקבע לפי תאריך הדיון או השיחה (התאריך רשום בכותרת הראשית).

הטכסט. נוסח התעודות המודפסות הוא הנוסח המקורי, להוציא את השינויים ותיקוני העריכה הבאים:

א הושמטו המען של השולח ושל הנמען וגם התאריך בצורתו המקורית, ולעתים גם כותרות או חלקי כותרות של דו״חות, תזכירים ופרוטוקולים. פרטים אלה נכללו בחלקם, במתכונת אחידה, בכותרת העורך (ראה להלן) או בהערה לתעודה.

ב בתעודות אחדות הושמטו קטעים שאין להם זיקה ישירה לנושאים המדיניים (בכלל זה עניינים אישיים). כמו כן הושמטו משפטים או חלקי משפטים שיש בהם פגיעה אישית חמורה או העלבה או שנזכרים בהם שמות החייבים להישאר חסויים לאחר מועד החשיפה הרגיל. כל השמטה סומנה בטכסט והוסברה בהערה.

ג פליטות־קולמוס, טעויות־הדפסה זעירות ושגיאות־כתיב תוקנו בלא שהדבר צוין.

ד קיצורים מקובלים וקיצורים שמשמעם אינו מוטל בספק הושלמו בלא שהדבר צוין. אולם קיצורי שמות של אנשים ומקומות, וקיצורים שנעשו מטעמי סודיות, הושלמו בסוגריים מרובעים.

יוצאים מכלל זה קיצורי מלים שנהוג להגותן על דרך הקיצור (לדוגמה: או״ם, UNSCOP, UNO, U.N.). קיצורים אלה נכתבו כפי שהם רשומים בטכסט.

ה נוספו מלים החסרות במקור — אם על־פי השערה (בסוגריים מרובעים, עם סימן־שאלה), אם על־פי נוסח מקביל (בסוגריים מרובעים, עם הערת־הסבר).

ו מלים לועזיות הרשומות בתעודות עבריות בתעתיק עברי, הודפסו בדרך־כלל באותיות לועזיות.

ז הכתיב העברי הואחד לפי כללי הכתיב המלא.

ח הכתיב של תעודות כתובות אנגלית הואחד לפי כללי הכתיב הבריטי, להוציא תעודות שמקורן באישים או במוסדות אמריקאים.

ט פיסוק: סימני־פיסוק נוספו או שונו לפי הצורך. במברקים גם הוכנסו סימני־פיסוק במקום שמות הסימנים: נקודה — במקום STOP, פסיק — במקום COMMA, מרכאות פותחות וסוגרות — במקום QUOTE ו־UNQUOTE, וכו׳.

י כאשר יש נוסח יוצא ונוסח נכנס של מברק, נחשב הנוסח היוצא כנוסח הקובע. אם התברר מהשוואת הנוסחים, שבנוסח הנכנס יש שיבושים חמורים, צוין הדבר על־ידי לוכסנים משני צדי המלים ששובשו.

כותרת העורך. הכותרת כוללת, בין היתר, את סימול התיק שבו נמצאת התעודה, ולגבי מברקים — את סימולי התיקים שבהם מתויקים הנוסח היוצא והנוסח הנכנס.

במראי־מקום לתיקים השמורים בגנזך המדינה ניתנים רק מספרי החטיבה, הסדרה,

המיכל והתיק, ללא ציון הארכיון. במראי־מקום לתיקים השמורים בארכיונים אחרים צוין שם הארכיון. (ראה רשימת ארכיונים וקיצורים במראי־מקום).

שם המקום שאליו נשלחה התעודה רשום בכותרת העורך. שם המקום לא צוין כאשר מדובר במקום מושבם של משרד־החוץ ושל רשויות מרכזיות אחרות של ממשלת ישראל.

שם המקום שממנו נשלחה התעודה ותאריך כתיבתה או שיגורה מובאים בראש הטכסט בניסוח אחיד.

הערות־העורך באות להאיר פרשיות או אירועים חשובים, והן שובצו בדרך־כלל לפני התעודה שבה נזכר הנושא בפעם הראשונה.

הערות־שוליים. רוב ההערות הן הערות־שוליים ממוספרות — הערות־הסבר ומראי־מקום. במראי־המקום צוינו בעיקר מקורות ראשוניים (בכלל זה מקורות שפורסמו בדפוס, ומדובר בעיקר בתעודות של מחלקת־המדינה של ארצות־הברית שהופיעו בסידרה Foreign Relations of the United States. מטרתן העיקרית של הערות־השוליים היא להאיר עניינים הטעונים הסבר ולהצביע על תעודות המכילות מידע משלים. במראי־המקום יש גם הפניות לתיקים ולתעודות שיישארו חסוים במשך תקופה נוספת, זאת לאור ההנחה שבעתיד ייפתח גם החומר הזה לעיון החוקרים.

הערות־שוליים ביוגרפיות ניתנו כאשר הדבר דרוש להבנת הטכסט. מידע ביוגרפי על רוב האישים הנזכרים בתעודות נמצא במפתח השמות והעניינים. במפתח אין מידע ביוגרפי על אישים הנזכרים בהערות בלבד.

נספחים. בסוף הכרך יש שבעה נספחים ובהם מובאות במלואן החלטות של העצרת הכללית ומועצת־הביטחון בעניין ארץ־ישראל בתקופה הנידונה, וגם שתי הצעות־החלטה אמריקאיות והצעת־תיקון בריטית.

מפות. בספר שתי מפות — של קווי הפסקת־האש הראשונה ושל קווי הפסקת־האש השנייה. במפות גם סומנו גבולות החלוקה לפי החלטת האו״ם. במפות צוינו, באנגלית, מקומות ישוב ואיזורים גיאוגרפיים הנזכרים בכרך שלפנינו. המפות מיועדות בעיקר לסייע לקורא הלא־ישראלי שאינו מתמצא במפת ארץ־ישראל.

כרך־לוואי אנגלי. בכרך־הלוואי מובאים, בין היתר, תקצירים של התעודות העבריות, תרגום של הערות־השוליים ושל הערות־העורך, ומפתח אנגלי לכרך הראשי ולכרך־הלוואי.

תודתנו נתונה לאנשים ולמוסדות שסייעו בידנו בהכנת הכרך: למר משה יובל, ממשרד־החוץ, שקרא את כתב־היד, על הערותיו החשובות ועל שיתוף־הפעולה בכל שלבי העבודה; לד״ר אליהו אילת, שסייע לנו בהסברת עניינים שונים הקשורים בתחום פעילותו כנציג ישראל בוואשינגטון באותה תקופה; לד״ר מיכאל היימן, מנהל

הארכיון הציוני המרכזי, ולסגנו, מר ישראל פיליפ, ולכל עובדי הארכיון — על עזרתם הרבה; למר חיים שריד, מנהל ארכיון צה״ל, ולסגנית המנהל, ד״ר זהבה אוסטפלד, שטרחה הרבה במציאת תיעוד משלים רב־ערך; לגב׳ נחמה שלום, מנהלת גנזך וייצמן ברחובות, שסייעה לנו בתיעוד וגם היתה אחראית על הגהת החומר הלועזי בכרך הזה; לד״ר יעקב רואי, על סיועו בהבהרת שאלות שונות בתחום של יחסי ישראל — ברית־המועצות; למר יעקב לזרוס על העריכה הלשונית של כרך־הלוואי האנגלי; לפרופ׳ יהושע פורת על עזרתו בתחום הכתיב של שמות ערביים; למר צבי שפירא על הכנת הטיוטות של התקצירים האנגליים, לגב׳ לאה אלדור, למר מיכאל פלוטקין ולגב׳ לו קדר על עזרתם בענייני לשון, כתיב ותרגום; לגב׳ קלוד וולפיש, לגב׳ ורה עדן ולגב׳ בינה פאר, שהדפיסו את כתב־היד של התעודות וההערות.

תודתנו נתונה גם לכל האנשים שטרחו וסייעו לנו במידע ביוגרפי על עצמם או על אישים אחרים הנזכרים בתעודות.

מבוא

הכרך הראשון של תעודות למדיניות החוץ של מדינת ישראל הוא המשך ישיר לכרך התעודות המדיניות והדיפלומטיות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948.[1] תחילתו ביום הכרזת המדינה, ב־14 במאי 1948, וסיומו ב־30 בספטמבר 1948, בעיצומה של ההפוגה השנייה ותחילת הדיונים במושב השלישי של עצרת האו״ם.

ארבע משימות עיקריות היו למדיניות החוץ של ישראל בתקופה זו:

א. הפעלת האו״ם לצורך בלימת הפלישה הערבית וחיסולה.

ב. חתירה ללגיטימציה בינלאומית של המדינה החדשה והכרה בה על־ידי מדינות העולם.

ג. יצירת התנאים המדיניים להמשכת העלייה של העקורים ממערב־אירופה ומקפריסין; שמירת הקשר עם הקיבוצים היהודיים במזרח־אירופה ועליית יהודים משם.

ד. אבטחת מקורות נשק, דלק ומימון.

פלישת צבאות ערב לאחר ההכרזה על הקמת המדינה הוסיפה מימד של סכסוך בינלאומי לדיון שהתנהל במועצת־הביטחון בעניין ארץ־ישראל מאז פברואר 1948. בישיבת המועצה שהתקיימה ב־15 במאי 1948 דרש נציג ישראל שהמועצה תקבע כי המצב בארץ־ישראל מהווה איום על השלום הבינלאומי, ותורה למדינות ערב לחדול מיד מתוקפנותן.[2] האמריקאים הציעו, במקום זאת, שהמועצה תצווה להפסיק את האש בארץ־ישראל בתוך 36 שעות.[3] הדיון במועצת־הביטחון התמשך, ורק ב־31 בחודש החליטה המועצה על הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל למשך 28 יום.[4] מחמת קשיים ביישום ההחלטה בארץ־ישראל, נכנסה הפסקת־האש לתוקפה אך ב־11 ביוני.

במשך ארבעת השבועות של ההפוגה נעשה נסיון לתווך בין הצדדים. על־פי החלטת העצרת המיוחדת השנייה, מיום 14 במאי,[5] מונה מתווך, שהיה אמור, בין היתר, לקדם הסדר שלום בין הצדדים. המתווך — הרוזן השוודי פולקה ברנאדוט — הגיע לאיזור בסוף חודש מאי. הוא שוחח עם ראשי המדינה ועם מנהיגים של מדינות ערב ולאחר תקופה קצרה קבע את מקום מושבו ברודוס, לשם זימן נציגים של הצדדים בדרג נמוך כדי לקבל מהם בעת הצורך עצה של מומחים.[6] הצעותיו, שהוגשו לצדדים

1. גנזך המדינה והארכיון הציוני המרכזי, תעודות מדיניות ודיפלומטיות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, ירושלים, תש״ם.
2. ראה מס׳ 10.
3. ראה מס׳ 18.
4. ראה נספח ד, עמ׳ 666.
5. ראה נספח א, עמ׳ 663־664.
6. ראה מס׳ 205.

בסוף חודש יוני כ"בסיס אפשרי לדיון", היו מרחיקות־לכת ובמידה רבה מפתיעות. ברנאדוט הציע שבתחום המנדט הארצישראלי המקורי (ארץ־ישראל המערבית ועבר־הירדן) יקום איחוד (union) ובו שתי מדינות־חברות (members) — ערבית ויהודית. הוא הציע להעניק למועצה המרכזית של האיחוד סמכויות יזמה וביצוע בתחומי כלכלה ופיתוח וסמכויות תיאום בתחומי מדיניות החוץ וההגנה. כל אחת מן המדינות־החברות תהיה ריבונית בענייניה היא, אולם בנושא העלייה תהיה לכל אחת מהן הזכות לערער כעבור שנתיים על מדיניות ההגירה של חברתה, כשהמועצה הכלכלית והחברתית של האו"ם משמשת כערכאה סופית, בעלת סמכות הכרעה. אשר לגבולות, הוצעו השינויים הבאים בתכנית החלוקה של 29 בנובמבר: ירושלים והנגב — כולו או חלקו — יימסרו לערבים, ואילו הגליל המערבי — כולו או חלקו — ייכלל בשטח היהודי. לאוכלוסיה היהודית של ירושלים תוענק אוטונומיה מוניציפלית.[7]

עוד לפני תום ההפוגה, החל המתווך בנסיונות להאריכה.[8] ממשלת ישראל הסכימה להארכה למשך 30 יום,[9] אך מדינות ערב סירבו. הפסקת־האש תמה ב־9 ביולי וקרבות "עשרת הימים", שהחלו באותו יום, שינו באופן מכריע את מאזן הכוחות לרעת הערבים. הגליל התחתון נכבש; הפרוזדור לירושלים הורחב והקשר עם העיר באמצעות "דרך בורמה" הובטח; לוד ורמלה נכבשו; המצרים נבלמו בנגב ושופרה האחיזה הישראלית שם, אך ישובי הנגב נשארו מנותקים. שינוי יחסי הכוחות והלחץ הבינלאומי שהופעל במועצת־הביטחון, בכלל זה האיום בהטלת סנקציות על־פי פרק ז' של מגילת האו"ם,[10] הביאו לחידוש הפסקת־האש, שנכנסה לתוקפה ב־18 ביולי. הפעם נקבע שהפסקת־האש תהיה בתוקף עד שיושג הסדר שלום בארץ־ישראל.

הדיונים במועצת־הביטחון, מגמתם של מאמצי התיווך והבעיות הכרוכות בשמירה על הפסקת־האש בארץ־ישראל המחישו את מגבלותיו של האו"ם כעושה שלום וכמתווך בין הצדדים. התברר שארגון האו"ם כבד תנועה, נתון ללחצים פוליטיים וקשה להניעו לפעולה מידית; בארץ־ישראל לא הצליחו המתווך וצוותו להוציא אל הפועל כמה מתנאי היסוד של הפסקת־האש: אבטחת אספקה לירושלים ולנגב הנצורים, חידוש הזרמת המים לירושלים וגישה חופשית לכותל המערבי; במשך הזמן, ובמיוחד במרוצת ההפוגה השנייה, כשהמצב הצבאי נטה לרעת הערבים, החל להיווצר הרושם בצד הישראלי שהמתווך וצוותו נושאים פנים לערבים. רצח המתווך על־ידי פלג של לח"י ב־17 בספטמבר נתן ביטוי דרמטי וקיצוני להרגשה רווחת זו. הרצח אמנם גונה על־ידי חוגים רחבים בציבור, וממשלת ישראל הוקיעה אותו והודיעה כי תשתדל להביא לידי תפיסת מבצעיו והעמדתם לדין, אולם היחסים עם האו"ם נפגעו פגיעה קשה.

כשלון התיווך של האו"ם הניע את משרד־החוץ לחפש אפיקים אחרים לפתרון מדיני של הסכסוך, שכן ההנחה הרווחת היתה כי במגע ישיר עם הערבים ניתן יהיה

7. ראה מס' 239.
8. ראה מס' 267.
9. ראה מס' 291.
10. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־670.

לפרוץ דרכים להסדר. בראשית יולי יצא אליהו ששון, מנהל מחלקת המזרח־התיכון במשרד־החוץ, לפאריס במטרה לפתוח במשא־ומתן עם נציגים ערביים. ששון חידש קשרים ישנים ויצר קשרים חדשים עם מדינאים ונציגים ממדינות שונות. הוא התחיל את מגעיו בדיונים עם נציגי עבר־הירדן, שעמה היו כבר מגעים רבים בעבר;[11] אבל במהרה התברר שדווקא אצל המצרים מסתמנת מגמה חיובית ורצון לסיים את מצב המלחמה בדרך של משא־ומתן.[12] על היחסים עם הערבים העיבה בעיה חדשה, שהלכה והחמירה במהלך הקרבות — בעיית הפליטים הערביים. פליטים אלה — בחלקם תושבי השטחים שנועדו למדינה היהודית ובחלקם תושבי אותם חלקים של ארץ־ישראל שנועדו למדינה הערבית ונתפסו על־ידי צה"ל — הלכו והתרכזו בתחומי ארץ־ישראל המוחזקים על־ידי צבאות ערב ובמדינות השכנות. שאלת החזרתם, ישובם או הקלת מצוקתם הפכה לנושא בעל חשיבות מרכזית ביחסים בין ישראל, האו"ם, המעצמות והמדינות השכנות.

עם התכנס המושב השלישי של עצרת האו"ם, בספטמבר 1948, לא נראה פתרון קרוב לבעיית ארץ־ישראל. על שולחן האו"ם היה מונח הדין־וחשבון של המתווך שחובר לפני הרצחו. הפעם המליץ ברנאדוט, בין היתר, שהנגב יימסר לערבים והגליל כולו ליהודים, ירושלים תהיה בינלאומית ואילו חלקי ארץ־ישראל הערביים יצורפו לממלכת עבר־הירדן.[13] העובדה שהדין־וחשבון פורסם סמוך מאוד להרצחו של המתווך ולפיכך הצטייר כמעין צוואה פוליטית שלו, ושמעצמות המערב סמכו ידיהן על עיקרי המלצותיו, העמידה את ממשלת ישראל בפני בעיה מדינית קשה במושב השלישי של העצרת.

אחת ממטרותיו המרכזיות של משרד־החוץ בתקופה זו היתה ביצור מעמדה הבינלאומי של המדינה. לשם כך השתדל להניע מדינות רבות ככל האפשר להעניק לה הכרה, לפחות דה־פאקטו. הנשיא טרומן הודיע על הכרה דה־פאקטו מיד לאחר ההכרזה על הקמת המדינה, אולם מחלקת־המדינה הפחיתה מערכה של הכרה זו על־ידי קביעת דרג נמוך לנציגותה.[14] ברית־המועצות, לעומת זאת, מיהרה להעניק הכרה בלתי־מסויגת, ובעקבותיה הלכו גם רוב מדינות הגוש המזרחי. גם אחדות ממדינות אמריקה הלטינית הכירו בישראל, ועד סוף ספטמבר זכתה המדינה בהכרתן — דה־יורה או דה־פאקטו — של שש־עשרה מדינות. עם זאת נכשלו המאמצים להשיג את הכרתן של מדינות מערב־אירופה, סקנדינביה וחבר־העמים הבריטי (להוציא את דרום־אפריקה). היחסים עם בריטניה שיקפו את המשקע של שלהי ימי המנדט. בריטניה קיימה אמנם מעין ייצוג באמצעות הקונסוליה שלה בחיפה, אך היחסים עם הקונסול היו מתוחים,[15] ופרשת מעצרם של חמשת עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים, שנחשדו בריגול, הביאה את היחסים כמעט עד משבר גלוי.[16] ישראל וצרפת קיימו יחסים טובים במישור הלא־רשמי וצרפת הוסיפה להושיט עזרה בתחום הרכש והעלייה, אך הממשלה הצרפתית נמנעה ממתן ביטוי פורמלי ליחסים אלה.

11. ראה מס' 382.
12. ראה מס' 541.
13. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 612.
14. ראה מס' 107.
15. ראה מס' 261, 453.
16. ראה מס' 327 והערה 1 שם.

פרשת תפיסתם של כמה מוסדות דת צרפתיים על־ידי צה"ל היתה מקור לחיכוכים ממושכים בין שתי המדינות.[17] בריטניה וצרפת, ולאחריהן מדינות מערב־אירופה, סקנדינביה וחבר־העמים הבריטי, הכירו בישראל רק בתחילת 1949 עם שוך הקרבות וערב חתימת הסכם שביתת־הנשק עם מצרים.

בעיה אחרת הקשורה במעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל היתה צורת זימונה של ישראל לשולחן מועצת־הביטחון. בריטניה, וכמובן הערבים, דרשו להמשיך ולקיים את הנוהג של הופעת הצד היהודי כנציגות של הסוכנות היהודית או כנציגי "הרשויות היהודיות בארץ־ישראל." נציגי ישראל דרשו שיזמינו אותם לשולחן הדיונים כנציגי הממשלה הזמנית של ישראל. בשאלה זו הכריעה בסופו של דבר העובדה שהמתווך בארץ־ישראל ניהל את מגעיו בצורה רשמית עם "הממשלה הזמנית של ישראל", ומראשית יולי זומנו נציגי ישראל אל שולחן המועצה כנציגי הממשלה הזמנית של ישראל.[18]

עניין קבלת ישראל לאו"ם היה קשה יותר. לשם כך היתה ישראל זקוקה לתמיכת שבע מתוך אחת־עשרה חברות מועצת־הביטחון, ונציגיה לא הצליחו להשיג את התמיכה הדרושה. רק בסוף נובמבר פנתה ישראל בבקשה להתקבל לאו"ם, אך בקשתה לא נענתה.

בתחום העלייה ניהלה ישראל מאבק עיקש נגד הגבלות שיש בהן משום פגיעה בריבונותה. במרוצת הדיונים במועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש הראשונה, דרשו הבריטים לאסור כליל את עלייתם של גברים יוצאי־צבא. בסופו של דבר נאסרה הכנסתם של לוחמים (fighting personnel), אך הודות ליזמה צרפתית הוחלט לא להחיל איסור זה על עלייתם של יוצאי־צבא שאינם כלולים בהגדרה זו, בתנאי שהללו לא יגויסו או יאומנו במשך ההפוגה.[19] בזמן ההפוגה הראשונה קיימה ממשלת ישראל תנאי זה בקפדנות ושיכנה את העולים במחנות מיוחדים בפיקוח האו"ם. אולם ממשלת בריטניה פירשה פירוש משלה את החלטת מועצת־הביטחון ואסרה כליל את עלייתם של גברים יוצאי־צבא ממחנות המעצר בקפריסין.[20] גם מדינות אחרות הלכו בעקבות בריטניה והטילו הגבלות על יציאתם של גברים בגיל הגיוס.[21] בתקופת ההפוגה השנייה רבו החיכוכים בין ישראל והמתווך, שטען כי יש שיעור מופרז של גברים יוצאי־צבא בקרב העולים; ממשלת ישראל דחתה טענות אלה והתנגדה לכל התערבות בשיקולי מדיניות העלייה שלה.[22]

העלייה ממזרח־אירופה היתה מרכיב מרכזי במערכת היחסים עם ברית־המועצות ושאר מדינות הגוש המזרחי. מדינות אלה עשו הבדלה ברורה בין עזרה מדינית וצבאית למדינת ישראל — בתחום זה הן נתנו סיוע רב במשך כל התקופה — ובין ענייני עליה ומגעים רשמיים למחצה או בלתי־רשמיים עם הקיבוצים היהודיים הגדולים שנותרו בארצות אלה לאחר המלחמה. ברית־המועצות לא נכנסה כלל למשא־ומתן בעניין עלייה; מדינות אחרות, כגון פולין וצ'כוסלובקיה, עוררו קשיים;

17. ראה מס' 111.
18. ראה מס' 284.
19. ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.
20. ראה מס' 134.
21. ראה מס' 242.
22. ראה מס' 469, 480.

רומניה נקטה את הקו הנוקשה ביותר — המשא־ומתן אתה היה מייגע ותוצאותיו זעומות.[23] בולגריה היתה הנוחה ביותר בתחום זה: היא התירה עלייה ללא הגבלות, אך דחתה כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל עד שתסתיים יציאתם של כל היהודים שרצו לעלות. לקראת שלהי 1948 התרבו הקשיים בתחום העלייה ממזרח־אירופה וזאת על רקע של הסתייגות גוברת של מדינות הגוש המזרחי מישראל וממדיניותה.

הריבונות המלאה שזכה בה הישוב ב־14 במאי 1948 שיחררה אותו מהאפיטרופסות הבריטית בענייני עלייה, רכש ומדינות כלכלית, אך המאבק המדיני והצבאי שנכפה עליה מיד לאחר היווסדה העמיד אותה בפני בעיות קשות בתחומים אלה. ארצות הברית הטילה איסור מוחלט על יצוא נשק למזרח התיכון עוד בדצמבר 1947. היא קיימה איסור זה בקפדנות, ובקשות של ישראל לאספקת נשק לא נענו.[24] מדינות מערב־אירופה נקטו מדיניות דומה ורק בצ׳כוסלובקיה ניתן היה לרכוש נשק בכמויות גדולות.

אספקת דלק היתה גם היא חיונית. עם צאת הבריטים פסקה העבודה בבתי־הזיקוק בחיפה ובמקום נשאר רק מלאי קטן של דלק גולמי. כמו כן הופסקה הזרמת הנפט הגולמי דרך הצינור מעיראק. לאחר שלא עלה בידי ממשלת ישראל לשכנע את ההנהלה הבריטית של בתי־הזיקוק לחדש את העבודה, נתפסו בתי־הזיקוק על־ידי המדינה והוחל בזיקוק מתוך מלאי הדלק הגולמי שנותר בארץ.[25] מכיוון שכושר הזיקוק של חיפה עלה בהרבה על הדרוש לצרכי ישראל ואילו באירופה שרר מחסור במתקני זיקוק ובתזקיקים, זכתה ישראל לאוזן קשבת במשרדי־החוץ ובחברות הדלק הגדולות בנסיונותיה לחדש את התפעול המלא של בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה — אם על־ידי הזרמת נפט דרך הצינור מעיראק ואם על־ידי אספקה באמצעות מיכליות ממקורות במזרח־התיכון. תכנית זאת לא התממשה, אך ישראל הצליחה לקבל אספקה שוטפת לצרכיה — חלקה בצורת תזקיקים וחלקה בצורת נפט גולמי ממקורות מחוץ למזרח־התיכון, בין היתר ממזרח־אירופה.

בנטל הכבד של מימון המלחמה וקליטת העלייה נשאו באותם חודשים ראשונים אזרחי ישראל ויהודי התפוצות. עוד באמצע 1947 פנתה הסוכנות היהודית לממשלת ארצות־הברית בבקשה למלווה באמצעות הבנק ליצוא וליבוא.[26] הבקשה חודשה פעמים אחדות לאחר הקמת המדינה,[27] אך בשלב זה ללא תוצאות.[28]

התקופה המתועדת בכרך זה היתה קשה וגורלית. המדינה עמדה במאבק על קיומה, ואף שההכרעה נפלה בשדה הקרב ולא בארגון האו״ם או במשרדי־החוץ השונים, היתה הפעולה המדינית חלק אינטגרלי של מאבק הקיום של ישראל. עתה, שלא כבתקופה שקדמה להקמת המדינה — כאשר הקשר בין המערכה הצבאית, שהתנהלה בארץ, ובין המערכה המדינית, שנוהלה בעיקר בארצות־הברית, היה רופף למדי — אנו עדים למידה רבה של שיתוף־פעולה ותיאום בין שתי הזרועות. לדוגמה נזכיר את הפעולה המדינית הנמרצת להשגת הפסקת־האש הראשונה, בשעה שהמצב

23. ראה מס׳ 374, 549.
24. ראה למשל מס׳ 4, 82.
25. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 392־393.
26. ראה *FRUS*, 1947, V, pp. 1090-2.
27. ראה מס׳ 37.
28. ראה מס׳ 490.

הצבאי היה קשה ביותר, לעומת העמדה המסויגת והשקולה יותר בעת קביעת מועד הפסקת־האש השנייה. עם זאת עדיין היה לקוי אותו שלב של התייעצויות סדירות — בעל־פה ובכתב — ותכנון לטווח ארוך, תולדת שגרה ומסורת של מדינות מבוססות, והדבר משתקף בתעודות.

מדיניות החוץ נוהלה בד בבד עם הפעילות הארגונית שהיתה כרוכה בהקמתו של משרד־החוץ והרכבת סגל דיפלומטי, וטבעי הדבר שנוהלי ודפוסי עבודה עדיין היו רחוקים מגיבוש. אין פלא שבמצב זה היו מדי פעם תופעות חריגות כגון אחדות מפעולותיה של הנציגות הישראלית באו"ם[29] או העצמאות היתרה של נחום גולדמן בעבודתו הדיפלומטית בלונדון.[30] אבל ההתארגנות המהירה, על יסוד התשתית שהיתה קיימת כבר לפני קום המדינה, והאילתורים שהיו בבחינת הכרח בל יגונה, אפשרו תיפקוד יעיל למדי של המערכת, שהועמדה במבחן קשה משעה שהוקמה.

משרד־החוץ ונציגויות ישראל בחוץ־לארץ; הנציגויות הזרות בישראל

משרד־החוץ

זמן קצר לאחר החלטת החלוקה של האומות המאוחדות החלה ועדת המצב בתכנון ובהכנות להקמת המשרדים והמנגנון של המדינה היהודית. במסגרת זו הוחל גם בתכנון מבנה משרד־החוץ ושרות החוץ. התפקיד הוטל על "המוסד להשתלמות שליד הסוכנות היהודית" ("בית־הספר לדיפלומטים"), ומנהלו, ולטר איתן, ריכז את העבודה. התכנית הראשונה הוגשה לוועדת המצב ב־30 בינואר 1948 ובקוויה הכלליים היא מומשה תוך זמן קצר לאחר קום המדינה.

בחירתו של משה שרתוק, ראש המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית, לתפקיד שר־החוץ היתה מובנת וטבעית. הפקיד הבכיר האחראי כלפי השר על כל פעולות המשרד היה המנהל הכללי — לתפקיד הזה מונה ולטר איתן; המזכיר הכללי — חיים רדי (ברמן) — היה אחראי למינהל, כספים וכוח־אדם. כשהוקם משרד־החוץ היו איתן ורדי בירושלים הנצורה והם הגיעו לתל אביב רק בסוף יוני. בתקופה הנידונה בכרך שלפנינו היו במשרד־החוץ שש מחלקות גיאוגרפיות: מזרח תיכון, מערב־אירופה, מזרח־אירופה, צפון־אפריקה (לימים הוסב שמה ל"מחלקת ארצות־הברית") אמריקה הלטינית וחבר־העמים הבריטי. בתכנית המשרד גם נכללה "מחלקת אסיה ואפריקה", אולם הקמתה נדחתה (מחלקת אסיה הוקמה בסוף 1949). מנהל מחלקת חבר־העמים הבריטי ומנהל מחלקת אמריקה הלטינית (מ. קומיי ומ. טוב) היו מסופחים בתקופה הנידונה למשלחת ישראל באו"ם והדבר עיכב לתקופת־מה את הנהגתם של נוהלי עבודה תקינים במחלקות הללו. עם יתר מחלקות המשרד נמנו: מחלקת מוסדות בינלאומיים, מחלקה כלכלית, מחלקה מדינית (איסוף, מודיעין וחקר) ומחלקה קונסולרית.

29. ראה מס' 82, 495.
30. ראה מס' 38 והתכתבות נוספת בין שרתוק לגולדמן.

נציגויות ישראל בחוץ־לארץ

בחודשים שלאחר הקמת מדינה הוקמו נציגויות דיפלומטיות בחמש מן המדינות שהכירו בישראל: בארצות־הברית, ברית־המועצות, רומניה, פולין וצ׳כוסלובקיה. נוסף עליהן היו נציגויות גם בבירות של כמה מדינות חשובות שלא הכירו בישראל — בלונדון, פאריס ורומא. הללו לא נהנו מסטטוס דיפלומטי, אבל הוכרו למעשה על־ידי אותן המדינות כנציגי ישראל לצורך מגעים ומשא־ומתן.

במרכזים שבהם היו קיימים משרדים של הסוכנות היהודית ששימשו עד ה־15 במאי כשלוחות של המחלקה המדינית שלה, הוסבו משרדים אלה לנציגויות של המדינה, ומנהלי המשרדים בוואשינגטון ובפאריס — אליהו אפשטיין (אילת) ומוריס פישר — המשיכו לכהן — מעתה כנציגי מדינת ישראל. המשרד בניו־יורק הפך לקונסוליה כללית ושימש גם כמשרדה של משלחת ישראל באו״ם, שבראשה עמד אבא אבן. הקונסול הכללי, ארתור לוריא, מילא גם תפקיד של מנהל ענייני המשלחת.

הנציגויות הזרות בישראל

המדינות היחידות שכוננו בתקופה הנידונה נציגויות דיפלומטיות בישראל היו ארצות־הברית וברית־המועצות. מדינות אחרות היו מיוצגות על־ידי קונסולים, שרובם כיהנו כבר בתקופת המנדט; מקום מושבם היה בירושלים, ומקצתם — בתל־אביב. לבריטים היו שני קונסולים — בירושלים (המזרחית) ובחיפה. יש לזכור שירושלים לא הוכרה כחלק של מדינת ישראל, ומכאן מעמדם האמביוולנטי של הקונסולים שישבו בה. הקונסול האמריקאי, למשל, הוסיף לדווח ישירות למחלקת־המדינה בוואשינגטון, ולא היה כפוף לנציג המיוחד של ארצות־הברית בתל־אביב. כפילות נוספת נוצרה בגלל העובדה שהקונסולים של ארצות־הברית, צרפת ובלגיה בירושלים גם היו חברי ועדת ההפוגה של מועצת־הביטחון, שתפקידיה חפפו במידת מה את תפקידי המתווך מטעם האו״ם (ראה להלן).

רשויות האו״ם בארץ־ישראל

האו״ם היה מיוצג בארץ־ישראל על־ידי שני גופים: המתווך, צוותו וארגון משקיפי האו״ם מחד גיסא, וועדת ההפוגה של מועצת־הביטחון מאידך גיסא. מלכתחילה לא היה תיחום סמכויות ברור בין שני הגופים. ועדת ההפוגה, שהיתה מורכבת מן הקונסולים של בלגיה, צרפת וארצות־הברית בירושלים, מונתה על־ידי מועצת־הביטחון בהחלטתה מיום 23 באפריל 1948.[31] ובהחלטת העצרת המיוחדת מיום 14 במאי, שבה הוחלט על מינוי המתווך לארץ־ישראל והוגדרו תפקידיו, נאמר שהמתווך ״ישתף פעולה עם ועדת ההפוגה לארץ־ישראל.״[32] מאחר שחברי ועדת ההפוגה ישבו בירושלים הנצורה, הצטמצם תחום פעולתה, מיום שהוקמה, בירושלים וסביבתה. אף־על־פי שבהחלטת מועצת־הביטחון מן ה־29 במאי עדיין נכללה הוראה למתווך לפקח על הפסקת־האש ״בתיאום עם ועדת ההפוגה״,[33] היה הפיקוח בפועל בידיו, באמצעות צוות המשקיפים שהוא ארגן ושסר למרותו. מועצת־הביטחון הכירה במצב

31. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, עמ׳ 671.
32. ראה נספח א, עמ׳ 663־664.
33. ראה נספח ה, עמ׳ 666־667.

שנוצר למעשה, ובהחלטתה מן ה־15 ביולי העניקה סמכויות פיקוח מלאות למתווך, ואילו ועדת ההפוגה נתבקשה לסייע ביישום הפסקת־האש בירושלים.[34] למתווך היו לכן שני תחומי פעולה עיקריים: א) התפקיד המרכזי שהוטל עליו על־פי החלטת העצרת המיוחדת: לקדם את יישוב הסכסוך הארצישראלי בדרכי שלום. ב) המשימה שנבעה בעיקר מכורח הנסיבות וקיבלה אישור רשמי בהחלטות מועצת־הביטחון: הפיקוח על הפסקת־האש.

המתווך הקים את צוות המשקיפים מיד לאחר כניסת ההפוגה הראשונה לתוקפה, ועד תחילת יולי נשלחו לארץ־ישראל 93 משקיפים צבאיים (31 קצינים מכל אחת מן המדינות המיוצגות בוועדת ההפוגה). הללו נעזרו בכמה עשרות "שומרים", שסופקו על־ידי מזכירות האו"ם. בארץ־ישראל הוקמו חמישה איזורי פיקוח ומספר עמדות פיקוח, ואילו לארצות ערב נשלחו מדי פעם משקיפים למשימות פיקוח מיוחדות. מטה המשקיפים היה בתחילה בקהיר, אך כעבור זמן קצר הועבר לחיפה. המתווך קבע את מקום מושבו הקבוע ברודוס והיה מיוצג על־ידי חברי סגל המזכירות בירושלים, תל־אביב, חיפה, עמאן וקהיר.[35]

ועדת ההפוגה נדחקה למקום שולי, אם כי חבריה המשיכו להיות פעילים והעבירו מדי פעם דו"חות ותלונות למועצת־הביטחון. כאמור לעיל, גם ייצגו חברי הוועדה, במסגרת תפקידם כקונסולים, את מדינותיהם בירושלים. הם דיווחו ישירות למשרדי־החוץ שלהם, והגבול בין שני התחומים לא היה תמיד ברור לחלוטין.

יהושע פרוינדליך

34. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־670.

35. ראה *Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,* pp. 32 — 33.

רשימת ארכיונים וקיצורים במראי־מקום

גנזך המדינה

93. חטיבת משרד־החוץ, נציגויות בחוץ־לארץ
    - 93.01 מברקי צופן
    - 93.02 פאריס
    - 93.03 ניו יורק
    - 93.04 לונדון
    - 93.08 ואשינגטון

130. חטיבת משרד־החוץ, המשרד הראשי
    - 130.02 לשכות שר־החוץ והמנכ"ל
    - 130.09 מברקי צופן
    - 130.10 מחלקת מערב־אירופה
    - 130.11 מחלקת מזרח־אירופה
    - 130.15 מחלקת המזרח התיכון
    - 130.20 מחלקת ארצות־הברית

42. ועדת ירושלים והמושל הצבאי, 1948 — 1949

72.9 ארכיון מרדכי עליאש

הארכיון הציוני המרכזי (קיצור: אצ"מ)

S25 המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית

Z4 המשרד המרכזי של ההסתדרות הציונית והסוכנות היהודית, לונדון

ארכיון דוד בן־גוריון

גנזך וייצמן (קיצור: ג"ו)

תיקי אליהו אילת

רשימה ביבליוגרפית וקיצורים במראי־מקום

(ברשימה זו מובאים שמות הספרים והפרסומים הנזכרים בהערות)

א. כללי

ארלוזורוב, חיים   יומן ירושלים, מהדורה שנייה, תל אביב תש"ט

ברנר, אורי   אלטלנה; מחקר צבאי מדיני, תל אביב תשל"ח

נמיר, מרדכי   שליחות במוסקבה, תל אביב תשל"א

נקדימון, שלמה   אלטלנה, ירושלים תשל"ח

מדינת ישראל, מועצת־העם, מועצת־המדינה הזמנית, פרוטוקול דיונים, כרך א'

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(קיצור: *SCOR, Third Year*)

United Nations, *Trusteeship Council Official Records, Third Year*

(קיצור: *TCOR, Third Year*)

רשימת התעודות והנספחים ותוכנם

.20 18.5.1948 **מ. עליאש אל ט. לי**
התקפות על הרובע היהודי

.21 18.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
נחיתת־ביניים של מטוסי מסרשמיט ביוון

.22 18.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

.23 18.5.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מו"מ דיפלומטי בלונדון

.24 18.5.1948 **ו. מולוטוב אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הכרת ברה"מ בישראל

.25 18.5.1948 **ז. מודזילבסקי אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הכרת פולין בישראל

.26 18.5.1948 **ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מבקש מידע על הפעילות המדינית, יחסים עם בריטניה ודרום־אפריקה

.27 18.5.1948 **א. אבן אל ב. לוקר** (מברק)
תמיכה צרפתית ובלגית בהצעה האמריקאית במועצת־הביטחון

.28 18.5.1948 **מ. פישר אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
עמדת צרפת במועצת־הביטחון

.29 18.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שאלון מועצת־הביטחון לממשלת ישראל

.30 18.5.1948 **ב. לוקר אל א. בווין**
פלישת הלגיון הערבי לא"י

.31 19.5.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.32 19.5.1948 **י. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הצעת תשובה לשאלון מועצת־הביטחון

.33 19.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.34 19.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא וא. אבן** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.35 19.5.1948 **מ. פישר אל נ. גולדמן וא. אבן** (מברק)
הוראות לנציג צרפת במועצת־הביטחון; הכרת צרפת בישראל

.36 19.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ג'. מארשאל** (מברק)
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה"ב

.37 19.5.1948 **שיחת א. גאס — ב. בל**
הלוואה מהבנק ליצוא וליבוא

.38 19.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
מו"מ דיפלומטי בלונדון

.39 19.5.1948 **מ. קומיי אל ב. גרינג** (מברק)
הכרת דרום־אפריקה בישראל

.40 19.5.1948 **ל. כהן אל ד. בן־גוריון** (מברק)
פגישת נציגי או"ם עם המלך עבדאללה; הצעת ישראל להפסקת־אש ברובע היהודי

.41 19.5.1948 **ל. כהן אל ז'. ניואנהויס**
הצעה להפסקת־אש ברובע היהודי

42. 20.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיון במועצת־הביטחון; צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

43. 20.5.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
לחץ ארה"ב על בריטניה וסין לתמיכה בהצעתה במועצת־הביטחון

44. 20.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
מעצר נוסעים יהודיים בבירות

45. 20.5.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
ביקור שרתוק בארצות־הברית

46. 20.5.1948 **פ. ריגר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הקמת איזורי ביטחון; פעילות הצלב האדום בישראל

47. 20.5.1948 **שיחת ס. סילברמן, מ. רוזטי — א. בווין**
יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

48. 21.5.1948 **דין־וחשבון מאת ח.ו. הרצוג**
המצב בירושלים לאחר הפינוי הבריטי

49. 21.5.1948 **ט. לי א. אבן**
מינוי הרוזן ברנאדוט כמתווך בא"י

50. 21.5.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מעמדה של משלחת ישראל באו"ם; קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

51. 21.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

52. 21.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
מעצר נוסעים יהודיים בבירות

53. 21.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
עזרה צבאית וכספית מארה"ב

54. 21.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מגעים בריטיים־אמריקאיים בעניין א"י

55. 21.5.1948 **ב. לוקר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
כיבוד גבולות 29 בנובמבר

56. 21.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק**
סקירה על המצב במועצת־הביטחון

57. 22.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
בקשה לאספקת נשק מארה"ב וברה"מ

58. 22.5.1948 **ז'. ניואנהויס אל המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית**
הצעת הפסקת־אש בעיר העתיקה

59. 22.5.1948 **ו. איתן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הצעה לפירסום הכרזה על ירושלים

60. 22.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיון במועצת־הביטחון

61. 22.5.1948 **א. אבן אל ט. לי**
תשובת ישראל על שאלון מועצת־הביטחון

62. 23.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
תנאי ישראל להפסקת־אש

63. 23.5.1948 **א. אבן, א. אפשטיין, א. לוריא וי. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש

64. 23.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ח. וייצמן** (מברק)
יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

.65 23.5.1948 **המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית אל פ. אסקאראטה**
מוסדות האוניברסיטה והדסה של הר הצופים

.66 24.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
החלטת ממשלת ישראל על הפסקת־אש

.67 24.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש

.68 24.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם גורמיקו; הכרה ממדינות אמריקה הלטינית; יחסים עם בלגיה ובריטניה

.69 24.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
כיבוד גבולות 29 בנובמבר

.70 24.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
איום מצרי על ספנות לישראל

.71 24.5.1948 מ. **פישר אל א. אבן** (מברק)
דרישת צרפת להפסקת־אש מידית בירושלים

.72 24.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
אמברגו אמריקאי על ישראל

.73 24.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
פגיעות מצריות בספנות לישראל

.74 24.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
הפסקת שירותי ספנות לישראל

.75 24.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
הוראות למו"מ בבריטניה

.76 24.5.1948 **י. סמאטס אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הכרת דרום־אפריקה בישראל

.77 25.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש

.78 25.5.1948 **חברי האגף האמריקאי של הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית וחברי משלחת ישראל באו"ם אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסכמת ישראל להפסקת־אש

.79 25.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

.80 25.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הפסקת־אש בירושלים

.81 25.5.1948 **י. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
פגיעות מצריות בספנות לישראל

.82 25.5.1948 **ח. וייצמן אל הנשיא טרומן**
עזרה כספית וצבאית מארה"ב

.83 25.5.1948 **א. גאס אל א. קפלן** (מברק)
הלוואה מהבנק ליבוא וליצוא

.84 25.5.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מגעים מדיניים בבריטניה

.85 26.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסכמת ישראל להפסקת־אש

.86 26.5.1948 מ. **שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסכמת ישראל להפסקת־אש

87. 26.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
חריגה מסמכות על־ידי משלחת ישראל לאו״ם

88. 26.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
עמדת ישראל לגבי גבולות 29 בנובמבר

89. 26.5.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חרם יהודי על סחורות בריטיות בארה״ב

90. 26.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחות עם נציגי ארה״ב באו״ם — הפסקת־אש

91. 26.5.1948 **ח. וייצמן אל הנשיא טרומן**
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה״ב; המלצה על א. אפשטיין

92. 26.5.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם ברנאדוט

93. 27.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חילוקי־דיעות בקבינט הבריטי על המדיניות בא״י

94. 27.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחת וייצמן — טרומן

95. 27.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
הבטחת וייצמן לפינוי עכו ויפו

96. 27.5.1948 **ר. לווט אל א. אפשטיין**
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה״ב — דרג הנציגות

97. 27.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון**
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה״ב — דרג הנציגות

98. 27.5.1948 **מ. פישר אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הכרת צרפת

99. 27.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל פ. ריגר** (מברק)
כיבוד אמנת ז׳נבה

100. 28.5.1948 **א. אבן ומ. עליאש אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הפסקת־אש בירושלים

101. 28.5.1948 **מ. פישר אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הכרת צרפת; לחץ להפסקת־אש

102. 28.5.1948 **א. שטרן אל מ. שרתוק**
הכרת איטליה

103. 29.5.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הפסקת־אש בירושלים

104. 29.5.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסכמת ישראל להפסקת־אש

105. 29.5.1948 **משלחת ישראל באו״ם אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חשש מיזמה בריטית־אמריקאית לתיקוני גבולות לרעת ישראל

106. 29.5.1948 **ר. לווט אל א. אפשטיין**
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה״ב — דרג הנציגות

107. 29.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארה״ב — דרג הנציגות

108. 29.5.1948 **א. אפשטיין וא. גאס אל ל. הנדרסון**
הפרעות מצריות לספנות ישראל; מעצר נוסעים יהודיים בבירות

109. 29.5.1948 **ג. רופר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
גישושי שלום ערביים בניו יורק

133. 3.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
נשיאות סוריה במועצת־הביטחון

134. 3.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

135. 3.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק ב. לוקר ונ. גולדמן** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

136. 3.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

137. 3.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
סמכויות המתווך בשמירת הפסקת־האש; דו"חות ראשונים של המתווך

138. 3.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
עמדות מדאיגות במחלקת־המדינה

139. 3.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הכרת איטליה; עמדת הוואתיקן

140. 4.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
שיחה עם המתווך — הסדרי עלייה

141. 4.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה; מועד תחילת הפסקת־האש

142. 4.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

143. 4.6.1948 **א. אבן אל ב. לוקר** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

144. 4.6.1948 **ב. לוקר אל א. בווין**
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

145. 4.6.1948 **מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה; הכרת צרפת

146. 4.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם ג'. רוס, ממשלחת ארה"ב לאו"ם

147. 4.6.1948 **א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חרם יהודי על סחורות בריטיות בארה"ב

148. 4.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון**
פגיעות בקשרי ספנות עם ישראל

149. 4.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ד.פ. מאלאן** (מברק)
חילופי נציגים דיפלומטיים עם דרום־אפריקה

150. 5.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

151. 6.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

152. 7.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט**
הסדרי עלייה

153. 7.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרים בתקופת הפסקת־האש: עלייה, ירושלים

154. 7.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הרקע הצבאי לקבלת הפסקת־האש על־ידי ישראל

155. 7.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
עמדותיו של הנשיא טרומן לגבי ישראל

179 11.6.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

.180 13.6.1948 **מ. פישר אל א. אבן**
יחסי ישראל — צרפת

.181 13.6.1948 **תזכיר מאת א. לבבי**
התפקידים הדחופים של מדור אירופה המזרחית

.182 14.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.183 14.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

.184 15.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
שיחה עם ה. בילי מהמשלחת הבריטית באו"ם

.185 15.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

.186 15.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

.187 15.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.188 15.6.1948 **ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"

.189 15.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
סיבות צבאיות להפסקת־האש; גבולות מדינת ישראל; ירושלים;
בריחת התושבים הערבים

.190 16.6.1948 **י. רובינסון, א. אבן וא. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

.191 16.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם רוס ממשלחת ארה"ב באו"ם

.192 16.6.1948 **א. אבן אל ס. רוזנמן**
מדיניות ארה"ב

.193 16.6.1948 **א. גאס אל א. קפלן** (מברק)
הלוואה מהבנק ליצוא וליבוא

.194 16.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
רכישת דלק ברומניה

.195 16.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון** (מברק)
חידוש עבודת בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

.196 16.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
חידוש עבודת בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

.197 16.6.1948 **ד.ב. יוסף אל ז'. ניואנהויס**
שיירות אספקה לירושלים

.198 16.6.1948 **י. ידין אל ד. בן־גוריון**
שיירות לנגב

.199 17.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
אמברגו דלק על ישראל

.200 17.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חידוש הדיון במעמד ירושלים

223. 24.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

224. 24.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
יחסי ישראל — ארה"ב

225. 24.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מינוי מקדונלד כנציג מיוחד של ארה"ב בישראל

226. 24/25.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
יחסי ישראל — ארה"ב

227. 24.6.1948 **פ. קרמונה אל מ. שרתוק**
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"

228. 24.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ל. כהן ור. שילוח**
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"; עצורי קניה; איסור עלייה מקפריסין

229. 24.6.1948 **ד.ב. יוסף אל ז'. ניואנהויס**
אספקה לירושלים בתקופת הפסקת־האש

230. 25.6.1948 **ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק**
שיחות מדינות ברודוס

231. 25.6.1948 **ר. שילוח אל מ. שרתוק**
שיחות מדיניות ברודוס

232. 25.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל י. לינטון** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

233. 25.6.1948 **א. גאס אל א. קפלן** (מברק)
חידוש עבודת בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

234. 26.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל פ. קרמונה**
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"; הפרות הפסקת־האש על־ידי ישראל

235. 26.6.1948 **ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק**
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"; אופיו של מוסד הנשיאות בישראל; כיבוד גבולות 29 בנובמבר; יחסי ישראל — צרפת

236. 27.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

237. 27.6.1948 **י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין; חידוש הפעלת בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

238. 27.6.1948 **מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"; בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה; תפיסת מוסדות צרפתיים על־ידי צה"ל; הכרת צרפת

239. 27.6.1948 **הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק**
הצעות מדינות לפתרון בעיית א"י

240. 28/29.6.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מידע מארה"ב על עמדת בריטניה וארה"ב

241. 28.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

242. 28.6.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

243. 29.6.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

244. 29.6.1948 **י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
עצורי קניה; איסור עלייה מקפריסין

268. 5.7.1948 **מזכר מאת ג'. רידמן**
פירוז ירושלים

269. 5.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הארכת הפסקת־האש

270. 5.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
צמצום ההגבלות על עולים בתקופת הפסקת־האש

271. 5.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

272. 5.7.1948 **שיחות י. לינטון — ג'.מ. מארטין ול. ג'ונס**
יחסי ישראל — בריטניה; שינויים טריטוריאליים

273. 5.7.1948 **שיחת י. לינטון — ה. בילי**
הצעות המתווך; יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

274. 5.7.1948 **שיחת י. לינטון — הבארון ואן בוצלאר ואן אוסטרהאוט**
הכרת הולנד; בינאום ירושלים

275. 6.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הארכת הפסקת־האש

276. 6.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
בינאום חיפה; הצעת המתווך למסור את ירושלים לערבים

277. 6.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

278. 6.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
בקשת ארה"ב להבהרות בדבר מעמד רשויות ישראל בירושלים

279. 6.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
התנגדות הערבים להארכת הפסקת־האש

280. 6.7.1948 **י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

281. 6.7.1948 **שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט וצוות עוזריו**
הצעות הרוזן ברנאדוט; פירוז ירושלים וחיפה; הארכת הפסקת־האש; הסדרי עלייה

282. 6.7.1948 **הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק**
הצעות לפתרון בעיית א"י בירושלים

283. 7.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
מעמד רשויות ישראל בירושלים

284. 7.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
צורת זימונה של ישראל למועצת־הביטחון

285. 7.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הארכת הפסקת־האש; פירוז ירושלים וחיפה

286. 7.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
חידוש העבודה בבתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

287. 7.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הארכת הפסקת־האש; אספקת מים לירושלים

288. 7.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הארכת הפסקת־האש

289. 7.7.1948 **שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט**
הארכת הפסקת־האש; אספקת מים לירושלים; פירוז ירושלים וחיפה

312. 11.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסעיף הישראלי במצע המפלגה הדמוקרטית בארה"ב

313. 11.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין; ביקור שרתוק בארה"ב

314. 12.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

315. 12.7.1948 **א. אבן אל ג'. רוס**
הארכת הפסקת־האש; המשך שליחות התיווך של ברנאדוט

316. 12.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

317. 12.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

318. 12.7.1948 **א. אבן אל א. נג'ר** (מברק)
עמדת צרפת בדיונים על הפסקת־האש

319. 13.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

320. 13.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

321. 13.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

322. 13.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסעיף הישראלי במצע המפלגה הדמוקרטית בארה"ב

323. 13.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
צורך דחוף במטוסים בשביל ישראל

324. 13.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

325. 14.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

326. 14.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
החלטות ממשלת ישראל לגבי הפסקת־האש

327. 14.7.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים

328. 14.7.1948 **מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק**
הכרת צרפת; בינאום ירושלים; ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"; דיוני מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־האש

329. 15.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
פליטים ערביים; הסדרי עלייה

330. 15.7.1948 **י. פרוסקאואר אל א. לוריא**
דיונים על הפסקת־האש; שליחות ברנאדוט; הגבלת העלייה

331. 15.7.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק**
הכרת בריטניה עמדתה בעניין הפסקת־אש; מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים

332. 15.7.1948 **ד. בן־גוריון אל מפקד חטיבת עציוני**
הגנת מקומות קדושים בעיר העתיקה

333. 16.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי** (מברק)
קבלת הפסקת־האש על־ידי ישראל

.334 16.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
החלטת הפסקת־האש — שאלות של שרתוק

.335 16.7.1948 **א. אבן אל ח. וייצמן**
תיאום מדיני בריטי־אמריקאי

.336 16.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הערכה של אבן על החלטת הפסקת־האש

.337 16.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
החלטת הפסקת־האש — תשובות לשרתוק

.338 16.7.1948 **שיחת א. אבן, מ. קומיי — הרוזן ברנאדוט, ר. באנץ'**
הצעות לפתרון בעיית א"י

.339 16.7.1948 **א. לבבי אל מ. שרתוק**
יחסי ישראל — הונגריה

.340 18.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
הסדרי הפסקת־האש

.341 18.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
מועד תחילת הפסקת־האש

.342 18.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. פישר** (מברק)
מסירת בעיית א"י לבית־הדין הבינלאומי

.343 18.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
חד־צדדיות של ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים

.344 18.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ז'. שארירון**
פינוי מוסדות צרפתיים על־ידי צה"ל

.345 19.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
תנאי הערבים להפסקת־האש

.346 19.7.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל א. אבן**
לחץ בריטניה על הערבים לקבלת הפסקת־האש; יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

.347 20.7.1948 **שיחת ל. כהן — ג'. רידמן**
הצעות התיווך של ברנאדוט

.348 19.7.1948 **שיחות מ. קומיי — חברי משלחת ארצות־הברית לאו"ם**
ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים; מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים;
בעיית הפליטים הערביים

.349 20.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מסירת בעיית א"י לבית־הדין הבינלאומי

.350 20.7.1948 **תזכיר מאת הרוזן ברנאדוט**
תנאי הפסקת־האש

.351 20.7.1948 **נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
יחסי ישראל — בריטניה

.352 20.7/22.8.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ח. וייצמן**
סקירה כללית על המצב בישראל

.353 20.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל י. לינטון** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

.354 20.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חילופי גברי במחלקת־המדינה; יחסי ישראל — טורקיה

.355 21.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל מ. פישר**
הכרת צרפת

.356 22.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

.357 22.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל מ. קומיי** (מברק)
מדיניות ישראל לגבי הפליטים הערביים

.358 22.7.1948 **ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק**
הצעה לפירוז ירושלים

.359 22.7.1948 **ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק**
גיבוש עמדה מדינית לקראת שיחות עם המתווך

.360 22.7.1948 **הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
פריסת משקיפי או"ם לפיקוח על הפסקת־האש

.361 22.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
גיבוש עמדה מדינית לקראת עצרת האו"ם בסתיו

.362 22.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ברה"מ

.363 22.7.1948 **מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הכרת בריטניה וצרפת

.364 23.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם י. מאליק ממשלחת ברה"מ באו"ם

.365 23.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
חשיבות מינויו של נציג בבלגיה

.366 23(?).7.1948 **שיחת א. לוריא — ג'יימס מקדונלד**
שיחות ומגעים של הציר מקדונלד לפני הגיעו לישראל

.367 23.7.1948 **א. אבן אל נ. גולדמן**
סקירה על המצב באו"ם

.368 23.7.1948 **א. אבן אל י. לינטון** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

.369 23.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן** (מברק)
חידוש העבודה בבתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

.370 23.7.1948 **א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין** (מברק)
רכישת נפט וזיקוקו

.371 23.7.1948 **מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מסירת בעיית א"י לבית־הדין הבינלאומי; הכרת צרפת

.372 23.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. פישר** (מברק)
שיחה עם פארודי, נציג צרפת באו"ם

.373 23.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל ג'. איגנאטייב**
הכרת קנדה

.374 23.7.1948 **שיחת מ. נמיר — אנה פאוקר**
עלייה מרומניה

.375 24.7.1948 **מ. קומיי אל פ. ג'סאפ**
מדיניות ישראל לגבי הפליטים הערביים

.376 25.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

.377 25.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
הוראות לשיחה עם מזכיר־המדינה והנשיא טרומן

.378 25.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט**
הצעות לפתרון בעיית א"י

379. 25.7.1948 **מ. פישר אל ו. איתן**
הכרת צרפת; ספינת הנשק "אלטלנה"

380. 26.7.1948 **שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט וצוות עוזריו**
פירוז ירושלים; בעיית הפליטים הערביים; הסדרי עלייה

381. 27.7.1948 **ל. כהן: הערות לתזכיר של ו. איתן**
קווים למדיניות ערבית של ישראל

382. 27.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין** (מברק)
מו"מ ישיר עם הערבים; גיבוש עמדה לקראת עצרת האו"ם בסתיו

383. 27.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם מזכיר־המדינה מארשאל

384. 27.7.1948 **א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין** (מברק)
רכישת נפט וזיקוקו

385. 27.7.1948 **א. גאס אל ר. איקנס**
רכישת נפט וזיקוקו

386. 28.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הסדרי עלייה

387. 28.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים

388. 28.7.1948 **ו. איתן אל מ. שרתוק**
הצורך ביזמה מדינית של ישראל

389. 28.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ג'. רידמן**
פירוז ירושלים

390. 28.7.1948 **ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק**
בעיית הפליטים הערבים

391. 29.7.1948 **א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון**
מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים

392. 29.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. פישר** (מברק)
תפיסת מוסדות צרפתיים על־ידי צה"ל; חידוש עבודת בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

393. 29.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל ד. בן־גוריון**
הסדרי עלייה

394. 29.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
הלוואה מהבנק ליצוא־וליבוא

395. 30.7.1948 **א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון**
מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים

396. 30.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
איסור עלייה מקפריסין

397. 30.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
פירוז ירושלים

398. 30.7.1948 **א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
קבלת ישראל לאו"ם

399. 30.7.1948 **א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק)
שיחה עם הנשיא טרומן ומזכיר־המדינה מארשאל

400. 30.7.1948 **מ. שרתוק אל מ. פישר** (מברק)
עמדת ישראל לגבי ירושלים

401. 30.7.1948 **א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין** (מברק)
חידוש העבודה בבתי־הזיקוק בחיפה

.402	30.7.1948	**מ. פישר אל ו. איתן** הכרת צרפת
.403	30.7.1948	**מ. קומיי אל א. מקנוטון** קבלת ישראל לאו"ם
.404	31.7.1948	**פ. ברנשטיין אל א. גאס** (מברק) רכישת נפט וזיקוקו
.405	1.8.1948	**א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) יזמה בריטית לדיון בשאלת הפליטים הערביים והעקורים היהודיים במועצת־הביטחון
.406	1.8.1948	**מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנדאדוט** מדיניות ישראל לגבי הפליטים הערביים
.407	1.8.1948	**א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) קבלת ישראל לאו"ם
.408	1.8.1948	**מ. שרתוק אל ה. גרץ** (מברק) יחסי ישראל — הוואתיקן
.409	2.8.1948	**א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) דיון במועצת־הביטחון על הפליטים הערביים והעקורים היהודיים; מעצר עובדי חברת החשמל הבריטיים בירושלים
.410	3.8.1948	**א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) איסור עלייה מקפריסין; אספקת מים לירושלים
.411	3.8.1948	**א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) הסכם בין הדמוקרטים והרפובליקנים בארה"ב בשאלת המדיניות כלפי ישראל
.412	3.8.1948	**א. אפשטיין אל ר. לווט** הלוואה מהבנק ליצוא וליבוא
.413	3.8.1948	**מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק** הכרת צרפת
.414	3.8.1948	**מ. שרתוק אל ו. אוריול** הכרת צרפת
.415	3.8.1948	**שיחת מ. פישר — פ. קארוני** יחסי ישראל — איטליה; יחסי ישראל — הוואתיקן
.416	3.8.1948	**א. ששון אל י. שמעוני** (מברק) שיחה עם ציר עבר־הירדן בלונדון
.417	4.8.1948	**א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון** איסור עלייה מקפריסין
.418	4.8.1948	**שיחות י. לינטון — ג'יימס מקדונלד** הנחיות הנשיא טרומן לג'יימס מקדונלד; ראיון מקדונלד עם בווין
.419	4.8.1948	**א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין** (מברק) אספקת דלק לישראל
.420	5.8.1948	**א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) פירוז ירושלים; תכניות התיווך של ברנאדוט; קבלת ישראל לאו"ם
.421	5.8.1948	**א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק** (מברק) קבלת ישראל לאו"ם
.422	5.8.1948	**א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון** אספקת מים לירושלים

נספחים

תעודות

DOCUMENTS

1

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק. התקבל: 15.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/126/7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/5

Washington, 14 May 1948

1. United States Government has just recognized State in following language:

> This Government has been informed that a Jewish State has been proclaimed in Palestine and recognition has been requested by the Provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.

2. Informal conversations with White House representatives have made clear that recognition de facto rather than de jure because announced government provisional in nature.

3. The surrounding circumstances are as follows: Clark Clifford, White House spokesman,[1] phoned Washington friends, advising that the State Department, at noon, May 14, will agree immediate recognition in event request therefor received. After careful consultation here with Ben Cohen[2] and Ginsburg,[3] following letter drafted and sent to the President and Secretary of State:[4]

> I have the honour to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within the frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that the Provisional Government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the State against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law.
>
> The Act of Independence will become effective one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May, 1948, Washington time.
>
> With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has [been] strengthened over the past thirty years between the

1

1. קלארק מ. קליפורד, יועץ מיוחד לנשיא.
2. בנימין ו. כהן, לשעבר יועץ למחלקת־המדינה (1945—1947). בשנים 1919—1921 שימש כיועץ לצד הציוני במשא־ומתן על ניסוח המנדט הארצישראלי.
3. צ'ארלס דוד גינסבורג, משפטן, יועץ למחלקת־המדינה, 1947.
4. המכתב אל מזכיר־המדינה בתיק 93.08/364/10; המכתב אל הנשיא טרומן בתיק 93.03/126/7.

Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the Provisional Government of the new State to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.

Very respectfully yours,

Eliahu Epstein,
Agent, Provisional Government
of Israel.

4. Wider consultation and prior notifications were precluded by pledge of secrecy demanded by Clifford.

5. Earlier during the day, Loy Henderson[5] phoned to ascertain boundaries of new State. Advised that boundaries in accordance with U.N. Resolution.

6. Circumstances required that I take title for this act and assume responsibility for sending letter.

2

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1551

Washington, 15 May 1948 (09.58)

Pursuant to further request,[1] have given unqualified assurances that Israel will respect the boundaries established for the Jewish State in the General Assembly Resolution of November 29. This is without prejudice to the requirements of military action.

Epstein

5. לוי ו. הנדרסון, מנהל המחלקה לענייני המזרח הקרוב ואפריקה במחלקת־המדינה.

2

1. ראה מס' 1.

3

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1551

Washington, 15 May 1948 (11.39)

Lovett[1] and Henderson presented to-day their best personal wishes to our new state.

Further assurances regarding our frontiers been given by me to-day.[2] Conduct[ing] negotiations for lifting embargo and U.S.A. action in Security Council.[3]

Epstein

4

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH20. התקבל: 16.5
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 15 May 1948 (23.30)

See my cable Lourie, Eban, regarding Egyptian aggression by land and air.[1] In face this new phase onslaught, please approach State Department view obtaining permission acquire fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery in U.S.A. and export them Palestine. Cable steps and results.[2]

Shertok

3

1. רוברט לווט, סגן מזכיר־המדינה של ארצות־הברית.
2. ראה מס' 2.
3. ראה מס' 16.

4

1. המברק מיום 15.5.1948 (93.03/128/5), לא הודפס כאן, אך תוכנו מובא במס' 15.
2. ראה מס' 16.

5

א. אפשטיין אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (לייק סאכסס)

E. Epstein to the President of the Security Council (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/94/5

Washington, 15 May 1948

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within the frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that the Provisional Government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the State against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law.

The Act of Independence became effective one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

I have been authorized by the Provisional Government of the State of Israel to inform you that Dr. Mordecai Eliash has been appointed to represent the State of Israel at meetings of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, with authority to name substitutes and assistants.[1]

Respectfully yours,

Eliahu Epstein
Delegate, Provisional
Government of Israel

6

מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)

M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

מברק MH3
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

Tel Aviv, 15 May 1948

Have honour inform you that National Council for Jewish State consisting of members of elected representative Jewish bodies Palestine, which had applied to United Nations Palestine Commission for recognition as Provisional Council Government under Part I B4 of resolution of General

5

1. נכתב לפני שהגיעה ההודעה על מינויו של א. אבן לנציג באו"ם. (ראה שרתוק אל אפשטיין, 15.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1). עליאש הופיע בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון ב־15.5.1948 בשם הסוכנות היהודית. ראה מס' 9, 10.

Assembly of November 29th 1947,[1] met yesterday, May 14th, and issued proclamation declaring inter alia following: "On November 29, 1947, General Assembly of United Nations adopted resolution for establishment of independent Jewish State in Palestine, and called upon inhabitants of country to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put the plan into effect. This recognition by United Nations of right of Jewish people to establish their independent state may not be revoked. It is moreover self-evident right of Jewish people to be a nation as all other nations in its own sovereign state. Accordingly we, members of National Council representing Jewish people in Palestine and Zionist Movement, met together in solemn assembly today, day of termination of British Mandate for Palestine, by virtue of natural and historic right of Jewish people and of Resolution of General Assembly, hereby proclaim establishment of Jewish State in Palestine to be called Israel. We hereby declare that as from termination of Mandate this night of 14th to 15th May 1948, and until setting up of duly elected bodies of State in accordance with constitution to be drawn up by Constituent Assembly, not later than 1st October 1948, present National Council shall act as Provisional State Council and its executive organ shall constitute Provisional Government of State of Israel. State of Israel will be open to immigration of Jews from all countries of dispersion; will promote development of country for benefit of all inhabitants; will be based on precepts of liberty, justice and peace; will uphold full social and political equality of all citizens without distinction race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education, culture and language; will safeguard sanctity and inviolability of shrines and Holy Places of all religions and will dedicate itself to principles of United Nations Charter. State of Israel will be ready to cooperate with organs and representatives of United Nations in implementation of Resolution of Assembly of November 29, 1947, and will take steps to bring about Economic Union over whole of Palestine. We appeal to United Nations to assist Jewish people in building of its State and to admit Israel into family of nations." Accordingly, I beg declare on behalf of Provisional Government of State of Israel its readiness to sign declaration and undertaking provided for respectively in Part I C and Part I D[2] of resolution of Assembly, and beg hereby to apply for admission of State of Israel to membership of United Nations.

Behalf Provisional Government of Israel

Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary

1. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, עמ' 799-800. גוף זה כונן כמועצת העם באפריל 1948 וזו הפכה עם הקמת המדינה למועצת המדינה הזמנית.
2. ראה שם, עמ' 802־806.

7

מ. שרתוק אל ו. מולוטוב (מוסקבה)
M. Shertok to V. Molotov (Moscow)

MH3c מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.02/2424/19

Tel Aviv, 15 May 1948

Have honour inform you and ask you bring to notice of your Government that National Council for Jewish State, consisting of members of elected representative Jewish bodies of Palestine, met yesterday, May 14th, upon termination of British Mandate and on basis of resolution of General Assembly of United Nations of November 29, 1947, proclaimed establishment of independent Jewish state in Palestine to be called State of Israel. Council declared that State of Israel will be open to immigration of Jews from all countries of dispersion; will promote development of country for benefit of all inhabitants; will be based on precepts of liberty, justice and peace; will uphold full social and political equality of all citizens without distinction race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education, culture and language; will safeguard sanctity and inviolability of shrines and Holy Places of all religions and will dedicate itself to principles of United Nations Charter. Council also declared that State of Israel will be ready to cooperate with organs and representatives of United Nations in implementation of resolution of Assembly of November 29th 1947, and will take steps to bring about Economic Union over whole of Palestine. Council called upon Arab inhabitants State of Israel to return to ways of peace and play their part in its development with full and equal citizenship and due representation in its governing bodies, provisional and permanent. Council also offered peace to all neighbouring states and their peoples, and invited them to cooperate with State of Israel for common good of all. On behalf of Provisional Government of Israel I hereby beg to request official recognition of State of Israel and its Provisional Government by Government of Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. I beg to express hope that such recognition may soon be forthcoming and am confident that it will strengthen friendly relations between Soviet Union and its peoples on one hand and State of Israel and Jewish people of Palestine on other hand, as well as serve cause of peace and justice in international relations generally. I take this opportunity of expressing feelings of profound gratitude and appreciation of Jewish people of Palestine, which are shared by Jews throughout world, for firm stand taken by U.S.S.R. delegation to United Nations in favour of establishment of independent sovereign Jewish State in Palestine; for its consistent championship of this idea despite all difficulties, for its expressions of genuine sympathy with sufferings of Jewish people in Europe at hands of their Nazi

tormentors and for upholding principle that Jews of Palestine are a nation entitled to sovereignty and independence.[1]

On behalf Provisional Government of Israel
Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary

8

מ. פישר[1] אל ז'. בידו[2] (פאריס)
M. Fischer to G. Bidault (Paris)

העתק: 93.02/183/2

Paris, le 15 mai 1948

Monsieur le Ministre,

L'établissement de l'Etat Juif en Palestine nommé Israël, a été proclamé le 14 mai à 16 heures par le Conseil National, représentant le peuple juif de Palestine et le mouvement sioniste mondial.

D'ordre du Gouvernement Provisoire de l'Etat d'Israël, j'ai été chargé de porter ce fait à votre connaissance et de prier votre Gouvernement de vouloir bien examiner dans les meilleurs délais la possibilité d'accorder sa reconnaissance au nouvel Etat.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.[3]

M. Fischer

9

מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

מברק

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 15 May 1948

Pursuance my official cable,[1] beg inform you have appointed Aubrey Eban as acting representative our Provisional Government *vis-à-vis* United

7

1. ראה גם מס' 12 והערה 1 שם. בקשה להכרה סובייטית הופנתה גם אל א. גרומיקו, סגן שר־החוץ והנציג הקבוע של ברית־המועצות באו"ם. (ראה אפשטיין אל גרומיקו, 15.5.1948, (93.03/72/16). תשובת מולוטוב — ראה מס' 24.

8

1. מוריס פישר, המזכיר המדיני של משרד הסוכנות היהודית בפאריס, מונה זה עתה לנציג ישראל בפאריס.
2. ז'ורז' בידו, שר-החוץ של צרפת.
3. בקשה להכרה הוברקה גם ישירות משרתוק אל בידו ב־15.5.1948 (93.03/72/16).

9

1. מס' 6.

Nations, but pending regularization position he and others may appear as representing Jewish Agency as heretofore.[2] Take opportunity expressing you sincere gratitude for invariable helpfulness, accessibility and sound advice.

Moshe Shertok

10

א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 15 May 1948

Security Council this afternoon Eliash appeared behalf Agency.[1] Cadogan,[2] replying your cable,[3] declared Etzion Jews fired first. Chairman unpursued, saying past history, deal instead with Egyptian communication their entry Palestine purpose ending Zionist terrorism.[4] Discussion failed entirely deal with admitted invasion but:

1 Criticism absence information from Truce Commission.[5]
2 Reference need give consideration new juridical situation Palestine.[6]
3 Allegation by Tsiang[7] inconsistency American recognition with membership Truce Commission.[8]

2. ראה מס' 5 והערה 1 שם; שרתוק אל סילבר, 15.5.1948, (130.09/2328/1).

10

1. בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון, עליאש הפנה את תשומת־הלב למברקה של הסוכנות היהודית בדבר פלישת צבאות ערב לארץ־ישראל (ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 459), דרש שמועצת־הביטחון תקבע שפלישה זו מהווה הפרה של השלום הבינלאומי ומעשה תוקפנות, וביקש שמועצת־הביטחון תקרא לערבים לחדול מיד מתוקפנותם. נציג הוועד הערבי העליון, עיסה נחלה, טען שעם סיום המנדט הפכה ארץ־ישראל למדינה עצמאית, שהיהודים מהווים בה מיעוט מרדני, ושצבאות ערב נקראו על־ידי הוועד הערבי העליון להשליט סדר בארץ. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 292nd Meeting ,15.5.1948).
2. אלכסנדר קאדוגן, ראש המשלחת הבריטית לאו"ם.
3. מברק שרתוק אל הסוכנות היהודית בניו יורק מיום 13.5.1948, המיועד למועצת־הביטחון ולנציג הבריטי באו"ם; שרתוק תבע פעולה מידית להפסקת התקפת הלגיון הערבי, במיוחד בגוש עציון. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 292nd Meeting ,15.5.1948, p.2; תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 507, 508.
4. מברק ממשלת מצרים אל מועצת־הביטחון מיום 15.5.1948, המסביר את סיבת פלישתם לארץ־ישראל. (ראה מסמך או"ם S/743).
5. הביקורת הושמעה על־ידי נציגי פרו וקנדה. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 292nd Meeting, 15.5.1948, pp.11-12).
6. ראה דבריו של נציג ארגנטינה (שם, עמ' 20-22); הוא הציע לעכב כל פעולה או החלטה של מועצת־הביטחון עד שיובהר מעמדה המשפטי החדש של ארץ־ישראל.
7. טינגפו טסיאנג, הנציג הקבוע של סין באו"ם.
8. ראה שם, עמ' 15.

4 Fawzi,[9] Nakhleh, attack Agency participation Council.

Austin,[10] Gromyko, silent throughout. Adjourned till Monday afternoon. Atmosphere thoroughly discouraging.

Transmitting delegations text proclamation,[11] but essential, if not yet done, you notify governments direct, requesting recognition. This particularly urgent major centers view Friday's application *Ir Bira*,[12] cable confirmation.

Eliash did reasonably well, but you sorely missed. Capacity in which we should seek appear at U.N. requires immediate consideration. In any event, cable credentials behalf *Medina*.[13]

Arthur

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ד. בן־גוריון אל הנשיא טרומן (ואשינגטון)

D. Ben-Gurion to President Truman (Washington)

מברק MH30

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 16 May 1948

On behalf of Provisional Government of State of Israel beg to extend to you expression of profound gratitude and appreciation for your great gesture in according prompt recognition to Provisional Government as de facto authority of new State of Israel. Your consistent and wise advocacy of justice of our cause in national and international councils, your insistence on admission to Palestine of large numbers of survivors of Nazi oppression in Europe, your direction of United States policy, giving U.S. delegation leadership at November session of Assembly in favour of creation Jewish State in Palestine, and finally your lead to whole world, making United States the first power in history to recognise State of Israel, have been decisive in shaping destinies of Holy Land and Jewish people. State of Israel in its present trials and tribulations is confidently looking forward to you and your people's continued sympathy and support for final solution of Palestine question, which will end age-long Jewish tragedy and enable State of Israel to become stabilizing and progressive force in Near East, and to contribute its humble share to welfare and peace of human race.

For Provisional Government State of Israel,
David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister

9. מחמוד פאוזי, נציג מצרים באו"ם.
10. וורן אוסטין, ראש משלחת ארצות־הברית באו"ם.
11. הצהרת העצמאות.
12. בקשת ההכרה מוואשינגטון — ראה מס׳ 1.
13. ראה מס׳ 9.

12

מ. שרתוק אל א. בווין (לונדון)
M. Shertok to E. Bevin (London)

מברק MH39
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[Tel Aviv], 16 May 1948

Have honour inform you and should be grateful if you would convey to your Government that National Council for Jewish State, consisting of members of elected representative Jewish bodies in Palestine, which had applied to United Nations Palestine Commission for recognition as Provisional Council of Government of Jewish State, in accordance with Assembly's resolution, at its solemn convocation May 14th, in view of termination British Mandate and on basis of resolution of General Assembly United Nations of November 29, 1947, proclaimed establishment Jewish State to be called State of Israel. Council decided that pending formation duly elected organs of government, in accordance constitution to be drawn up by Constituent Assembly not later than October first as envisaged in resolution, it shall act as Provisional Council of State possessing all legislative authority and that its executive organ shall constitute Provisional Government. Council declared that State of Israel will be open to immigration of Jews from all countries of dispersion; will promote development of country for benefit of all inhabitants; will be based on precepts of liberty, justice and peace; will uphold full social and political equality of all citizens without distinction race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education, culture and language; will safeguard sanctity and inviolability of shrines and Holy Places of all religions and will dedicate itself to principles of United Nations' Charter. Council pledged its readiness to cooperate with organs United Nations in implementation of Assembly's resolution and take steps bring about Economic Union all Palestine. On behalf Provisional Government, beg to request that Government of United Kingdom may grant official recognition to State of Israel and its Provisional Government, and venture to express hope that this recognition may soon be accorded. Take this opportunity of recalling wise and far-sighted statesmanship which led Government of his Britannic Majesty in 1917 to recognise right of Jewish people to re-establish its national home in Palestine by issuing Balfour Declaration which will rank forever in annals of history as great act of reparation and creative statecraft. Despite lamentable deterioration of relations between Jewish Palestine and British Government in recent years and barriers to better understanding inherent in present Middle Eastern situation, beg express hope that these relations will once more assume normal course as between friendly states and that early recognition of State of Israel by your

Government will prove first and heartening step towards that goal. Have asked members Executive Jewish Agency resident England represent our Provisional Government for time being in London, and have authorised Dr. Nahum Goldmann to make personal representations our behalf to you and Foreign Office.[1]

Behalf Provisional Government State of Israel
Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק) וא. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)

M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York) and E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 7/81
נוסח נכנס (ניו יורק): 93.01/2180/15

Tel Aviv, 17 May 1948 (00.08)

For Eban and Epstein. Have documents proving considerable quantity military equipment being shipped this month by British to Arab Legion. Shipment arranged to reach Transjordan May 14, May 15, coinciding with termination Mandate. These shipments on three vessels from Suez to Aqaba containing petrol, 48 Oerlikon guns and ammunition and 250 tons other ammunition. This supply petrol and ammunition on the eve of the termination of the Mandate with [British][1] Intelligence well aware of Arab Legion activities and intentions, should be brought to notice State Department and Security Council.[2]

Shertok

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1. **בקשות להכרה במדינת ישראל בנוסח דומה הופנו, עד סוף חודש יוני 1948, אל המדינות** הבאות: אוסטרליה, אוקראינה, אורגוואי, איסלנד, אירלנד, אירן, אפגניסטן, אקוואדור, ארגנטינה, אתיופיה, בולגריה, בוליביה, בורמה, ביילורוסיה, בלגיה, ברזיל, ברית־המועצות, גואטמלה, דנמרק, דרום־אפריקה, האיטי, הודו, הולנד, הונגריה, הונדוראס, הריפובליקה הדומיניקנית, ונצואלה, טורקיה, יוגוסלביה, יוון, לוקסמבורג, ליבריה, מכסיקו, נורווגיה, ניו־זילנד, ניקרגואה, סין, סלוואדור, פולין, פיליפינים, פינלנד, פנמה, פקיסטן, פראגוואי, פרו, צ׳ילי, צ׳כוסלובקיה, צרפת, קובה, קולומביה, קוסטה ריקה, קנדה, רומניה, שוודיה, תאילנד. (ראה בתיקים 130.02/2424/19,20).

13

1. במקור בטעות: Arab Legion.
2. מברק דומה נשלח גם אל ב. לוקר, חבר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית בלונדון. (16.5.1948, 130.09/2318/1).

14

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק 9
נוסח יוצא: תיקי א. אילת
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1559

Washington, 17 May 1948

Following result of extensive informal conversations State Department with Henderson and staff:

1) Credentials cabled to me[1] insufficient for official dealings here. Required is cable from you to Marshall, stating that you have been informed regarding U.S. recognition and that I have been appointed Acting Representative. Until this is done, I shall have no official status in Washington.[2]

2) However, Henderson suggests that final appointments be made quickly and if possible at once, since status of U.S. Representative in Israel determined by status of Israel's Representative here. Although willing consider any alternative, intimates Henderson, and we here recommend, that Legation be established and that Ministers be exchanged. Henderson advises that if Legation status agreed, U.S. prepared send Minister or, pending suitable choice, Chargé d'affaires Israel near future, possibly ten days.

3) After official status of office and myself determined, request authority appoint provisional Consuls or Vice Consuls for New York and Washington. Henderson emphasizes New York volume of business and urges prompt action. Request authority and suggestions for personnel.

4) Immediate need exists to issue visas and discharge various types legal obligations. If nature and design of seal and rubber stamps have been /agreed/, request exact details or preferably copies by courier. If seal and stamps not yet agreed, request authority prepare temporary forms here. Will send copies to you promptly if authority granted.

5) Henderson advises following personnel ultimately required for normal operation Legation: Minister, Counsellor, First Secretary, Second Secretary, two third Secretaries, one Press Attaché, one combined Financial-Commercial Attaché, Military Attaché subject discussions with Defence Department. Further suggests initially single Consulate General in New York with Consul and two Vice Consuls. Advises against enlarging

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1. לא נמצא.
2. ראה מס' 36.

function New York Consulate to supervise other areas, and if necessary suggests use of Consular Agents in other communities, directly under Washington. Request your comments and indication regarding available personnel, especially for office of Counsellor in Washington.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל ר. לווט (ואשינגטון)
E. Epstein to R. Lovett (Washington)

העתק: 93.08/364/10

[New York], 17 May 1948

Dear Mr. Lovett,

Further to our telephonic conversation of this morning, I should like to submit to you the following information with reference to acts of agression committed by Egyptian military forces against the state of Israel.

According to a cable received here yesterday from Mr. Shertok,[1] several Egyptian planes bombed Tel Aviv in repeated waves early on the morning of the 16th May and again during the afternoon, causing a number of deaths and destruction of property. Anti-aircraft defences, which went into action immediately, shot down one plane whose pilot was unhurt and taken prisoner. The aircraft was a "Spitfire" with the mark "VB" and also marking of the Royal Egyptian Airforce. The name of the captured pilot is Flight Lieutenant Mahmud Baraka of Egyptian Fighter Squadron No. 2. According to a deposition which was taken from him, the commander of the said squadron also participated in the raid.

The raid on Tel Aviv was confirmed according to this morning's *New York Times* by the Egyptian Army communiqué, issued in Cairo on Sunday night, which said "that Egyptian war planes had set fires to depots in the Port of Tel Aviv and have destroyed the Petach Tikvah airport to the East."

Mr. Shertok cabled further, that aircraft bearing Egyptian Airforce markings also attacked the settlement of [Nir Am][2] which is within the boundaries of the State of Israel in the Negev, causing loss of life and destruction of property. In addition to this, a mechanized column of the Egyptian army also shelled the settlement of Nirim on May 16th. Finally, large concentrations of regular Egyptian forces have been reported in and around Gaza, and movements of Egyptian mechanized columns have been observed in other parts of southern Palestine.

15

1. ראה שרתוק אל לוריא ואבן, 15.5.1948, 93.03/128/5.
2. במברקו של שרתוק (הערה 1 לעיל) כתוב בטעות: נירים, וכך גם הועתק כאן.

We are bringing to the attention of the Security Council these acts of aggression on the part of the Egyptian Government. It will be recalled, of course, that the Egyptian Government admitted in its cablegram to the President of the Security Council, dated the 15th of May, that "Egyptian army forces have started to enter Palestine."[3]

I am grateful to you for giving me the opportunity for placing these facts before you for your consideration.

Yours very truly,

Eliahu Epstein,
Acting Representative of the
Provisional Government of Israel

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

Washington, 17 May 1948

Today transmitted to Lovett orally and in writing [? request] your behalf for United States Government's initiative and action in Security Council.[1] Lovett informed me [State] Department been working and continues work on this matter. He asked for factual material on Egypt's air attacks on Tel Aviv. I submitted him copies your cables to New York.[2] Additionally I presented you[r] request for acquisition fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery here and export them Israel,[3] but did not insist on immediate reply, since awaiting results today's meeting Security Council and discussions of lifting embargo, which now under urgent consideration by United States Government.

Please advise new telegraphic address.

Epstein

3. ראה מס' 10, הערה 4.

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1. ראה מס' 15.
2. הכוונה כנראה למברקו של שרתוק אל לוריא ואבן (ראה מס' 15, הערה 1) ולמס' 13.
3. ראה מס' 4.

17

מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (New York)

מברק

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 17 May 1948

Greatly heartened by yours 15th.[1] Urge you again fly London immediately to negotiate. Have applied officially for recognition.[2] Please refer to us any condition or new problem they may raise. Myself fully appreciate importance my visit New York connection Security [Council], but this is opposed by David [Ben-Gurion]. Anyhow don't wait, maybe we meet London.[3]

Moshe

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבה ה־293 של מועצת־הביטחון ב־17.5.1948, טען הנציג האמריקאי (אוסטין), שעל פי המידע שבידו, המצב בארץ־ישראל מהווה איום והפרה של השלום במשמעות סעיף 39 של מגילת האו"ם; לפיכך הוא הגיש למועצת־הביטחון הצעת־החלטה, המצווה על כל הרשויות והממשלות בארץ־ישראל לחדול תוך 36 שעות מקבלת ההחלטה מכל פעולות איבה — ראה נספח ב, עמ' 664. נוסף על כך הוא הציע, שמועצת־הביטחון תשגר שאלון לצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך, כדי לקבל מידע טוב יותר על המתרחש בארץ־ישראל לפני קבלת החלטה. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 293rd Meeting, 17.5.1948, pp. 2—4).

18

א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק 03

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/5

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 17 May 1948

Austin proposed resolution Security Council that following questions be addressed all Arab states: 1)Are your forces now operating in Palestine? 2) If so, where and under what command? 3) On what basis are they entitled

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1. לא נמצא, אך ראה מברקו של שרתוק אל גולדמן, המאיץ בו לנסוע ללונדון ולפתוח במגעים עם ממשלת בריטניה (16.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).
2. ראה מס' 12.
3. ראה מס' 23.

enter Palestine? 4) Who exercises administrative functions in non-Jewish part Palestine? 5) Are you negotiating with any Jewish authority regarding truce or political settlement? 6) What are your military objectives? 7) Have Arab governments made any agreement among themselves regarding Palestine? 8) What are terms such agreement?

Following questions addressed Arab Higher Committee: 1) What part Palestine are you exercising authority if any? 2) What governmental functions are you exercising? 3) Have you made any requests to any government outside Palestine for assistance? 4) Have you named any representatives appear before Truce Commission?

Following questions to Provisional Government Israel: 1) Over which areas do you in fact exercise authority? 2) Do your forces operate outside Jewish part of Palestine? 3) On what basis do you justify such action? 4) Have you named representative for Truce Commission? 5) Do you negotiate with any Arab authorities for a truce or political settlement? 6) Will you agree to an immediate truce as regards Jerusalem?[1]

Lourie

19

מ. שרתוק אל ז׳. ניואנהויס[1] (ירושלים)

M. Shertok to J. Nieuwenhuys (Jerusalem)

מברק.[2] התקבל: 19.5
נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ S25/1553

Tel Aviv, 18 May 1948

Greatly regret interruption civilian traffic to Jerusalem make[s] personal contact with you and Commission temporarily impossible, meanwhile address myself to you in writing on matter which brooks no delay. Am transmitting regularly authentic information on course Arab invasion to Security Council through our representatives in New York, but am informed that unless this information confirmed by you, Security Council may not be in position take official cognizance of our reports.[3] Therefore

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1. מועצת־הביטחון דנה בשאלון ב־18 במאי והכניסה שינויים אחדים בנוסח המוצע. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 294th and 295th Meetings ,18.5.1948). הנוסח שהופנה אל ממשלת ישראל ראה במס׳ 29.

19

1. ז׳אן ניואנהויס, הקונסול הכללי של בלגיה בירושלים, יושב־ראש ועדת ההפוגה.
2. נשלח באמצעות ליאו כהן מהמחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית בירושלים.
3. בדיוני מועצת־הביטחון הושמעה דרישה לקבלת מידע מהימן מוועדת ההפוגה. ראה, למשל, דברי נציג קולומביה *SCOR, Third Year*, 293rd Meeting, 17.5.1948, pp.9-10. ראה גם מברקו של לוריא אל שרתוק, 17.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1559.

would be grateful if you arrange for immediate cable report to be sent Security Council on present position, to be followed by further progress reports. In interests authenticity and speed, take liberty suggesting that Colonel Lund[4] be authorized come to Tel Aviv keep close liaison with us and report Security Council direct on your behalf. Factual position is as follows:

1. Since Saturday morning, planes of Egyptian Air Force been raiding Tel Aviv several times daily, bombing and machine-gunning, causing destruction and loss life. At least three planes brought down by our ground defences, two pilots captured alive, held prisoners. Planes bear Egyptian Air Force markings, pilots paybooks in our possession.

2. Egyptian planes also bombed Nir Am settlement in south Palestine.

3. Several mechanised columns of Egyptian regular forces operating in south Palestine. One of them repeatedly attacked Nirim settlement with tanks and artillery. Attacks so far repulsed with heavy losses to invaders.

4. Unidentified, probably Iraqi planes been bombing settlements east and south Lake Tiberias: Ein Gev, Ashdot Ya'akov, Afikim, Massada, Sha'ar Hagolan, as well as Tiberias City.

5. Mechanised Iraqi column invaded territory State Israel east of Jordan and Lake Tiberias, launched shell-fire attacks against Jewish position Samakh and settlements Sha'ar Hagolan, Ashdot and Afikim.

6. Forces Arab Legion of Transjordan occupied Palestine Electric Corporation's power house on confluence Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers after shelling buildings and damaging works. This column now reported moving towards Jewish settlement Beth Yosef in northern part Beisan Valley within territory State Israel.

7. Another column Arab Legion crossed Allenby Bridge, turned north along Jordan Valley and reached Nablus, whence one part proceeded west towards coastal plane and another south towards Ramallah. Latter force attacked and occupied Jewish settlement Neveh-Ya'akov, presumably in preparation for attack on Jewish Jerusalem.

8. Arab Legion column, after heavily attacking Jewish settlement of Kfar Etzion group between Jerusalem and Hebron, which resulted in their destruction and large-scale loss of life, turned south towards

4. קולונל א. רושר לונד, נציגו האישי של ט. לי בארץ־ישראל. לפני כן שימש כמומחה הצבאי של קבוצת־החלוץ של ועדת ארץ־ישראל של האו"ם (מארס — אפריל 1948).

Beersheba and occupied Iraq Suweidan Police Station within State Israel territory.

Would appreciate intimation whether suggestion regarding Lund accepted and what action you found possible take.[5]

Respectful greetings

Moshe Shertok

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מ. עליאש אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
M. Eliash to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/128/14

[New York], 18 May 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the following cable which has just been received from the Foreign Secretary of Israel, Tel Aviv, May 17.

> Despite truce discussions Jerusalem conducted by Consular Committee and Arab undertaking to cease fire in the Old City of Jerusalem given to the Trusteeship Council,[1] the Arabs yesterday launched a heavy attack on the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. The Armenian Patriarch informed the Jewish Agency liaison officer that armed Arabs forced their way to the Patriarchate building, which is within the walls, notwithstanding his protest that the place was holy, and that they were using the Patriarchate as a base for attack on the Jewish Quarter.[2] Azcarate[3] was informed and protested vigorously to the Arabs, who nevertheless contined the attack. It is learned Azcarate and the Belgian Consul, who is chairman of the Consular Committee, left for Amman.[4] Signed, Moshe Shertok.

I will be grateful to you if you will circulate this message to the Members of the Security Council.[5]

Respectfully

M. Eliash,
Jewish Agency for Palestine

5. ועדת ההפוגה הודיעה, כי אין היא מסכימה לשלוח את לונד לתל אביב כיוון שהתפקיד המוצע לו חורג מתחום סמכויותיה. (ראה הרצוג אל זסלני, 20.5.1948, 130.02/2443/1).

20

1. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 434 והערה 1 שם.
2. ראה מס' 48.
3. פאבלו אסקאראטה, ראש קבוצת־החלוץ של או"ם בארץ־ישראל ממארס עד אפריל 1948, מונה לנציג של המזכיר־הכללי של או"ם בארץ־ישראל בסוף אפריל, ולממלא־מקום נציב או"ם בירושלים באמצע מאי.
4. ראה מס' 40.
5. נוסח המברק הועבר באותו יום גם אל מחלקת־המדינה. (ראה אפשטיין אל לווט, 18.5.1948, 93.08/364/10).

21

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 9/79

נוסח נכנס (ניו יורק): 93.01/2180/15

Tel Aviv, 18 May 1948

Our 10 Messerschmitt acquired in Europe cannot reach Palestine for lack of intermediate station, in view of their limited range. Meanwhile Tel Aviv being bombed seventh time per day, and this evening night attacks have started. We operate only with ground defence and are unable chase away raider[s] by engaging them in air. Please urge State Department advise Greece to allow us land, refuel, Greek mainland and Rhodes. Matter desperately urgent, cable results.[1]

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 99/42. התקבל: 19.5

נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/16

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/5

New York, 18 May 1948

Your cable fifteenth May to Secretary-General[1] is not proper form of application membership in accordance with article four,[2] and should be /interpreted/ rather as list obligations State towards U.N. Weizmann, Goldmann, Robinson,[3] /self/, all consider advisable defer formal application until ground prepared, votes /assured/. Please cable views.[4]

Eban

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1. אפשטיין השיב שאין הוא מצפה לעזרה מצד מחלקת־המדינה, אך הוא פנה לשגריר היווני בוואשינגטון, שהבטיח לסייע. (ראה אפשטיין אל שרתוק, 13.6.1948, 130.02/2308/6). המטוסים הועברו לבסוף במטוסי תובלה, כשהם מפורקים לחלקים.

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1. מס' 6.
2. סעיף 4 ממגילת האו"ם קובע, ש"החברות באומות המאוחדות פתוחה לכל מדינה שוחרת שלום, המקבלת עליה את ההתחייבויות הכלולות במגילה הזאת ושביכולתה וברצונה, לפי דעת הארגון, לקיים את ההתחייבויות הללו."
3. יעקב רובינסון, היועץ המשפטי בנציגות ישראל באו"ם.
4. ראה מס' 51.

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 1/61. התקבל: 19.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/16
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/5

New York, 18 May 1948

Received your cable.[1] Your communication Foreign Office not fully satisfactory,[2] but will go London Thursday. Will try obtain exchange /letters/ with Foreign Secretary, recognizing my status, appointing same time their representative with equal status. Until then, please don't make any public announcements. Chaim [Weizmann], myself, feel public attacks Great Britain this moment, before clarification our relations with them, undesirable.[3] Referring /especially/ to reported violent speech Shragai London.[4] Regards.

Nahum

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ו. מולוטוב אל מ. שרתוק
V. Molotov to M. Shertok

מברק[1]
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2391/5

[Moscow], 18 May 1948

I beg to confirm receipt of your telegram of 15 May[2] in which you bring to notice of the Government of the U.S.S.R. the proclamation, on the basis of the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, of the

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1. מס' 17.
2. ראה מס' 12. עוד קודם לכן הבריק גולדמן, כי לא ייתכן שישראל תיוצג בלונדון על־ידי קבוצת אנשים, ובמיוחד לא על־ידי קבוצה המורכבת מחברי הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית; זאת לאור האזהרה שהשמיע מקניל, שבעתיד לא ינהלו הבריטים משא־ומתן עם ציונים בריטיים או עם הסוכנות. (ראה שני מברקים מאת גולדמן אל שרתוק, 17.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1559. דברי מקניל — ראה גם תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, עמ' 781).
3. ראה מס' 26.
4. מוסב על נאום של ש.ז. שרגאי, חבר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית מטעם "הפועל המזרחי", באסיפה פומבית בלונדון בראשית מאי. שרגאי טען כי בריטניה רוצה להרוס את המדינה היהודית העתידה לקום ושהיא עומדת מנגד בשעה שנהרגים יהודים בארץ־ישראל. (ראה *Jewish Chronicle*, 14.5.1948).

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1. תרגום מרוסית. הנוסח הרוסי ראה בתיק 93.03/72/16.
2. מס' 7.

creation in Palestine of an independent State of Israel and request their recognition by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government. I hearby beg to inform you that the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics has adopted a decision officially to recognise the State of Israel and its Provisional Government. The Soviet Government hopes that the creation by the Jewish people of its own sovereign state will serve the cause of the strengthening of peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East, and expresses its confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.[3]

V. Molotov,
Minister Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R.

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ז. מודזילבסקי אל מ. שרתוק
Z. Modzelewski to M. Shertok

תרגום מפולנית:[1] אצ"מ S25/1553

וארשה, 18 במאי 1948

יש לי הכבוד לאשר קבלת המברק של אדוני, המודיע כי בקשר עם סיום המנדט הבריטי ועל יסוד החלטת האסיפה הכללית של או"ם מיום 29.11.1947, הכריזה מועצת העם היהודית ביום 14 במאי על ייסוד מדינה יהודית בשם ישראל.[2]

ברצוני להביע בשם ממשלת פולין את שביעות־רצונה מהממשלה הזמנית כשלטון יהודי זמני בישראל, אשר התחייבה לשקוד על פיתוח הארץ לטובת כל תושביה למען החופש והצדק והשלום, תוך שמירת השוויון החברתי והפוליטי של כל האזרחים, וכן על הבטחת אי־פגיעה בכל המקומות הקדושים היקרים לכל האנושות. עמדת ממשלת פולין בעניינים הנוגעים לעם היהודי ולשלטון היהודי בישראל ידועה לכול בפורום הבינלאומי ובייחוד באו"ם. ממשלת פולין שמרה אמונים לעמדת האהדה המלאה לעם היהודי הנלחם לחירות ולמדינה משלו. ב־20 באפריל הצהרתי לפני עשרות נציגים, בכללם גם נציגי יהדות ארץ־ישראל, כי קיימת התקווה שהעם היהודי יתגבר על כל הקשיים. ואז הממשלה הפולנית תתמוך בעמדה, שהמדינה היהודית צריכה להיכנס כשווה עם מזיינות ריבוניות אחרות לאו"ם.

3. שרתוק הודה למולוטוב על הכרת ברית־המועצות וביקש את הסכמתה להחליף נציגים בדרג של ציר או מיופה־כוח (ראה מברקו אל מולוטוב, 23.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1). ברית־המועצות השיבה בחיוב, אך המברק המודיע זאת לא הגיע לתל אביב (קשר המברקים עם מוסקבה התנהל דרך לונדון וקהיר); הידיעה על כך הגיעה למשרד־החוץ באמצעות העיתונות ובאיחור. (ראה שרתוק אל אפשטיין, 16.6.1948, 130.09/2308/1).

25

1. תורגם במשרד־החוץ. הנוסח הפולני ראה בתיק 93.03/72/16.
2. ראה שרתוק אל שר־החוץ של פולין, 16.5.1948, שם.

הנני למסור לאדוני, בשם ממשלתי, את ההכרה הרשמית בממשלה הזמנית של מדינת ישראל, והנני משתמש בהזדמנות להביע תקווה שבין עמנו וממשלתנו, אשר הראו אהדה כה רבה לעם היהודי, לבין הממשלה הזמנית של מדינת ישראל, יימשך שיתוף־הפעולה ויתחזק עוד יותר מאשר עד עתה.

בכבוד רב,

זיגמונד מודזילבסקי
מיניסטר־החוץ הפולני

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ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק
C. Weizmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 100/69. התקבל: 19.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/16
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/5

New York, 18 May 1948

1) Would appreciate if I could be kept informed as frequently as /situation permits/ of position in country and of plans of government.

2) Please advise me beforehand of any contemplated important pronouncements on foreign policies, particularly relations with foreign powers.

3) Would advise use every opportunity improve relations with Britain.

4) Smuts replied, stating already publicly welcomed and expressed good wishes new state, but official action still held up by considerations new situation and necessary consultation.[1]

Weizmann

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1. על־פי בקשתו של שרתוק (ראה מברקו אל וייצמן מיום 15.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1) פנה וייצמן אל יאן סמאטס, ראש־הממשלה ושר־החוץ של דרום־אפריקה, וביקשו להחיש תשובה חיובית על בקשתה של ישראל להכרת דרום־אפריקה. (ראה וייצמן אל סמאטס, 16.5.1948, ג"ו). תשובתו של סמאטס נמסרה באמצעות שגרירות דרום־אפריקה בוואשינגטון (17.5.1948, ג"ו).

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א. אבן אל ב. לוקר (לונדון)
A. Eban to B. Locker (London)

מברק

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/127/8

[New York], 18 May 1948

Extremely urgent immediate maximum effort secure French, Belgian, support American resolution calling for cease-fire and determination threat to peace.[1] Have cabled Fischer.[2]

Eban

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מ. פישר אל נ. גולדמן (ניו יורק)
M. Fischer to N. Goldmann (New York)

מברק מוצפן 58/33

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

Paris, 18 May 1948 (16.05)

Parodi[1] informed Quai [d'Orsay] his intention strong attitude [Security] Council.[2] Bidault not fully happy, but no contradictory been instructed through usual channel.[3] Israel on agenda Ministers Council Wednesday.

Fischer

27

1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 17.
2. ראה אבן אל פישר, 18.5.1948, 93.03/128/10.

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1. אלכסנדר פארודי, הנציג הקבוע של צרפת באו"ם.
2. ראה מס' 27.
3. במברק נוסף מסר פישר, שנודע לו כי המשלחת הבלגית קיבלה הוראות לתמוך בהצעה האמריקאית. (ראה פישר אל גולדמן ואבן, 20.5.1948, 93.01/2180/15).

29

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

[New York], 18 May 1948

Following letter received by Lourie from Sobolev:[1]

I am directed by the President of the Security Council to communicate to you for transmission to the appropriate Jewish Authorities in Palestine the attached questions which the Security Council decided at its 295 meeting, held 18 May 1948, to address to the Jewish authorities in Palestine. I have the honour to inform you also that in view of the urgency of the matter, the Security Council requested to receive a reply to the questions within 48 hours, counting from 19 May 1948 at noon, New York standard time.

Following text questions to the Jewish authorities in Palestine:

A. Over which area of Palestine do you actually exercise control at the present time?

B. Do you have armed forces operating in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Arabs are the majority, or outside Palestine?

C. If so, on what basis do you attempt to justify such operations?

D. Have you arranged for the entry into Palestine in the near future of men of military age from outside Palestine? If so, what are the numbers and where are they coming from?

E. Are you negotiating with Arab authorities regarding either the truce or a political settlement in Palestine?

F. Have you named representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purpose of effecting the truce called for by Security Council?

G. Will you agree to an immediate and unconditional truce for the City of Jerusalem and the Holy Places?

H. Have Arab forces penetrated into the territory over which you claim to have authority?

Following my comments for your consideration:

Question B: Myself pointed out, only defined area recognized by us [is] that of November resolution, within which we majority, constituting Government.

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1. ראה גם מס' 18. מכתבו של סובולב — עוזר המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם לענייני מועצת־הביטחון — בתיק 93.03/94/5.

Question D: Pointed out immigration policy, matter of exclusive Israel authority, irrelevant to question threat to peace.

Question H: Included on my initiative, but Cadogan obscured final phrase which should have read: "claim jurisdiction." Suggest your answer interpret this area November resolution. Address reply to me.[2]

Eban

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ב. לוקר אל א. בווין (לונדון)
B. Locker to E. Bevin (London)

העתק: אצ"מ Z4/14829

[London], 18 May 1948

Dear Mr. Bevin,

I take the liberty of sending you enclosed a copy of a telegram which I sent yesterday to Mr. Shinwell,[1] regarding the Arab Legion in Palestine.[2] I would only like to add that the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent again stated on May 17th that the Arab Legion had not been withdrawn from Palestine, this time giving the following explanation:

> The British Forces withdrew eighteen hours earlier than expected in Jerusalem, and the evacuation of the Arab Legion ordered by the British Commander was thus prevented.

On behalf of the Government of Israel, I would most earnestly urge that His Majesty's Government should immediately take serious steps against the policy of aggression admittedly being pursued by the Arab Legion. We believe this request to be warranted alike by the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty, and by Great Britain's special responsibility for the bringing of units of the Arab Legion into Palestine under the Mandatory regime, and for the financing and command of the Legion.

I am sending a letter to the same effect to the Minister of Defence.[3]

Believe me to be, Yours sincerely,

B. Locker

.2 ראה מס' 31.

30

.1 עמנואל שינוול, שר־המלחמה של בריטניה.

.2 המברק לא נמצא. בעניין כניסתו של הלגיון הערבי לתחומי ארץ־ישראל — ראה מס' 10.

.3 לא נמצא.

31

א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 19 May 1948

Legal position Security Council as follows: President continues invite representatives Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, to Council table under Rule 39 procedure.[1] We were strongly advised from various quarters against making application appear behalf Israel under Article 32 and 35 Charter and Rule 14 procedure,[2] as present circumstances little prospect acceptance and danger divert discussion from aggression to status. Yesterday's questionnaire addressed "to the Jewish Authorities in Palestine"[3] represents compromise of American proposal addressing questions to Provisional Government of Israel and Egyptian proposal "Palestinian Jews". Americans accepted compromise to avoid undesirable delays. Eban emphasized will convey answers behalf Provisional Government. There is no need at this moment clarify our position other organs United Nations. Supplementing cable 99/42,[4] draw your attention rules 58 through 60[5] provisional rules procedure Security Council re admission.

Lourie

31

1. תקנה 39 בתקנות הזמניות של מועצת־הביטחון קובעת, שהמועצה רשאית לזמן לדיוניה על פי ראות־עיניה כל אדם היכול לתת לה מידע או עזרה אחרת בעניינים שהיא מוסמכת לדון בהם.
2. סעיף 32 של מגילת האו"ם קובע, שמדינות שאינן חברות במועצת־הביטחון או באומות המאוחדות, והן בעלות־דין בסכסוך שמועצת־הביטחון דנה בו, יוזמנו להשתתף באותו דיון. סעיף 35 קובע שכל מדינה, בין אם היא חברה באומות המאוחדות ובין אם לא, רשאית לעורר את דעתה של מועצת־הביטחון או של העצרת על כל סכסוך שהיא בעלת־דין בו ושמועצת־הביטחון או העצרת מוסמכות לדון בו. תקנה 14 של התקנות הזמניות של מועצת־הביטחון דנה בנוהל הגשת כתבי יפוי־כוח של נציגי מדינות שאינן חברות במועצת־הביטחון, המוזמנות להשתתף בדיונים.
3. ראה מס' 29.
4. מס' 22.
5. תקנות 58 ו־60 בתקנות הזמניות של מועצת־הביטחון דנות בנוהל קבלת חברים חדשים לאו"ם.

32

י. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק
J. Robinson to M. Shertok

מברק 15

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 19 May 1948

Suggest:

1) While answers to questions[1] must come technically within framework of suggestions, you should try include most possible important information regarding general problem threat peace.

2) Answering question "A", make distinction between areas under civil and military control respectively, strict adherence to rules military occupation under fourth Hague regulation land warfare.

3) Formula "where Arabs are in majority" interpret as meaning "outside Israel."

4) Consider dealing under headings A,B,C also with Jewish settlements outside boundaries Israel and Jerusalem. We exercise control over Jewish settlements in Arab State ("A"), and have armed forces operating for their protection ("B"). Justification "C" — inclusion in Arab State under November 29 [resolution][2] conditional on option of citizenship, international guarantees, free access, economic links. Until establishment Arab state with conditions, safeguards, laid down November 29 resolution, also ensurance physical security, Israel must continue exercise responsibility for Jewish settlements. In regard Jerusalem, please consider statement more or less following language: renunciation Jewish rights Jerusalem conditioned implementation plan international statute. As long as this plan not yet implemented, both Jerusalem and access to it vital concern Israel.

Robinson

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1. ראה מס' 29.
2. במקור, בטעות: regulation.

33

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH95
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 19 May 1948

Davar reports you having stated in Security Council fact questionnaire be addressed Provisional Government unimplies recognition, also that you unopposed use term "Jewish Authority".[1] Trust on second thoughts you will agree both observations were superfluous, quite *lifnim mishurat hadin*. Actually Sobolev's letter[2] refers "Jewish Authorities" in plural.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא וא. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Lourie and A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH96
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 19 May 1948

Please reply Sobolev's letter[1] you are unaware which appropriate authorities intended. There are in Jewish State area today Provisional Government, Jewish Agency and municipalities. To whom of these are you expected to transmit Security Council's questions?

For your guidance: Provisional Government will reply only if questions are addressed to Provisional Government.[2]

Shertok

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1. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 294th Meeting, 18.5.1948, pp.6,15
2. ראה מס' 29.

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1. ראה מס' 29.
2. עוד באותו יום הבריק שרתוק, שהוא שוקל שוב את העניין (ראה מברקו אל לוריא ואבן, 130.09/2328/1). בסופו של דבר השיבה הממשלה לשאלון, אך הקפידה לציין שהיא עושה זאת כממשלה הזמנית של ישראל — ראה מס' 61.

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מ. פישר אל נ. גולדמן וא. אבן (ניו יורק)

M. Fischer to N. Goldmann and A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 59/79. התקבל: 20.5

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

Paris, 19 May 1948

1) Instructions to Parodi[1] vote for American proposal if no commitment beyond those imposed upon whole United Nations. 2) Immediate recognition opposed by Quai [d'Orsay]. Matter left pending. Implication — date of recognition subject further developments. Quai anxious not advance recognition position while important commercial treaty re Egyptian cotton being negotiated. Bidault in secret council argued also France should be mediator, therefore neutrality advisable. This statement known to fellow minister[s] only whom am [.....] we are assured recognition within a week.[2]

Fischer

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מ. שרתוק אל ג׳. מארשאל (ואשינגטון)

M. Shertok to G. Marshall (Washington)

מברק MH 98

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 19 May 1948

I have the honour to inform you that the Provisional Government of Israel, having taken cognizance of its recognition by the United States Government, has decided to seek the approval of the United States Government, which I confidently hope will be forthcoming without delay, for the establishment of the legation of Israel in Washington and to appoint Mr. Eliahu Epstein, former representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, as the minister of Israel in Washington.

I trust that the legation will be accorded all proper facilities, and that the cordial personal relations existing between Mr. Epstein and officials of the State Department will continue in the new auspicious phase of his duties.

35

1. ראה מס׳ 27.
2. בפרפרזה של המברק שהוכנה בניו יורק נוסח המשפט האחרון כדלקמן: "Nevertheless we have been assured that there should be recognition within a week."

The Provisional Government of Israel hopes that the United States Government may soon see its way to establishing a legation of the United States in the State of Israel and to sending for this purpose its representative to Tel Aviv with the status of a minister.

I take this opportunity of reiterating the deep appreciation of the Provisional Government for the prompt recognition granted to it by the United States Government as the de facto authority in the State of Israel, as well as of expressing my own gratitude to you for the personal consideration which you have so kindly shown to me and to Mr. Epstein in the past.

For the Provisional Government of the State of Israel
Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary

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שיחת א. גאס[1] — ב. בל (בוואשינגטון, ב־18 במאי 1948)
Meeting: O. Gass — B. Bell (Washington, 18 May 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.08/365/1

Washington, 19 May 1948

On Tuesday, May 18th, I called Mr. Bernard Bell, of the staff of the Export-Import Bank, and had lunch with him. As a result of our conversation, I learned the following facts:

1. Mr. Martin, the president of the Bank, is generally aware of the intention of Israel to apply for a loan from the Export-Import Bank and is prepared to "look at it".[2]
2. The Export-Import Bank has a reserve of uncommitted lending power of approximately five hundred million dollars.
3. A bill pending in Congress would increase the lending authority of the Bank by five hundred million dollars. This amount would, however, be more or less specifically earmarked for Latin America.
4. After European Recovery Program and other legislation, the Bank regards its lending area as consisting primarily of Canada, Latin America and the Middle East.
5. A recent approach to the Bank by Saudi Arabia was rejected summarily "under the prevailing circumstances".

My general conclusion from this conversation is that, so far as such a conversation can cast light on the general possibilities, the situation is not too unfavorable.

Oscar Gass

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1. אוסקר גאס, יועץ כלכלי לנציגות ישראל בוואשינגטון.
2. בדבר בקשת הסוכנות היהודית למלווה מהבנק ליצוא וליבוא, למימון תכניות פיתוח של המדינה היהודית (דצמבר 1947), ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס׳ 62 והערות שם. ראה גם מס׳ 130 להלן.

38

מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (New York)

מברק MH102
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 19 May 1948

My opinion question definitive appointment with permanent status doesn't arise before whole complex our relations with Britain and chances recognition cleared up.[1] Therefore suggest you undertake *ad hoc* mission this direction. If recognition secured, shall be happy appoint you permanent representative, but wonder whether you realise limitations entailed. Would mean strictly adhering our instructions and giving up all independent public activity, limiting appearances to purely formal occasions and expression official policy, exactly same as your opposite number. Urge you immediately proceed London, where am cabling latest about British misdeeds.[2] Generally fear your friend misled and misleading.[3] By all means do everything you can Western capitals, coordinating Locker.[4] Cable departure. Cabling Kahany as proposed.[5]

Moshe

39

מ. קומיי אל ב. גרינג[1] (יוהאנסבורג)
M. Comay to B. Gering (Johannesburg)

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/126/3

[New York], 19 May 1948

Tardiness recognition Dominions interpreted many circles here as holding back under British influence. Particularly South African delay arousing

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1. ראה מס׳ 23.
2. ראה מס׳ 13 והערה 2 שם.
3. השווה שיחת גולדמן — מקניל ב־11.5.1948 — תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס׳ 496.
4. מוסב, ככל הנראה, על מברקו של גולדמן אל שרתוק, מיום 18.5.1948 (אצ״מ S25/1559), לפיו ביקשו ממנו ידידים בבלגיה ובשוודיה לבוא ולהכין את הקרקע לקראת הכרה במדינת ישראל.
5. מנחם כהני היה פקיד בכיר בנציגות הסוכנות היהודית בפני מוסדות חבר־הלאומים, ולאחר מכן מוסדות האו״ם, בז׳נבה. מאז 1946 נמנה על משלחת הסוכנות בניו יורק. שרתוק הבריק לכהני לשוב לז׳נבה, לייצג שם את ממשלת ישראל בפני מוסדות האו״ם ולברר את סיכויי הכרת שווייץ בישראל (19.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).

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1. ברנארד גרינג, יושב־ראש ההסתדרות הציונית בדרום־אפריקה.

comment for obvious reasons,[2] and American cease-fire proposal Security Council weakened accordingly. Suggest Lippie[3] or other suitable person privately, tactfully, sound friend[4] regarding recognition. Considered here that official delegation yourselves may be inadvisable, as relations with foreign government involved. Please keep me informed.

Mike

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ל. כהן אל ד. בן־גוריון
L. Kohn to D. Ben-Gurion

מברק

נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ S25/9390

[ירושלים], 19 במאי 1948

הבוקר נפגשנו עם הבלגי,[1] שמסר על פגישתו הוא ואסקאראטה עם עבדאללה. מסרו למלך את האזהרה החמורה שנתבקשו למסור לו מוועדת־הביטחון.[2] המלך סער והגיב בחריפות, ואמר שהוא ממשיך בפעולתו הצבאית. אמר שהוא מחבב את היהודים והציע להם תנאי שלום אשר נדחו, ואין לו ברירה אלא להילחם. אסקאראטה מסר למלך, שהוא נכנס כעת לתפקידו בירושלים מטעם או"ם,[3] והוסיף שדאגתו הראשונה היא למים ואוכל לעיר. המלך ענה בחריפות, שלא יהיה מים ולא אוכל. שום דבר מועיל לא יצא מהשיחה וחזרו לירושלים.[4] ועדת הקונסולים נפגשת הבוקר, לאחר ביקורנו, לדון על המצב. מסרנו לבלגי המברק הארוך ממשה [שרתוק][5] והגשנו ההצעה בדבר העברת לונד לתל אביב.[6] כן מסרנו לקונסול הצעה בכתב, שמקורה הממ"ז,[7] ותוכנה — שאחרי שכוחותינו השיגו מטרתם הצבאית בעיר העתיקה — יצירת קשר עם הרובע היהודי — אנחנו מחדשים הצעתנו להפסקת־האש שם, בתנאי שהערבים לא ינסו להפריע לקו התחבורה שנוצר בינינו לבין העיר העתיקה ושלא יתקיפונו מהרובעים הערבים.[8] הקונסול יביא גם הצעה זאת לדיון בישיבת הקונסולים.

2. ראה מס' 26 והערה 1 שם.
3. ליאופולד גרינברג, שופט בית־המשפט העליון בדרום־אפריקה, נשיא אגודת שוחרי האוניברסיטה העברית בדרום־אפריקה.
4. יאן סמאטס.

40

1. ז'אן ניואנהויס, הקונסול הכללי של בלגיה בירושלים ויושב־ראש ועדת ההפוגה.
2. הכוונה כנראה למברק ששיגרה ועדת ההפוגה של מועצת־הביטחון אל המלך עבדאללה ב־28.4.1948. המלך הוזהר להימנע מפעולות או החלטות צבאיות כל עוד עצרת האו"ם ומועצת־הביטחון דנות בעניין ארץ־ישראל. (ראה ועדת ההפוגה אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון, 29.4.1948, 93.03/125/15).
3. ראה מס' 20 והערה 3 שם.
4. ראה גם מס' 48.
5. מס' 19.
6. ראה שם.
7. מפקד מחוז ירושלים, דוד שאלתיאל.
8. מס' 41.

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ל. כהן אל ז׳. ניואנהויס (ירושלים)
L. Kohn to J. Nieuwenhuys (Jerusalem)

העתק: 130.02/2397/5

[Jerusalem], 19 May 1948

Sir,

I am directed to inform you of the present situation in the Old City of Jerusalem.[1]

Following upon the Arab attack on the Jewish quarter of the Old City, Jewish forces in the early hours of this morning succeeded in breaking into the Old City, in effecting a junction with the forces defending the Jewish quarter, and in establishing firm lines of communication between the New City and the Old.

The Jewish Forces have thus achieved the object of their operation — the relief of the Jewish quarter in the Old City.

The Jewish Agency once again renews its offer of a cease-fire in the Old City of Jerusalem. If Arab attacks in the Old City cease, it is not intended that Jewish forces shall undertake further action that might involve the Old City as a whole and make the entire area a scene of fighting.

The Jewish Agency therefore formally offers a cease-fire in the Old City, upon the sole condition that no attempt is made from the Arab side to interfere with the lines of communication that have been established between the New City and the Old.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

Leo Kohn
for the Jewish Agency for Palestine

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון ב־19 במאי אמר נציג בריטניה (קאדוגן), שממשלתו תומכת במטרותיה של הצעת־ההחלטה האמריקאית (ראה הערת־עורך, **עמ׳ 17**), אך מסתייגת מניסוחה. הוא ביקש להימנע מאיזכור סעיף 39 של מגילת האו״ם, הנוגע לדעתו רק לאיום על השלום הבינלאומי, וטען שקשה להגדיר באורח מדויק ״מעשה תוקפנות״ ו״תוקפן״ בכל הנוגע לסכסוך בארץ־ישראל. הוא הטיל ספק בחוקיות הקמתה של המדינה היהודית בארץ־ישראל, שלדבריו לא נעשתה בהתאם להוראות של החלטת ה־29 בנובמבר. לפיכך הציע קאדוגן נוסח מתוקן של ההצעה האמריקאית — ראה נספח ג, **עמ׳ 665**. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 296th Meeting, 19.5.1948, pp. 2-6).

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1. ראה מס׳ 40. להשתלשלות העניינים שקדמה למכתב זה ראה מס׳ 48, **עמ׳ 49**.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 20 May 1948

Result today's meeting prospects American resolution[1] considerably improved, though issue still uncertain. Passage would vastly strengthen our position Lake Success and Washington. In this connection must emphasise, first, essential we cooperate replying questionnaire,[2] second, supreme importance our acceptance cease-fire if ordered, placing onus of breach on Arabs. Executive[3] here agreed accept questions addressed "Authorities". Americans also advised not press Security Council address Government until acceptance certain. Answers when received will, however, be transmitted officially by myself in name Provisional Government, this additional important reason answers be sent. All here agree grave inadvisability withhold answers on formal grounds.

Eban

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א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 19/34. התקבל: 24.5

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 20 May 1948

Reliably informed note sent by State Department to Bevin urging acceptance American resolution Security Council,[1] indicating failure to pass resolution might result change of policy U.S.A. regards embargo, also might prejudice Marshall Plan. Similar message to Chinese Government.

Lourie

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 17.
2. ראה מס' 29, 34.
3. האגף האמריקאי של הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית.

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 17.

44

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH 116
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 20 May 1948

When U.S. *Marine Carp* called Beirut on route Haifa, Lebanese authorities forcibly removed from boat and detained 61 male Jewish passengers "of military age", allowing proceed only women, old and children. Detainees include returning Palestinians and American citizens /proceeding/ Palestine as immigrants or visitors. Please make most urgent representations State Department for immediate intervention view effecting release these people, preventing further recurrence such unheard of arbitrariness.

Shertok

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א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 18/164. התקבל: 22.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 20 May 1948

Regarding your coming here, firstly Washington: Believe your visit could be extremely valuable /giving first hand account/ military situation, dealing top level /questions embargo and American/ policy generally. Washington battle /far from/ won, your presence would constitute important stiffening factor.

Secondly Lake Success: Aubrey [Eban] doing /splendid/ job, but unquestionably your appearance at Security Council would be most stimulating, bringing directest authoritative word from *Yishuv* and war /area/. On other hand: 1) Prospects any early /positive/ action /here/ very slim in view attitude Britain, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, though essential prevent actual negative decision. 2) Serious problem would immediately arise regarding capacity in which you appear. See /very great/ objections /to you/ appearing otherwise than as Foreign Secretary, while if application made appear behalf Israel, probability is prolonged discussion with likelihood at this stage of non-admission.

/My view/ therefore your visit very valuable for Washington scene, less so Lake Success. In addition, direct conversation with Gromyko prior his departure[1] could have important bearing future relations U.S.S.R.

Lourie

/Fully/ concur.

Gideon [Ruffer][2]

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פ. ריגר אל מ. שרתוק
P. Ruegger to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

Genève, le 20 mai 1948

Le Comité International de la Croix Rouge à Genève douloureusement ému par les graves événements de Palestine et inspiré uniquement par le [seul desir de] protéger le plus grand nombre de vies humaines adresse aux gouvernements le pressant appel suivant qui se fonde sur les principes de la Croix Rouge et du Crois[sant] Rouge. Dès avril le Comité International avec l'agrément des autorités civiles et militaires arabes et juives et l'approbation du gouvernement de Palestine était sur le point d'instituer dans Jérusalem même des zones de sécurité destinées à recueillir la population non combattante pour la mettre à l'abri des opérations militaires. Au début de mai le projet fut de plus envisagé de neutraliser Jérusalem tout entière moyennant l'assentiment de toutes les autorités.[1] Les pourparlers à ce sujet n'ayant pas abouti en temps utile et des combats se déroulant actuellement à Jérusalem le Comité International de la Croix Rouge à Genève s'adresse à vous pour [vous] prier instamment de prendre les mesures nécessaires tendant à ce que soient en tout cas respectées les zones de sécurité que la délégation du Comité International s'efforce d'instituer à l'intérieur de la ville elle-même comme elle l'avait primitivement prévu ou les zones de sécurité qu'elle pourra chercher à établir dans d'autres villes de Palestine. Le but de ces zones de sécurité est de recueillir sous le contrôle du Comité International de la Croix Rouge des non combattants avant tout arabes et juifs et de sauver ainsi le plus grand nombre possible de vies humaines. Le même appel est adressé aux

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1. גרומיקו עמד לסיים את תפקידו כנציג ברית־המועצות באו"ם. במקומו התמנה י. מאליק.
2. בנוסח הנכנס של המברק רשום בטעות ג. רופר כמחברו.

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1. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 466 והערה 1 שם.

gouvernements Arabie Saoudite, Egyptien, Irakien, Libanais, Syrien, Transjordanien ainsi que pour information à la Ligue des Etats Arabes et au Haut Comité arabe.[2] Le Comité International de la Croix Rouge se permet de rappeler ici à votre gouvernement les premiers résultats de son intervention en Palestine: primo adhésion des autorités arabes et juives aux principes essentiels des Conventions de Genève,[3] secundo mise sous la protection du Comité International de la Croix Rouge de divers établissements hospitaliers, tertio envoi de médicaments et autres secours destinés aux deux parties, quarto interventions individuelles et continues de ses délégués qui ont ainsi pu sauver des blessés arabes et juifs au cours des précédents combats. Le Comité International demeure persuadé que dans l'esprit du présent appel tous les gouvernements auxquels il s'adresse s'efforceront avec lui de limiter les souffrances qu'engendre le conflit palestinien.

Paul Ruegger
Président, Comité International de la Croix Rouge

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

במהלך הוויכוח על הדין־וחשבון של סיעת הלייבור בפרלמנט, שנערך בוועידה השנתית של המפלגה בסקארבורו (17 — 21 במאי), ביקר מוריס (משה) רוזטי את מדיניות ממשלת הלייבור בארץ־ישראל; הוא תקף במיוחד את השתתפותו של הלגיון הערבי, הממומן בכסף בריטי והמונהג על־ידי קצינים בריטיים, בהתקפה על המדינה היהודית. הרברט מוריסון, שסיים את הוויכוח מטעם האכסקוטיבה של הלייבור, הטעים שהלייבור תמך ויוסיף לתמוך ברעיון של מולדת יהודית בארץ־ישראל. הוא ביקש לא לעסוק יותר בעבר והודיע שהממשלה תעשה הכל כדי למנוע שפיכות דמים בארץ־ישראל.

ישראל השיבה שהיא תכבד כל איזור ביטחון שהוקם או יוקם על־ידי הצלב האדום, אך היא מבקשת ערובות שאיזורים אלה לא ישמשו כבסיס להתקפה נגדה. (ראה שרתוק אל ריגר, 25.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).

3. ב־12.3.1948 פנתה הוועדה הבינלאומית של הצלב האדום אל הצדדים הלוחמים בארץ־ישראל וביקשה מהם להודיע, שהם מכבדים את אמנת ז'נבה בכל הנוגע לשבויי מלחמה וליחס לפצועים וחולים. הסוכנות היהודית השיבה בחיוב במכתב מיום 4.4.1948 (ראה התכתבות, אצ"מ S25/5702).

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שיחת ס. סילברמן,[1] מ. רוזטי[2] — א. בווין (בסקארבורו, ב־20 במאי 1948)

Meeting: S. Silverman, M. Rosetté — E. Bevin
(Scarborough, 20 May 1948)

דין־וחשבון: אצ״מ Z4/20283

[London], 20 May 1948

Early on Thursday morning, when Mr. Bevin was due to speak at Conference, Mr. Silverman approached Mr. Herbert Morrison[3] and pointed out that the statement of Sir Alexander Cadogan at Lake Success[4] had completely destroyed the favourable effect of Mr. Morrison's statement the previous day. Mr. Morrison said he would approach Mr. Ernest Bevin in order to ascertain whether he intended to deal with Palestine in his speech. He came back and informed Silverman that he was not going to make any reference to Palestine, but was prepared to discuss the matter with Silverman and Rosette after the speech. Silverman insisted that other members of the Executive should be present, and accordingly the meeting was held on the platform of the Conference at the end of the session. In addition to Bevin, Silverman and Rosette, there were present Hector McNeil, Philip Noel-Baker, Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton and Harold Laski.

Herbert Morrison began by reference to the speech of Rosette the day before, which he hoped Bevin knew had been restrained and moderate, apart from the protests made on the question of the Legion, and that his own reply had also been conciliatory. Bevin indicated that he was aware of the speeches, and Silverman then raised the question of Cadogan's statement. Mr. Bevin's reply was that he had not read Cadogan's statement, but he imagined that the purpose of it was to prevent the invoking of Article 39, because this meant that sanctions would be used, and under no circumstances would Britain agree to that. Cadogan's instructions were to do everything to get a cease-fire, but to do it by means of Article 6 or Article 41.[5] Mr. Bevin went on to say that he believed he was on the point of securing a truce when the American recognition of Israel came as a complete surprise and

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1. סידני סילברמן, חבר פרלמנט יהודי מטעם הלייבור.
2. משה (מוריס) רוזטי, ראש המחלקה המדינית של פועלי־ציון בבריטניה.
3. הרברט מוריסון, חבר הקבינט הבריטי ומנהיג בית־הנבחרים.
4. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 35.
5. סעיף 39 מדבר על תפקידה של מועצת־הביטחון לקבוע אם יש איום על השלום או הפרת השלום ולהמליץ על אמצעים לקיום השלום או החזרתו; סעיף 6 עוסק בהרחקת חברות שאינן מקיימות את מגילת האו״ם מהארגון; סעיף 41 מדבר על האמצעים, להוציא שימוש בכוח, שמועצת־הביטחון רשאית לנקוט כדי להוציא אל הפועל את החלטותיה.

spoiled his efforts. He had understood that recognition would not be asked for, but did not indicate from whom he understood it.

He was still prepared to make every effort for peace, and he had, he said, a mediator in mind who was favourable to the Jewish cause, had influence with the Arabs and was also acceptable to the Russians, and he believed the Russians would have agreed but the Americans had spoiled it again. He indicated quite clearly that he did not intend to recognize the State until mediation had taken place.

Mr. Silverman spent some time in pointing out the absurdity of the position, but it made no impact on Bevin. Silverman then raised the question of the Arab Legion, and Bevin denied that the Arab Legion had not been withdrawn from Palestine. He said [that] before the termination of the Mandate all except one company which could not leave had crossed the Jordan. He then said that the purpose of leaving the British officers with the Arab Legion was that it would prevent disintegration of the forces, that they would be disciplined and that they would police the future Arab area. The instructions were that the moment fighting began, the officers were to be withdrawn. He denied that Glubb Pasha was leading the Arab Legion and denied a number of other things, despite Silverman's assertions. He did however say, and Hector McNeil[6] was instructed to do this, that enquiries would be made about the present position.

Silverman then was asked by Bevin, "What is it exactly that you want?" and Silverman replied, "I want you to recognise the State." Bevin's reply was, "That is impossible." Silverman said, "You may be the last. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have already done so. In the end you may have to." Bevin replied, "Wait till the State is established." Silverman then reminded Bevin that he had once said that he could settle the Palestine problem if there were no outside interference, and said that if it were the Palestine Arabs only, the difficulties would have settled themselves by now. Bevin's reply was to make a long and rambling statement about the boundaries never having been delineated, and there was an exchange on the question of Jaffa, which he took to be evidence of Jewish intention not to stay within the boundaries.[7] Both Silverman and Rosette point[ed] out the facts with regard to Jaffa, and again he was unmoved. Finally, he said that he would look into the question of Cadogan and his instructions, that he would press for a cease-fire and mediation, and that he would go on trying to get peace. That was his only objective.

At a certain stage he appealed to Dalton to confirm that there was strong feeling in this country against British troops being involved. Dalton did so, and then Bevin said, "When the troops were brought back to Palestine I

6. הקטור מקניל, השר הזוטר (Minister of State) במשרד־החוץ הבריטי.
7. על־פי גבולות החלוקה, יפו היתה אמורה להיות מובלעת ערבית בתוך המדינה היהודית. יפו כותרה על־ידי כוחות האצ"ל וה"הגנה" בסוף אפריל 1948 ונכבשה ב־13.5.1948.

thought they might be useful, and indeed for a little while Jaffa and Acre were safe for the Arabs, but public opinion was too strong."[8]

We left with the understanding that Hector McNeil would see Silverman in the afternoon, and, when he did, McNeil gave the following information:

(a) That a telegram had been sent to the political agents in all the Arab countries urging them to agree to a truce on any terms.

(b) Cadogan had been instructed to go as far as possible in order to get a cease-fire, but not to agree to Article 39.

Rosette subsequently saw Colonel George Wigg, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Shinwell, who said they were in constant touch with Palestine, and had no evidence that British officers were leading the Arab Legion. It would be useful to send any evidence available immediately to George Wigg.

At a certain stage of the conversation on the question of the Arab Legion, Bevin made some reference to his belief that there was an agreement between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah to the effect that he should take that part of Palestine up to the borders of the Jewish State, and Bevin thought the presence of the Arab Legion would enable Abdullah to do this effectively.

One general impression of the conversation was that the other four Cabinet Ministers present at the discussion were completely intimidated and hardly took part in the conversation except when spoken to by Bevin. They were, however, very disturbed, and this applies particularly to Morrison and McNeil, when seeing Bevin's attitude rather nakedly exposed.

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דין־וחשבון מאת ח.ו. הרצוג[1]
Report by C.V. Herzog

93.03/95/1 :דין־וחשבון

[Jerusalem],[2] 21 May 1948

It is exactly one week since the British troops withdrew from Jerusalem. The situation in the city since that time has been adequately described in a "Report on Jerusalem" written by Walter Eytan.[3] The purpose of this

8. בעת הקרבות על יפו בסוף אפריל 1948 החישו הבריטים תגבורת לעיר מכוחותיהם בקפריסין. עכו, שהיתה אמורה להיכלל בתחומי המדינה הערבית, נכבשה ב־18.5.1948 — 17.

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1. חיים ויוויאן הרצוג, קצין־קישור לענייני ביטחון עם נציגי האו"ם בירושלים.
2. הדין־וחשבון הועתק ככל הנראה בתל אביב. ראה הסיפא.
3. ולטר איתן, מהפקידים הבכירים של המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית. מאמצע יוני — המנהל הכללי של משרד־החוץ.

document is to place on record for reference all attempts which were made with a view to a cease-fire or truce in the city of Jerusalem, or any part of it, and the reasons for the various failures.

On Friday morning, May 14th, the British left Jerusalem. Simultaneously Jews began to take over all Jewish-owned property in the so-called security zones. These were principally the Generali building, the Anglo-Palestine Bank building, the Post Office, etc., in what is known as "Bevingrad", and Jewish property in Zone B, right down to David building which formerly housed the Public Information Office.

With the withdrawal of the British, heavy firing broke out all over the city, when the Arabs attempted to resist or interfere with Jews taking over their property. It should be noted that in many cases, i.e., in the case of "Bevingrad",[4] local private arrangements were made with British commanders in order to take over the property intact before the Arabs had a chance of destroying them. At the same time, our forces entered Sheikh Jarrah. By agreement reached at a meeting attended by General McMillan, G.O.C. Troops in Palestine, and Colonel C.R.W. Norman[5] on the one hand, and Mr. E. Kaplan[6] and Major V.C. Herzog on the other, the Jews were to receive prior warning of the time of the British withdrawal from that district, so that they could re-take the buildings from which they had been driven earlier in the week by the British, and thus ensure the safety of the road leading to Mount Scopus.[7] However, in spite of last-minute reminders, the British did not keep their word, and our troops were obliged to enter Sheikh Jarrah by force.

On the morning of Friday, the 14th, Walter Eytan and Chaim Berman[8] visited the French Consulate to discuss with the Consular Truce Commission a cease-fire with a view to an ultimate truce. It was decided that both sides should accredit a liaison officer to the Truce Commission to negotiate on whatever terms would be proposed. I was instructed to proceed forthwith to the French Consulate and to remain there until further notice. At the same time, a letter was addressed to the Chairman of the Truce Commission, agreeing to a cease-fire for Jerusalem so as to give that Commission an opportunity to pursue their negotiations, and declaring that armed Jewish forces had been ordered not to attack or move into any areas in Jerusalem inhabited by Arabs, as long as we were not subjected to

4. כינויו של איזור ביטחון מס׳ 1 במרכזה של ירושלים, שנסגר ופונה מתושביו האזרחיים באמצע 1946; מקום מושבם של רוב משרדי ממשלת המנדט.
5. לייטנאנט קולונל נורמן, קצין־מודיעין במפקדת הצבא הבריטי בארץ־ישראל.
6. אליעזר קפלן, עד הקמת המדינה — גזבר הסוכנות היהודית ונציג ההנהלה בירושלים במשא־ומתן בעניין הפסקת־אש בעיר. מאמצע מאי 1948 — שר־האוצר בממשלה הזמנית.
7. ראה דין־וחשבון מפגישה של קפלן והרצוג עם הגנרל מקמילן והקולונל נורמן, 26.4.1948, אצ״מ S25/5634.
8. חיים ברמן (רדי), מזכיר המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית בירושלים. מיולי 1948 — המזכיר הכללי של משרד־החוץ.

attack from such areas. A copy of this letter is attached herewith (Appendix A).[9]

By approval with the commander of the Haganah in Jerusalem, Walter Eytan and Chaim Berman agreed to cease-fire at mid-day on May 14th. This was observed by the Jewish forces, but the Arabs did not observe it, claiming they could not get orders to their troops in time. The time for the cease-fire was then extended to 13.30 hours. Again the Jewish forces complied.

At 13.30 hours, in accordance with instructions I had received, I set out for the French Consulate. Going into Julian's Way from Wauchope Street, an American car preceded mine and we were both subjected to heavy fire from Arab positions. The American car was hit, crashing, and a member of the Consular Staff was severely wounded. Our car managed to reach the Consulate. As we entered the French Consular compound, we were again fired at and our driver was wounded in the head. It soon became obvious that the Arabs had once again not sent out instructions for a cease-fire, or were unable to do so because of the loose chain of command that existed within their ranks.

The Consul General received me coldly and I was informed that our representatives had deliberately deceived them, because they now learnt that Jews were advancing into Zones B and C. I pointed out that our representatives had in the first place not discussed this matter with the Truce Commission at the previous meeting to which they referred, and that in any case there had been no intention of considering the taking over of Jewish property by Jews as a matter for discussion. The houses into which the Jews were entering, including the central buildings in "Bevingrad" were Jewish property, and this could not be called advancing in a military sense, as in each case the buildings had been handed back to their rightful owners by the military hirings authority. The French Consul was dissatisfied and kept on repeating that we had deceived him. He then launched into a tirade against the Jewish Agency, and said that they considered it a direct insult to the Security Council by the Jewish Agency that none of the Jewish leaders, namely Mr. Ben-Gurion, Mr. Shertok or Mrs. Meyerson, had seen fit to come to Jerusalem to speak to them in the last decisive week before the termination of the Mandate. He there and then, in great fury, proceeded to draft a telegram to the Security Council in this sense, and as he was about to hand it to the clerk for despatch, his Jewish radio operator was wounded in the arm, shot by Arabs from the Citadel. Since then, the French Consulate's radio station has been out of action.

At this point, a very heavy fusillade of shots hit the room in which we were sitting, and the officer in charge of the French guards announced that

9. ראה איתן אל יושב־ראש ועדת ההפוגה, 14.5.1948 (אצ"מ S25/5176). הנספחים אינם רצופים לדין־וחשבון — ראה הסיפא.

the shots had been directed at the Consulate by Arabs from the Old City. The result of this very heavy attack was to cause us to evacuate the Consul General's room for safer but less dignified quarters and to improve his temper towards me generally. It should be pointed out here that the one man who throughout backed me up and did his best to understand our case was Colonel Lund.

At 15.30 hours, attempts were made to get in touch once again with the Arabs, both directly by phoning Dr. Izzat Tannous,[10] and a Friar Emile in the Old City, the French Consul General's contact with the Arabs. Repeated requests were made for the Arabs to send a liaison officer immediately, but they claimed they could not leave because of Jewish sniping. I phoned the Haganah, who agreed once again to a cease-fire for several hours beginning at 17.00 hours. This was transmitted to the Arabs, who agreed to comply and to take advantage of the lull to send a liaison officer to the Consultate.

At 17.00 hours, exactly, the Jewish forces stopped firing throughout the city and maintained this cease-fire practically throughout the night. The Arabs were then asked to send their representative and maintained the whole time that they were being sniped at by Jews. At this point the French Friar rang up to say that a mortar shell fired by Jews had landed in his school near the New Gate. All over the city one could hear shells landing (despite the cease-fire) and the French Consul once again launched into a tirade against the Jews, became extremely excited and resigned from the Commission. I at once phoned up a number of places in the city and obtained a list of the points where such shells had fallen. I took out a map and marked the shell hits on it, and by simple military calculation proved to the Commission that the shells, including the one which had hit the Friar's school, must have been fired by the Arabs from Deir Abu Tor. Colonel Lund confirmed that my calculations were correct and took this to the French Consul General, who then returned to the meeting and became extremely eloquent and rude on the subject of the Arabs! There was evidence, however, from all the numerous telephone conversations taking place, that the Arabs seemed to be willing to talk peace, although our people had the impression the whole time that they were playing for time in order to bring up reinforcements.

When the Arabs were asked why they did not cease firing at 17.00 hours, they replied that they had come to another arrangement with M. de Reynier of the Red Cross,[11] which was to commence at 18.00 hours. This upset the calculations of the Commission who by now were somewhat confused. The Commission then understood from the Arabs that they preferred the Red Cross cease-fire to that of the Consular Truce Commission because the

10. עזאת טאנוס, מנהיג ערבי בארץ־ישראל, חבר הוועד הערבי העליון.
11. ז'אק דה רנייה, ראש משלחת הצלב האדום לארץ־ישראל.

terms of the former seemed to be more favourable to the Arabs.[12] A great deal of confusion arose out of this, and for the first time during the day Mr. Azcarate took part in the discussion to protest at the fact that the Red Cross were carrying on independent negotiations. It appears that the Jewish authorities, too, were somewhat guilty of taking part in dual negotiations without proper coordination. Thus when I rang up to check the story that the Arabs had passed to the Commission that Jews were treating with the Red Cross, the Haganah Commander informed me that his instructions were not to treat with the Red Cross but only with the Truce Commission. This information satisfied the Commission, but I was placed in an extremely awkward situation when half an hour later other Jewish representatives phoned the Belgian Consul General, Chairman of the Commission, and indicated they were negotiating independently with the Red Cross as well.

As the night wore on and as the shooting continued and the number of wounded in the Consulate grew, it became evident that no useful purpose could be served in staying on, as the Arabs were not prepared to send their liaison officer. Colonel Lund and I decided to "make a break for it" and we were joined by the Belgian Consul General, two Jews who had been wounded, the U.N. Staff consisting of Mr. Azcarate and Mr. McCabe[13] and a number of others. After a rather exciting trip we managed ultimately to reach safety. I took the Belgian Consul back to his Consulate in Talbieh. On the way we were stopped by a platoon of Jewish troops moving up into positions. When they heard the Belgian Consul was Chairman of the Truce Commission, the Platoon Commander was extremely indignant about the cease-fire which they had strictly observed under Arab fire, and as a result had lost a number of men. The boy's obvious sincere indignation and undiplomatic approach greatly impressed the Belgian. As I said good night to him, he held me back and asked me why we were considering the Red Cross plan at all. He could tell me privately that both Azzam Pasha[14] and Abdullah had agreed to the Consular Truce Commission's proposals. I expressed surprise that the Truce Commission had not seen fit to convey this to our representatives before now, and I understand that next morning, when the Belgian spoke to Berman about the same thing, the latter also expressed surprise, especially in view of the fact that he has been in constant touch with the Belgian Counsul, both before and during the present negotiations.

On Saturday, May 15th, Colonel Lund met the Haganah Commander of Jerusalem and it was agreed that another attempt would be made to have a cease-fire, beginning that evening at 19.00 hours, provided neither forces

12. לפרטים — ראה תעודות, נובמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס׳ 466, 475.
13. ג׳וזף מקייב, מצוות האו״ם בארץ־ישראל, ראה להלן עמ׳ 47.
14. עבד אל־רחמן עזאם פאשה. המזכיר הכללי של הליגה הערבית.

advanced after that time, that truce negotiations would be completed within 48 hours of the beginning of the cease-fire, and that at least two hours' notice would be given in advance of the commencement of the cease-fire. At the same time, members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem met to discuss the question and they asked for an interview with representatives of the Truce Commission that afternoon. This was granted for 16.00 hours. The Executive, accompanied by Dr. Leo Kohn, met certain members of the Commission and discussed the whole problem with them for several hours. The result of their discussions was agreement on the text of a draft Truce Agreement, copy of which is attached (Appendix B).[15] No reply was received from the Arabs by 19.00 hours about a cease-fire. Colonel Lund was in constant touch with Fadel Bey, the Iraqi Commander in Jerusalem, who seemed to agree in principle to the cease-fire. He stated, however, that he had to refer the whole matter to Amman and that he expected a reply that night by 22.00 hours. At 22.00 hours Colonel Lund was informed by Fadel Bey that King Abdullah and various Chiefs of Staff were still in conference on the subject and that therefore no reply would be forthcoming until the next day. At 10.00 hours the next day Colonel Lund received no communication as promised, and did his best to contact Fadel Bey who, throughout the morning, was not available. Colonel Lund interpreted this rightly as the Arab way of saying no to an offer of cease-fire. In fact, from our own intelligence sources it was perfectly clear that the Arabs were not interested in a case-fire agreement, and that they regarded the Red Cross and the U.N. Commission as nuisances and instruments to be used only for their own purposes.

On Monday, the 17th May, Sheringham[16] phoned from the British Consulate and asked whether we had any means of getting the members of the Truce Commission to Haifa by plane, with a view to their ultimately going on to Amman. I promised a reply and sent a query to Tel Aviv, but meanwhile we learnt that arrangements had been made for a Red Cross car to take Azcarate and the Belgian Consul to Amman. Eytan and myself lunched with Colonel Lund, who was to have gone to Amman as well, but did not, and he expressed the opinion that McCabe, the Administrative Officer sent out to Palestine by the U.N. with Azcarate, was a British agent who was causing us a lot of trouble.

The same afternoon, Dr. L. Kohn, who had been lunching with Marti,[17] head of the Red Cross, attempted to point out how the Red Cross was not performing its proper functions and engaging in politics under de Reynier. He tried to bring Colonel Lund and M. Marti together, so that the Red

15. ראה "Articles of a draft truce agreement for Jerusalem and the residential supply lines leading to that City", 15.5.1948, S25/5176 אצ"מ
16. ג'ון שרינגהם, סגן־הקונסול של בריטניה בירושלים.
17. רולאנד מרטי, ראש המחלקה הרפואית של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי, חבר משלחת הצלב האדום לארץ־ישראל.

Cross and the Truce Commission could cooperate. Both were extremely willing to carry this out, but nothing ultimately developed from this.

In the meantime, the Belgian Consul had telephoned to say that he understood that the Arabs had launched a heavy attack on the Jewish quarters in the Old City. He was very apprehensive of the results of such an attack and feared a wholesale massacre. He begged us to get in touch with him at the earliest possible opportunity if we thought there was such danger, so that theTruce Commission could take what steps they might be able, to avert a calamity.

On Tuesday morning, the 18th May, the Arabs launched their long awaited attack in the Old City. Half way through the morning the Armenian Patriarch rang to say that the Arabs had blown open the doors of his Patriarchate and several scores of them were firing at the Jewish quarters from there. He sounded very agitated and implored us not to retaliate against his buildings as he was doing all that was humanly possible to get the Arabs to leave his place. In this connection he also phoned the Truce Commission and numerous other religious bodies within the Old City. We telephoned a formal protest to Mr. Azcarate against the breach of the agreement reached with the Trusteeship Council some weeks ago on the subject of a cease-fire for the Old City, which had been meticulously observed by our people. Later, Mr. Azcarate phoned to say that he had submitted this protest in the strongest possible language, but the sound of the heavy firing and the increasing number of explosions testified to the ineffective result of his protest.

All day the news from the Old City was bad and there was constant danger of our garrison being overwhelmed by sheer superiority of numbers and fire-power. Unofficial and indirect approaches were made by private bodies in the city, especially by religious groups who were interested to know what the terms of surrender would be for the Jewish population in the Old City, their prime worry being to avert a massacre.

On Tuesday evening the Belgian Consul and Mr. Azcarate returned from Amman by way of Jericho and entered the Old City. They apparently spent the night at or near the Arab headquarters, as their telephonic conversations were extremely guarded. The Belgian Consul had, however, phoned through at 22.30 hours and conveyed the following terms of surrender for the Old City. The mediator had been the Father Custodian of the Holy Places (Custos Terrae Sanctae).[18]

1) All men between the ages of 15 and 55, as well as the slightly wounded, were to be taken prisoners of war.

2) All women, boys under 15, men over 55 and the severely wounded, were to be evacuated from the Old City by the Red Cross.

3) All arms to be handed over to the Arabs.

18. ראש מסדר הפרנציסקנים בארץ־ישראל, האב אלברטו גורי.

4) All sacred places to be put under the custody of the Latin Patriarchate or the Moslem Supreme Council, or both.

5) All persons who surrendered would be required, before leaving the Old City, to go into their houses to ensure they were not mined.

6) The Arabs required the signatures of the Jewish Agency, the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Le'umi and the Stern Group to the surrender terms.

7) The persons to be removed from the Old City by the Red Cross would not be released to the Jews until Arab prisoners taken in Jerusalem had been released.

These terms were turned down, and the Belgian Consul was informed there was no intention of surrendering in the Old City.

That night the Palmach Battalion "Haportzim" made their historic attack on Mount Zion and drove into the Old City, effecting a conjunction with the beleaguered garrison inside the Jewish Quarter. (It will be to our everlasting discredit that this historic and gallant action was not properly reported to the world in time because of the inadequate arrangements which we had made to send stories of the battle out of Jerusalem, due primarily to lack of cooperation on the part of our security forces.) Meanwhile, all night Jerusalem was being heavily shelled by Arab artillery from outside the city.

Next day the Commander of the Haganah consulted with members of the Political Department and said that in view of the fact that our situation was now improved, he thought it might be possible to renew negotiations for a cease-fire in the Old City, as he had no desire to continue the attack. We had also by now established contact with our forces there and could secure the Jewish quarter, and therefore it might be propitious to discuss the matter. A letter was conveyed to the Truce Commission by Dr. L. Kohn, Walter Eytan and Ch. Berman. Copy of this letter is attached (Appendix C).[19]

Meanwhile, the Arab Legion had entered Jerusalem, and the Irgun Zvai Le'umi garrison at Sheikh Jarrah and the Police School on Mount Scopus had withdrawn, two columns of armour approaching from the north and from the east.

Later, the British Consul, in a conversation on the telephone, told us that Legion armour was parked near the Consulate at Damascus Gate and asked us to respect the immunity of his Consulate. The shelling during the night and day from Legion batteries intensified and direct hits were scored on numerous hospitals, consulates, public institutions, etc. During the day we learnt from the Truce Commission, who had endeavoured to get in touch with the Legion via the British Consulate, that there was no prospect of achieving a cease-fire in the Old City, and it was hinted very broadly that

19. ראה מס' 41.

the British had a large part in this. That Consul had at all events not shown very much desire to do anything effective in this connection. That night the shelling was still more intense and the Hadassah Hospital was hit at point-blank range by the Legion from Sheikh Jarrah. The operating theatre, the radium institute, the x-ray department were blasted. As soon as this began, we protested to the Red Cross, who later phoned and suggested we hoist a white flag, that the garrison surrender, and then they would be prepared to take over the hospital as a Red Cross institution. This was flatly turned down without even referring it to our military people. We also communicated with the American Consul,[20] who was informed by the Arabs when he approached them that if the American flag was hoisted on the Hadassah, the Legion would occupy and "protect it"! We also made a formal protest to the Truce Commission and asked that it be transmitted to Lake Success. In an effort to save the priceless property at the University and in Hadassah an unofficial approach was made to see if the U.N. would be willing to take these institutions under its flag, but the U.N. people intimated they did not think the Arabs would respect their flag and so there was little point in doing this.

We received a report on the conversation between King Abdullah on the one hand and Mr. Azcarate and the Belgian Consul in Amman on Tuesday. He received them in a very undignified manner, being attired in breeches and a lumber jacket. He was in a very bad mood and extremely nervous. He was bellicose in his references to the Jews, and when Mr. Azcarate in his capacity as temporary Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem asked him about the water supply, Abdullah flared up and said he would let the Jews of Jerusalem die of thirst. He had never before appeared so obviously in the role of a puppet of the British. Glubb Pasha is directing the campaign and Abdullah's orders are thrown into the waste-paper basket. They saw ample evidence of this during their journey and also noted the fact that the British Staff is active in this campaign. They met Kirkbride, the British Minister,[21] whose sole constructive remark to them appears to have been that they had come to Abdullah on one of his off-days. Azcarate had taken with him an extremely strongly-worded protest forwarded by the Security Council for transmission to Abdullah, and this was received with scant contempt [*sic*] by the King who was obviously not willing to listen to reason.[22]

On Thursday, May 20th, the front stabilized as a result of some six Legion armoured vehicles being knocked out at the approaches to the City.

Eytan and myself had a conversation with Lund in the afternoon, in which we tried to explore possibilities still left to the Truce Commission. Lund stated that as the Commission saw it, there were three possibilities:

20. תומאס ואסון, הקונסול של ארצות־הברית בירושלים; נהרג ב־23.5.1948.
21. סר אלק קרקברייד, ציר בריטניה בעבר־הירדן.
22. ראה מס׳ 40.

either the Jews win, or the Arabs win, or there is a stalemate. In the latter event there was still some useful purpose in their existence.

An attempt was made to find out from Lund whether it would not be possible for Azcarate to assert himself more, both in the eyes of the people of Jerusalem and in the eyes of the world, as the U.N. Commissioner for Jerusalem. Up to now he had behaved in an apathetic and lethargic manner, not even informing the citizens of Jerusalem that he was the U.N. Municipal Commissioner. In fact the ordinary man in the street was not aware that such a U.N. Commissioner existed for Jerusalem. Lund said that Azcarate was afraid of releasing this information only to one side, but we pointed out that there were numerous possibilities of making this known to the Arab world and the Arab civilian population of Jerusalem, and once he began to assert himself, power would gradually accrue to him. We left Lund with this thought in mind, and he promised to see what could be done to impress Azcarate with the importance of this. At the same time he pointed out that McCabe was not playing a clean game and was gradually influencing Azcarate.

The above is a very inadequate attempt to place on record a few of the salient events in the political life of Jerusalem during the first week of the State of Israel. To understand the whole background against which this political game is being played, the reader is advised to see Eytan's graphic account of conditions in the city during the first week. The city is suffering from a shortage of food and of water, and there is no electricity with the result that no news is heard on the radio. For the past four days we have been subjected to almost continuous shelling at point-blank range. The physical background of the Truce Commission has been equally difficult, although this is in the main due to the obstinate insistence on meetings being held at the French Consulate which is probably one of the most exposed buildings in the entire city and where already six people have been wounded. For the past three days the Consulate has been without a telephone, which makes the Commission's work even more difficult.

The Red Cross have shown themselves to be virtually ineffective due to a complete lack of cooperation on the part of the Arabs and also partly to the fact that its director in Palestine, M. de Reynier, has been playing what might be termed as a sinister game of politics. He is certainly no friend of the Jews and in the last few days has been taking an active part in the war of nerves against us. His headquarters in the Y.M.C.A. is entirely staffed by young Arabs of military age, and since the U.N. Secretariat have also moved there, communication with them is also difficult and most unreliable.

Other points which stand out are Colonel Lund's sincere honesty and straightforwardness and Mr. Azcarate's ineffectual inactivity. The Truce Commission has succeeded nowhere and is unlikely to succeed until the Arabs have received a number of resounding knocks.

The end of the first week in Jerusalem, after the establishment of the State of Israel, finds the city under heavy gun fire, the Hadassah hospital being blasted at point-blank range, and the Truce Commission busy with meetings.

Vivian Herzog

Note: As the Appendices to this document are still in Jerusalem, it is impossible to obtain them in time for despatch. They will be forwarded later to addressees.

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ט. לי אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
T. Lie to A. Eban (New York)

מקור: 93.03/130/3

Lake Success, 21 May 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee of the General Assembly, composed of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and established by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948 (document A/554)[1] has chosen, on 20 May 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte as the United Nations Mediator in Palestine.

I shall be grateful if you would advise your authorities in Palestine accordingly.

Count Bernadotte is proceeding to Paris as soon as possible, where he will be joined by the Secretariat assigned by me to assist him in the performance of his duties.

In the case you will find it useful for your representatives to get in contact with Count Bernadotte as soon as he arrives in Paris, I suggest that inquiries about his whereabouts in Paris should be made through the United Nations Office there.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

Trygve Lie
Secretary-General

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1. ראה נספח א, עמ' 663—664.

50

א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 25/39. התקבל: 22.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 21 May 1948

Lie officially addressed Eban as acting representative Israel to U.N. regarding appointment U.N. Mediator.[1]

Feel you should know your reference in cable to Lie "accessibility, sound advice"[2] aroused some comment Secretariat.[3]

Lourie

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 123
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 21 May 1948

Yours 99/42.[1] Fully realise my 15th[2] not strictly in accordance formalities, but considerations public relations made immediate approach general terms imperative. Had intended follow up with formal approach, including requisite declaration and undertaking. Robinson urged this strongly before my departure; has he changed mind? Suggest you consult *Tetlamed*.[3] Cable.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס' 49.
2. מס' 9.
3. שרתוק הסביר שכוונתו היתה לעזרה ולעצה בענייני נוהל, כגון למי וכיצד להפנות את אשגרי הממשלה הזמנית. (ראה מברקו אל לוריא, 27.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).

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1. מס' 22.
2. מס' 6.
3. טריגווה לי.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH 133
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 21 May 1948

Regarding *Marine Carp.*[1] Exact number detainees is 69, of whom 23 Palestinians, 41 United States citizens. They tried resist and crew was ready help them, but United States minister came on board and urged them submit view avoiding bloodshed. According report he stated Lebanese authorities entitled remove them and he would communicate Washington. Consult Robinson regarding legal aspect. Cable results your action.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 17/194. התקבל: 23.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 21 May 1948

To facilitate activity here[1] suggest that you, Ben-Gurion, telegraph immediately Secretary of State Marshall as follows: "The Provisional Government extremely grateful for the firm support U.S.A. Government has given to cause of justice in defence of Israel against aggression. People of Israel determined to offer their lives in defence of State. While we defending, we might have had proceed [*sic*] with immigration, settlement remnant our people. In these circumstances feel justified calling on democrats of the world, in the forefront upon U.S.A. Government, help us preserving our independence. We do not ask U.S.A. Government to fight for us, we do ask immediate material assistance. We request from U.S.A. Government: First, military equipment approximately 70 millions. It is to U.S.A. Government alone to decide by what means their assistance can be best rendered. [?Second], we propose to apply at once normal manner for immediate credit approximately 40,000,000—50,000,000 dollars from Export-Import Bank not used entirely for productive purpose connected can relieve settlement development [*sic*]. We expect be in a position to

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1. ראה מס' 44.

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1. ראה מס' 37.

satisfy [—] full. The Provisional Government of Israel instructing its minister designate Washington office take up the matter with your Government and give you any further information. We trust it will be possible for U.S.A. Government to make high policy decision in our favour of these two proposals." Recommend you send immediately message and inform us exact text. Amount mentioned in draft cable represents my, Gass, Ginsburg [?estimate] on what might be acceptable, but suggest you consult Kaplan, others.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 20/167. התקבל: 24.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 21 May 1948

Following learned reliable source: 1) British Minister Balfour[1] visited Lovett 21st May general discussion relation Israel and [—]. British Minister emphasized believes Israel will be able defend frontiers, by implication thus suggestion for immediate action modification embargo not required. Further [—] British anticipate Israel counter-attack will drive [—] from Arab territories; this he states would require British intervention, since Arab territories promised Abdullah. Balfour believes Abdullah seeking take Jerusalem to raise prestige, and concluded Abdullah may also wish annex certain areas. Understand Lovett did not react regarding Jerusalem, but firmly declared annexation any Israel territories plain aggression, that after (?) U.S. recognized Israel also recognized 29th November boundary [—] cannot accept revising boundary by Arab forces [—].[2] U.S. extending high pressure on China in cooperation with Security Council.[3]

Learned Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs very indignant British behaviour Palestine, said to friend: "British digging their own grave in Jerusalem."

Arrest U.S. citizens by Lebanon[4] cause (?) favourable for us. Discussing this issue with State Department, received assurance their full support.

Epstein

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1. סר ג'ון באלפור, ציר בשגרירות בריטניה בוואשינגטון, ובאותם הימים — ממונה על השגרירות.
2. השווה הדין־וחשבון של לווט על שיחה זו, *FRUS*, 1948,V, pp.1019-20.
3. החלק האחרון של המשפט משובש ואולי צריך לקרוא for cooperation in Security Council, והשווה מס' 56, עמ' 56.
4. ראה מס' 44.

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ב. לוקר אל מ. שרתוק
B. Locker to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 1/82. התקבל: 22.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 21 May 1948

Very important to publish soonest official declaration that Israel accepts borders laid down 29th November, claims no part territory assigned [?Arab State], and territories occupied defence measures will be returned as soon as peace restored, and we shall respect Jerusalem decision. Fact that independence proclamation not explicit this point used against us. Harold MacMillan[1] yesterday asked whether this is absolutely clear.[2]

Gregory Farber,[3] who works for Bernstein[4] on fuel, asks if advisable to sound his friends regarding war plane. Please telegraph.

Locker

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

תזכיר: 130.02/2414/22

[New York], 21 May 1948

Last minute information:

1. The United States has instructed the Ambassador in London to approach Bevin urgently, emphasizing the importance of passage of the American resolution and strong action in the Security Council. Failure to do this, the Ambassador is to report, would prolong the condition of war in Palestine. *It would prejudice European Recovery Programme.* Simultaneously, strong diplomatic pressure has been brought to bear by the United States on Canada and Belgium and on China, whose representative, despite instructions to follow American lead, is strongly upholding the British-Arab front.[1]

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1. הארולד מקמילן, חבר הפרלמנט מטעם המפלגה השמרנית.
2. פרטים נוספים אינם ידועים.
3. גרגורי פרבר, איש־עסקים תושב ישראל, תיווך בעיסקות נפט ובין היתר — ברכישה הראשונה של מוצרי נפט מברית־המועצות.
4. פרץ ברנשטיין, שר־המסחר והתעשייה בממשלת ישראל.

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1. ראה מס׳ 43.

2. The firm United States attitude resulted in the certain defeat of the British proposal in the Security Council. U.S.S.R., Ukraine, United States, France, Colombia and Argentine have indicated their inability to support that proposal. The first five have also supported the American resolution. The Americans are trying to secure that, once the British amendment has fallen, Belgium and Canada will vote for the American resolution, though it may be necessary even then to water the resolution down in its reference to Article 39.[2]

3. There is the closest strategic and tactical cooperation between ourselves and the local *mishlachat.*[3] We concerted action to avoid a vote against presenting the questions to Israel. The answers, however, will be definitely presented on behalf of the Provisional Government. When this is done, we, on our part, plan to announce that the Jewish Agency is no longer the body capable of speaking on behalf of the residents of Israel, and that we must be seated in future as the Provisional Government of Israel. There is the precedent of the Provisional Government of Indonesia, which was admitted to the table before it was recognized either by the United Nations or by any single member of the Security Council.[4] (It was to this precedent that I was referring and to which the Senator[5] referred in saying that position at the table did not in itself raise problems of recognition. The observation was entirely accurate, though I now agree that the public relations effect should have been more cautiously appraised. At the same time, I should like you to react rather to the verbatim reports than to press extracts of doubtful accuracy).[6]

4. The pattern of American policy is very clear and for the time being, their determination to get the State of Israel established, free from invasion and threat, is sincere and whole-hearted. The plan is: First stage, to obtain a cease-fire order even if the breach of the peace paragraph cannot yet be carried. Second, when the Arabs break the cease-fire order, a renewed attempt will be made to secure a charge of aggression. Even if it fails, through the hopeless composition of the Security Council, the United States will then be free to take unilateral action, including lifting of the embargo in our favour. The breaking of a cease-fire order by Abdullah will make the British position intolerable and smoke them out of their legalistic contention that Abdullah has done no international wrong.

2. ראה הערת־עורך עמ׳ 17.
3. משלחת ארצות־הברית לאו״ם.
4. המדובר בהחלטה של מועצת־הביטחון באוגוסט 1947 לאפשר לנציגי הרפובליקה של אינדונזיה לקחת חלק בדיונים על הסכסוך בינה לבין הולנד, אף שאינדונזיה לא היתה חברה באו״ם. המצדדים בשמיעת הנציגים האינדונזיים הטעימו, שתמיכה בהופעת אינדונזיה במועצת־הביטחון אינה מהווה הכרה במדינה. (ראה *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947/48*, p. 365).
5. וורן אוסטין, ראש המשלחת של ארצות־הברית באו״ם, סנטור ריפובליקני לשעבר.
6. ראה מס׳ 33.

5. The Soviets agree entirely that the passage of the United States resolution would be an important practical gain for us, though they object to certain details which they will amend, if possible.

6. Abdullah's refusal to reply to the questionnaire[7] has caused irritation even among the lukewarm delegations and has confirmed general suspicion about Britain's action. A situation of embarrassment has arisen for Cadogan owing to his persistent silence on the Arab Legion matter after so many accusations from us and from others.

7. The whole basis of the American plan rests upon the hope that a situation can be created in which Arab violation of the cease-fire order can be fairly clearly proved. For this reason, great importance should be attached to contact with the Truce Commission and with the Mediator when he arrives.

8. A sort of de facto acceptance of our status is growing, to the extent that we shall soon force the issue of accepting the Provisional Government or having an empty chair. Naturally, we shall first consult with the comrade[8] and the Senator on this matter. There are signs of a tentative improvement in the French position, and Lopez'[9] vehement and cynical attack on the cables from Transjordan and Egypt was the surprise of the session.

9. The Arabs here are subdued. Fawzi has been silent since I challenged him on Tuesday, with some personal heat directed to himself, to cite a provision of the Charter which would justify the use of armed force by the bombardment of Tel Aviv. Malik[10] is almost non-existent and he sought out an opportunity to tell me that he enjoyed what I said on Tuesday. Since this was a somewhat violent assault on the Egyptians, Malik's greetings are amusing.

In conclusion, at the moment, we have a certain momentum in the Security Council which can be developed. A cause of major anxiety is the lack of government directives from home, especially on military policy, which could assist our formulation and representation here. We attach great importance at this stage to the development and completion of all the formal and external insignia of statehood, since the irrevocability of May 15 is becoming increasingly impressed on the public mind.

In the appointment of representatives and the effort for recognition, high priority should be devoted to the Security Council powers. The press is beginning to reflect the bitterness between America and Britain, which is

7. שאלון מועצת־הביטחון — ראה מס׳ 18. עבר־הירדן היתה המדינה הערבית היחידה שלא השיבה לשאלון. בתשובתה על פניית מועצת־הביטחון צוין, שארצות־הברית — יוזמת השאלון — ומועצת־הביטחון עדיין לא הכירו בממשלת עבר־הירדן ולא המליצו על קבלתה לאו״ם. (ראה מסמך או״ם S/760).

8. אנדרי גרומיקו.

9. אלפונסו לופס, נציג קולומביה באו״ם.

10. שארל מאליק, ציר לבנון בארצות־הברית ונציגה באו״ם.

now openly spoken of by "inspired" correspondents such as James Reston.[11]

Finally, once again, more frequent directives on matters with a military implication are urgent.

P.S. The Weizmann appointment[12] has made a profound impression in U.N. circles. During the final days before the 15th of May, his opposition to the U.S. truce proposal had become generally known and had psychological effects.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 2/102
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1

[Tel Aviv], 22 May 1948 (16.00)

Please ask State Department for immediate reply regarding release fighter-bomber aircraft and anti-aircraft anti-tank artillery, yes or no. Also apply immediately Soviet embassy for transmission request Moscow similar assistance. For your background, air raids Tel Aviv growing in frequency, intensity and damage, causing serious disruption industry, commerce, office work, schools. Morale time being superb, but fear serious deterioration if city continues virtually defenceless. Don't plead with State Department, only ask, but stress we determined obtain these weapons as it is a matter life death. Matter extremely urgent.[1] Inform Weizmann.[2]

Shertok

11. ראה כתבה של רסטון ב"ניו יורק טיימס" מיום 20.5.1948, על חשש של חוגים במחלקת־המדינה בוואשינגטון, שהקרע בין בריטניה וארצות־הברית בשאלת ארץ־ישראל עלול להקל על חדירת הסובייטים למזרח התיכון.
12. וייצמן נבחר לנשיא מועצת־המדינה ב־16.5.1948.

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1. נשלח בעקבות ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית ב־20.5.1948, בה דרשו שרי מפ"ם, מ. בנטוב וא. ציזלינג, לפנות אל מדינות העולם ובמיוחד אל ברית־המועצות בבקשה דחופה לאספקת נשק. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 20.5.1948).
2. לא נמצאה פניה של אפשטיין למחלקת־המדינה או לשגרירות הרוסית בוואשינגטון להסרת האמברגו. אך העניין נדון בשיחה בין וייצמן והנשיא טרומן ב־25.5.1948 (ראה מס' 82). מדיניותה של ארצות־הברית בעניין אספקת נשק למדינות המזרח התיכון הוגדרה בתזכיר של מחלקת־המדינה לנשיא טרומן, מיום 22.5.1948; בתזכיר כלולה המלצה, שעל־פיה ארצות־הברית תשקול מחדש את שאלת המשך האמברגו רק אם מועצת־הביטחון לא תצליח להביא לידי הפסקת־אש או לאכוף אמברגו נשק כללי. (ראה *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1027-28).

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ז'. ניואנהויס אל המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית (ירושלים)
J. Nieuwenhuys to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem)

העתק: אצ"מ S25/8176

Jerusalem, 22 May 1948

Dear Sirs,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 19th inst. in which you kindly informed me of the position in the Old City of Jerusalem as it was in fact on that day.[1]

As you are aware, I endeavoured to forward your offer of a cease-fire in the Old City of Jerusalem to the Arab authorities in person; unfortunately, as the fighting was very severe when we reached Me'a She'arim Police Station, we very reluctantly had to give up the idea of conveying the message ourselves, and I was compelled therefore to give it over the telephone to my British colleague, Mr. Beaumont[2] who, a few minutes later, rang me up from Arab headquarters intimating that the offer had been rejected. He seemed to suggest that this line had been taken by the Arab High Command on account of the proviso mentioning a direct line of communication between the Jewish Section of the Old City and the town of Jerusalem.

The Arab Commander-in-Chief, to whom I spoke personally later on, confirmed that he wished to hear of nothing less than unconditional surrender.

On those terms obviously no agreement was possible.

I hope to have better luck in the future, and expressing to you again all my gratitude for the swiftness with which you provided an escort and my admiration for the courage and steadfastness of your boys in those somewhat troublesome circumstances, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

Jean Nieuwenhuys
Belgian Consul General

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1. ראה מס' 41.
2. ריצ'ארד א. בומונט, קונסול בריטניה בירושלים.

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ו. איתן אל מ. שרתוק
W. Eytan to M. Shertok

מברק 686
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2451/4

[ירושלים], 22 במאי 1948 (20.30)

אני מציע שמדינת ישראל תפרסם לאלתר הכרזה פומבית לפי הקווים דלהלן; הנני מציע שתשקול מיד את הדבר:

ירושלים משמשת מטרה להתקפה פראית ובלתי־מוצדקת מצד כוחות ערביים, בהנהלה בריטית ובציוד אנגלי. כוחות אלה כבר הרסו מקומות קדושים רבים, וללא אבחנה התקיפו את האזרחים. הישוב היהודי בירושלים עומד מול התקפות אלה והודף אותן, אולם אין זאת אומרת שיש לעם היהודי שאיפות פוליטיות או טריטוריאליות בירושלים. הסכמנו לבינלאומיות של העיר, והיה ברור שההתקפה הערבית היא נגד עיר בינלאומית. עודנו עומדים בהסכמתנו בדבר בינלאומיותה של ירושלים, אולם אנו מתרים בעולם כולו: אם תוך 48 שעות לא תיפסק ההתקפה, נילחם במעשה תוקפנות זה רחוב אחרי רחוב, בית אחרי בית, אבן אחרי אבן, גם אם פירושו של דבר שירושלים תיחרב כולה, כפי שעלול לקרות. ועוד הננו מתרים, שלאחר מאבקנו זה על ירושלים נחשוב את העיר כחלק בלתי־נפרד של מדינת ישראל, ולא נהיה עוד קשורים להחלטה על בינלאומיותה.

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבה ה־302 של מועצת־הביטחון, ביום 22.5.1948, נערכה הצבעה על הצעת־ההחלטה האמריקאית והצעת־התיקון הבריטית (ראה נספחים ב, ג, עמ' 664, 665). ההצעה האמריקאית לא זכתה לרוב; ההצעה הבריטית התקבלה, להוציא את הסעיף הראשון ובתיקונים מסוימים בסעיף השלישי. על־פי ההחלטה, נתבקשו הצדדים הלוחמים בארץ־ישראל להפסיק את האש, שלושים ושש שעות לאחר חצות לפי שעון ניו יורק, 22 במאי 1948. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 302nd Meeting, 22.5.1948; נספח ד, עמ' 666).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 27/75. התקבל: 25.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 22 May 1948

After meeting, Austin, Ross,[1] informed me /regard/ resolution passed today only as first inadequate step. They believe Arab refusal order cease-

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1. ג'ון רוס, חבר משלחת ארצות־הברית לאו"ם.

fire will be followed by passage resolution by [Security] Council act aggression. Obviously essential utmost /care/ our side making clear initiative fighting from Arab /side/.

Believe time ripe press issue our admission Security Council as non-member state under procedure Rule 14,[2] even at risk rejection. Please cable views but withhold action.

Eban

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א. אבן אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
A. Eban to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/130/3

New York, 22 May 1948

Sir,

I am directed by the Provisional Government of Israel to communicate to you the following replies to the questions addressed by the Security Council at its 295th meeting, held on May 18, 1948, to the "Jewish authorities in Palestine".[1] These questions were transmitted by me to the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of Israel in Tel Aviv.

I have to point out that the designation "Jewish authorities", which applied in the past to the Jewish Agency for Palestine and to the National Council of theJews of Palestine (Va'ad Le'umi), now applies to the Provisional State Council and the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, jointly established by those bodies, and in which, since May 15, 1948, all legislative, executive and judiciary powers in the State of Israel are now vested.

I have the honour, Sir, to be, Your obedient servent,

Aubrey S. Eban

נספח
APPENDIX

REPLIES OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SECURITY COUNCIL QUESTIONNAIRE

Question (a): Over which areas of Palestine do you actually exercise control at the present time?

2. ראה מס' 31 והערה 2 שם.

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1. ראה מס' 29.

Answer to Question (a): The Provisional Government of Israel actually exercises control at present over the entire area of the Jewish State as defined in the Resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th of November, 1947. In addition, the Provisional Government exercises control over the city of Jaffa; Northwestern Galilee, including Acre, Zib, Bassa and the Jewish settlements up to the Lebanese frontier; a strip of territory alongside the road from Hulda to Jerusalem; almost all of new Jerusalem; and of the Jewish Quarter within the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem. The above areas, outside the territory of the State of Israel, are under the control of the military authorities of the State of Israel, who are strictly adhering to international regulations in this regard. The Southern Negev is uninhabited desert over which no effective authority has ever existed.

Question (b): Do you have armed forces operating in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Arabs are the majority, or outside Palestine?

Answer to Question (b): We consider the territory of Israel as a single unit with a Jewish majority. As indicated above, the Government of the State of Israel operates in parts of Palestine outside the territory of the State of Israel, parts which, with the notable exception of Jerusalem, formerly, for the most part, contained Arab majorities. These areas have, however, been mostly abandoned by their Arab population. No area outside of Palestine is under Jewish occupation, but sallies beyond the frontiers of the State of Israel have occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces for imperative military reasons, and as a part of an essentially defensive plan.

Question (c): If so, on what basis do you attempt to justify such operations?

Answer to Question (c): The above operations in areas outside the State of Israel are justified on the following grounds:

1. In order to repel aggression, and as part of our essentially defensive plan, to prevent these areas being used as bases for attacks against the State of Israel.
2. In order to protect Jewish population, traffic and economic life, including the protection of those Jewish settlements outside the area of the State where, owing to the absence of any duly constituted authority and the failure to implement the guarantees and safeguards provided for under the General Assembly Plan, life and property are in imminent danger. Similar considerations apply in the absence of any international statute for the City of Jerusalem to the Jewish area of that City.

Question (d): Have you arranged for the entry into Palestine in the near future of men of military age from outside Palestine? If so, what are the numbers and where are they coming from?

Answer to Question (d): Arrangements have been and are being made for the entry into Palestine of Jewish immigrants of all ages and both sexes

from various countries in accordance with the avowed object and primary purposes of the State of Israel to open its gates for large-scale immigration. The State of Israel regards the matter of immigration as a matter within its domesic jurisdiction.

Question (e): Are you negotiating with Arab authorities regarding either the truce or a political settlement in Palestine?

Answer to Question (e): No such negotiations are at present proceeding. The Secretary-General of the Arab League was informed immediately after the November Resolution that the Jews are ready to negotiate for peaceful collaboration on the basis of implementation of the Resolution of the General Assembly of November 29th.[2] To this no reply was received. Repeated approaches were also made to King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, offering on behalf of the Jewish State peace and good neighbourliness, but these offers were rejected by King Abdullah, who insisted that the whole of Palestine come under his rule and that the Jews accept Arab nationality and rest content with regional autonomy.[3]

We have on repeated occasions indicated our affirmative attitude to cease-fire proposals coming from British authorities in Palestine and various organs of the United Nations. The cease-fire in the Old City initiated by the Trusteeship Council and observed by the Jews, was broken by the Arabs.

Question (f): Have you named your representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purposes of effecting the truce called for by the Security Council?

Answer to Question (f): When the Security Council adopted the Truce Resolution, the Provisional Government of the State of Israel did not yet exist, but the Jewish Agency kept in close touch with the Truce Commission in Jerusalem from its inception. This liaison has now been taken over by the Provisional Government.

Question (g): Will you agree to an immediate and unconditional truce for the City of Jerusalem and the Holy Places?

Answer to Question (g): Yes.

Question (h): Have Arab forces penetrated into the territory over which you claim to have authority?

Answer to Question (h): Arab forces have penetrated into the territory of the State of Israel in certain corners of the Northern Negev and in the Jordan Valley south of Lake Tiberias. In addition, planes of the Royal Egyptian Air Force have repeatedly raided Tel Aviv and southern Jewish settlements, while Iraqi air-force planes have been raiding settlements in the Northern Jordan Valley and artillery of the Syrian and Lebanese armies have been shelling settlements in Upper Galilee from across the frontier.

2. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 14.
3. שם, מס' 506.

62

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

[New York],[1] *23 May 1948*

In Council today I conditioned our traditional cease-fire attitude as follows:

1) Simultaneous cease-fire observance by each and all Arab armies is condition of any Jewish cease-fire.

2) Our understanding [that] cease-fire is provisional arrangement to be swiftly followed by removal foreign armies to their original territories, otherwise warned cease-fire always unstable.

These formulations reached here by consultation, including Goldie [Meyerson],[2] but much handicapped lack your directives.

On cease-fire clause[3] ten voted for and Syrian against. Soviets abstained on clauses relating to Truce Commission and therefore on resolution as whole.

63

א. אבן, א. אפשטיין, א. לוריא וי. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban, E. Epstein, A. Lourie and J. Robinson to M. Shertok

מברק 32
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 23 May 1948

Suggest following as clearest form action in view decisive meeting Monday, Tuesday.[1] You immediately approach Truce Commission offering cease-fire on deadline, provided Arab Higher Committee and five governments which confessed their forces in Palestine give same assurance. Also ask Truce Commission ascertain if those parties prepared issue such

62

1. נשלח באמצעות סוכנות הידיעות פלקור, דרך לונדון.
2. גולדה מאירסון נשלחה לארצות־הברית כדי לנהל שיחות מדיניות ולסייע בגיוס כספים.
3. ראה סעיף שני בנספח ד, עמ' 666.

63

1. בישיבות אלה של מועצת־הביטחון עמדו להתקבל תגובות ישראל ומדינות ערב על החלטת המועצה בדבר הפסקת־אש.

order. Press here unanimous Austin ready propose Chapter VII[2] against those not prepared to issue cease-fire order. Important we receive immediate information steps taken and intended.

Eban, Epstein, Lourie, Robinson

64

מ. שרתוק אל ח. וייצמן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to C. Weizmann (New York)

מברק מוצפן 17/82. התקבל: 24.5
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

Tel Aviv, 23 May 1948 (18.45)

Further to my open cable.[1] Am anxious as you improve relations with British but see little hope of change heart their part. Bevin's implacability, Cadogan's casuistry and Glubb's views, Arab Legion shelling Degania A and University and massing forces for attack elsewhere — point unmistakable inexorable line of crushing Jewish State or reducing it to Woodhead size[2] and letting neighbouring beasts devour large part of Palestine. Perhaps you can help London.

Shertok

65

המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית אל פ. אסקאראטה (ירושלים)
The Political Department of the Jewish Agency to P. Azcarate (Jerusalem)

רישום שיחת טלפון: אצ"מ S25/5634

[Jerusalem], 23 May 1948

The competent Jewish authorities in Jerusalem state that King Abdullah's offer with regard to Mount Scopus[1] cannot be accepted for the following reasons:

1) The Hadassah buildings on Mount Scopus are hospital buildings. They fly the Red Shield Flag, which is the accepted equivalent of

2. הפרק השביעי של מגילת האו"ם עניינו — פעולות הארגון ביחס לאיומים על השלום, הפרת השלום ומעשי תוקפנות.

64

1. בתשובה למס' 26 הבריק שרתוק אל וייצמן תמצית של נוסח פנייתו אל ממשלת בריטניה להכיר בישראל (מס' 12). (ראה מברק מיום 23.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).
2. ועדת וודהד בדקה ב־1938 את אפשרויות ביצוען של החלטות ועדת פיל לחלוקת ארץ־ישראל. היא המליצה להגביל את המדינה היהודית לתחומי שפלת השרון.

65

1. המלך עבדאללה הציע לפנות בחסות הצלב האדום את הצוות והחולים מבית־החולים "הדסה" על הר הצופים, בתנאי שאנשי ה"הגנה" יעזבו גם הם. הוא הבטיח לשמור על הבניינים והציוד.

the Red Cross, and which in itself confers upon them the immunity always accorded to hospital buildings.

2) Neither the Hadassah Hospital nor the Hebrew University is a base for attack. Jewish forces stationed there will not attack or fire on the Arab Legion, nor upon any other Arabs, if they are not themselves attacked, and if the Arab forces do not advance in their direction. The Jewish forces on Mount Scopus are stationed there for defence only, and not for any other military purpose whatsoever.

3) The institutions on Mount Scopus are medical and scientific institutions and American property. The Jewish authorities are prepared to agree that there shall be permanently stationed there an American observer from the American Consulate, or any other neutral citizen attached to the United Nations Mission, to supervise the action of the Jewish defence forces.

4) If, however, Arab forces should attack, the Jewish forces will have to fight, with all means at their disposal, and wherever they may be, to resist a barbaric action of this kind. In this eventuality, it will be necessary to reconsider the immunity which has been willingly conceded to the Government hospital at Beit Safafa from the first day of the present disturbances, in spite of the fact that from the first day down to the present time Arab forces have been firing from this hospital at Jewish positions and at Mekor Haim.

5) For greater certainty, and in execution of our duty, we have transmitted the text of King Abdullah's offer to Tel Aviv for information. There has so far been no reply yet from the responsible Jewish authorities in that city.[2]

(ראה מברק מהקונסוליה של ארצות־הברית בירושלים אל ״הדסה״ בארצות־הברית, 23.5.1948, 93.03/127/4).

2. לא נתקבלה תשובה על הצעה זו מתל אביב. מאוחר יותר הוסמכו נציגי משרד־החוץ בירושלים לשאת ולתת על גורל המוסדות על הר הצופים. הם הציעו שחיל־המצב יוגבל להגנה פסיבית על האיזור, תחת פיקוח של כוח נייטרלי. (ראה מברק מהקונסוליה של ארצות־הברית אל ״הדסה״ בארצות־הברית, 1.6.1948. שם; תזכיר של ל. כהן, 2.6.1948, אצ״מ S25/5634).

66

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 149
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 24 May 1948

Your 32.[1] Provisional Government decided yesterday order be issued cease-fire all fronts tonight, twenty hours summer time Israel, corresponding midday New York,[2] provided other side acts likewise. Decision published immediately on adoption, and this morning communicated Truce Commission Jerusalem. Order cease-fire above time and not restart firing unless other side continues, issued to all our commanders, and particularly scrupulous observance urged in Jerusalem. Your 31,[3] replying Parodi separately.[4]

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1

[New York], 24 May 1948

Security Council through President and Austin expressed appreciation our swift acceptance. Council accepted Arab request defer answer forty-eight hours expiring Wednesday,[1] one o'clock, New York summer time,

66

1. מס' 63.
2. מאוחר יותר הבריק שרתוק תיקון והודיע ששעת הפסקת־האש נקבעה ל־9 בערב. (ראה מברקו אל אבן, 24.5.1948, 130.09/2328/1).
3. מדובר במברק של לוריא (22.5.1948, 93.03/94/5), שהעביר תוכן מברק ששיגר א. פארודי בתוקף תפקידו כנשיא מועצת־הביטחון. פארודי טען שממשלת ישראל לא סייעה לעבודתה של ועדת ההפוגה, וביקש שימונו קציני־קישור ליד הוועדה.
4. בתשובתו (באמצעות א. אבן), הודיע שרתוק לפארודי, שממשלת ישראל קיימה ומקיימת קשר רצוף עם ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים למרות הסכנות הכרוכות בכך. עם זאת הוא הציע לקיים קשר עם ועדת ההפוגה או עם כל גוף אחר של האו"ם בתל אביב, מאחר שירושלים מנותקת ומושב הממשלה הוא בתל אביב. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 24.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1553; אבן אל פארודי, 25.5.1948, 93.03/94/5).

67

1. 26.5.1948.

instructed we inform you accordingly. Suggest follow same procedure as previously. Myself protested, saying consultation Arab states could proceed without bombardment Jerusalem, Tel Aviv. Arab states meeting Amman decide answer tomorrow.[2]

Eban

68

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 31/83. נשלח: 25.5 ; התקבל: 27.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 24 May 1948

Eliash and self had cordial talk with Grom[yko]. He still urges postponement raise issue admission for seating Provisional Government until seven assured.[1] Expressed full agreement our attitude all points so far. Am addressing all letters United Nations as from Government, and receiving replies accordingly. Toff[2] expects recognition both his friends Security Council soon.[3] Lopez now acting firmly our favour. Suggest urgent visit Nahum [Goldmann] Brussels at your request. Chief[4] determined not go to London while present policy lasts, suggest encourage him this attitude.[5]

Eban

2. הליגה הערבית קיימה התייעצות קצרה בעמאן ב־25 במאי. בישיבה ה־305 של מועצת־הביטחון ביום 26.5.1948 מסר נציג עיראק, בשמן של המדינות הערביות, שהן דוחות את ההחלטה להפסיק את האש משום שאין בה ערובות נגד התקפות הציונים. עם זאת הן סבורות, שיש לקיים את החלטת מועצת־הביטחון מיום 17.4.1948 בדבר הפוגה בארץ־ישראל, והן נכונות לשקול הצעות אחרות של מועצת־הביטחון. (ראה .SCOR, Third Year, 305th Meeting, 26.5.1948, pp. 47-9).

68

1. ראה מס' 56.
2. משה טוב, הממונה על ענייני אמריקה הלטינית בנציגות ישראל בניו יורק.
3. ארגנטינה וקולומביה. מדינות אלה הכירו בישראל רק בפברואר 1949.
4. חיים וייצמן.
5. השווה מס' 64.

69

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 30/42. התקבל: 25.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 24 May 1948

Ambiguity in proclamation regarding frontiers[1] much commented delegations and exploited opponents, possibly delaying recognition and restricting those received. We urge official statement defining frontiers Israel in accordance November resolution, stressing this implied in references in proclamation to that resolution.[2]

Eban

70

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 61/49
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

[Tel Aviv],[1] 24 May 1948

Transmitted from Tel Aviv. Received information re Egyptian Government warned Italian Government that ships carrying arms or immigrants Israel will be attacked. We asked friends influence Italian Government give orders its Ambassador Washington D.C. transmit this official announcement to Security Council and State Department. Please verify if Ambassador received order. If not received, try to influence him to ask Rome. This is very urgent.

Shertok

69

1. בהצהרת העצמאות מוזכרת החלטת האו"ם מיום 29 בנובמבר 1947, אולם אין התייחסות מפורשת לעניין הגבולות.
2. לאחר מחשבה נוספת חזר בו אבן מהצעתו וקבע, שהצהרה בנוסח זה היא "טרם זמנה, עד שהשכנים יסכימו לכבד [את הגבולות]. עד אז מוטב כנראה להחזיק בעמדת המיקוח החזקה ביותר." שרתוק סמך ידו על מסקנה זו. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 25.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1559; שרתוק אל אבן, 27.5.1948, 93.01/2180/17).

70

1. נשלח דרך נציגות ישראל בפאריס.

71

מ. פישר אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Fischer to A. Eban (New York)

מברק
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/128/10

Paris, 24 May 1948 (22.20)

French delegation instructed insist energetically immediate truce Jerusalem. French Government prepared participate any measure towards restoration peace Jerusalem.[1]

Fischer

72

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 28/60. התקבל: 25.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 24 May 1948

Vandenberg[1] yesterday sent a strong personal cable to Bevin demanding /more/ British cooperation in ending war Palestine.

Learned influential U.S.A. military circles object lifting embargo for Israel only. They suggest an overall U.N. embargo on both Arabs and Jews.

At yesterday's Jewish Veterans /dinner/ attended /by many dignitaries and high government/ officials, Air Secretary /Symington/, in reply to my appeal for lifting embargo, expressed cautiously but firmly /Administration's sympathy for more active and/ material /support to Israel/.

Epstein

71
1. ראה מס' 100.

72
1. ארתור ואנדנברג, יושב־ראש הוועדה ליחסי חוץ של הסנאט.

73

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH154 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/128/5

Tel Aviv, 24 May 1948 (18.00)

All boats calling Egyptian ports with cargo for Jewish firms Palestine are detained and forced either give up Palestine bound cargo for confiscation or undertake not proceed destination Palestine. Several important consignments thus confiscated or returned ports departure. Egypt reportedly invoking procedure adopted by Allies during war regarding enemy countries. Please take appropriate steps and advise us on legal aspect. Inform Epstein.

Shertok

74

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

MH155 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 24 May 1948 (18.35)

Tel Aviv port practically at standstill and no new boats arriving Haifa, consequences require no emphasis. Current assumption this is result air raids untenable regarding Haifa. According documentary evidence our possession, in March or earlier "Peninsular and Mediterranean Committee", which is British controlled international shipping conference east Mediterranean headed by general manager Prince Line, decided with knowledge Mandatory discontinue all its services Palestine upon termination Mandate. Apparently American Lines now decided likewise. Important ascertain position immediately and urge through all possible channels resumption American Lines, as inconceivable they should participate in blockade Israel. If this fails, would have approach proper authorities for charter American ships to us. Inform Lourie, cable.

Shertok

75

מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (לונדון)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (London)

מברק מוצפן 29/83
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2318/1

Tel Aviv, 24 May 1948

Before you raise question recognition, status etc., please do utmost ascertain their real designs. Face them with incontrovertible fact their responsibility for Transjordanian aggression carried on in concert with invasion movements by Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqian troops. We cannot negotiate under false assumption normal relations when they are doing everything through Arab League to crush Jewish State out of existence. Negotiations on recognition, while British-sponsored invasion proceeds, will merely serve as cloak for their conspiracy and prevent us exposing it.

Shertok

76

י. סמאטס אל מ. שרתוק
J. Smuts to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2391/39

Pretoria, 24 May 1948 (15.28)

In reply to your Excellency's telegram,[1] the Union Government accords de facto recognition to the State of Israel. In view of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 29 November, 1947, which is based on partition, this recognition is not in respect of any particular boundaries and the Union Government will be prepared to accord similar recognition to an Arab area in Palestine, either as a separate state or as incorporated into neighbouring Arab states. The Union Government expresses its cordial good wishes to the State of Israel as the fulfilment of the policy of the Jewish national home in Palestine and as a contribution to historic justice and to world peace.[2]

Smuts, Prime Minister, Union of South Africa

76

1. שרתוק אל סמאטס, 15.5.1948, (130.02/2424/19) — בקשת הכרה מדרום־אפריקה.
2. בתשובתו הודה שרתוק על הכרת דרום־אפריקה. בעניין הגבולות ומעמדה של המדינה הערבית העתידה לקום, הטעים שרתוק שהחלטת העצרת מיום 29 בנובמבר "קבעה הסדרים מוגדרים לעתיד חלקי ארץ־ישראל שאינם נכללים במדינה היהודית... וכל נסיון לשנות הסדרים אלה פותח פתח לשינוי ביותר מכיוון אחד." (ראה מברקו אל סמאטס, 25.5.1948, 130.02/2391/39).

77

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH168 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/1

Tel Aviv, 25 May 1948

Inform Security Council as follows: Provisional Government Israel was astonished to learn that Security Council found it possible to go back on its previous decision calling for cease-fire last night and to postpone time-limit originally fixed to suit convenience of Arab governments engaged in open and armed defiance of United Nations authority in Palestine and in aggression against State of Israel and Jewish population of Palestine.[1] Provisional Government is satisfied that purpose of this Arab request for postponement without any undertaking comply with cease-fire at expiry of period is to utilize it for attempting to achieve military decision in Jerusalem, which would place Holy City under Arab domination and subject its Jewish population to Arab rule. We are moreover satisfied from authentic reports at our disposal that this design is being pursued in concert with and with assistance from foreign power. While delay granted on plea of need for consultation, the shelling of entire area of Jerusalem from outside by foreign Arab forces is proceeding with unabated fury, and ancient Jewish synagogues in Walled City are being destroyed one after other as result of Arab artillery fire directed from inside. We originally decided, as on previous occasions, to respond to Security Council's call for unconditional cease-fire on 22nd May, midday, New York time, but now that this order has become inoperative and alteration in Security Council's decision enables bombardment of Holy City to continue, we must review position and shall in due course inform Council of our decision under new circumstances.[2]

Shertok

77

1. ראה מס' 67.
2. מסירת תוכן המברק למועצת־הביטחון עוכבה על־ידי נציגות ישראל בניו יורק — ראה מס' 78.

78

חברי האגף האמריקאי של הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית וחברי משלחת ישראל באו"ם אל מ. שרתוק

Members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive and Members of the Israeli Mission at the United Nations to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1553

New York, 25 May 1948

We all agree utmost indignation Security Council postponement entirely justified and must be voiced.[1] Damage and sacrifice forty-eight hours already incurred and now irreparable. On other hand, our position Lake Success, Washington, immensely strengthened by ready acceptance cease-fire and will be gravely affected with serious consequences both centres if we now withhold confirmation. Many members Council agreed. Our acceptance and Arab rejection cease-fire might also enable lifting embargo. This jeopardised by negative reply from us. Have suggested Eban withhold communicating Council until your final reply cease-fire received. Please endeavour reach us by deadline.

Silver, Neumann, Greenberg, Halprin, Epstein, Eliash, Comay, Kenen, Lourie, others absent.[2]

79

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק

A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 42/34. נשלח: 26.5; התקבל: 27.5

נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 25 May 1948

Discussed with Lie question admission Security Council and Assembly. He also advises preliminary work assure seven votes, raising issue immediately thereafter. Accordingly, I withdraw suggestion making immediate application. Herein additional reason Nahum [Goldmann] visit Brussels.[1]

Eban

78

1. ראה מס' 77.
2. מאוחר יותר הודיע גם וייצמן על הסכמתו לתוכן המברק. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 25.5.1948, 93.03/128/5).

79

1. ראה מס' 38.

80

א. אבן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
A. Eban to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/10

[New York], 25 May 1948

Please draw constant attention Quai [d'Orsay] our affirmative answer in Security Council to question whether we accept unconditional immediate cease-fire Jerusalem and Holy Places.[1] Refer Security Council verbal records, document S/PV 301 of May 22.[2]

Eban

81

י. רובינסון אל מ. שרתוק
J. Robinson to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/5

[New York], 25 May 1948

Yours MH154.[1] Action Egyptian authorities ports patently illegal. The right of inoffensive passage in territorial waters subject to police, customs and health control firmly established international law. If Egyptians invoke war practice Allies, they are on shaky grounds, since Arab doctrine in Security Council was consistently international peace unthreatened and no war in Palestine. There can in addition be no war, objectively speaking, under the Charter. Concerning these actions, up to country whose flag boats carry to make necessary representation, ask satisfaction and damages. Doubtful if any action State Israel this moment more than propagandistic value. Impossible here determine responsibilities ships towards goods' owners, this might be differnt from case to case. Conclusion: States flags be urged take energetic action, legal position goods should be clarified. Please cable report all acts violating rights inoffensive passage committed so far Arab states against various flags.

Robinson

80

1. ראה תשובת ישראל לשאלון מועצת־הביטחון — מס' 61, שאלה g.
2. ההפניה היא לפרוטוקול הזמני של דיוני מועצת־הביטחון. תשובת ממשלת ישראל ראה ב־ SCOR, Third Year, 301st Meeting, 22.5.1948, pp.8-11.

81

1. מס' 73.

82

ח. וייצמן אל הנשיא טרומן (ואשינגטון)
C. Weizmann to President Truman (Washington)

93.08/375/15 תזכיר:[1]

[Washington], 25 May 1948

Subject: Israel's two basic problems.

1. Israel is now wrestling with two basic problems: first, national survival in the face of Arab aggression supported by the British; second, the resettlement and rehabilitation of the homeless D.P.'s.

2. There is little hope that the Arabs will accept the cease-fire order without crippling limitations. The British still feel that they can divide American opinion and render American policy irresolute; the Arabs still rely on guidance and assistance by the British. Only action can bring peace to the Middle East, and the most effective action with the British and Arabs is a modification of the arms embargo established by the United States.

3. Military aid is thus the first basic problem which confronts the new State. It requires especially anti-tank weapons; anti-aircraft weapons; planes; and heavy artillery. By American standards the needed quantities are extremely limited, but in the context of the current activity in Israel they may well be decisive. Above all, speed in the provision of such arms is urgently necessary. Would it be possible to make limited quantities of these weapons available from depots or other storesplaces in the Middle East?

4. The second basic problem confronting Israel arises from the desperate situation of the Jewish D.P.'s. Israel plans to empty the camps at the rate of 15,000 persons per month. To transport, equip, house and rehabilitate these impoverished people requires expenditures which by Israel's standards are enormous, and which must be made at a time when Israel is engaged in a struggle for national survival.

5. Israel is now applying to the Export-Import Bank for a loan.[2] It was thought that funds could be obtained more speedily in this way rather than by requesting at this time a gift or a grant. Israel can and will satisfy the necessary banking requirements. An indication from you, Mr. President, that you are sympathetic to our application would make certain that speedy action, so urgently required, will be forthcoming.[3]

82

1. וייצמן התקבל על־ידי הנשיא טרומן ב־25 במאי כאורח רשמי של הבית הלבן. התזכיר נמסר לאחר השיחה.
2. ראה מס' 53.
3. ראה מס' 94.

83

א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

מברק מוצפן 21/67. נשלח: 26.5; התקבל: 27.5

נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/24

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 25 May 1948

After careful consideration significance Weizmann-Truman conversation,[1] believe we should open Export-Import discussion by requesting immediate loan of from 90 to 100 million. Must emphasize to you significance of fact that Israel Government will be permitted to sell significant part of imports so financed to local people in Israel against payment in local currency. Suggest programme might consist of old[2] one plus 15 to 25 million dollars total for food, petroleum and ships in case necessary. Regards.

Gass

84

נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 8/140, 9/184. נשלח: 26.5; התקבל: 27.5

נוסח יוצא: ג"ו

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 25 May 1948

Jackson,[1] assistant Lie, spent few days here, saw important Cabinet members /including/ Bevin, reported sympathetic attitude most members except Bevin. Myself saw U.S. Ambassador Douglas, Bevan,[2] Crossman,[3] seeing today McNeil who was absent. Two talks Douglas with Bevin concerned primarily cease-fire. Douglas and Bevan assert that Bevin strongly pressuring Arabs for acceptance cease-fire. Douglas asked me if we could guarantee Irgun, Stern,[4] acceptance, observance, cease-fire as British making fuss about this. Replied convinced Israel Government can take responsibility that all citizens State will observe any undertaking /they

83

1. ראה מס' 82 והערה 1 שם.
2. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 69 והערות שם.

84

1. רוברט ג.א. ג'קסון, עוזר המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם לענייני ביצוע ותיאום.
2. אנירין בוואן, שר־הבריאות בממשלת בריטניה.
3. ריצ'ארד קרוסמן, חבר הפרלמנט מטעם מפלגת הלייבור, לשעבר חבר ועדת החקירה האנגלו־אמריקאית לעניין ארץ־ישראל (1946).
4. אצ"ל ולח"י.

sign/. Individual law-breakers possible everywhere, but Government will deal with them as other governments deal with law-breakers. Urge you authorise Aubrey Eban make similar statement in Security Council if question arises. Bevan /regards situation here as hopeful/, is convinced inner Cabinet, of which he member, will not allow Bevin continue send arms Arabs if Security Council brands them aggressors once they reject cease-fire. Believes Bevin himself would favour /such policy/. Bevan thinks Bevin would want /arrange/ cease-fire and would want take part mediation. I told him Bevin no suitable mediator for us, could only help by moderating influence on Arabs. Our mediator Bernadotte. Bevan advises me see Cripps,[5] /who now friendly, Bevan will arrange appointment/. Locker trying see Morrison, /who also supposedly more friendly. Bevin's position hardened largely because anger sudden U.S.A. recognition spoiling his line. Bevan thinks he looking for way out of most embarrassing position, enabling him play role saviour peace/.[6] Bevan convinced de facto recognition not far off. Seeing my friend[7] today /after he sees Bevin/, will ascertain through him if should ask interview Bevin, don't want risk refusal. /Douglas asked me remain permanent contact with him for mutual information/. Saw Charteris,[8] who regards our military position good, our prospects short war good, long war of attrition bad. He is sure /settlement with/ Arabs, especially Abdullah. /Pretends British officers Legion useful preventing Legion invading Jewish territory, but/[6] believes possibility their withdrawal after new decision Security Council. Hints Abdullah's desire keep Jerusalem, maybe offering internationalisation Old City, Holy Places, but agrees Christian world hardly likely accept /Abdullah's regime/. Charteris raised question /boundaries, especially/ southern Negev for exchange with western Galilee. Told him no mediation possible on other basis than Jewish state, only after acceptance this basis could other problems be discussed. We sticking to boundaries, other provisions November 29th resolution. Charteris assured me oil stocks refineries remaining in country and British strongly desire reopen refineries soonest, owing difficulties with Iraq's refusal allow pumping oil. This would be part of future agreement. Suggest on advice Crossman, other friends, /you/ urge friends U.S.A. abstain time being from propaganda boycott British goods,[9] this increases difficulties here. Cable your opinion. Am /flying tonight/ Paris, where meeting tomorrow Bernadotte. Returning Wednesday night London, regards.

Nahum

5. ר. סטאפורד קריפס, שר־האוצר בממשלת בריטניה.
6. הקטע המסומן נשמט בנוסח הנכנס של המברק. 7. הקטור מקניל.
8. לייטנאנט־קולונל מארטין צ׳ארטריס, לשעבר ראש שירותי המודיעין של הצבא הבריטי בארץ־ישראל, הממונה על ענייני ארץ־ישראל במשרד־המלחמה הבריטי, 1947־1948.
9. באותה עת התפרסמו בעיתונות הניו יורקית, באנגלית וביידיש, מודעות הקוראות להחרים תוצרת בריטית. ראה למשל, המודעה ב״ניו יורק פוסט״, 2.6.1948: ״כל דולר שאנו נותנים לבריטניה מסייע לשפוך דם יהודי.״ ראה גם מס׳ 89.

85

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 176
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

Tel Aviv, 26 May 1948

Fully appreciate colleagues' reasons which present our mind throughout.[1] Nevertheless please communicate our reply immediately without waiting deadline, particularly as full text published.[2] Somewhat surprised you refer our communication as negative reply, which isn't case. Government meeting this afternoon review position. Decision be communicated to you in time.[3]

Shertok

86

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 177
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

Tel Aviv, 26 May 1948

Further my 176,[1] felt essential immediate counterstroke to Anglo-Arab plot, moreover had provide contingency Arabs achieving decision in Jerusalem during delay, whereupon our acceptance cease-fire after delay would be tantamount submission Arab conquest Jerusalem. As in that eventuality we should not been able accept cease-fire with honour, but should have had to fight on, felt vital prepare ground for it with fullest possible prior justification.

Shertok

85

1. ראה מס' 78.
2. ראה "ניו יורק טיימס", 26.5.1948.
3. הממשלה חזרה ודנה בהפסקת־האש בישיבתה ב־26 במאי. בן־גוריון סיפר על פגישתו עם ראשי הצבא, שהמליצו בפניו לקבל את ההפוגה בתנאי שירושלים לא תיפול. הוחלט לתת הוראה לכוחות הביטחון להפסיק את האש בשעה שמונה בערב, אם יעשו זאת הערבים, ולהודיע על כך למועצת־הביטחון (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 26.5.1948).

86

1. מס' 85.

87

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH 181 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 26 May 1948

Further my 176.[1] Having dealt matter practical merits, must now take strong exception formally and otherwise interference definite instruction. Apart from irregularity procedure, essential understand once instruction issued cannot but assume is being carried out, and am proceeding accordingly. Therefore delay in execution can only create confusion and embarrassment.

Shertok

88

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 4/81
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 26 May 1948

Regarding /boundaries/[1] please in future conversations formulate our /attitude/ carefully along following lines: We accepted boundaries as in resolution[2] within its context, namely Arab State in remainder with Economic Union and /international/ Jerusalem. If any or all these three elements do not materialize, /fate Jewish Jerusalem/ and Jewish settlements outside Jewish State will have to be reconsidered. Particularly if neighbouring states persist invading and attempt annexing parts Palestine, we shall fight them view to retaking territory and holding it pending final settlement, in which interests Israel will be fully safeguarded.

Shertok

87

1. מס' 85.

88

1. ראה מס' 2, 69.
2. החלטת החלוקה של 29 בנובמבר 1947.

89

א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 44/13. התקבל: 27.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 26 May 1948

Growing demand certain quarters anti-British boycott.[1] Please advise, /including/ possible reaction *Yishuv*.

Lourie

90

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 45/92. התקבל: 27.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 26 May 1948

Conversation with Ross and colleague. /Seven/ votes still uncertain, owing British pressure Belgium, Canada. Nevertheless Americans wish proceed strong /policy/ with view either Council or unilateral action.They believe tactics now should concentrate first Abdullah, view his exposed position and insult United Nations regarding/questionnaire/.[1] Also they consider useful concentrate efforts truce Jerusalem and instruct Mediator accordingly. Please cable Government's views. In atmosphere here these tactics appear to us sound, though must continue insist prevention Egyptian attacks. *Mazkir Klali*[2] told me *Mazkir Gadol*[3] showed welcome firmness yesterday's luncheon.[4]

Eban

89

1. ראה מס' 84 והערה 9 שם.

90

1. ראה מס' 56 והערה 7 שם.
2. טריגווה לי.
3. ג'ורג' מארשאל.
4. בעיתונות דווח שבפגישה בין מזכיר־המדינה מארשאל ומשלחת ארצות־הברית באו"ם לבין אנשי מזכירות האו"ם, שהתקיימה ב־25 במאי, נדונו צעדים שמטרתם לשכנע את הערבים להסכים להפסקת־האש, בכלל זה אפשרות של הטלת סנקציות כלכליות. (ראה "ניו יורק טיימס", 26.5.1948).

91

ח. וייצמן אל הנשיא טרומן (ואשינגטון)
C. Weizmann to President Truman (Washington)

130.02/2414/26 :העתק

[Washington], 26 May 1948

Dear Mr. President,

Before leaving the shores of the United States, I should like to express to you my warmest thanks for the friendly reception which you accorded me yesterday and for the kind hospitality given to Mrs. Weizmann and myself and to the members of my party at Blair House. This official visit, coming soon after the recognition given to the new State of Israel, will be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to my people.

I trust that the two questions of military assistance, and of financial help for constructive work and for the absorption of Jewish Displaced Persons, will receive urgent and favourable consideration. I shall not go into the details here, as these are contained in the aide-mémoire which I had the opportunity of leaving with you.[1]

There is, however, one matter to which I only made brief reference, and which is of some importance to us. We are anxious that the United States recognition of the State of Israel should be put on a regular basis by an exchange of diplomatic representatives. In anticipation of this arrangement, we have designated Mr. Eliahu Epstein, who is now acting as the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in this country, as the prospective Minister in Washington. Mr. Epstein, a Palestinian with intimate knowledge of the whole Middle East, has spent the last three years in Washington as the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and has done invaluable work in explaining our aims, problems and activities. I am confident that he will be successful in the new task of increasing the ties between Israel and the United States and of deepening the friendly relations between the two peoples. I hope, Mr. President, that it may be possible for theUnited States to appoint a Minister to Israel at a very early date.[2]

In taking my leave of you, Mr. President, I should like warmly to commend Mr. Epstein, in whom I have every confidence.

Yours very sincerely,

Chaim Weizmann

91

1. מס' 82.
2. במשרד־החוץ עדיין לא נתקבלה תשובה ממחלקת־המדינה לבקשה בדבר החלפת צירים בין שתי המדינות — מס' 36. (ראה שרתוק אל אפשטיין, 25.5.1948, 130.09/2329/22).

92

נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: ארכיון בן־גוריון 1580

[Paris, 26 May, 1948]

Saw Bernadotte today for nearly two hours, Bunche[1] present. Bernadotte full good will but realistic, not excessively hopeful about results his mission. He plans go tomorrow Cairo, then Amman, probably also Beiruth before going Palestine. He wants "attack first the attackers". I told him my conversation strictly informal, just for clarification issues, survey situation. He asked me questions about British attitude, gave him such information I had. His main questions following:

1) On what basis would we accept mediation? My reply - on basis State Israel. Only State will negotiate, not Jewish Agency, even if Arabs will put such condition. He seemed to regard this as reasonable.

2) Would we make condition for our participation his mediation Arab acceptance boundaries our State in advance? My reply — we stick to boundaries Assembly resolution, expect Arab recognition these boundaries result Bernadotte's mediation. May not insist as preconditions for talks. He then raised question Southern Negev connection with Western Galilee. Told him Southern Negev essential to us, and generally essential departure Assembly resolution impossible. Bunche mentioned we not insisted Southern Negev Geneva UNSCOP.[2] Replied — but we insisted on many other parts, like Western Galilee, which did not receive anyhow; our basis now Assembly resolution.

3) Bernadotte wanted know outlines our immigration policy. Is our intention unlimited immigration for every Jew who wants to immigrate, or selective immigration? Expressing his view, after having seen *Exodus* people, that many D.P.'s unsuitable build Jewish State. Replied - we under obligation save all Jews who need Palestine, especially D.P.'s waiting camps three years; within this general obligation will certainly select certain categories, certain periods, as necessary for building country. Meaning Jewish State that every Jew entitled come. Prerogative State admit or refuse him.

4) Asked if Arab condition with regard immigration for truce period

92

1. ראלף באנץ', מנהל מחלקת הנאמנות במזכירות האו"ם ונציג אישי של המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם בארץ־ישראל.
2. מדובר בשיחות לא־רשמיות שנערכו בקיץ 1947 בז'נבה עם חברי המשלחת והמזכירות של UNSCOP.

acceptable us.[3] Replied - we sovereign state, will insist full freedom regulate our immigration.

5) Asked about prohibition importation arms into Palestine during truce. I told him about discussion this problem with State Department during truce negotiations, said that certainly impossible expect us stop importation arms if Arab states continuing as states provide arms for fight Palestine. [Asked]: if we would accept stop importation if Arab States would do same, [Replied] — for our Government to decide, which will take into consideration political and military aspect problem.

6) How do we envisage understanding with Arabs? Told him essential basis Arab recognition Jewish State. Once we equal, will consider agreement with them, to allay their fears we would act as agents foreign imperialism. Many methods possible for such agreements, as we do not intend being used by any foreign power for imperialistic purposes. Details such arrangements must be discussed with both parties. He finally intimated in case failure his mission because Arab intransigence, will report so to United Nations, urging strong action. Asked many questions about American, British, policy, also military situation. Will report fully in letter through Zvi Herman.[4] Bernadotte informed press my seeing him. Asked about you, also asked if I would be Palestine near future. Replied - may be, but time being staying London. Regards.

Nahum

93

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 24/57. התקבל: 28.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 27 May 1948

Reliable information here indicates serious division British Cabinet on Palestine. Usual authoritative sources believe Bevin in yesterday's Douglas talk pleaded for delaying action Lake Success, give Arabs time crush our forces at least in Jerusalem.[1] British apparently desire war continued and our losses increased, that we unable to protect Israel's frontier, especially Negev. Latter be annexed Transjordan.

Epstein

3. הערבים התנו את הסכמתם להפסקת־האש בהפסקת עלייתם של יוצאי־צבא.
4. לא נמצא.

93

1. מוסב על השיחה שהתקיימה ב־25.5.1948 במעונו הפרטי של בווין. השווה דיווחו של השגריר האמריקאי, FRUS, 1948, V, pp. 1046-50; מס' 120.

94

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 25/65. התקבל: 28.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 27 May 1948

Weizmann—Truman talk[1] achieved nothing practical on embargo, more encouraging on financial assistance. Weizmann submitted Truman your recommendation regarding types of arms required. Before departure, Weizmann wrote personal letter President[2] summarising his memorandum, indicating particularly American Government necessity accredit me earliest and send envoy [? to] Israel.[3]

Suggest that you consider inviting Ben Cohen assist establishment Foreign Office and advise constitutional matters [—] very useful.[4]

Epstein

95

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 6/31
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 27 May 1948

For your guidance. Weizmann in reply press inquiries, pledged evacuation Jaffa, Acre.[1] This is unwarranted. We cannot foresee all eventualities arising as result present war and must avoid such commitments. Inform Eban.

Shertok

94

1. ראה מס׳ 82.
2. מס׳ 91.
3. במקור envoy *of* Israel ; תוקן על־פי מס׳ 91.
4. שרתוק השיב שיש להמתין בהזמנתו של כהן עד שיחודש המגע עם אנשי המחלקה המדינית הנצורים בירושלים. (ראה מברק מיום 3.6.1948, 130.09/2328/1).

95

1. הדברים נאמרו בראיון לעיתונות לאחר פגישתו עם טרומן, ראה ״ניו יורק טיימס״, 26.5.1948.

96

ר. לווט אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)

R. Lovett to E. Epstein (Washington)

130.02/2386/1 :העתק

Washington, 27 May 1948

Dear Mr. Epstein,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948,[1] addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.

It would be appreciated if you would inform Mr. Shertok that the United States will be prepared to exchange Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary with Israel when the situation in Palestine is such as to cause the Government of the United States to decide that it would be appropriate for it to accord de jure recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

97

א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון (ואשינגטון)

E. Epstein to L. Henderson (Washington)

130.02/2386/1 :העתק

Washington, 27 May 1948

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. Henderson,

After returning to my office, it occurred to me that you might wish to have a brief record of certain of the considerations that I presented to you in connection with the matter of the exchange of Minsters or Representatives.[1]

96
1. מס' 36.

97
1. ראה מס' 96.

First: In accordance with our original conversation on this matter,[2] I naturally advised my Government regarding the views which you informally indicated to me. Indeed, the message to Secretary Marshall from Mr. Shertok[3] was prompted by the receipt of those advices. Insofar as my Government understands, the United States is prepared to go forward with an exchange of Ministers. Our conversations today would unquestionably be regarded as a reversal of United States policy.

Second: I am genuinely concerned regarding Arab reaction to any announcement that the United States is unwilling to go forward with an exchange of Ministers. This would almost certainly be viewed by the Arab countries as a modification in the United States position, and might well lead to increased resistance to any overtures by the Security Council or others.

Third: There is a strong possibility that the proposed action by the United States, if announced at this time, would be interpreted by the American public and by world opinion as a reversal in the attitude of the United States toward Israel. This concerns me deeply since the de facto recognition already accorded has been widely interpreted as resolving doubts regarding the American position.

Fourth: The U.S.S.R. and other countries have already advised the Government of Israel that they are going forward with an exchange of Ministers.[4] Quite frankly, any announcement now that the United States is unwilling to move ahead will seem to be retrogression, and I strongly fear may undo the good accomplished by the fact that the United States was first among the countries of the world to recognize the new State. Full diplomatic relationships will thus first be begun with countries other than the United States.

I fully recognize and appreciate the fact that the exchange of Special Representatives would in practical consequence be much the same as the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately true that the symbol is extremely important, and the denial of larger and customary rights will almost surely be regarded as in the nature of a rebuff and a modification of American policy. The danger of such an interpretation would seem to be aggravated by reason of the statement in the letter which I have before me, refusing to go forward because of "the situation in Palestine", rather than because of the provisional nature of the Government.

The foregoing views are naturally both personal and preliminary and are here recorded for your convenience as considerations which should perhaps be taken into account.

With my personal regards, I am, Yours sincerely,

Eliahu Epstein

2. ראה מס' 14.　3. מס' 36.　4. ראה מס' 24 והערה 3 שם.

98

מ. פישר אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Fischer to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 65/33
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

Paris, 27 May 1948 (17.48)

Minister Council decided further expectant attitude.[1] Doing utmost to exert pressure public opinion and National Assembly. [—] preparing two squadrons jet-propelled Vampires and training crews for Egypt.

Fischer

99

מ. שרתוק אל פ. ריגר (ז'נבה)
M. Shertok to P. Ruegger (Geneva)

מברק MH 193
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

Tel Aviv, le 27 mai 1948

Reçu votre télégramme[1] qui m'était adressé personnellement. Vous apprécierez fait que je vous réponds au nom du Gouvernement provisoire de l'Etat d'Israël il m'étant impossible prendre officiellement connaissance de démarches ou demandes adressées à collectivité non définie, vaguement dénommée Autorités juives. Au nom du Gouvernement provisoire d'Israël j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que mon Gouvernement a l'intention d'observer très strictement toutes provisions Convention Genève en ce qui concerne prisonniers guerre et détenus civils tombés nos mains. Nous nous fions au Comité International Croix Rouge faire tout possible pour obtenir que même traitement soit accordé prisonniers guerre et internés civils juifs tombés mains l'autre partie conflit actuel.[2] Votre délégué à Tel Aviv[3] reste en contact étroit avec notre Gouvernement et délégué principal à Jérusalem[4] avec représentants l'Agence juive et communauté juive.

Shertok, Ministre Affaires Etrangères,
Gouvernement Provisoire d'Israël

98
1. ראה מס' 35.

99
1. ריגר אל שרתוק, 24.5.1948 (אצ"מ S25/1559), בקשה שישראל תכבד את אמנת ז'נבה בנוגע לשבויי מלחמה.
2. ריגר השיב, שהוא ימסור את השקפת ממשלת ישראל לידיעת הערבים, כדי להבטיח שגם הם יקיימו את אמנת ז'נבה. (ראה מברקו מיום 28.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1559).
3. רוברט גואי (Gouy).
4. ז'אק דה רנייה.

100

א. אבן ומ. עליאש אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban and M. Eliash to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1

[New York], 28 May 1948

Parodi introduced resolution for unconditional and immediate cease-fire in City of Jerusalem, with threat of Chapter VII if rejected or subsequently disobeyed.[1] Please react immediately.[2]

Eban and Eliash

101

מ. פישר אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Fischer to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 66/222. התקבל: 29.5
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/15

Paris, 28 May 1948 (23.55)

Bidault today assured maximum pressure exercised on Arab states for cease-fire. Said police measures being taken North Africa in view of future recognition. Robert Schuman assured French Government disapproves unreservedly British attitude, and instructions Parodi have been reinforced, France today inclined participate any [—] by United Nations. Regarding recognition said: "Together with the other[s]."

[.....][1]

100

1. פארודי נימק את הצעתו בכך, שלאו"ם יש מכשיר לפיקוח על הפסקת־האש בירושלים — ועדת ההפוגה הקונסולרית, שהפסקת־האש בירושלים לא תיראה כמתן יתרון לאחד הצדדים ושחיזוק סמכות האו"ם בירושלים יחיש את השלטתה של הפסקת־האש בכל שטח ארץ־ישראל (ראה, *SCOR, Third Year*, 308th Meeting, 28 May 1948, pp.37-46). לאחר שנתקבלה החלטה בדבר הפסקת־אש בכל ארץ־ישראל (ראה הערת־עורך עמ' 92) הסיר נציג צרפת את הצעתו.
2. ראה מס' 103.

101

1. המשך המברק משובש מאוד ולא הודפס כאן. מובאות בו ידיעות ממקור צרפתי על התרחשויות במדינות ערב.

102

א. שטרן[1] אל מ. שרתוק
A. Stern to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2391/65

רומא, 28 במאי 1948

הנדון: הכרה בממשלתנו.

א.נ.,

בהיעדר מחלקה מדינית של הסוכנות אצלנו, יצא לי במשך הזמן לייצג את הסוכנות כלפי השלטונות בעניינים רשמיים. עם הקמת המדינה אמרנו ברורות, כי הממשלה בארץ היא אשר תקבע את נציגיה, ומשרדינו ממשיכים לפעול בבחינת משרדי הסוכנות.

עם ההכרה על־ידי אמריקה, נראה לנו שיש להגביר את הלחץ על הממשלה האיטלקית כל עוד היא תחת הרושם של ההכרה הזו; מאידך, הסתייגנו מפנייה רשמית בשם הממשלה, בלי יפוי־כוח.

בינתיים נודע לנו, שהפנייה הרשמית ממילא נשלחת ישר על־ידכם,[2] ואז סוכם על־ידנו להתרכז בהכנת הקרקע בחוגי הממשלה להכרה, מבלי לעשות צעד רשמי כאן. עדה סירני[3] מנצלת את קשריה לעניין זה. כמו־כן אנו מנצלים את הקשרים של אישים יהודים אחרים, וככה הובא העניין לפני אישים שונים בממשלה.

גישת הממשלה כיום היא, שהיא אינה יכולה להיות המדינה הראשונה מתוך הבלוק האירופאי המערבי להכרה. אין זאת אומרת, שמיד אחרי הכרת צרפת תבוא ההכרה שלהם, אבל הכרת צרפת מהווה שוב מומנט מתאים להגברת לחצנו. יש גם להדגיש, כי רק לפני ימים מספר הורכבה הממשלה האיטלקית החדשה, שימים רבים נמשך המשא־ומתן על הקמתה, והיא המוסמכת להחליט בעניין זה.

בברכה,

אריה שטרן

102

1. אריה שטרן (אורון), מנהל משרד הסוכנות היהודית ברומא, ומאוגוסט 1948 — קונסול ישראל שם.
2. ישראל לא ביקשה באופן רשמי את הכרת איטליה; נעשו גישושים, אך הוחלט להמתין עד לאחר הכרתה של צרפת. (ראה שרתוק אל לוריא, 3.6.1948, 93.03/72/16).
3. עדה סירני, ראש המוסד לעלייה באיטליה.

103

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 226
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

[Tel Aviv], 29 May 1948

Regarding Parodi's proposal[1] immediate unconditional cease-fire Jerusalem, we agree on clear understanding military, political, status quo be maintained. If this called condition, we regret but cannot help. We cannot accept unconditional cease-fire which will enable Abdullah ride into Jerusalem and proclaim himself King thereof, or Arab Legion, Egyptian forces, march into city even if not single shot fired.

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

דחיית ההחלטה בדבר הפסקת־האש על־ידי הערבים והמשך הקרבות בארץ־ישראל הביאו לחידוש הדיון בהפסקת־אש במועצת־הביטחון. בפני המועצה הונחו שתי הצעות־החלטה: הצעה סובייטית, המורה לחדול מכל פעולה צבאית תוך 36 שעות משעת קבלתה, ושכללה איום בסנקציות (ראה מסמך או"ם S/794/Rev.2); והצעה בריטית, הקוראת לצדדים להפסיק את פעולות האיבה למשך ארבעה שבועות ובינתיים לא להכניס חומרי מלחמה ואנשים בגיל הגיוס לארץ־ישראל (ראה מסמך או"ם S/795/Rev.2). בישיבה ה־310 של מועצת־הביטחון, ב־29.5.1948, התקבלה ההצעה הבריטית עם תיקונים אחדים, שהחשוב בהם הוצע על־ידי צרפת, ולפיו תותר כניסת אנשים בגיל הגיוס לארץ־ישראל, אך ייאסר אימונם וגיוסם. הצדדים נתבקשו להודיע על הסכמתם להצעה עד ליום 1.6.1948, שעה 6 אחר־הצהריים, לפי שעון ניו יורק — ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.

104

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 82
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1

[New York], 29 May 1948

Perhaps this occasion we declare will transmit our cease-fire decision only when Arab states have given agreement, in view two previous occasions where we suffered disadvantage military dislocation as result of cease-fire later cancelled.

Eban

103
1. ראה מס' 100.

106
1. מס' 36. ראה גם מס' 96, 97.

105

משלחת ישראל באו"ם אל מ. שרתוק
Israeli Mission at the United Nations to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 63/55. התקבל: 31.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 29 May 1948

If cease-fire becomes effective, Foreign Office and State Department may closely collaborate achieve /territorial changes our disadvantage/. Therefore reemphasize necessity your short visit Washington.

Gideon [Ruffer], Eban, Toff, Comay, others absent

106

ר. לווט אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
R. Lovett to E. Epstein (Washington)

מקור: תיקי א. אילת

[Washington], 29 May 1948

Dear Mr. Epstein,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948, addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.[1]

It will be appreciated if you will inform Mr. Shertok that the United States Government is giving careful consideration to the exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary between the United States and Israel and will communicate later with the Provisional Government of Israel on this subject.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett
Acting Secretary

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 28/227,27/242,26/263
נשלח: 31.5/29.5;
התקבל: 1.6/30.5
נוסח יוצא: תיקי א. אילת
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 29 May 1948

Following explanatory message promised my 48.[1] 1) On May 27, Henderson handed me a letter[2] identical with the one transmitted to you in message /48/ as to the first and third paragraphs, but containing the following second paragraph: "It would be appreciated if you would inform Mr. Shertok that the /United States/ will be prepared to exchange Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary with Israel when the situation in Palestine is such as to cause the Government of the United States to decide that it would /be appropriate for it to accord/ de jure recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel". 2) Henderson explained that though he had originally requested a prompt exchange of ministers,[3] the [State] Department's lawyers had ruled that such an exchange was impossible since it would constitute full de jure recognition. 3) Henderson said de facto recognition did not involve acceptance any particular frontiers. He indicated quite casually and incidentally that he would be personally interested in knowing whether we would be willing to make some frontier adjustments in order to accelerate de jure recognition. I reminded him of /Marshall's/ statement to press day earlier, affirming that de facto recognition did involve acceptance Israel's frontiers.[4] As to my remark that November 29 settled the frontier question, Henderson replied that /American/ recognition was not based on November 29 but rather on a de facto situation Palestine and the desire to avoid a vacuum. Moreover, Henderson added that with no more Economic /Union/ in view, "some changes and adjustments" in /November 29/ frontiers could help viability Israel". When requested to indicate particular proposals, Henderson hastily dropped whole matter and denied having heard British views or pressure on matter. 4) I thereupon told Henderson that while I would transmit to my Government the letter and inform concerning his explanations, I felt

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1. לא נמצא, אך מדובר כנראה במברק של אפשטיין אל שרתוק, שבו נמסר תוכן המכתב שקיבל מלווט — מס׳ 106.
2. מס׳ 96.
3. ראה מס׳ 14.
4. מארשאל אמר זאת במסיבת־העיתונאים השבועית של מחלקת־המדינה בוואשינגטון. (ראה *Journal American*, 26.5.1948).

/required/ to make the following preliminary observations. First observation: I naturally advised my Government of his former /views/ regarding exchange of Ministers and Shertok message to Marshall[5] was based on this advice; consequently my Government will see this letter as a change of policy and will be correspondingly disturbed. Second observation: Expressed concern reactions world opinion, American public, and Arab countries over apparent new shift American policy. Third observation: Pointed out undesirability of United States losing position deriving from prior recognition, by allowing Moscow, others take precedence in according full diplomatic exchange. Final observation: Stressed /grave/ implications denial full diplomatic exchange because of presumed /"situation in Palestine"/. 5) Henderson, disturbed by these observations, suggested I see Lovett and meanwhile withhold transmission letter my Government. I agreed and meanwhile sent Henderson immediate letter embodying my observations.[6] 6) Saw Lovett in company Henderson May 29. Repeated my observations /systematically/ and added that our lawyers advised that American practice does not /exclude/ exchange of Ministers under de facto recognized government, and consequently adherence position May 27 letter would be very unfortunate. Lovett did not challenge my reference to de facto government /as/ distinguished /from/ state, and admitted that difference between de facto and de jure recognition is very thin. 7) Lovett nevertheless /empahsized/ two reasons why America undesirous immediate de jure recognition: First reason — Israel might /expand/ frontiers to Amman; second reason — Communists might /conceivably/ acquire dominant influence in our government. He suggested avoiding pressure which would embarrass Government and President. 8) Lovett stressed that Mission would have all rights of legation, except that only Special Representative would have diplomatic immunity. Otherwise may open and conclude negotiations with all /agencies/ of American Government, may open consulates, issue visas, use secret codes, have diplomatic couriers, etc. 9) While attempting to secure my acceptance May 27 letter as satisfactory, Lovett admitted being impressed my observations and was obviously concerned to extricate Henderson. /He/ therefore, towards the end of our conversation, suddenly produced the new letter[7] cabled you /in my 48 and said he would sign it, if/ acceptable. I told him that though I saw the improvement, I could only refer the matter to my Government for instructions. I expressed the view that the new letter did not in any way solve the underlying /problem/ but only delayed the matter. Lovett /concurred in/ this /view/. 10) View urgent needs practical work which hindered by lack

5. מס' 96.
6. ראה מס' 97.
7. מס' 106.

any status, I advise acceptance Mission, /but/ message accepting Mission should indicate we regard Mission only as momentary stage on path exchange full ministerial representatives and urge speedy solution matter.[8]

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין וא. גאס אל ל. הנדרסון (וואשינגטון)
E. Epstein and O. Gass to L. Henderson (Washington)

תזכירים:[1] 93.08/377/8

Washington, 29 May 1948

THE NEED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF MARITIME CARGO SERVICES TO THE PORTS OF ISRAEL

1) Among the most immediate practical problems of Israel is the assurance of adequate international cargo services to its ports. Such services are indispensable for maintenance of essential civilian supplies and for the successful prosecution of the defence of Israel against aggression.

2) Due to the illegal blockade proclaimed by Egypt and Syria, ships of many nations have been deterred from calling at Israeli ports. Egypt has seized cargoes on ships in Egyptian ports bound for Israel. Egypt has also ordered ships using the Suez Canal to disembark any cargoes bound for Israel and, in default of such discharge of cargo, has detained such ships indefinitely. The other Arab States have threatened similar action.[2]

3) The Provisional Government of Israel is prepared to give assurance that if American ships carrying cargoes both for Israel and for the Arab States call first at Israeli ports, Israel will not seize the cargoes bound for Arab State ports.

4) The Provisional Government of Israel requests that the United States Government use its best efforts to contribute to a solution of this urgent shipping problem in the following ways:

a) By issuing a public statement indicating the affirmative interest of the United States Government in the assurance of adequate international shipping services to the ports of Israel;

b) By assuring that routes fixed by Maritime Commission order (relating to ships chartered from the Maritime Commission) are so organised as to assure a safe first call at Israeli ports;

8. שרתוק אישר את הצעתו של אפשטיין ומכתב בנוסח המוצע נשלח אל מחלקת־המדינה. (ראה שרתוק אל אפשטיין, 6.6.1948, 130.09/2328/2 ; אפשטיין אל מארשאל, 7.6.1948, 93.08/364/10).

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1. תזכירים אלה הוגשו בעקבות שיחה של גאס ואפשטיין עם הנדרסון ממחלקת־המדינה. (ראה מברקם אל שרתוק, 29.5.1948, אצ"מ S25/1559).
2. ראה מס' 73, 74.

c) By exercising moral suasion on ship operators not acting under direction of the Maritime Commission to make a safe first call at Israeli ports;

d) By facilitating the transfer to Israeli flag of craft that can be brought into the service of Israeli ports only by purchase;

e) By a sympathetic attitude specifically towards that part of the Provisional Government's application for a loan from the Export-Import Bank which would provide funds immediately for ship acquisition.

*

Detention of Passengers on American Flag Vessels Bound for Israel

1) The Provisional Government of Israel wishes to renew its request to the United States Government that every effort be made to assure the safe arrival of passengers on United States flag vessels bound for Israeli ports.[3] These passengers are, in many cases, going to Israel for purposes which would be wholly unexceptionable even were there to be a formal state of war. Still less can any state claim a legitimate right to detain them under current conditions. It is surely an intolerable affront that any state should presume to dictate the ultimate destination of these detained persons as a condition for their release from illegal detention.

2. The Provisional Government of Israel wishes to call to the attention of the United States Government not only the problem of American citizens on such vessels but also — and more especially — the problem of persons of other than American citizenship travelling to Israeli ports on American flag ships. Surely the diplomatic good offices and protection of the United States Government cannot fail to extend to persons who travel under its flag and are illegally removed therefrom before arrival at their intended destination.[4]

*

Supplement to the Aide-Mémoire of May 29, 1948, Relating to the Maintenance of Cargo Services to the Ports of Israel

This will supplement the assurance given in Point Three of the Memorandum of May 29th.

The Provisional Government of Israel is prepared to guarantee that if American ships carrying persons both for Israel and for the Arab States call first at Israeli ports, Israel will not detain persons bound for Arab State ports.

3. ראה מס' 44.
4. בתשובה לתזכיר זה הודיעה מחלקת־המדינה, שממשלת ארצות־הברית מיחתה בפני ממשלת לבנון ו"תמשיך לתת הגנה דיפלומטית לנתיניה בכל מקרה שפעולה מצדה של ממשלה זרה תתעלם מהעקרונות המוסדים של החוק הבינלאומי." (ראה גרוס אל אפשטיין, 22.6.1948, 93.03/73/4).

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ג. רופר אל מ. שרתוק
G. Ruffer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: 59/167. התקבל: 30.5
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 29 May 1948

Met today upon his request Francis Kettaneh, Catholic Lebanese, Jerusalem born, United States citizen, millionaire, relative Beshara,[1] in highest esteem Arab delegations here and apparently with influential connections Middle East. He extended peace feelers behalf Malik,[2] Fares [al-Khouri][3] and others. Replied we ready meet Arab leaders for discussion lasting settlement on following premises: 1) Cease-fire. 2) Integrity Israel State with U.N. boundaries. 3) Direct talks without British mediation. We agreed although no agenda to be fixed, talks should include following subjects: 1) Destiny Arab part Palestine. 2) Economic Union. 3) Jewish-Arab Middle East economic cooperation. Kettaneh leaving June 3, arriving Cairo 16, will contact Azzam[4] and others and notify me chances. He expressed greatest anxiety Lebanon and will also /influence/ Lebanese Government take separate action. Please cable your comments and suggestions before his departure.[5]

Understand /Bayard Dodge/[6] left for Levant with State Department approval prepare ground for peace.

Gideon

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1. בשארה אל־ח׳ורי, נשיא לבנון.
2. שארל מאליק.
3. פארס אל־ח׳ורי, נציג סוריה באו״ם.
4. עבד אל־רחמן עזאם פאשה, המזכיר הכללי של הליגה הערבית.
5. בתחילת יולי הבריק קטנה, כי הוא מסר את הודעתו של רופר בקהיר ובבירות, ושהעניין נמצא בדיון. (ראה רופר אל שרתוק, 6.7.1948, 130.09/2337/7).
6. באיירד דודג׳, נשיא האוניברסיטה האמריקאית בבירות, 1923־1948.

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ב. לוקר אל מ. שרתוק
B. Locker to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: 15/97. התקבל: 30.5
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 29 May 1948

Saw Swedish, Norwegian, Ambassadors this week, gave them memoranda for governments on recognition. Their attitutde friendly, noncommital. Saw Spaak[1] Brussels Friday 1 hour. He definitely biased, argued we will ultimately attempt conquering other parts Palestine if immigration unlimited, insisted upon danger Communists infiltration, Haifa becoming Russian spring-board, finally suggested we agree define number immigrants 2 to 3 years, agreement to be revised afterwards. Have been informed prevented [?positive] resolution socialists parliament. Will telegraph Thursday.[2] Saw Buset[3], Anseel[e].[4] Promised to raise the question Monday party executive. They say Belgian attitude largely dependable Vatican because of Catholic party position.

Locker

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ז׳. שארירון אל מ. שרתוק
J. Charreyron to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2413/11

Tel Aviv, le 29 mai 1948

Le Consul de France à Tel Aviv présente ses compliments à Monsieur Shertok et a l'honneur de lui remettre ci-inclus le texte d'une note, qu'il a été chargé d'ordre de son Gouvernement, de transmettre d'urgence aux Autoritiés Juives.

M. Charreyron saisit cette occasion pour prier Monsieur Shertok de bien vouloir agréer les assurances de sa considération la plus distinguée.

J. Charreyron

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1. פול־אנרי ספאק, ראש־הממשלה ושר־החוץ של בלגיה.
2. לא נמצא.
3. מאכס ביזה, יושב־ראש המפלגה הסוציאליסטית בבלגיה.
4. אדוארד אנסלה, סגן יושב־ראש המפלגה הסוציאליסטית בבלגיה.

נספח
APPENDIX

Le Gouvernement Français a, depuis longtemps, marqué son souci de voir la ville de Jérusalem soustraite aux actes de violence. C'est dans ce sens qu'il a déployé aux Nations Unies tous ses efforts en vue de faire assurer une protection de la ville et de ses habitants.

En dépit de ces efforts les combats ont pris, depuis la fin du mandat britannique, un caractère particulièrement violent, tant à Jérusalem que dans le reste de la Palestine. De nombreux établissements français ont été occupés par les forces arabes ou juives et souvent très gravement endommagés. Des ressortissants français ont été tués ou blessés. De tels faits ne sauraient laisser le Gouvernement Français indifférent.

Aux fins de mettre un terme à une situation si dommageable à ses établissements et à ses ressortissants, le Gouvernement Français est amené à demander instamment aux Autoriés Juives de vouloir bien souscrire une déclaration par laquelle elles s'engageraient, sous réserve d'un engagement identique de la partie adverse, à faire évacuer les établissements français de Palestine occupés par les forces juives, et à ne pas laisser occuper par les mêmes troupes les établissements français qu'évacueraient les forces arabes ou d'autres établissements français en Palestine.

Pour ce qui est des modalités d'exécution des évacuations à opérer et des questions relatives à la sauvegarde ultérieure des établissements français, le Gouvernement Français serait obligé aux Autoritiés Juives de vouloir bien désigner des officiers de liaison auprès du Consul Général de France à Jérusalem.

Au cas où les Autorités Juives laisseraient sans suites les demandes contenues dans la présente note, le Gouvernement Français, qui considère la situation présente comme intolérable, se réserverait de prendre toutes mesures pour assurer la protection de ses établissements.

Une note identique est adressée au Gouvernement Royal de Transjordanie.

Tel Aviv, le 29 mai 1948

112

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH243
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/1

Tel Aviv, 30 May 1948

Reference Security Council cessation hostilities resolution.[1] If Council meets before deadline, try elicit whether it is clear that: 1) Cease-fire means complete freedom movement civilian traffic, particularly food supply Jerusalem. 2) No movement armed forces and arms to be allowed inside country. 3) Ban on export arms will not delay British evacuation. Also 4) How proposed ensure implementation ban importation arms into neighbouring countries? And 5) Will Egypt be prevailed discontinue commercial blockade?

Shertok

113

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 86
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1

[New York], 30 May 1948

Your MH 243[1], point 1; during my remarks suggested implication was peaceful movement in or to Jerusalem would not be obstructed. This was not challenged. Shall seek clarification from leading supporters regarding other four points, meanwhile offer following comments: Regarding 2, did raise question of standfast with Americans who thought too complicated. Regarding 3, consider British evacuation unaffected. 4, Mediator responsible implementation.

Eban

112
1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 92; נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.

113
1. מס' 112.

114

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 65/262. נשלח: 31.5; התקבל: 1.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 30 May 1948

Unmistakable signs yesterday[1] close Anglo-American /accord/ which also confirmed by Goldmann London.[2] American record even bad in efforts amend British proposal. Austin originally /retained/ men military age provision, which we had to fight at table.[3] Mediator's terms reference /confined to/ Assembly resolution owing to Canadian, not American, amendment.[4] Arms embargo American amendment went only half way to revising British unilateral embargo.[5] Our case both at table and private talks was /avoid/ any limitation immigration, any revision functions Mediator, any restriction our arms purchase. Despite earlier signs acquiescence, conduct at table did not fully honour any of these principles. In conversations afterwards /they/ assert definite possibility Arabs wish stop war, reconcile themselves Jewish State, saving face yesterday's resolution. This, they say, borne out Malik attitude.[6] They further assert, ourselves in four weeks able consolidate statehood, acquire recognition and even freely stockpile outside Middle East, while Arabs also forced relinquish prospects shipments their /countries/. My general impression Mediator's visit highly significant, marking attempt Anglo-American effort Arab-Jewish conference with territorial changes uppermost. Friends here preparing /intensified work/ Washington, and would urge you seriously consider yourself spending week there. Attach vital importance to steps mentioned my previous cable regarding /District Commissioners and separate/ citizenship.[7] Would appreciate knowing if you taking steps these matters. All

114

1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 92; נספח ה, עמ׳ 666־667.
2. מוסב על השיחות בין בווין לבין השגריר האמריקאי בלונדון, לואיס דוגלאס — ראה מס׳ 120.
3. ראה נספח ה, סעיפים 3 ו־4, (עמ׳ 666־667). סעיפים אלה תוקנו ביזמת הנציג הצרפתי, (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 310th Meeting, 29.5.1948, pp.40-52).
4. ראה שם, עמ׳ 55־61.
5. בנוסח המקורי דובר רק על איסור הכנסת נשק לארץ־ישראל. (ראה מסמך או״ם, S/795/Rev.2). הנוסח המתוקן ראה בנספח ה, סעיף 5 (עמ׳ 667).
6. ראה דבריו של שארל מאליק, נציג לבנון, בדיוני מועצת־הביטחון ביום 28.5.1948, שבהם קרא להפסיק את הוויכוח וההתנצחות במועצת־הביטחון ולהתרכז במאמצי פיוס בין הצדדים בארץ־ישראל. (*SCOR, Third Year*, 308th Meeting, 28.5.1948, pp.31-5).
7. אבן ורופר הציעו לקדם את פני המתוך בגילויים עובדתיים ברורים של ריבונות מדינת ישראל והפרדתה מהחלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל. הם הציעו להחליף את הדרכונים הישנים של השלטון

agree wisdom delay decision one way or other on resolution until all Arab replies received.[8] All realize here practical military considerations must predominate and will give full support and best possible formulation whatever you decide. Would greatly welcome knowing your thinking if possible /every step/.[9]

Eban

115

א. אבן וג. רופר אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban and G. Ruffer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 66/48. התקבל: 1.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/15
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 31 May 1948

Your attention. Present deadline applies acceptance only.[1] Actual cease-fire deadline will be fixed Wednesday meeting.[2] If military /considerations/ necessitate delaying issue cease-fire order, /may be able/ fill gap by raising practical questions interpretation.

My 65[3] meant /by/ "delay decision" only defer announcement.[4]

Eban, Gideon

המנדטורי בדרכונים של מדינת ישראל ולמנות מושלי מחוזות בכל שטח המדינה. (ראה מברקם מיום 30.5.1948, 130.09/2337/6).

8. ראה מס' 104.
9. בטיוטת המברק נוסף המשפט הבא: Perhaps worth bearing in mind existence alternatives between acceptance and rejection by acceptance readiness

115

1. ראה מס' 114.
2. בישיבה ה־311 של מועצת־הביטחון, ביום 2.6.1948, הוחלט להיענות לבקשתו של המתווך, שדרש לקבוע בעצמו את מועד תחילתה של הפסקת־האש, לאחר שישלים את הקמת מנגנון הפיקוח ויתייעץ עם הצדדים. ראה מס' 129; *SCOR, Third Year*, 311th Meeting, 2.6.1948.
3. מס' 114.
4. מברק זה לא הגיע לתעודתו במועד. ישיבת הממשלה, שהתכנסה ב־1 ביוני, היתה נתונה לרושם, שהמועד שקבעה מועצת־הביטחון מוסב על תחולה בפועל של הפסקת־האש. אחרי דיון הוחלט להורות להפסיק את האש בשעה היעודה ולהודיע על כך למועצת־הביטחון. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 1.6.1948). ראה גם מס' 123, 128.

116

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 43/32
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

Tel Aviv, 31 May 1948 (12.00)

Unless there is very sharp deterioration in Jerusalem, which is unlikely though not impossible, you may take it for granted that decision will be affirmative, but it will not be adopted before Tuesday noon, our time, when it will be communicated to you immediately.[1]

Shertok

117

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/1

[New York], 31 May 1948

Reference your MH243.[1] Supplementing my 86,[2] your points 1 and 5, *netzig* Perach[3] intimated personal opinion any interference food supplies would be act of armed force, but unwilling officially interpret. He considers Bernadotte competent person for proper interpretation. American delegation refuses give interpretation any points in advance Security Council discussion. Regarding my attitude Security Council discussions, first sentence my 86 not quite accurate. When commenting on French cease-fire resolution for Jerusalem,[4] I suggested principle that cease-fire within a given area implied free movement for peaceful purposes to and within that area. In announcing decision, we should declare similar assumption for whole Palestine, specifying that acts of armed force include stoppage of or interference with ordinary civilian traffic on public roads, leaving onus of contradiction upon others. Similarly suggest declaring assumption regard-

116
1. ראה מס' 115 והערה 4 שם.

117
1. מס' 112.
2. מס' 113.
3. א. פארודי, נציג צרפת.
4. ראה מס' 100 והערה 1 שם.

ing your point 5 as follows: "Stoppage of or interference with shipping, in particular acts done in pursuance of commercial blockade proclaimed by Egypt and Syria." Regarding your point 2, prevalent opinion is that proper interpretation debars advances beyond existing positions occupied by respective armed forces but does not debar movements within areas controlled by respective parties. Please consider advisability incorporating such specific assumption in our reply. Regarding your point 3, whole group here considers resolution inapplicable to British evacuation, and regards it unwise this juncture drag in question British evacuation. Regarding your point 4, consider as all Arab countries placed on same footing with Palestine, supervision machinery operated by Mediator must equally cover all countries concerned. Suggest answer[5] be sent us for transmission prior release to press.

Eban

118

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH250
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1

Tel Aviv, 31 May 1948

Metavekh definitely assumes acceptance resolution entails complete standstill all military movements. If Ovadya[1] tried enter Yevus,[2] would be guilty violation. Other hand believes only food supply would be ensured Jerusalem, possibly other strictly-controlled traffic, but not free access to all.[3] Can you still secure specific ruling this regard? Cable.

Shertok

5. להחלטת מועצת־הביטחון בדבר הפסקת־האש.

118

1. המלך עבדאללה.
2. ירושלים.
3. הדברים נאמרו בפגישה הראשונה שנערכה בין המתווך לבין בן־גוריון ושרתוק. (ראה דין־וחשבון מהפגישה בישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 1.6.1948).

119

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH251
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/1

Tel Aviv, 31 May 1948

May be asking impossible, but most essential make ban on importation arms Arab states apply deliveries arms stockpiled by British in respective territories. Cable.[1]

Shertok

120

נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 21/132
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 31 May 1948

American Embassy learnt talk Ambassador-Bevin[1] concerned cease-fire not final settlement of boundaries. Their impression that Foreign Office acquiescing existence Jewish State, contemplating settlement on this basis, though does not know what boundaries. Final [--] cease-fire resolution, told them they will get reaction from you, indicated clause importation arms unacceptable, will allow Arab states import while preventing us. They say intention embargo whole Near East. Replied — do not know what position will be as [--] important factor, also immigration clause impossible. They raising the question our ability enforce cease-fire Irgun Zvai Le'umi, Stern Gang, warned disastrous effects if they broke cease-fire. Urge you clarify publicly or telegraph to me position accusation Stern Gang broke cease-fire Jerusalem. My impression is every effort is being made both Governments understanding, largely by American yielding. Warned Ambassador Anglo-American agreement our expense not feasible.[2] Seeing friend Monday.[3] Suggest you send copies important cables Epstein, Eban, here, securing parallel actions.

Goldmann

119

1. אבן השיב שהנציג הבריטי, קאדוגן, נתן הבטחה מפורשת בעניין זה בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון ב־2 ביוני (ראה מברק אבן אל שרתוק, 3.6.1948, 93.03/128/6).

120

1. ראה מס׳ 93 והערה 1 שם.
2. ראה גם גולדמן אל שרתוק, 1.6.1948, ארכיון בן־גוריון 1580.
3. השיחה עם הקטור מקניל — ראה מס׳ 126.

121

מ. פישר אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Fischer to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 76

נוסח נכנס (ניו יורק): 93.01/2180/17

Paris, [?31 May 1948]

Italian Ambassador Paris[1] informed no American pressure for recognition in spite of great British pressure for non-recognition. Reliable information American Ambassador Paris,[2] instructions from White House press French Government recognition, but contrary to instructions State Department. Please verify. Intend contact American Embassy Paris [--] present intentions representative.

122

מ. שרתוק אל ד. בן־גוריון
M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion

העתק: 130.02/2413/11

תל־אביב, 31 במאי 1948

הנני להזכירך את פניית הממשלה הצרפתית בדבר פינוי מוסדותיה בירושלים,[1] אשר דנו עליה בישיבת הממשלה אתמול מבחינת הצורה.[2]

תהי צורת תשובתנו אשר תהיה, עלינו לקבוע עמדה ברורה לגופו של העניין. נדמה לי כי דעתך כדעתי, שיש להיענות לתביעת הפינוי, בתנאי המובן מאליו שגם הצד שכנגד יתחייב על כך, אלא אם כן יש הכרח צבאי גמור ומוחלט, שאינו מניח לנו לפנות. צד זה של השאלה נתון לשיפוטך, ואבקשך להודיעני את מסקנתך בעניין זה בהקדם האפשרי.

לדעתי, אין לנו להשהות את תשובתנו עד שיתברר גורל החלטתה האחרונה של מועצת־הביטחון בשאלת הפסקה כללית של פעולות־איבה בכל הארץ. ייתכן כי גם נסיון זה לא יביא לידי תוצאות של ממש, ועל־כל־פנים, מוטב לנו להראות תשומת־לב מיוחדת לבעיה שעוררה ממשלת צרפת.

121

1. פייטרו קארוני.
2. ג'פרסון קפרי.

122

1. מס' 111.
2. בישיבה הציע בן־גוריון שלא להשיב על מכתב הקונסול הצרפתי משום שהופנה אל ״השלטונות היהודיים״ ולא אל הממשלה הזמנית. הצעתו נדחתה. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 30.5.1948).

בירושלים סבורים כי על־ידי משא־ומתן ישיר עם הקונסול הצרפתי שם אפשר אולי להגיע לידי איזה הסדר. אבל לשם כך דרוש יפוי־כוח מצד הממשלה להנהלת המשא־ומתן.[3]

מ. שרתוק

123

א. אבן אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
A. Eban to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 1 June 1948

Sir,

On Saturday, May 29, I transmitted to the Provisional Government of Israel the text of the resolution adopted by the Security Council with reference to a cease-fire in Palestine for a period of four weeks.[1] I now have the honour to convey the following reply from Mr. M. Shertok, Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government of Israel:[2]

> The Provisional Government of Israel has given full consideration to the resolution of the Security Council adopted on May 29, 1948, calling upon all governments and authorities to order the cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks.
>
> The Provisional Government of Israel has decided to respond to this call and to instruct the High Command of the Defence Army of Israel to issue a cease-fire order to Israeli forces on all fronts to be observed as from Wednesday, June 2, 3:00 AM Israeli time (corresponding to 7:00 PM New York Daylight time), if the other side acts likewise.The Provisional Government of Israel will also comply with all the injunctions and obligations imposed by the resolution, provided that a similar undertaking is entered into by the other governments and authorities concerned.
>
> The readiness of the Provisional Government of Israel to cooperate in the execution of the cease-fire as laid down in the Security

3. ב־1 ביוני קיבלו ו. איתן וח. ברמן יפוי־כוח למשא־ומתן עם הקונסול הצרפתי בירושלים על גורל המוסדות הצרפתיים המוחזקים על־ידי הצבא בירושלים. יחד עם זאת, הם התבקשו להדגיש בפני הקונסול, שאין אפשרות לפנות את מנזר נוטר דאם (ראה שדר של שרתוק אל איתן, 1.6.1948, 130.02/2413/11). החזקת מנזר נוטר דאם והתנהגות החיילים שם היתה הנושא המרכזי בקובלנות הצרפתים בעניין מוסדותיהם.

123

1. ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.
2. ראה מס' 115 והערה 4 שם.

Council's resolution is based on the following assumptions which, in the opinion of the Provisional Government, are clearly implied in the terms of the resolution:

1. That the ban on the import of arms into the territory of the Arab States enumerated in the resolution should apply also to the deliveries of arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign powers within those territories.

2. That during the cease-fire, the armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond the areas controlled by them at the announcement of the cease-fire, and that each side will be entitled to maintain the positions in its military occupation at that time.

3. That freedom of access to Jerusalem will be ensured for the supply of food and other essentials, as well as for normal civilian entry and exit.

4. That any attempt by the parties concerned to stop or impede the normal transport of goods assigned to Israel and other states concerned will be regarded as an act of armed force.

5. That while the Provisional Government of Israel is ready to comply with the injunction that persons of military age admitted during the cease-fire period should not be mobilized or submitted to military training, its freedom to admit immigrants, regardless of age, will not be impaired.

Although all these consequences seem to flow naturally from the text and spirit of the cease-fire resolution, which the Provisional Government of Israel accepts without reservation, it seems important for the avoidance of misunderstanding that they should be placed on the record at this stage.

In addition to this letter, I have been instructed to seek an early occasion, at the discretion of the Security Council, for explaining the views of the Provisional Government of Israel in an oral submission. May I request that the contents of this letter be made available to members of the Security Council.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

Aubrey S. Eban
Acting Representative
Provisional Government of Israel

124

ד. בן־גוריון אל ב. לוקר (לונדון)
D. Ben-Gurion to B. Locker (London)

מברק מוצפן 36/22
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/24

Tel Aviv, 1 June 1948

Yours 1/82.[1] Government entirely disagrees with you. Those asking questions should answer first whether they accept November resolution and help to implement it.

Ben-Gurion

125

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 31/139. התקבל: 2.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 1 June 1948

Had discussion problem Israel and Arab relation[s] General [We]demeyer, Chief Operations General Staff. He expressed sympathy Israel and respect our military accomplishment. Nevertheless [—] that present Arab leadership must be sheltered from receiving any smashing blow from Israel, because otherwise unknown [—] irresponsible elements might rise to [—] position in Arab states. He expressed concern over our receiving, as he said, arms via Yugoslavia and Albania, over strength left-wing force Israel and possibility they might acquire greater influence. [---][1] telegraph primarily concerning Arab oil case war. Spoke against lifting embargo as likely cause increasing bloodshed and disastrous consequences. Expressed uncertainty whether present frontiers are entirely satisfactory, but did not emphasise. I explained limitations of the considerations he [—] and supplied him further material after my meeting.

Epstein

124
1. מס' 55.

125
1. במקור מלה אחת חסרה ושתי מלים משובשות.

126

נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק

N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 23/113, 24/139.
נשלח: 2.6/1.6; התקבל: 3.6/2.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 1/2 June 1948

Talked yesterday my friend[1] who suggested following procedure semi-official contact: Suggest[ed] I write him letter asking opportunity permanent contact Foreign Office discuss matter[s] common interest without prejudice question formal recognition.[2] Repeated Foreign Office available discussion matter[s] common interest, thus opening way discussion routine matters, political, military, financial. He personally will be in charge of contact with me, in his absence — Mayhew.[3] Government will soon send representative similar de facto contact with Israel in Tel Aviv. Regarding seeing Ernest Bevin, think[s] may be next week, let me know. Cease-fire would facilitate direct talk Bevin. He said no intention of Britain participate mediating. Bernadotte requested them send some military observer[s]. They had refused, suggesting that no great power be asked to do this, only smaller neutral states. Their intention is to cease-fire and settlement through (?) discussions. Avoided asking his intentions; generally friend hopeful problem settled before next UNO Assembly. Raised question closing Haifa Port immigration [? repatriation] Cyprus detainees.[4] He promised look into these questions, communicate with me. Mentioned Gaza Airport.[5] Asked me to make a claim in writing, will investigate. He asked possibility Israel joining Arab states some larger confederation, told him this was matter arrangement Israel, Arab states, after they had recognized our existence. Generally we ready to do anything to allay Arab fear State being used by foreign powers. Basis his optimism final settlement

126

1. הקטור מקניל.
2. מכתב בנוסח זה נשלח למחרת (ראה גולדמן אל מקניל, 2.6.1948, אצ"מ Z4/20288); משרד־החוץ הבריטי לא השיב עליו.
3. כריסטופר מייהיו, סגן שר־החוץ הבריטי.
4. מאז אוגוסט 1946 העבירו הבריטים את המעפילים שנתפסו על־ידם למחנות מעצר בקפריסין. בתקופה שבין תום המנדט הבריטי ועד לקבלת ההחלטה על הפסקת־האש לא אסרו הבריטים את יציאת המעפילים מקפריסין. לאחר שנתקבלה החלטת מועצת־הביטחון פירשו הבריטים את סעיף העלייה בהחלטה כאוסר את עלייתם של כל הגברים בגיל הצבא, ואסרו את יציאתם של אלה מקפריסין.
5. שדה־התעופה של חיל־האוויר הבריטי בעזה נתפס על־ידי המצרים, למרות שהיה רכוש בריטי, וממשלת ישראל התבקשה על־ידי הבריטים לא לפגוע בו לאחר הפינוי. שדה־התעופה שימש בסיס יציאה למטוסים שהפציצו את תל אביב. (ראה איתן אל הקונסול הבריטי בירושלים, 19.5.1948, 130.02/2391/1; גולדמן אל מקניל, 2.6.1948, אצ"מ Z4/20288).

[—] Arab[s] do not think it desirable to fight long war but difficulty Arab leaders [—] excited about public opinion. He thinks Transjordan has considerable stocks small arms, no large quantities heavy artillery. Egyptain[s] same. Please telegraph your opinion exchange letters, and should I press some announcement of Foreign Office and establishment branch office our representation in case of arrangements concluded? Do not think Jewish Agency Office suitable address or place for this.

Goldmann

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH262 מברק

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2

Tel Aviv, 2 June 1948

For Security Council.[1] 1) 06.45 this morning, 21.45 your time, Negba reported shelled by Egyptian guns from position between Majdal and Iraq Suweidan. 07.50 seven Egyptian tanks reported having broken into Negba owing observance cease-fire our part. 2) 08.15 our commander Latrun sector reported two Egyptian aircraft bombed Hulda. Directions one Egyptian pilot to another where to drop bombs clearly intercepted, names both pilots known. 3) Later in morning reports received Arab counterattack on our positions north of Jenin occupied well before deadline. 4) Dan shelled by guns beyond frontier. 5) Our forces east of Kfar Yona attacked from Tulkarm. 6) Ramat Hakovesh shelled from Tira.

Last night operations which were in full swing were cut short, and others, ordered but yet unexecuted, were checked in view alleged Arab acceptance cease-fire. Myself personally participated urgent consultation 02.30 a.m., half hour before deadline, where these decisions were taken. In absence any official notification, we relied Reuters[2] and decided risk lives our people, safety our settlements, rather than violation Security Council's order. Feeling throughout Israel we again let down. Meanwhile our people naturally react to local firing and attacks, but unless Arabs completely cease fire all fronts by nightfall, we reserve full freedom resume major operational initiative throughout. Above for communication, what follows for your guidance. Unless you hear from me contrary, press for immediate applica-

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1. ראה מס' 115 והערה 4 שם.
2. מוסב, ככל הנראה, על ידיעה של סוכנות "רויטרס" מניו יורק, מיום 1.6.1948, על הסכמת מדינות הליגה הערבית להפסיק את האש.

tion sanctions against Arab states. If you don't succeed preventing Council fixing new deadline, please make absolute condition: 1) Deadline be fixed middle day, on no account nightly hour, as we cannot again rack nerves our people, expose them incalculable dangers. 2) We shall next issue orders only after we are officially notified that orders been issued by other side.[3] Cable position.

Shertok

128

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17

[New York], 2 June 1948

My cable no. 66/48, May 31[1] stated: "Present deadline acceptance only. Actual cease-fire deadline will be fixed Wednesday meeting." Regret non-arrival cable contributed misunderstanding regarding deadline, now clarified during telephone conversation Arthur [Lourie]. Unable press for sanctions against Arabs for non-compliance as generally accepted Security Council view deadline was unfixed.[2] Atmosphere also affected by general eagerness achieve truce. My statement covers all other points your instructions. Anticipate fixing deadline and interpretation practical aspects cease-fire will be left discretion Mediator, who will have extensive powers. Will cable more fully after Council meeting.

Eban

3. בישיבה של מועצת־הביטחון ב־2.6.1948, מסר אבן את תוכן ההודעה הזאת, ציין שממשלת ישראל פירשה — ולדעתו פירשה כדין — את ההחלטה העקרונית בדבר הפסקת־האש כהוראה להפסקה מידית של פעולות האיבה, ודרש לקבוע מועד מידי להפסקת־האש. (ראה *SCOR*, *Third Year*, 311th Meeting, 2.6.1948, pp.6-14).

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1. מס' 115.
2. ראה מס' 127.

129

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 107
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 2 June 1948

Security Council received suggestion from Mediator that he should be authorized fix actual date cease-fire, after consulting parties. Mediator suggests days rather than hours in order that controls may in the meantime be devised and established. Matter being considered by Council now and we shall protest against delays.[1] Guide your action accordingly.

Eban

130

א. אפשטיין וא. גאס אל א. קפלן
E. Epstein and O. Gass to E. Kaplan

מברק מוצפן 34/184. התקבל: 3.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 2 June 1948

Epstein, Gass, held preliminary financial discussions Henderson, Thorp,[1] Martin,[2] Thursday, Friday, Tuesday.[3] Martin promised reply in principle end of this week or early next week. He obviously concerned respecting assurance Israel surviving and consequent repayment ability. Can be confident of loan realistically only if peace achieved or striking Israel victory is assuring ultimate success. Loans in the absence of peace or assured victory will mean State Department's desire to support Israel's war effort. Such support doubtful. Discussions loan poisoned by continual flow news from Cairo, Amman, and Palestinian Arabs, reporting great Arab successes against Israel. Absence of denial of victories claims from Israel and failure Israel [—] any reports success having disheartening effects on friends here. In connection with more detailed discussion need policy immigration so far this year, anticipated immigration for the month

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1. שרתוק הורה לאבן לא למחות (ראה מברקו מיום 4.6.1948, 130.09/2328/1). ראה גם מס' 141.

130

1. וילארד תורפ, עוזר מזכיר־המדינה לעניינים כלכליים.
2. ויליאם מארטין, נשיא הבנק ליצוא וליבוא.
3. ראה גם מס' 83.

ending [*sic*]. Also require estimate Israel Government revenue from taxes and from local borrowing as well as current level government expenditure for non-war activities. Also require the fullest information obtainable re price, cost, market levels, employment in non-war production and indication agricultural and non-agricultural output. Regards.

Epstein, Gass

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 1/25
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 2 June 1948

Foreign Affairs Commission National Assembly decided call upon Bidault explain why no recognition. Pending further action [*sic*]. Bidault remains personally hostile recognition.[1]

Fischer

132

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 118
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 3 June 1948

Friends believe time ripe raise question our proper designation Council.[1] First step to be letter from Chairman Agency, announcing, first, Agency no longer body authorized represent or communicate Jewish views, interests, on political, military, aspects Palestine question; second, Provisional Government Israel has authorized certain representatives transmit, express, its views; third, Agency expresses gratitude courteous treatment etc. This leaves initiative with Council. General belief is that only when presented with necessity will Council produce majority, which almost

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1. בתשובה לשאילתה באסיפה הלאומית הצהיר בידו, שהממשלה תבחר את "המועד והגבולות שבהם תכיר במצב, שהוא ברגע זה עדיין בדוחק בבחינת מצב דה פאקטו." (ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 7.6.1948, 130.09/2344/4).

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1. ראה מס' 68, 56.

certain, though likely accompanied reservations some members our admittance not equivalent formal recognition. Indonesian precedent here applies.[2] Believe delay this issue now would have adverse political effects, view illusions revision, federation, confederation etc. Same considerations seem apply so strongly my previous cable regarding separation citizenship passports.[3] Would welcome knowing reasons if view not shared by Government. Epstein and Executive here[4] concurred on urgency this matter in light position here.[5] Please cable urgently.

Eban

133

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 82/105. נשלח: 4.6; התקבל: 5.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 3 June 1948

Delivered to Secretary-General formal protest against Syrian chairmanship Security Council, pointing out this against elementary judicial principles.[1] He earnestly advises us withhold letter on following grounds: first, it is formally improper ourselves raise procedural issues; second, several delegations endeavoured unsuccessfully persuade al-Khouri relinquish chair; third, if matter raised publicly at all, then only by member Council, and none had volunteered; fourth, is confident that President's /discretion/ limited and under close secretariat supervision; fifth, formal raising of issue might result in vote of confidence. Promised him reconsider in light this advice. Al-Khouri's conduct hitherto completely correct and careful. Lie advises also against releasing protest. Please cable views or confirm my power discretion.[2]

Eban

2. ראה מס' 56, הערה 4.
3. ראה מס' 114 והערה 7 שם.
4. האגף האמריקאי של הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית.
5. אבן הוסיף והבריק בעניין זה, כשהוא מטעים שהן ברית־המועצות והן ארצות־הברית יתמכו בזימונה של ממשלת ישראל בשמה המפורש על־ידי מועצת־הביטחון. (ראה מברקו אל שרתוק, 4.6.1948, 93.03/72/16).

133

1. נציג סוריה, פארס אל־ח'ורי, כיהן כנשיא התורן של מועצת־הביטחון בחודש יוני. ראה גם אבן אל לי, 3.6.1948, 93.03/94/5.
2. בשיקול שני, ולאחר התייעצות עם חברי הנציגות הישראלית בניו יורק, החליט אבן לקבל את המלצת המזכיר הכללי ולא להגיש את המחאה. (ראה מברקו אל שרתוק, 3.6.1948, 93.01/2180/17).

134

מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט
M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2

[Tel Aviv], 3 June 1948

Message to Count Bernadotte through the good offices of Mr. J.N. Reedman:[1]

Received cable from Cyprus signed by Central Committee Jewish Detainees that British Commissioner[2] informed them of decision U.K. Government to interpret order of Security Council[3] as prohibiting all immigration into Israel of all able-bodied people from Cyprus camps. Beg to draw your urgent attention to this arbitrary procedure on part of U.K. Government which we regard as contrary to Security Council resolution. Resolution expressly envisages entry into Israel during cease-fire of men of military age. Contention that all able-bodied persons among Cyprus detainees are fighting personnel is untenable in view of whole evolution over years of movement of Jewish refugees from post-war Europe to Palestine, which resulted in accumulation at Cyprus at present of 24,000 people. Moreover, after termination Mandate, U.K. Government has no legal title whatsoever forcibly detain these people in Cyprus. In our submission, competence to decide what arrivals are and what are not fighting personnel is yours as Mediator and not U.K. Government's. Would be grateful if you would see your way urge U.K. Government reconsider their decision.

Shertok

135

מ. שרתוק אל ב. לוקר ונ. גולדמן (לונדון)
M. Shertok to B. Locker and N. Goldmann (London)

מברק MH268
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2

Tel Aviv, 3 June 1948

Please protest most strongly against decision communicated Cyprus detainees, discontinue transportation all able-bodied among them to Israel during cease-fire, as contrary terms Security Council's resolution, which

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1. ג'ון רידמן, נציג מיוחד של המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם, נספח לצוות המתווך.
2. גודפרי קולינס, הנציב למחנות העצורים בקפריסין.
3. החלטת מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש, ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.

expressly envisaged continuation arrival Palestine men military age.[1] By taking this decision U.K. Government arrogates to itself competence and functions of Mediator. Contention that able-bodied Cyprus detainees are fighting personnel is untenable view whole evolution movement Jewish refugees to Palestine which resulted their accumulation Cyprus. Moreover, after termination Mandate they have no legal title keep these people Cyprus. Please cable steps taken and results.[2]

Shertok

136

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 133
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 3 June 1948

In Council today I protested British unilateral interpretation Cyprus[1] and affirmed our refusal negotiate on existence, independence, Israel. Jamal [al-Husseini][2] openly said they envisage continued siege of Jerusalem and complete cessation immigration as legitimate interpretation, also Arab participation and control. Council evidently embarrassed, stopped discussion, emphasizing reliance Mediator. Council next meeting Monday,[3] when Mediator probably reports on cease-fire order and control recommendation. See my 80/11.[4]

Eban

135

1. ראה מס׳ 134.
2. מברק דומה נשלח גם אל אבן בניו יורק (93.03/95/2 ,3.6.1948), תוך בקשה שימחה נמרצות במועצת־הביטחון. ראה גם מס׳ 144.

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1. ראה מס׳ 134 ; 135 והערה 2 שם.
2. ג׳מאל אל־חוסייני, ממלא־מקום נשיא הוועד הערבי העליון, נציגו במועצת־הביטחון.
3. 7 ביוני.
4. בקשה ששרתוק יקיים מגע הדוק עם המתווך ויציג את טענות ישראל בתקיפות. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 130.09/2337/6 ,3.6.1948).

137

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 81/117. התקבל: 4.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 3 June 1948

Opinion in Council favours maximal powers discretion for Mediator both in interpretation and implementation of truce resolution, and considers him suitable for efforts peaceful adjustment. Presume vital importance contact with him generally recognized. His first confidential cables show awareness of reality Jewish independence, effective occupation, administration of areas through which he passed, deep-rooted Jewish suspicion Britain, and your general military optimism except regarding Jerusalem. Confidential cables Bunche, Reedman, also favourable so far. Truce Commission, Mediator, recommend appointment 45 control officers — 9,15, and 21 from Belgium, France, United States respectively. Likely to be accepted. Lie claims close friendship Mediator. Would welcome your impressions his views, attitudes.

Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 35/148. התקבל: 4.6
נוסח יוצא (ניו יורק): 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 3 June 1948

Consider coming few weeks under truce, if accepted, as crucial for our political situation here. Recent conversations with Lovett and Henderson indicated no change in traditional attitude State Department. Unfortunately President leaving shortly for three weeks tour country, accompanied by Clifford, presently our most influential supporter White House. British will undoubtedly endeavour use truce period in accord and with assistance State Department for promotion their plans along territorial revision Palestine problem, possibly along modified Grady-Morrison lines.[1]

138

1. בתכנית זו (1946) הוצע לכונן מחוז ערבי ומחוז יהודי בחלק מארץ־ישראל ולהעניק להם אוטונומיה מוגבלת — ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 45, הערה 7.

Department will use de facto recognition Israel as their trump against us, which became obvious my conversations with Lovett, Henderson.

View situation, urging Silver to mobilize our friends in Congress for necessary preventive and defensive action. Secondly, trying arrange through Dave [Niles][2] that no action on Palestine by State Department shall be taken without consent President, wherever he may be. Finally, rallying our friends press for more efforts our support.

Epstein

139

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 36/46. התקבל: 4.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 3 June 1948

Reliable Italian source here states Sforza[1] favours recognition and friendly relations Israel. However, most of his advisers oppose recognition in view Italian desire get back colonies and avoid conflict Arabs.

According same source, Vatican attitude cautious. Pope awaits results Palestine war and will decide line accordingly.

Epstein

140

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH290
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/2

Tel Aviv, 4 June 1948

Result yesterday's 3 hour interview Bernadotte Haifa, today's conversation Reedman, who transmitted Bernadotte's messages, have accepted following arrangements now ratified by Government: 1) We notify Mediator in advance date, port embarkation every immigrant transport. 2) Our

2. דוד ניילס, עוזר מינהלי לנשיא ארצות־הברית, ממונה על קשרים עם היהודים וקבוצות־מיעוט אחרות.

139

1. הרוזן קארלו ספורצה, שר־החוץ של איטליה.

representatives cooperate with Mediator in search ships if practicable at ports embarkation, otherwise on arrival. 3) Immigrants found in possession arms be disembarked, and if arrive — not admitted. 4) Arrivals first week truce be regulated according Mediator's capacity handle transport. 5) Men military age during cease-fire be kept hostels, camps, work-centres, where can be effectively supervised view ensuring no recruiting, no training. 6) If Cyprus ban removed,[1] our immigration programme cease-fire will concentrate mainly evacuation Cyprus. 7) Regarding European transports, shall strive maintain normal age composition.

We proposed military age 18 to 35.[2] Been informed Mediator approached U.K. regarding removal Cyprus ban. We further agreed food, water, supplies Jerusalem under auspices Red Cross, unless we manage meanwhile organise own supplies by alternative roads, which would form part *status quo* but be subject scrutiny view preventing transportation arms. Also agreed appoint responsible representative Jerusalem liaison with Mediator's delegate, able take decisions without reference ourselves each case concerning conditions Jerusalem.[3]

We accepted Mediator's tentative proposal regarding date which cabling separately.[4]

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 52/96
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

Tel Aviv, 4 June 1948 (18.00)

Re [—][1]. Thursday[2] evening met Mediator fresh from Amman. Opened with sweeping declaration no control over fighting personnel feasible, therefore propose no immigration four weeks. Emphatic rebuff caused retreat and reported arrangement.[3] Proposed date is Monday,[4] 12 noon Greenwich Mean Time, 2 p.m. Arabs, 4 p.m. Israel. We interested in few nights operational freedom. Alternative route Hulda to Gate Valley[5] practically completed, jeeps passing, hope carry trucks. Also planning alternative water supply from powerful sources of Gezer. Making every effort take Latrun but very difficult.

Shertok

140
1. ראה מס' 134.
2. מאוחר יותר טענו אנשי האו"ם, שהיו אלה הצעות בעלות אופי טנטטיבי ולא הצעות סופיות — ראה מס' 151, הערה 5.
3. לתפקיד מונה ד. יוסף.
4. ראה מס' 141.

141
1. כנראה MH290 — מס' 140.
2. 3 ביוני.
3. ראה מס' 140.
4. 7 ביוני.
5. "דרך בורמה".

142

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 83/32. התקבל: 5.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 4 June 1948

Suggest that you seek solution Cyprus question[1] through persuading Bernadotte to inform General Secretary he satisfied your arrangements guarantee non-drafting arrivals during cease-fire. This would force British change attitude.

Eban

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א. אבן אל ב. לוקר (לונדון)
A. Eban to B. Locker (London)

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/127/8

[New York], 4 June 1948

Our criticisms unilateral interpretation Cyprus matter appeared impress some delegations and cause weakening of position *Mishlachat.*[1] Important insist text resolution must be taken as is, each side accepting both disadvantages and liberties implied. Important stress Mediator alone has power observe activities immigrants military age, and then only when in Israel, not before. While cease-fire not operative, general reluctance apparent not prejudice it, therefore persistent representations ourselves may have results.

Eban

142

1. ראה מס' 134.

143

1. משלחת בריטניה לאו"ם. ראה דברי אבן בישיבת מועצת-הביטחון ב־3 ביוני, *SCOR, Third Year*, 313th Meeting, 3.6.1948, pp.26-7.

144

ב. לוקר אל א. בווין (לונדון)
B. Locker to E. Bevin (London)

העתק: 130.02/2398/10

[London], 4 June 1948

Dear Mr. Bevin,

I have been asked by the Provisional Government of the State of Israel to convey to you their strongest protest against the decision not to allow men of military age from the Cyprus camps to proceed to Israel.[1] This decision is contrary to the terms of the resolution of the Security Council, whose whole context makes it clear that, in the Article dealing with immigration, the expression "all governments and authorities concerned" means the Governments of the Arab States invading Palestine, and the Government of Israel. Neither the British nor any other Government is asked to do anything with regard to immigration. It is only with regard to arms that the Security Council calls upon "both parties and all governments" to refrain from importing or exporting war materials, etc.[2] His Majesty's Government have therefore no *locus standi* at all with regard to the question of what kind of immigrants may enter Palestine during the period of the truce.

Moreover, the Security Council resolution definitely envisages the continued arrival in Israel of immigrants of military age, and requests an undertaking from the "governments and authorities concerned" not to mobilise or submit them to military training during the cease-fire.

The contention that all able-bodied immigrants from Cyprus must be classed as "fighting personnel" is untenable. Most of them have spent a very long time in Cyprus, where there were of course no facilities for military training.

Whatever may have been the rights and wrongs of the retention of these people in Cyprus during the Mandate, now, after the termination of the Mandate, neither His Majesty's Government nor the Cyprus Administration can have any legal right to deprive them of their liberty.[3]

Yours sincerely,

Berl Locker

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1. ראה מס' 135, 143.
2. ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.
3. ראה גם מס' 164.

145

מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 38
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2457/7

[פאריס], 4 ביוני 1948 (19.20)

א. מיניסטריון־החוץ מודיע לי, שארצות־הברית מסכימות להשקפה האנגלו־ערבית ביחס לעלייה בזמן שביתת־הנשק. פארודי נשאר חזק על ההוראות שקיבל מכאן אחרי התערבותי,[1] למרות לחץ בריטי חזק.

איש לבנוני שנמצא כאן הודיע, ששמע מפי ריאד סולח[2] את המלים הבאות: "ראיתי טנקים מסוג שרמן מגיעים לרבת עמון."

ב. מועצת־המיניסטרים שדנה בבואו של וייצמן לפאריס,[3] החליטה על פגישות מיניסטרים אתו רק באופן פרטי. האורגניזציה שלוחצת על הממשלה ביחס להכרה פועלת, אבל הרצון לדחות את ההכרה הוגבר עוד על־ידי שביתת־הנשק. סימן שהידידות שהממשלה הצרפתית מראה לווייצמן עשויה לכסות על הרושם של אי־ההכרה. בגלל זה אני מציע לווייצמן עמדה פושרת ואפילו שלא משביעת־רצון.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 87/319. נשלח: 5.6; התקבל: 6.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 4 June 1948

Long talk Ross, I pointed out disquiet caused by phrase "eventual political settlement" in recent Austin's speeches. He assured me reference is to settlement between Israel and neighbours with no thought revision. Nevertheless, he asked casually whether our view Assembly frontiers most suitable. General trend his remarks indicate acceptance State Israel as irrevocable; considers our position strong, becoming stronger through four weeks peace. Americans don't expect much activity Mediator during four weeks regarding political adjustment, owing preoccupation controls etc., therefore hope extension cease-fire order 6 months. He frankly explaining significance this period is carrying beyond General Assembly and Presi-

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 92.
2. ריאד אל־צולח, ראש ממשלת לבנון.
3. וייצמן הגיע לפאריס ב־2 ביוני לביקור פרטי.

dential election.[1] Americans anxious avoid discussion on substance next Assembly. Their line with Arabs will be attempt divert them from political anxieties towards interest economic development assisted by /international/ agencies etc. I explained difficulties this approach without however discouraging it. He explained official view considers strongest Jewish card is passage of time with growing /habit/ all parties become used to existence Israel. Regarding our correct designation Security Council, he /regarded this as/ logical, inescapable, though warned several members would make reservations regarding individual recognition. Expressed great interest our success creating unified military command, which described as essential criterion general recognition. They will support any control system agreed between Mediator and party concerned. He said British embarrassed their own efforts unilateral interpretation. Our remarks yesterday had some effect.[2] He believed Egyptian position South Palestine artificial, precarious, speculated whether face-saving device available enable Abdullah agree with us. Considered our chief advantage four weeks truce would be difficulty Arabs resume conflict thereafter without arousing international resentment. My general impression no sharp reversal local attitude, though undoubted signs increased caution, reluctance increase commitments swiftly or conspicuously. They believe British attitude somewhat modified as result recent quarrel. I endeavoured drive home decisive British role to determine Abdullah's attitude and consequent capacity here help terminate conflict by /diplomatic pressure/.

Eban

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א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק 134
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17

[New York], 4 June 1948

My 44/13.[1] Self-appointed group inserting advertisements Yiddish press. With authoritative backing, movement might achieve considerable momentum. Emergency Council decided, unless advised contrary, to appoint small committee to promote. Asks immediate advice.

Lourie

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1. הבחירות לנשיאות ארצות־הברית עמדו להיערך בתחילת נובמבר; המושב השלישי של העצרת הכללית של האו"ם נועד לחודשים ספטמבר עד דצמבר 1948.
2. ראה מס' 143.

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1. מס' 89.

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א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון (ואשינגטון)

E. Epstein to L. Henderson (Washington)

העתק: 93.08/377/4

Washington, 4 June 1948

Dear Mr. Henderson,

As you will recall, on Thursday, May 27th, I called on you and Mr. Wilkins,[1] accompanied by my legal and economic advisers. We had occasion, at that time, to go over various problems affecting the availability of cargo and passenger services to Israeli ports. We also ventured to suggest various measures which, in our submission, the Government of the United States might reasonably take in view of the illegal blockade proclaimed by Syria and Egypt and the unlawful seizures of cargoes and detention of persons by various Arab States. Subsequently, at Mr. Wilkins' suggestion, the substance of our views was communicated in writing.[2]

In an effort to be helpful, I gave you the assurance — orally, and subsequently in writing — that, if American flag ships would make a safe first call at Israeli ports, the Provisional Government of Israel would guarantee not to seize cargoes or detain persons bound for Arab States. It was and is my understanding that no corresponding assurance has been forthcoming from the Arab States. You were so kind as to express your judgment that the availability of such a guarantee from Israel was an important fact affecting the appropriate routing of American flag ships.

During the past week, Mr. Gass, my Economic Adviser, has at my request been in touch with Mr. Wilkins, particularly on the question of the routing of the *Marine Carp* due to leave the United States on June 11th for the Middle East.Government authority is particularly involved in the case of the *Marine Carp* since the ship belongs to the United States Government and is operated by the American Export Lines for the United States Maritime Commission on a management contract. The officers of the American Export Lines have made it clear that they expect to receive guidance on the routing of such a ship from the United States Government, and particularly from the Department of State.

Due to the most unfortunate experience of this line with Lebanese seizure of passengers bound for Israeli ports, it was our suggestion that the *Marine Carp* make a safe first call at Haifa or Tel Aviv and then proceed to Beirut and Alexandria, so as to give the maximum of safe service to all concerned. We were informed of some eighty passengers who wished to

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1. פרייזר וילקינס, מאגף המזרח הקרוב במחלקת־המדינה.
2. מס' 108.

proceed to Israel aboard the *Marine Carp;* others of whom we had no direct knowledge seem now to bring the total of passengers involved to about one hundred. (There is no question of cargo, except for the excess luggage of passengers, since the *Marine Carp* is not a cargo ship.) Mr. Wilkins was so kind as to express to Mr. Gass his preliminary concurrence in the idea that a first call at an Israeli port was justified under the circumstances.

I was correspondingly shocked to learn late yesterday afternoon that the *Marine Carp* was dropping all Israeli ports from her itinerary on this voyage and would go directly to Beirut. The American Export Line has indicated that this routing was approved by the United States Government authorities concerned.

By this act, the illegal action of Lebanon in detaining lawful passengers on an American flag ship has been rewarded by giving the Lebanon exclusive service. It is the innocent passengers wishing to go to Israeli ports who are punished.

I cannot overestimate the unfortunate effect which this incident might have on the whole issue of the availability of shipping services to Israeli ports. The shipping world will see in this routing of the *Marine Carp* clear evidence that the United States Government condones illegal violence even against ships owned by the United States Government itself. Such conduct will deter other shippers from maintaining essential services to Israeli ports.

Large issues of international law and equity are involved in this matter as well as interests of vital concern to Israel. For these reasons, I venture to request you to utilize your best efforts to have the routing of the *Marine Carp* hanged to provide a safe first call at an Israeli port. The practical issues involved require that the new routing, to be of maximum usefulness, should be established at the earliest possible hour.[3]

Yours sincerely,

Eliahu Epstein
Acting Representative of the
Provisional Government of Israel

3. בעקבות התערבות זו, שינתה ה"מארין קארפ" את נתיבה ועגנה תחילה בחיפה. (ראה אפשטיין אל הנדרסון, 7.6.1948, 93.08/377/4).

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מ. שרתוק אל ד.פ. מאלאן (פרטוריה)
M. Shertok to D.F. Malan (Pretoria)

מברק MH287
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2

Tel Aviv, 4 June 1948

In pursuance of my exchange of cables with your esteemed predecessor,[1] have honour approach you on behalf Provisional Government of Israel with request to accept permanent representative State of Israel to be accredited to Union Government with rank of Minister, with view to his establishing Israeli legation with location to be approved by Union Government. Beg express hope that this arrangement will be acceptable to Union Government, and that they too will reciprocally establish legation in Israel to be headed by a Minister. In putting forward this request, Provisional Government of Israel is actuated by keen desire to strengthen friendly relations between Union South Africa and State Israel, closeness of which in past, including fields of commerce and investment of South African capital in Palestinian development, has proved of such outstanding benefit. Take this opportunity of presenting my respectful compliments to Your Excellency and wishing you successful term of office.[2]

Moshe Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 149
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2328/2

New York, 5 June 1948

Mediator cabled Council asking if clause regarding immigration men of military age permissive.[1] Council replied Mediator responsible for inter-

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1. ראה מס' 76. בתחילת יוני 1948 היו חילופי ממשלות בדרום־אפריקה. "המפלגה המאוחדת", בראשותו של סמאטס, פינתה את מקומה בשלטון ל"מפלגה הלאומית". דניאל פ. מאלאן, מנהיג "המפלגה הלאומית", התמנה לראש־הממשלה ושר־החוץ.
2. מאלאן השיב שממשלת דרום־אפריקה שוקלת החלפת נציגים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל; לעת־עתה הוא סבור, שהזמן עדיין אינו בשל לכך. (ראה מאלאן אל שרתוק, 8.6.1948, 93.03/72/20). ישראל ודרום־אפריקה החליפו נציגים רק בקיץ 1949.

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1. ראה ברנאדוט אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם, 4.6.1948, מסמך או"ם S/823.

pretation, refused to convene meeting on his request.[2] French delegation, which drafted amended text, supported our interpretation through spokesman. Ourselves informing all concerned grave consequences departure from text. Did Mediator agree with you on controls system outlined your cable?[3] If so, please consider publication in event any withdrawal.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)

M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH315 מברק

130.09/2328/2 :נוסח יוצא

[Tel Aviv], 6 June 1948

Today's interview, Count went back on previous understanding regarding immigration.[1] He explained having stumbled serious difficulty turned to Security [Council] President for authoritative interpretation, presented me with copy Khoury's telegram, which myself received from Kenen,[2] and his own written conclusions based thereon.[3] This four-page document intended only for us, stresses basic principle immigration into Israel is unchallenged, and question narrowed down to ensuring that neither side gains military advantage during or after truce from entry men military age. Document further emphasises advantages to us resulting from Arab acceptance of principle of Jewish immigration, meaning women, children, old, and possibility conduct immigration safely during truce. Following rules set: 1) Prior notification of embarkation in time for Mediator send observers check immigrants. 2) No fighting personnel, including immigrants bearing arms, be admitted. 3) Mediator entitled place observers on ships. 4) All immigrants carefully checked by Mediator's observers at ports disembarkation Israel. 5) (Which is operative part as regards men military age) Mediator shall exercise discretion during truce in determining whether

2. התשובה ניתנה מטעמו של נשיא מועצת־הביטחון פארס אל־ח׳ורי, שקבע כי משמעות החלטת מועצת־הביטחון היא — שלא תצמח תועלת צבאית לאחד הצדדים במשך תקופת הפסקת־האש. (ראה פארס אל־ח׳ורי אל ברנאדוט, 5.6.1948, 130.02/2424/20; *SCOR, Third Year*, 314th Meeting, 7.6.1948, pp.1-2).

3. מס׳ 140.

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1. ראה מס׳ 140.

2. ראה מס׳ 150 והערה 2 שם.

3. ראה "Statement of Count Bernadotte communicated to Mr. Shertok at their meeting in Haifa on 6 June 1948", 93.03/95/2.

they represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give Jewish side military advantage and, if such be his decision, in refusing their admission. 6) Those of military age who are admitted, be kept in camps under surveillance. 7) For one week following effective date truce no immigration whatsoever pending organisation control. This subsequently changed to read: During first week following truce, in consideration time required for setting up machinery etc., Mediator shall exercise discretion regarding time entry immigrants. 8) Regarding ships bearing immigrants already *en route* desirable should not disembark until control effective. 9) Men military age be considered 18 to 45. Elicited from Count criterion in admitting men military age be their proportion of total men already enlisted, but no percentage divulged. Myself objected most strongly whole conception as unwarranted deviation from resolution, distorting and prejudging issue. Count finally stated these are dictates his conscience, if we object should appeal Security Council, meaning [as] far as he concerned cannot go further. He proposes communicate tomorrow us, Arabs, his final conclusions and deadline, will expect clear reply. After Government meeting later today, informed Reedman, according decision, for transmission Count, my objections fully shared by Government, which considered Count's proposed policy contrary to resolution and very serious obstacle to truce; we therefore reserve right appealing Security Council. One point strongly criticised at meeting was fact movement troops from and into Arab states and Palestine will not be effectively supervised pending establishment controls, while delay their establishment considered sufficient reason hold up Jewish immigration. Government will consider matter further after receipt Count's final communication, thereafter shall instruct you. If matter comes up Security Council before receipt instructions, you can voice criticism along above lines, divulging agreement originally reached as explained previous two cables,[4] emphasising to what length we went in agreeing internment D.P.'s in Israel, cooperating searches etc., and concluding final decision be taken by Provisional Government.[5] Relay London.

Shertok

4. מס׳ 140 ומברק נוסף של שרתוק אל אבן מיום 6.6.1948 (93.03/95/2), המביא תוספות והסברים למברק זה.

5. אבן הודיע למזכיר הכללי של האו״ם, במברק מיום 7.6.1948 (93.03/130/3), את תוכן ההסכם שהושג לכאורה בין המתווך וממשלת ישראל ושהוברק אליו ב־4 ביוני (מס׳ 140). בתגובה על כך הבריק שרתוק לאבן ב־8 ביוני (130.09/2328/2), כי פירסומו של נוסח ההסכם לא תאם את ההנחיות שהוברקו לו ב־6 ביוני (מס׳ 151), וכי הדבר עלול לשבש את היחסים עם המתווך. ראה גם ההסבר של אבן לצעד שנקט — במברקו אל שרתוק מיום 8.6.1948 (93.03/95/2); מס׳ 156 והערה 3 שם.

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט
M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte

שדר: 130.09/2328/2

Tel Aviv, 7 June 1948

Have reported fully to meeting of Provisional Government yesterday on our interview in Haifa.[1] Provisional Government authorised me to inform you that it fully endorses my objection to your proposal to restrict entry into Israel of Jewish immigrants of military age during truce period. Provisional Government cannot agree that policy you propose to adopt in this regard accords with resolution of Security Council of May 29th, inasmuch as this resolution imposes no other limitation on immigration of men of military age than that they should not during truce be mobilized or trained for military service. Provisional Government considers limitations you intend to impose as very serious obstacle to acceptance of truce proposal and must naturally reserve its right to appeal against it to Security Council.

In course of discussion, following consideration was stressed: During initial stage of truce period movements of troops from one Arab country into another and possibly from some into Palestine will go unchecked owing to absence of effective machinery of control. Yet absence of such machinery for that particular purpose is not deemed by you sufficient reason for non-initiation of truce arrangement, whereas on other hand its absence is regarded as legitimate reason for interrupting or delaying Jewish immigration.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 159
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 7 June 1948

Regarding Mediator. 1) Does silence about Jerusalem imply acceptance our position? 2) Regarding immigration, Rose [Halprin][1] strongly opinion American public would understand our rejection, accordingly your anxieties such reaction should not govern decision.

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 151.

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1. רוז הלפרין, חברת הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית, נשיאת "הדסה" בארצות־הברית.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 60/144
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

Tel Aviv, 7 June 1948

Military background consideration truce: 1) Though with the exception eastern Galilee we in offensive all fronts, our fighting manpower resources extremely strained and tired; many vital positions held tenuously. 2) More than half our recruits, total 40,000, yet [un]trained, 4 weeks respite would be great boon. 3) Despite extraordinary effort Jerusalem yet unrelieved, rations steadily diminishing, fear starvation and continuous bombing saps morale. Great deal depends success operation planned for tonight and tomorrow night.[1] 4) On the other hand, unless we succeed circumventing ban on import armaments, shall be far more severely hit by it than Arabs in view of their overwhelming superiority aircraft, artillery, armour, and impending [?loss] valuable transport on our side.

Line is do utmost minimise restriction of immigration but believe shall have accept truce last resort, though under protest. All this strictly confidential, only for most responsible friends New York, Washington.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 37/56. התקבל: 8.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 7 June 1948

Reliably informed Truman will support our application for loan, and will object any attempt change frontiers Israel. During presentation credentials by new British Ambassador, Truman expressed strong terms his displeasure Bevin policy regarding Palestine.[1] Truman inclined to avoid appointments Jews or Catholics head of United States America missions and later legations Israel, and will prefer Protestants agreeable Israel.

Epstein

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1. מדובר בנסיון השלישי להשתלט על איזור לטרון. המערכה החלה אור ל־9 ביוני והסתיימה ללא הצלחה עם כניסת ההפוגה לתוקפה ב־11.6.1948.

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1. בדיווחי העיתונות האמריקאית על מסירת כתב־האמנתו של השגריר הבריטי סר אוליבר פראנקס נאמר, שבשיחה עם טרומן לא נדון עניין ארץ־ישראל. (ראה *New York Herald Tribune,* 4.6.1948).

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הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק
Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok

שדר: 130.02/2424/20

Cairo, 8 June 1948[1]

1. I have the honour to inform you that in pursuance of the action of the Security Council at its 311th meeting on June 2, authorizing the Mediator to fix the effective date for the truce in Palestine, and following extensive consultations on this matter with the representatives of the two parties, and with the support of Truce Commission, I herewith give formal notice of the effective date and hour for the commencement of the cease-fire and truce in Palestine as envisaged in the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May.[2]

2. This effective date and hour of the cease-fire and truce, including the application of the supervision envisaged in the resolution of 29 May, shall be Friday, 11 June, 1948, at 6 o'clock in the morning G.M.T., (repeat Friday, June 11, 1948, at 6 o'clock in the morning G.M.T.). As from this date and hour there is to be a cessation of all acts of armed force in Palestine for a period of four weeks, and all combatants in the field should be notified accordingly.

3. In view of the urgency of the time factor and the necessity of giving final confirmation of this decision in ample time to each of the parties concerned, I must ask that notification to me of your acceptance or rejection of this date and hour shall be in my hands not later than Wednesday noon G.M.T., 9 June, (repeat Wednesday noon G.M.T., 9 June). If this decision is accepted by all parties, final confirmation will be dispatched to you by me not later than 6 o'clock in the evening G.M.T., Wednesday, 9 June, in order to reach you on the same day. Should the decision be rejected, or accepted only conditionally, by any of the parties, no further consultations on the matter will be undertaken by me, but I will promptly report the circumstances fully to the Security Council for such action as that body may deem appropriate. It is, of course, my earnest hope that the decision will be accepted unconditionally.

4. In the event of acceptance of this decision, the date and hour for public announcement of the beginning of the truce will be communicated to you in my message of final confirmation on 9 June, in order that publication shall be made simultaneously by all concerned.[3]

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1. פורסם גם כמסמך או״ם (S/829). התאריך שם: 7.6.1948.
2. ראה נספח ה, עמ׳ 666־667.
3. מאוחר יותר נקבע, שמועד תחילתה של הפסקת־האש יפורסם בעת ובעונה אחת על־ידי כל הצדדים, ב־9.6.1948, בשעה 8.00 על פי שעון גריניץ׳ (ראה לי אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון, 9.6.1948, מסמך או״ם S/830). למרות זאת הקדימו אנשי האו״ם את הפרסום, בטענה שהדבר

5. This decision has been taken in the light of the following considerations:

i. The clear intent of the truce as envisaged in the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May is to bring about a cessation of hostilities without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews, and to ensure that no military advantage shall accrue to either side as a result of the application of the truce.

ii. The President of the Security Council has informed me that all parties concerned have accepted the resolution of 29 May unconditionally, and that the Mediator should fix the date for the cease-fire in consultation with the two parties and the Truce Commission in as short a period as possible.

iii. I am aware of course that each side in accepting the resolution notified the Security Council of certain "assumptions" and explanations in connection with some of the provisions of that resolution, and that as a result there were conflicting views of the precise intent of particular clauses, especially those relating to "fighting personnel and men of military age".

iv. In the course of the amicable consultations with the representatives of parties concerned on the days of June 3, 4, 5 and 6, I exerted every effort to reconcile these divergent interpretations, and as a result of these consultations and the explanations and interpretations made by me to each of the parties, I am firmly convinced that any remaining differences are altogether insufficient to warrant any further delay in beginning the truce.

6. As I have carefully explained to each side, it is my earnest intention to apply the truce and the controls required in such manner as to ensure that no military advantages will accrue to either side during the period of the truce or as a result of its application. To this end, I have made certain interpretations of the resolution and certain decisions as to its application which have been thoroughly explained to the representatives of both sides and which in summary are the following:

i. No fighting personnel, which shall include persons identified as belonging to organized military units as well as all persons bearing arms, shall be introduced into any of the Arab States or into any part of Palestine.

ii. As regards men of military age, the Mediator shall exercise his discretion during the period of the truce in determining whether men of military age are represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give to one side a military advantage if their entry is permitted, and

נחוץ לאור ההודעה הלא־מדויקת ששלח אבן למזכיר הכללי של האו"ם ב־7 ביוני בדבר הסכמה, כביכול, בין המתווך וממשלת ישראל — ראה מס' 151, הערה 5. (ראה רידמן אל שרתוק, 10.6.1948, 130.02/2424/20).

in such event shall refuse them entry. Should men of military age be introduced in numbers necessarily limited by the application of the foregoing principle, they are to be kept in camps during the period of the truce under the surveillance of observers of the Mediator, and shall not be mobilized in the armed forces or given military or para-military training during such period.

iii. The Mediator shall exercise, to the fullest extent practicable, a check on all immigration at the ports of embarkation and debarkation, and shall place U.N. observers on ships bearing immigrants, and to this end shall be notified well in advance as to the port of embarkation of any ship bearing immigrants.

iv. During the first week following the truce, in consideration of the time required for setting up the controls essential to effective application of the resolution, the Mediator shall exercise his discretion as regards the entry of any immigrants irrespective of age or sex.

v. Movements of troops or war material from one interested country to another, or closer to the borders of Palestine, or to the fighting fronts in Palestine, are prohibited during the period of the truce.

vi. All fighting fronts and lines shall remain stablilized during the period of the truce, and there shall be no increase in the fighting strength deployed along the fronts and lines, nor in the war materials on hand. Routine replacement of personnel may be undertaken.

vii. War materials shall not be imported into the country or[4] territory of any interested party.

viii. Relief to populations of both sides in municipal areas which have suffered severely from the conflict, as in Jerusalem and Jaffa, shall be administered by the International Red Cross Committee in such manner as to ensure that reserve stocks of essential supplies shall not be substantially greater or less at the end of the truce than they are at the beginning.

ix. All warlike acts, whether on land or sea or in the air, shall be prohibited during the period of the truce.

7. I recognize fully that both the effectiveness of the truce and its fairness depend in large measure on the manner in which it is supervised and applied. A detailed plan for its application is in preparation and will be put into operation when the truce begins. No doubt numerous questions will arise in connection with the details of supervision of the truce. Consultations on such matters of detail may be undertaken when the truce is in effect.

4. במקור נדפס from the ותוקן בכתב־יד ל־or. הטעות מופיעה גם בנוסח הרשמי שפירסמה מזכירות או"ם. ראה גם במס' 168, סעיף 6.

8. I am deeply appreciative of the spirit of cooperation manifested by both sides in the difficult negotiations over the truce. I trust that the same spirit will continue in order that the truce may be achieved and the larger work of mediation may proceed constructively in an atmosphere of peace in Palestine.

Count Bernadotte
Shepheard's, Cairo

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ג׳. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Reedman to M. Shertok

שדרים: 130.02/2424/20

8 June 1948

ORAL MESSAGE FROM COUNT BERNADOTTE TO MR. SHERTOK TRANSMITTED BY MR. REEDMAN ON 8.6.48, EVENING.

With reference to Mr. Shertok's message to Count Bernadotte on June 7th,[1] Count Bernadotte wishes Mr. Shertok to know that he admits the validity of the second point of the message (simultaneity of control in the initial period of immigration on one hand and of movement of troops among Arab countries on the other hand) and will adjust his policy accordingly.

Count Bernadotte wishes to emphasise again that in the event of rejection or conditional acceptance — the word "or" being underlined — he will refer the matter back to the Security Council. In fact, he will himself immediately proceed to Lake Success in order personally to report to the Council.

MESSAGE FROM DR. BUNCHE TO MR. SHERTOK TRANSMITTED BY MR. REEDMAN ON 8.6.48, EVENING.

In the event of the Arabs accepting and the Jews rejecting the cease-fire, Dr. Bunche feels sure, on the basis of information received from Lake Success, that the Security Council will uphold Count Bernadotte's line.

Dr. Bunche also wishes to point out that from the wording of the Security Council's resolution of May 29th it is clear that while immigration of men of military age is permitted, no "blanket permission" is given for it to proceed in unlimited numbers.

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1. מס׳ 152.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 178
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2
נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ S25/1559

[New York], 8 June 1948

Ross just phoned, conveying Washington regards Mediator's proposals very reasonable. With regard Mediator's discretion men military age, they presume he will exercise it fairly and liberally.[1]

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 183
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 8 June 1948

Regarding your enquiry Eliahu [Epstein],[1] although some regard June third agreement[2] reasonable, doesn't follow they would repudiate new proposals. Presume these formulated to avoid constituting clear flagrant departure. Prevailing tendency here would be to support him,[3] and this likely prove decisive despite countervailing sympathy. Almost inconceivable imagine him overruled unless extreme bias shown. Receiving material this afternoon and will explore more specifically.

Eban

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1. בפרפרזה של המברק, שהוכנה ככל הנראה במשרד־החוץ בתל אביב, נוסף המשפט הבא: U.S. hopes that parties will accept cease-fire on this basis (אצ"מ S25/1559).

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1. המברק לא נמצא; מן־הסתם מוסב על עמדת ממשלת ארצות־הברית וממשלות אחרות ביחס לסעיף העלייה שבהחלטת מועצת־הביטחון.
2. ראה מס' 140.
3. במתווך.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH332 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/72/16

Tel Aviv, 8 June 1948

Your 118[1] and subsequent. Government decided take action proposed, but reversed procedure. First step, Provisional Government applies for invitation meetings; second, if asked whether we seek dual representation, we reply negatively and explain once we admitted, Agency withdraws; third, after our request granted, Agency sends letter thanks. Believe logic obvious. Consult friends, advise whether preferable we apply Secretary direct or you apply our behalf. If you prefer latter course, you may proceed, but advise me before publishing.

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

New York, 8 June 1948

Your 337.[1] Did not wish be unduly insistent, but had not received cable saying matter before Government. Fully agree action should not be precipitate. Suggest letter applying entry Council be drafted by yourself and cabled us for transmission Council at time appearing appropriate. Long discussion British delegation today, they agreed matter must be settled, but as matter procedure not involving substance. They are cabling London for confirmation. Will complete canvass delegation[s] tomorrow, interviewing Colombia, France. Argentina already agreed not raise objections. British ask whether ministers Provisional Government have resigned Jewish Agency Executive. Since affirmative answer would assist, suggest your cable refer to fact negotiations proceeded Mediator - Provisional Government, and Government issued cease-fire orders.

Eban

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1. מס׳ 132.

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1. ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 8.6.1948 (130.09/2328/2). שרתוק הודיע כי הממשלה דנה באופן זימונה של ישראל על־ידי מועצת־הביטחון וכי הבריק הנחיות — ראה מס׳ 160.

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א. אבן אל נ. גולדמן (לונדון)
A. Eban to N. Goldmann (London)

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ Z4/20291

New York, 8 June 1948

Government decided raise issue our admission Security Council as Israel,[1] especially view *Nasich*[2] direct negotiation Government and direct correspondence Council with Government which creates strong practical case, especially since Agency virtually exercises no control or authority towards United Nations. General attitude Council favourable, though many delegations will make reservations our admission not implying individual recognition. Strong precedent Indonesia which admitted Council without being recognised by any state.[3] Ourselves emphasizing purely practical procedural issue involved, raising no principle of status or recognition. Discussed this with Beeley[4] today, who agreed formula must be found avoiding inaccurate designation Agency. He promised consult London. Suggest you take this up with friends, pointing out nothing involved but correct description existing facts. Ourselves would not object any reservations made referring recognition. Relevant point out that May [18]th,[5] Cadogan did not object addressing questionnaire Government Israel so long as no conclusions drawn.[6] Believe same attitude would apply here. Obvious Council cannot discuss Palestine question without presence both parties, and only Jewish party authorised is Provisional Government. Grateful urgent action tomorrow, when Beeley consults. Have submitted above arguments to him.[7]

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 160.
2. הרוזן ברנאדוט.
3. ראה מס' 56 והערה 4 שם.
4. הארולד בילי, חבר המשלחת הבריטית לאו"ם.
5. במקור בטעות: fifteenth.
6. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 294th Meeting, 18.5.1948, p.7.
7. מברק דומה נשלח אל פישר בפאריס, שנתבקש לפעול אצל ממשלת צרפת (ראה אבן אל פישר, 9.6.1948, 93.03/127/9).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 96/183. נשלח: 9.6; התקבל: 10.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 8 June 1948

Talk with Beeley yields following picture. British policy aims Arab-Jewish settlement during truce on lines revised partition. Do not rule out Abdullah establishing himself Jerusalem while Jewish population acquires special status in relation Israel. Emphasize chief territorial defect Assembly map was cutting off Egypt from Arab world. Conclusions appear obvious. He convinced British recognition Israel will immediately follow new frontier solution, as also many other recognitions. Throughout conversation, existence State Israel not questioned by him. He compared present de facto position in Western Galilee and Negev, where Jewish, Arab military control respectively unchallenged, while Arab, Jewish villages left undisturbed. Also compared position Jews Jerusalem and Arabs Haifa, saying both must envisage cooperating with foreign regime. Comay, self, pointed out refusal Jerusalem Jews submit Abdullah, /also/ general difficulties territorial revision approach. British view Egypt, Syria, Lebanon have no territorial ambitions, and adjustment is affair between Israel and Abdullah, though latter must satisfy Arab League, especially Iraq, by gains of prestige and substance. They confident Mediator can produce proposals this basis not entirely unacceptable other party against alternative of resuming war.

Eban

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 33/38. התקבל: 9.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 8 June 1948

With reference to protest submitted by Berl Locker regarding Cyprus detain[ees,[1] no] reply forthcoming as Israel not get [*sic*] status Foreign Office. For this reason would have preferred protest made Lake Success publicly instead here, where not even acknowledgement probable. Suggest take into consideration for future as long no status arranged.

Goldmann

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1. מס' 144.

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מ. שרתוק אל ג'. מארשאל (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to G. Marshall (Washington)

MH334 מברק

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2

[Tel Aviv], 8 June 1948

Your undoubted sympathy with constructive resettlement and rehabilitation of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in State of Israel, concurrent with utmost development of Israel's economic resources for future peace and prosperity of Palestine and Middle East, encourages us to solicit your favourable consideration of application of Provisional Government of Israel to Import and Export Bank of U.S.A. for loan of 100 million dollars.[1] This loan is intended to facilitate productive absorption of large numbers of refugees in Israel and to promote country's agricultural and industrial development, as well as to finance housing schemes and alleviation of temporary supply of shortages caused by present emergency conditions. Application is based on sound schemes of investment and economic development, and bulk of loan will be self-liquidating. We believe that record of Jewish development in Palestine in last 25 years in teeth of far-reaching disabilities imposed by outside tutelage, is reliable indication of constructive potentialities of independence now gained and consequently of creditworthiness of our state. We sincerely hope that your favourable consideration will enable us to obtain this measure of assistance for carrying through a programme of reconstruction based on our self-reliant effort and clear undertaking of complete repayment. Awaiting your reply at your earliest convenience either direct or through our Special Representative Washington.

Moshe Shertok
Minister Foreign Affairs

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1. ראה מס' 130.

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מזכר מאת ו. איתן
Note by W. Eytan

מזכר: אצ"מ S25/5634

[Jerusalem], 8 June 1948

Confidential

NOTE ON ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

[.....]

I had the opportunity this morning of having a short talk with him [Dr. Vardi],[1] in the course of which he drew my attention to a number of points. He maintains that the somewhat fantastic-sounding crusade now being organised by the Franciscans, needs to be carefully watched.[2] He had information a month ago that something of this nature was being planned, and it is in his opinion not nearly as innocent or harmless a movement as it sounds. On paper, it is a crusade by Catholic noblemen with romantic names and romantic minds, with the object of protecting the Holy Places. If it were only this, it would perhaps not matter much — but these same Catholic noblemen are, almost without exception, very well connected in the Foreign Offices and Chancellories of the world, and it is in these quarters that the real inspiration and the real results are to be looked for. Catholic influence, as everybody knows, is quite disproportionately strong in the Foreign Office in London, and the same applies to France, Italy and other countries.

It will not have escaped notice that the Papal Legate at Beirut has formally denied that the Vatican has protested against the shelling of Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University. The original statement to this effect had apparently created an unfavourable impression in Christian and Moslem circles in the Middle East, and the Church was therefore at pains to put this right.

According to Dr. Vardi, the Catholic Church is opposed to the custody of the Holy Places being vested in the Jews, the Protestants, the Greek Orthodox and the Moslems — in this order; i.e. the Moslems, although not exactly desirable, would be in the eyes of the Church the least objectionable custodians.

One can go on for a long time along these lines, but there is no point in multiplying instances. I am persuaded that we should make a much more

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1. חיים ורדי, מומחה לעדות הנוצריות בארץ־ישראל, מיולי 1948 יועץ במשרד־הדתות.
2. מוסב על ידיעות בעיתונות על כוונת המסדר הפראנציסקני לשגר מיליציה של מתנדבים שתגן על המקומות הקדושים בארץ־ישראל. ידיעות אלה הוכחשו על־ידי הוואתיקן. (ראה *New York Herald Tribune*,5.6.1948 ; "הארץ", 6.6.1948).

strenuous effort than we have made so far to establish fruitful relations with the Vatican, which at present, as is well known, maintains its Nuncios and Legates in every Middle Eastern capital. It is not so long ago that the Mufti made a public statement to the effect that one of the first actions of an Arab Government in Palestine would be to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

I feel that a great deal of the trouble we have been having in recent weeks with the Church, in connection with Holy Places and other matters, could have been avoided or at least lessened if basic relations with the Vatican had existed.

The establishment of relations with the Vatican is a task of a peculiarly delicate nature, and the person to be entrusted with it would have to be carefully chosen. The difficulty of finding the right man should not, however, be allowed [to] stand in the way of taking such a step at the earliest possible moment.

Walter Eytan

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ו. ברדט אל ל. כהן

W. Burdett to L. Kohn

העתק: 130.02/2424/20

[Jerusalem], 9 June 1948

Sir,

We have been instructed by the Department of State to say that the U.S. Government is most favourably impressed by the note which Count Bernadotte has addressed to the Arab and Jewish authorities concerning the cease-fire and truce.[1] The U.S. Government very much hopes that Count Bernadotte's cease-fire proposal will be unconditionally accepted by both parties by noon Greenwich mean time, June 9th, 1948.

Burdett

Acting Consul General

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1. מס' 156.

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט
M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte

מברק

נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ S25/5176

[Tel Aviv], 9 June 1948

1. The Provisional Government of Israel has given careful consideration to the communication addressed by you to the undersigned on June 8th, 1948, indicating the date and the hour on which the proposed cease-fire and truce arrangements are to come into effect and setting out interpretations of the resolution and decisions as to its application which you adopted.[1]

2. The Provisional Government desires to inform you that it has decided to accept the cease-fire and truce proposal and is prepared, if the other side accepts it likewise, to issue an order for a cease-fire and cessation of acts of armed force for a period of four weeks commencing from Friday, 11th June, 1948, at 6 o'clock in the morning G.M.T., corresponding to ten o'clock in the morning, Israel time.

3. While the Provisional Government attaches no conditions to this decision, it finds it necessary to make certain observations which will be set forth in the following paragraphs: In this connection we beg to point out that 48 hours elapsed between the last meeting which the undersigned had with you in Haifa and the receipt of your communication under reply, and we cannot but assume that during this time representatives of the Arab League, or of the Governments forming it, had opportunities of further consultation with you by direct contact and of oral elucidation of the various points at issue, opportunities denied to us by the fact that you were in Cairo.

4. The Provisional Government maintained the position set forth in my message to you of June 7th as regards the restrictions you intend to impose on the entry into Israel of Jewish immigrants of military age during the truce period.[2] It regrets its inability to agree that the policy you propose to adopt in this regard accords with the resolution of the Security Council of May 29th, inasmuch as that resolution imposes no other limitation on the immigration of men of military age than that they should not be mobilised or trained for military service during the truce, which limitation the Provisional Government accepted from the outset. As a result of the interview which the undersigned had with you in Haifa on June 3rd,[3] and of your oral

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1. מס' 156.
2. מס' 152.
3. ראה מס' 140.

message transmitted through Mr. Reedman on June 4th, the Provisional Government felt justified in assuming that you had agreed that no numerical limitations be imposed on the entry of immigrants of this category, and that you accepted as adequate the arrangements agreed upon in that interview and further specified in the subsequent message concerning the surveillance of such immigrants after arrival in Israel during the truce period. Most of the details of these arrangements had in fact been proposed by you and accepted by the undersigned. In all these circumstances the Provisional Government regards your present interpretation as a departure from the text of the resolution and the agreement of June 3rd and 4th, and begs to express the hope that you will exercise your discretion so as to eliminate this discrepancy as far as possible.

5. With regard to paragraph 6(4) of your communication, the Provisional Government points out that the resolution of the Security Council of May 29th did not envisage any measures preventing or delaying the entry of Jewish immigrants into Israel irrespective of age or sex. While the Provisional Government is ready to cooperate fully with the Mediator in order to facilitate tasks of supervision and control, it will regard as unjustified any attempt to interfere with the normal flow of Jewish immigration into Israel.

6. With reference to paragraph 6(7), I would draw attention to the discrepancy between the two versions in which this paragraph has reached us: while in one it reads "War materials shall not be imported into the country from [*sic*] the territory of any interested party", the wording in the other is "War material shall not be imported into the country or [*sic*] territory of any interested party". It is assumed that the latter version is correct.[4]

7. With regard to paragraph 6(8) the Provisional Government assumes that the provision as regards the form in which relief is to be administered will not affect the parts of Jerusalem in Jewish hands to such an extent as the safety of passage to and from them and the supply of food to them may have been secured by the operations of the Jewish forces at the time of the commencement of the cease-fire and truce.

8. With regard to paragraph 6(9), the Provisional Government assumes that attempt by any of the Arab Governments concerned to impose a commercial blockade on Israel by confiscation or holding up cargoes of normal supplies consigned for it, will be regarded by you as warlike and will be prohibited.

9. The Provisional Government has noted with satisfaction your statement, transmitted to me yesterday by Mr. Reedman, that you accept as valid our contention conveyed to you in my message of June 7th, that it would be unwarranted to institute strict control of the movement of Jewish

4. ראה מס' 156 והערה 4 שם.

immigration in the initial phase of the truce while at the same time leaving unchecked possible movements of troops and war materials from one Arab country into another or into Palestine. It welcomes your assurance that you will adjust your policy accordingly.

10. I further beg to make it clear that if your cease-fire and truce proposals are rejected by the other party and the whole matter is consequently referred back to the Security Council, the Provisional Government reserves the right to revert to its original position as regards the interpretation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of May 29th without being committed to any of the concessions implied in its present acceptance of your cease-fire and truce proposal.

11. The Provisional Government of Israel begs to express the confident hope that if the cease-fire and truce materialise, you may find it possible to make such arrangements as will insure complete equality of contact with and access to you for both parties concerned.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 182
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 9 June 1948

Following views Robinson, Eliash, with which I concur. Consider matter recognition would be advanced by our circulating among all delegations set of state papers containing Declaration Independence, proclamation maintaining laws, ordinance establishing army. Further suggest ordinance or proclamation providing division Israel into administrative districts or other sub-units, with preamble referring to general boundaries of State under Plan and Declaration Independence, and text making obvious that total boundaries tally with Plan. Also other material legislation, such as occupied enemy territory administration, which may help dispel doubts and persuade vacillating governments.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 188
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 9 June 1948

Your MH 3[3]2.[1] Following Robinson views shared by Eliash which I concur. Action proposed Government does not take into account legal and factual position. Under Article 32 Charter, state not member shall be invited participate Security Council. It is imperative for Council to issue such invitation in dispute between Israel and Arab states. Although official agenda still uses expression "Palestinian question", in essence, especially since Mediator's proposals, obvious dispute two parties. All here convinced no danger exists our exclusion any discussion Palestine question, and this need not weigh your decision. Our soundings American, Russian, Canadian, French, Colombian, Argentinian, British, revealed no objections anywhere, but Security Council under chairmanship Syria, having Israel represented pseudonym, will not feel compelled invite State of Israel. Such compulsion will arise only if vacuum created by self-exclusion Agency. Therefore, first step self-exclusion. Next, initiative one of Council members, following which Security Council compelled invite Israel. My credentials as communicated Secretary General[2] insufficient this purpose. Suggest cable new credentials through this office, which must contain following clause: "The Provisional Government of Israel accepts in advance for the purposes of this dispute the obligations of a member of the United Nations." Please consider these views, advise accordingly.

Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 40/219. התקבל: 10.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 9 June 1948

Believe that immediate conference with Marshall or Lovett along following lines desirable as follow up on truce: "In accepting truce, Israel predominantly motivated by preserve authority of U.N. [*sic*]. Acceptance

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1. מס' 160. במקור בטעות: MH322.
2. ראה מס' 9.

given despite fact that Bernadotte unquestionably exceeded authority in connection with immigration. Accordingly, Israel hopes and assumes that the interpretation and application of his truce terms will not discriminate against Jews to appease Arabs but in practice will follow Security Council's resolution. Public opinion in Israel already infuenced by British effort to forestall Israeli military success and not likely to accept administration of truce terms, which not only govern composition of immigration but may reasonably limit total number of immigrants. Since assumed here that United States will be heavily involved truce supervising, Israel look to American Government for such co-operation as will make final settlement possible. Apart from truce, Israel concerned forthcoming period will not be used to seek solution outside framework of 29th November decision. Frontiers of General Assembly resolution and full independence regarded by Israel as *sine qua non* of any settlement. If United States and Britain are agreed and firm, reasonable claim that from Israel's point of view settlement within this framework possible without further bloodshed. In addition Israel expects pursue application economic [?*aid*] and de jure recognition during interval, and trusts that America will appreciate sacrifices made by Israel to restore peace." Send instructions.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)

M. Shertok to A. Lourie (New York)

מברק מוצפן 66/25

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

Tel Aviv, 9 June 1948 (20.00)

Yours 44/13 and 134.[1] Only if unimplicate even remotely, view possible boomerang effect. Therefore not even Emergency Council. In any case, if you consider undesirable and safeguards impracticable, drop whole matter.

Shertok

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1. מס' 89, 147.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 10/57
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 9 June 1948

Please approach U.S.S.R., New York or Washington wherever preferable, with request facilities for special mission visit Moscow discuss question purchase military equipment and food-stuffs. Tentative composition: Namir,[1] Ben-Aharon,[2] Perlson.[3] This is *ad hoc* pending legation. If agreeable, above will proceed Prague or Warsaw for visas. Matter urgent. Cable. Inform Golda [Meyerson].[4]

Shertok

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

העתק: 130.02/2382/12

פאריס, 9 ביוני 1948

משה היקר,

אינני יודע אם קבלת את המברקים האחרונים שלי ואת המכתב ששלחתי בכתב־ידי,[1] היות ולא קיבלתי ידיעה ממך, לא יכולתי עדיין להתחיל בטיפול רציני של מחלתי. אני אמנם שוכב בבית, אבל נשאר בקשר טלפוני עם העניינים. אמנם מזמן בואו של וייצמן אפשר לאמר שאני מתרגז יותר על העניינים מאשר שאני מנהל אותם. באתי לידי הסכם עם האנשים שאתם אני מתייעץ, שלא מתאים הדבר שווייצמן יבקש להתקבל על־ידי בידו.[2] ליאון בלום, שאת נאמנותו לענייננו אי־אפשר להעריך במידה מספקת, הלך באופן מיוחד לווייצמן כדי להוסיף משקל לעצתי. וייצמן אמר שיתחשב עם דעותינו, אך באותו הזמן ביקש את פרופ׳ ניוול[3] לסדר לו פגישה עם בידו. כיוון

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1. מרדכי נמיר, חבר הוועד־הפועל של ההסתדרות; מספטמבר 1948 — יועץ בצירות ישראל במוסקבה.
2. יצחק בן־אהרון, מזכיר מפ״ם.
3. אליעזר פרלסון (פרי), סגן ראש עיריית תל אביב, המפקח על המזונות במשרד המסחר והתעשייה.
4. שליחות זאת לא יצאה לפועל. ביולי 1948 יצא נמיר לבדו לרומניה כדי לדון באספקת דלק ולהסדיר את ענייני העלייה מרומניה. (ראה מ. נמיר, שליחות במוסקבה, עמ׳ 28־35).

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1. המכתב לא נמצא. 2. ראה מס׳ 145.
3. ליאון דניוול (Denivelle), כימאי ותעשיין, מזכיר כללי של הרשות לאנרגיה אטומית בצרפת, 1945־1948.

שלא ראה לנחוץ להודיע לי למפרע על פגישה זו, לא היתה לי אפשרות להבהיר לווייצמן בעוד מועד את עמדתו הנוכחית של בידו. על עצם הפגישה שמעתי רק בדרך מקרה.

עמדתו של בידו נמצאת כיום במאזניים. הוא נתקף קשות בגלל הוויתורים שעושה לאנגלו־אמריקאים בעניין גרמניה. מצד שני אינו מוכן לוותר על התמיכה הבריטית שמקבל עבור עמדתו בשאלה של ארץ־ישראל. אנו תומכים בארגונים שונים כאן, שמתארגנים ללחץ על הממשלה בשביל הכרת ישראל. ארבע המפלגות המהוות את הרוב המכריע בפרלמנט תומכות בהכרה.[4] אמנם יש לבידו, באם יישאר במשרתו, הרבה דרכי פרוצדורה שתאפשרנה לו לדחות את המועד שבו יהיה נאלץ להיכנע ללחץ דעת־הקהל והפרלמנט.

ליאון בלום קיים היום ואתמול פגישות עם שני באי־כוח תנועת הלייבור הבריטית, מורגן ופיליפס,[5] שבאו לפאריס לשם חתימת הסכמים סוציאליים, ודיבר אתם ארוכות על הבעיה הישראלית. הוא אמר שעמדת הלייבור הבריטי בשאלה זו מחלישה את התנועה הסוציאליסטית בכל העולם, שהיא מפריעה להתקדמות הסכמים בין ארצות אירופה המערבית ושהיא אחראית לכשלון ועידת וינה.[6]

אין לי רצון להיכנס בתיאורים על מהלך העניינים במשרדנו בפאריס כל זמן שהקרבות נמשכ[ים] בארץ. אך אני מתכונן לבקשך להרשות לי לטוס לארץ לשניים־שלושה ימים, כשהזמן יהיה מתאים לכך, כדי לברר אתך כמה עניינים ארגוניים.

צלצלו לי היום ממיניסטריון־החוץ כדי להגיד לי, שהעריכו מאוד את אדיבותך בעניין הנשק במנזר הצרפתי ביפו.[7] עניתי להם שאני בטוח שאותה האדיבות תיראה גם ביחס למקומות הקדושים בירושלים. שלחתי את נג'ר[8] אל וייצמן כדי שידבר על עניין המקומות הקדושים באסיפת העיתונאים שתתקיים היום.[9] נג'ר מכין לווייצמן את כל החומר לאסיפה זו.

שלחתי ברכות לנוויל לרגלי מינויו כקצין בלגיון־הכבוד, וקיבלתי ממנו תשובה.[10]

ברגשי ידידות והערצה,

מ. פישר

4. ראה מס' 131. המפלגות הגדולות היו: התנועה הרפובליקנית העממית (MRP), הקומוניסטים, הסוציאליסטים והרדיקלים.
5. כך במקור, אך הכוונה ככל הנראה לפגישה עם מורגן פיליפס, מזכיר מפלגת הלייבור ועם ג'יימס גריפית, שר הביטוח הלאומי בממשלת בריטניה ויושב־ראש מפלגת הלייבור. האחרון בא לפאריס כדי לחתום על אמנה לביטוח סוציאלי הדדי.
6. הוועידה הסוציאליסטית הבינלאומית, שהתקיימה בווינה בראשית יוני. הוועידה דנה, בין היתר, בבעיות וסכסוכים שנתגלעו בתוך המפלגות הסוציאליסטיות בצרפת ובאיטליה.
7. הנשק נמצא בחצר הקולג' של סט. ז'וזף ביפו, ב־31 במאי. דובר של משרד־החוץ פטר את הנזירות של הקולג' מאחריות, אך ציין שיש יסוד להניח שהנשק הוחבא על־ידי אנשי צוות העובדים הערבי של הקולג'. (ראה הודעה לעיתונות, 1.6.1948, 130.02/2397/7).
8. אמיל נג'ר, יועץ לענייני עיתונות בנציגות ישראל בפאריס.
9. שאלת המקומות הקדושים נדונה בפגישת וייצמן — בידו. אחרי הפגישה דיווח פישר, שווייצמן סירב לקבל תדרוך מהנציגות בפאריס ולכן לא היה מסוגל לענות על טענותיו של בידו. (ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 7.6.1948, 130.09/2329/23). וייצמן אמר אחר־כך במסיבת־עיתונאים, שהכוחות היהודיים בירושלים השתדלו למנוע פגיעה במקומות הקדושים, אף־על־פי שהערבים התבצרו בהם והפגיזו משם את העיר החדשה.
10. נוויל הודה לפישר על ברכתו וביקש שישפיע על הרשויות בישראל לנקוט עמדה יותר גמישה ביחסיהם עם הקונסוליה הצרפתית. (ראה נוויל אל פישר, 6.6.1948, 93.02/179/5).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 348
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/2

[Tel Aviv], 10 June 1948

In [Security] Council today you can make statement along lines MH344.[1] You may also be guided by my statement and replies yesterday's press conference.[2] Please refrain in Council and otherwise from commitments *gvulot* and *hachzara*, our line regarding latter is strict *status quo* and generally we consider it open problem, leading various possibilities. Regarding Mediator's supervisory staff, unless exclusion Britain definitely assured, seek opportunity raise issue pointing they not neutral. By all means criticise Jerusalem provision as you suggest, but don't use word "famine".[3] Stress we shall do utmost increase food supplies. Myself placed on record our determination this regard in conversation Mediator. Don't urge complete freedom access Jerusalem in view concomitant effects.

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 189
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 10 June 1948

Your MH348.[1] Some sentiment in [Security] Council for discussion observations only after cease-fire has come into effect. If this appears prevalent view, intend submitting observations Council, withholding other comment till next meeting.

Eban

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1. מברק משרתוק אל אבן, 9.6.1948 (93.03/95/2), הכולל את נוסח תשובתה של ממשלת ישראל למתווך — ראה מס' 168.
2. בדבריו, וגם בתשובות לשאלות, הדגיש שרתוק, שישראל תדרוש שינויים בגבולות החלוקה אם לא תוגשם על כל מרכיביה, היינו: כינון מדינה יהודית ומדינה ערבית בארץ־ישראל, שלטון בינלאומי בירושלים ואיחוד כלכלי.
3. אבן הציע למחות במועצת־הביטחון על הסעיף 6viii בהסדרי הפסקת־האש של המתווך (ראה מס' 156), המטיל הגבלות על הכנסת אספקה לירושלים. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 8.6.1948, (93.03/95/2).

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1. מס' 175.

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א. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 100/82. התקבל: 11.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 10 June 1948

Delegation, also Gold,[1] discussed 66/25.[2] All have serious misgivings. Suggest further consideration: 1) View truce development, believe main result widespread American boycott propaganda will be place new weapon Bevin's hands, likely produce strong reaction British public opinion. 2) To be effective, boycott must be conducted by authoritative leadership, which ultimately impossible to conceal; accordingly directive /against/ implicating even Emergency [Council], unrealistic. 3) Some also feel our instituting boycott undermines our own position on Arab boycott. Cable.

Lourie

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נ. גולדמן אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)[1]
N. Goldmann to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 67/87
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

London, 10 June 1948 (18.52)

In view of gravity oil position Palestine, necessary do everything reopen Refinery and enable Iraq oil flow Haifa.[2] Will start [?negotiations] here, but Anglo-Iraq Oil Company (owner pipe line) has 25% American capital, therefore essential State Department and American company participate Iraq company, pressure British positive decision. Asking Fischer do the

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1. זאב וולף גולד, חבר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית ומועצת המדינה הזמנית מטעם ה"מזרחי"; השתתף במשלחת הסוכנות לאומות המאוחדות ב־1946.
2. מס' 172.

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1. נשלח דרך משרד הסוכנות היהודית בניו יורק.
2. בתי־הזיקוק בחיפה, שהיו בניהול בריטי, עמדו להיסגר ב־15.6.1948, לקראת פינוי הבריטים מחיפה. לפני סגירתם דאגו הבריטים לסידורי אספקת דלק מזוקק לעבר־הירדן ממקורות אחרים. (ראה שרתוק אל לוריא, בשביל גולדמן בלונדון, 8.6.1948, 130.09/2328/2).

same Paris, French own 25%. Argument: 1) Israel cannot be allowed starving oil. 2) Haifa Refinery provide large part of petrol European Recovery Programme which endangered if Refinery remain closed long time. Please contact State [Department]. Cable chance American action with regard to Britain.

Goldmann

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 39/168. התקבל: 12.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 11 June 1948

First discussions Foreign Office but full exchange letters not yet done,[1] awaiting friend's[2] return next Wednesday. Eban asked us discuss question admission Security Council as state,[3] which got sympathizing hearing, full discussion, no commitment, especially as not yet report from Beeley his talks with Eban.[4] Arranged with Foreign Office our visas English passport to be given separate piece paper in passport itself. Discussed question oil with a view to finding arrangement, and if we could, must not miss such discussion.[5] They replied — ready to discuss, and Foreign Office will discuss it. They explained difficulty, especially attitude of Iraq; also they themselves interested in positive solution. Myself hinted bad results long interruption Refinery European Recovery Programme, also necessity get supply from some other source if this source closed. They suggested I ask you definite proposal, then approach them full discussion. If discussion develops, necessary get real experts our side as I not acquainted with facts. Generally talks atmosphere respect and attaining co-operation outstanding questions, leaving aside all matters major policy. Believe things to become easier when friend returns. Discussion today with Under-Secretary[6] and two members Eastern Department. Cable.

Goldmann

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1. ראה מס' 126.
2. הקטור מקניל.
3. ראה מס' 162.
4. ראה מס' 163.
5. מוסב על חידוש הזרמת הנפט מעיראק לבתי־הזיקוק בחיפה — ראה מס' 178.
6. כריסטופר מייהיו.

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מ. פישר אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Fischer to A. Eban (New York)

מקור: 93.03/64/3

Paris, 13 June 1948

My dear Eban,

In reply to your letter dated June 8th,[1] I have the following remarks:

Bidault's declaration may have been milder than the text as it appeared in the United States, but it was also a hard blow to us here. It shows that in the Palestine question Bidault takes his advice more from Mr. Bevin than from his French advisers. However, he could not have resisted long to pressure from French public and parliamentary opinion. But then came the second blow and that was Dr. Weizmann's arrival in Paris:[2] I asked Weizmann not to see Bidault or the French Premier, and my request was backed by Leon Blum. However, without informing me, Weizmann went to see Bidault quite unprepared. Even if Weizmann's account of the talk should be taken for granted, all my fears were realized. He thanked Bidault for services he never rendered us and he gave him to understand that we are not in a hurry about France's recognition. Still worse, Weizmann gave a press conference in which he reaffirmed that we understand why France does not recognise us and that we understand France's motives to be prudent. Of course, our French ministerial and parliamentary friends are at a loss to understand why our President gave them such a stab in the back. Weizmann talked also in his press conference about Golda Meyerson's interview with Abdallah[3] and about possibilities of understanding with Abdallah in a most harmful way.

When I called to the Quai d'Orsay with regard to your position as representative of the Government of Israel in the United Nations,[4] I was given to understand that the greatest latitude was being left to Parodi in such matters.

No decision has, as yet, been taken regarding naval participation in the control of the cease-fire agreement. I might have been able to exert some influence if I had known what our particular wishes are in this respect. I

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1. בתיק 93.02/172/9. אבן כתב שהנוסח המדויק של הצהרת בידו (ראה מס׳ 131 והערה 1 שם) היה מתון הרבה יותר מאשר הנוסח שהתפרסם בעיתונות האמריקאית; עם זאת ההצהרה הפתיעה לרעה, במיוחד לאור האהדה ושיתוף־הפעולה של הנציג הצרפתי באו״ם — פארודי. לאחרונה, למשל, התייעץ פארודי עם משלחת ישראל בעניין השתתפותן של יחידות צי צרפתיות בפיקוח על ההפוגה.
2. ראה מס׳ 174 והערה 9 שם.
3. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס׳ 506.
4. ראה מס׳ 162 והערה 7 שם.

have been able to do something useful in as far as the military control is concerned.

I am ill in bed since two weeks and I may have to undergo prolonged treatment. I intend nevertheless to fly to Palestine on next Wednesday in order to clear up certain matters. In my absence, Najar will be in charge of the Office.

Yours sincerely,

M. Fischer

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תזכיר מאת א. לבבי

Memorandum by A. Levavi

תזכיר: אצ״מ S25/5634

ירושלים, 13 ביוני 1948

התפקידים הדחופים של מדור אירופה המזרחית

א. התפקידים הדחופים של מדור אירופה המזרחית נובעים מעובדות היסוד הבאות:

1. ברית־המועצות, צ׳כוסלובקיה, פולין, יוגוסלביה והונגריה הכירו במדינת ישראל דה־יורה, והביעו את נכונותן לקיים אתה יחסים דיפלומטיים תקינים.
2. מדינות אחרות של הגוש המזרח־אירופי, כגון בולגריה, רומניה,[1] פינלנד, עלולות ללכת בעקבותיהן של המדינות הנ״ל.
3. הגוש המזרח־אירופי הוא אחד מריכוזי העוצמה הראשיים בעולם.
4. במסיבות מסוימות עלולים אנו להזדקק לתמיכה ישירה ומלאה של הגוש המזרח־אירופי בכל שטחי החיים הממלכתיים (מדיניות, כלכלה, הגנה וכו׳), או בתחומים מסוימים ובאופן חלקי. קיימים סימנים שסיוע כזה עלול להינתן בתנאים מסוימים ובמידה מסוימת.
5. למדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי חשיבות כלכלית רבה מאוד בשביל מדינת ישראל. תנאי התחבורה הימית בין מדינת ישראל לבין מדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי יכולים להשתפר על נקלה.
6. בכמה ממדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי קיים עדיין ישוב יהודי המוני, שהוא בחלקו מועמד לעלייה.
7. בכמה ממדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי תופסים יהודים עמדות ממשלתיות חשובות, ובכללם גם יהודים הנוטים לסייע למדינת ישראל.
8. חלק גדול מאוד מהישוב היהודי בארץ עלה מתוך ארצות הגוש המזרח־אירופי. כתוצאה מכך קיימת קרבה תרבותית־חברתית מסוימת. במקרים רבים קיימים עדיין קשרים משפחתיים בין אזרחי מדינת ישראל לבין קרוביהם המתגוררים עדיין במדינות אירופה המזרחית.

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1. רומניה הודיעה על הכרתה במדינת ישראל במברק מאת שרת־החוץ אנה פאוקר אל מ. שרתוק, מיום 11.6.1948 (130.02/2391/9). מסתבר שדבר ההכרה עדיין לא היה ידוע ללבבי בירושלים.

9. איזור המזרח־התיכון נמצא מחוץ לתחום ההשפעה של ברית־המועצות.
10. אין ברית־המועצות משלימה עם הוצאתה מהזירה המדינית של איזור המזרח־התיכון, הגובל למעשה עם תחומי ההשפעה הפוליטית שלה והעשיר בנפט, חומר הגלם האסטרטגי אשר ס.ס.ס.ר. זקוקה לו אולי יותר מאשר לכל חומר גלם אחר. מכאן המתיחות האמריקאית־רוסית ואנגלית־רוסית מסביב לבעיות המזרח־התיכון. המדיניות הרוסית במזרח־התיכון היא עתה מדיניות זהירה, אך לא מדיניות של ויתור והשלמה סופית.
11. יסודות קומוניסטיים פועלים במרבית המדינות של המזרח־התיכון. הם נרדפים באכזריות על־ידי שליטי ארצות ערב, אולם הרקע החברתי־המדיני הוא נוח למדי להתפתחותם, ואין לסתור את ההנחה כי עלולים הם לעלות במהרה במסיבות מסוימות.
12. המדיניות הסובייטית במזרח־התיכון תומכת בזמן האחרון במיעוטים אתניים, ובפרט בארמנים ובקורדים ובמידה מסוימת גם בלבנונים.
13. היסודות הקומוניסטיים בין יהודי הארץ הם חלשים. אין הם נרדפים ואין הם עומדים מחוץ לחוק, אך הרקע החברתי בכללו איננו נוח לעלייתם. רק במסיבות חירום מדיניות־צבאיות עלולים הם להיהפך לגורם ראשי במדינה.
14. האוריינטציה הכללית של ממשלת ישראל היא על שמירת ידידותן של ארצות־הברית, תוך מאמץ שלא לבוא בסתירה עם האינטרסים של הגוש המזרח־אירופי. בשלב הנוכחי נשקפת למדינת ישראל סכנה מצד השלישית שבמעצמות הראשיות: בריטניה. שאיפתנו היא על־כן להוות גורם המרכך את המתיחות שבכוח הקיימת גם לגבי בעיית הארץ בין ארצות־הברית וברית־המועצות.

ב. 1. התפקיד הראשון של אגף אירופה המזרחית הוא לסייע בארגון הנציגויות הדיפלומטיות של מדינת ישראל בכל מדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי אשר הכירו בנו. ביחוד על האגף לדאוג לסידורים האדמיניסטרטיביים. קביעת מערכת הקשר, שקידה על זרם המכתבים והמברקים המתמיד, ריכוז האינפורמציה המגיעה מהנציגויות והעברת האינפורמציה אליהן — במידה האפשרית מתן עצות בקשר להודעות שתישלחנה לנציגויות.
2. על האגף לסייע בטיפול בנציגויות של מדינות מזרח־אירופיות אשר תבואנה אל בירת מדינת ישראל. לאחר שמדינות אלה לא הכירו במדינת עבר־הירדן, ייתכן שנציגיהם יעברו מירושלים תל אביבה בעתיד הקרוב. האגף יקיים את הקשר היום־יומי עם הנציגויות הללו, ידאג לנוחיותם, ימציא להם אינפורמציה, יסייע להם בעניינים קונסולריים, יקשר אותם עם מיניסטריונים ומוסדות שלטון שונים, יכין את הפגישות בין ראשי הנציגויות לבין שר־החוץ וכו׳.
3. האגף יסייע בשיגור נציגים לא־רשמיים אל מדינות הגוש אשר טרם הכירו במדינת ישראל, לשם משא־ומתן למען הסדרת יחסים דיפלומטיים תקינים.
4. האגף יטפל בפרסום דברי־דפוס בלשונות הגוש המזרח־אירופי מתוך המגמות הבאות:

א. לבטא יחס של ידידות אל עמי הארצות הנידונות.
ב. לסלול את הדרך לקשרים כלכליים ותרבותיים.

ג. להביא אינפורמציה על מדינת ישראל.
ד. לחזק בעקיפין את הקשר עם הישובים היהודיים בארצות הנידונות.

5. האגף ירכז אינפורמציה שיטתית שוטפת על הארצות הנידונות, וידריך את מחקר־היסוד של הארצות הללו שיתנהל באגף המחקר של משרד־החוץ.
6. האגף יעמוד בקשר עם מערכת הבינה של משרד־החוץ בעניינים הנוגעים לארצות הגוש המזרח־אירופי.
7. האגף ירכז ויעסוק באינפורמציה שוטפת על פרשת יחסינו המדיניים והכלליים עם מדינות הגוש המזרח־אירופי וינסח מדי פעם הצעות בנידון זה.

ג. הגרעין הארגוני.
בשלב הראשון זקוק האגף לשלושה פקידים אחראיים (מנהל ושני עוזרים), מזכירה וכתבנית. מבחינה סכמטית רצוי שהמנהל ואחד העוזרים יהיו מושרשים בתרבויות סלאביות, ואילו העוזר השני רצוי שיהיה בקיא בלשונות ובעניינים של רומניה והונגריה. ידיעת הצרפתית רצויה אצל כל עובדי האגף. מכונות־הכתיבה הדרושות הן עברית, רוסית, לטינית (בשביל צרפתית ואנגלית). בשביל פרסום דברי־דפוס וביולטינים אפשר יהיה להיעזר בעובדים שלא מן המניין. האגף יהיה זקוק לשני חדרים ושני טלפונים. רצוי להגיע לתקן הנ"ל תוך חודש ימים אחרי הקמת האגף.

א. לבבי

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 218
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 14 June 1948

Following Mediator's approach Provisional Government,[1] I urged Secretariat cease describing me representative Jewish Agency.[2] Official document issued yesterday is described as letter from representative Provisional Government of Israel transmitting observations by Foreign Minister.[3] Strong basis obvious for final step, awaiting your final instructions after considering Robinson's views previously cabled.[4]

Eban

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1. ראה, למשל, פנייתו של ג'. רידמן, מצוות המתווך, אל שרתוק בתור "שר־החוץ, מדינת ישראל" במכתבו מיום 10.6.1948, 130.02/2424/20.
2. ראה אבן אל פרוטיץ', מנהל ענייני מועצת־הביטחון במזכירות האו"ם (93.03/94/5,8.6.1948). אבן מחה על שמכתביו, הנשלחים בשם "הממשלה הזמנית של ישראל", מופיעים בפרסומים הרשמיים של האו"ם כאילו נשלחו מטעם הסוכנות היהודית.
3. מדובר במכתב של אבן אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם מיום 10.6.1948, המעביר את השגות שר־החוץ של ישראל על הסדרי ההפוגה (מס' 168). המכתב פורסם כמסמך או"ם S/834.
4. מס' 170.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 219
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 14 June 1948

Mediator wired Secretary-General today, asking him draw attention member states immigration provisions truce resolution, also suggesting possibility appoint inspectors in member states whence immigrants leave.[1] Secretary-General reported taking no action pending further talk to Mediator tomorrow.[2] Please cable any available information and views.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH392
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/17

Tel Aviv, 15 June 1948 (10.50)

Your 96/183.[1] Beeley talked rubbish comparing Western Galilee Negev. Former under our effective occupation, administration from Acre to Naqura[2] inclusive, all Arab villages evacuated, only 2000 left in Acre. In latter, with exception one crossroads which Egyptians seized by trick last minute before truce,[3] throughout Israel area not single Egyptian hoof and most Arab villages northern part area evacuated. Only other post previously held by Egyptians in our Negev was Asluj camp, which we captured before truce. Egyptian column, which British installed number key positions, camps, police stations, advanced since May 15th only within narrow coastal strip along road, railway, keeping within Arab territory, while we operated offensively within that strip. Suggestion Egyptian administrative control Negev utterly fantastic. [.....][4]

Shertok

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1. מוסב כנראה על נוסח קודם של מברק המתווך, מסמך או״ם S/840, המוזכר במס׳ 186 (ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 159). נוסח זה לא פורסם על־ידי מזכירות האו״ם.
2. ראה מס׳ 186.

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1. מס׳ 163.
2. ראש הנקרה.
3. צומת כביש הנגב הפנימי עם כביש מג׳דל — פאלוג׳ה, דרומית לנגבה. הצומת נתפס על־ידי המצרים אור ליום 11.6.1948. ראה גם מס׳ 198.
4. החלק האחרון של המשפט לא הודפס כאן.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH397
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/2

Tel Aviv, 15 June 1948

Your 219.[1] See Mediator's communication 8th June, Para 6 (III),[2] which provides check by Mediator at ports embarkation, debarkation, and U.N. observers on ships bearing immigrants. Proposal now made drawing member states is innovation which consider unwarranted on principle and liable in practice cause arbitrariness, confusion, unnecessary delays and restrictions, consequent hardship and injustice. While we pledged full cooperation Mediator and his staff, cannot accept hydra-headed inspection of entire world. Suggestion already published by Reuters[3] not quite accurately, but mere idea of it is revolting to our public opinion.

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון ב־15 ביוני נדונו שדרים אחדים של המתווך בעניין קיום הפסקת־האש. בשדר האחד (מסמך או"ם S/837) נתבקשה מועצת־הביטחון להסכים, שהצדדים יעבירו את כל הפניות הנוגעות להפסקת־האש ולהפוגה דרך המתווך. בשדר אחר (מסמך או"ם S/840) ביקש המתווך להפנות את תשומת־הלב של המדינות העשויות לשמש מקור לעלייה, לתנאי העלייה כפי שנקבעו בהסדרי ההפוגה — ראה מס' 187. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 320th Meeting, 15 June 1948).

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1. מס' 183.
2. מס' 156.
3. הידיעה הופיעה בעיתונות הישראלית ב־16.6.1948.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 235
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 15 June 1948

[Security] Council approved principle that all complaints interpretations arising from truce resolution be submitted Mediator, but accepted my reservation that right of direct appeal to Council still remains. Mediator's revised cable[1] drew attention member state paragraph six truce resolution,[2] and requested cooperation with Mediator in implementing truce proposals as whole. No requests for action on controls made. I made reservation — this request does not entitle any government assume responsibility or initiative or institute control not specifically laid down, accepted, under terms June second communication.[3] No comment in Council. Would suggest Government approach to Mediator, reserving position against any innovations beyond terms June second document.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH400
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4

[Tel Aviv], 15 June 1948

Your 188.[1] At length obtained majority within Government in favour course proposed, but must still obtain approval Executive[2] for self-exclusion. Cannot proceed without clear decision Executive here, as minority insists matter be referred Actions [Committee] or even Congress. Must

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1. נוסח קודם ראה במס' 183.
2. כך במקור, אך הכוונה לסעיף 6 בהסדרי הפסקת־האש כפי שנקבעו על־ידי המתווך — ראה מס' 156.
3. אפשר שהכוונה להנחות ולהסתייגויות של ממשלת ישראל ביחס לתנאי ההפוגה, שהועברו למועצת־הביטחון ב־1.6.1948 (130.02/2424/19). התאריך 2 ביוני מתייחס כנראה למועד מסירתן למועצת־הביטחון.

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1. מס' 170.
2. הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית.

admit you were more successful in proving no danger involved in self-exclusion than that change status is urgently required. Executive meeting due tomorrow after Gruenbaum emerges from Jerusalem.[3]

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בשעות הערב של ה־11 ביוני 1948, שעות ספורות לאחר שנכנסה לתוקפה הפסקת־האש בארץ־ישראל, הפליגה מנמל פורט דה בוק בדרום צרפת הספינה "אלטלנה", כשעל סיפונה כ־900 עולים וכמות גדולה של נשק ותחמושת. העולים — רובם צעירים יוצאי־צבא — רוכזו ואומנו על־ידי האצ"ל באירופה; הנשק סופק ברובו על־ידי הרשויות בצרפת בעקבות מגעים בין נציגי האצ"ל ומשרד־החוץ הצרפתי. לאחר ההפלגה נעשה נסיון מצד האצ"ל לעכב את הספינה או להפנותה לנמל אחר באירופה. נסיון זה נכשל מחמת קשיים בתקשורת עם הספינה.

כשהתברר שהספינה עומדת להגיע לחופי הארץ נפתח משא־ומתן בין נציגי הממשלה הזמנית וראשי האצ"ל, שנסב על מקום הורדת האנשים ועל יעודו של הנשק. נציגי האצ"ל רצו שהנשק יימסר ליחידות האצ"ל שגויסו או עמדו להיות מגויסות לצה"ל (בהתאם להסכם מיום 1.6.1948), ומקצתו — ליחידות האצ"ל בירושלים, שם הוסיף הארגון לקיים מסגרת צבאית נפרדת. נציגי הממשלה דרשו שהנשק יימסר ישירות לצה"ל, ללא תנאי, אם כי בשלב מוקדם של המשא־ומתן הסכימו ש־20% ממנו יוקצו "לירושלים". בעניין זה לא הצליחו הצדדים להגיע לידי הסכמה.

"אלטלנה" הגיעה לחוף כפר ויתקין בליל ה־21/20 ביוני ושם הורדו מרבית העולים ומקצת הנשק. בשלב זה הציגה הממשלה אולטימטום לאצ"ל ודרשה למסור את הספינה על נשקה לצה"ל. דרישה זו נדחתה, ולאחר חילופי אש בין הצדדים הפליגה הספינה אל מול חוף תל אביב והגיעה לשם אור ליום 22 ביוני. כאן נעשה נסיון לפרוק את שארית הנשק ופרץ קרב בין אנשי האצ"ל לבין יחידות צה"ל. הספינה נפגעה באש תותח שהוצב על החוף ועלתה באש.

פרשת "אלטלנה" עוררה סערת רוחות עזה בישראל והוויכוח על הגירסאות השונות ביחס לפרטיה, על דרך טיפולה של הממשלה בפרשה ועל כוונות האצ"ל הוסיף להכות גלים במשך תקופה ארוכה.

(ראה א. ברנר, אלטלנה — מחקר מדיני וצבאי, תל אביב תשל"ח; ש. נקדימון, אלטלנה, ירושלים תשל"ח).

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ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק
C. Weizmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 9/47

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 15 June 1948

Newspapers report 2 ships left Marseilles with young immigrants and arms.[1] We should be most scrupulous and correct abiding by cease-fire conditions in order not to be accused of violating international law and mutually accepted agreement. This will most seriously prejudice our general position. Am convinced that you will act to secure correct behaviour of our representatives everywhere.

Weizmann

3. הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית התכנסה אך ב־22.6.1948 — ראה מס' 216.

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1. ראה הערת־עורך לעיל.

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מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (לונדון)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (London)

העתק: ארכיון בן־גוריון 1580

[Tel Aviv], 15 June 1948

Dear Nahum,

I am dictating this letter in the nick of time — pressure here is so tremendous that my honest and solemn decision to write to you a good long letter came to naught.

The truce is a fact, overwhelmingly so, despite all sorts of difficulties which inevitably attend its initial stages. The main reason which prevailed for the truce was the military situation, although it is fair to assume that even without the compelling force of that aspect it would have been extremely difficult for us to reject the truce on purely political grounds. On the military side it is not that we were about to cave in and had to forestall an impending disaster. Far from it. What we said publicly on the eve of the truce, that the initiative of offensive warfare was in our hands on all fronts, was the honest truth. Nevertheless, our position was highly precarious for the following reasons:

1) All our fronts were extremely tenuously held;

2) Those holding them and engaged in night-to-night operations were excessively tired, in many cases to the point of complete exhaustion;

3) The above two circumstances were the joint result of the numerical inadequacy of our effective fighting strength to cope with the extension of active warfare — less than one-half of the military personnel so far recruited are trained for battle, the bulk being raw recruits;

4) Our marked inferiority in planes, guns, tanks and heavy armour, made the execution of certain urgent tasks virtually impossible, and the position was that weeks were to pass before we could expect a marked improvement in our heavy equipment. A breathing-spell was therefore imperative, and it was our good fortune that our exploits in the last few weeks have made it for us a truce with honour.

The Count is already out of the practical side of truce implementation and has soared up to the heights of major policy. He is spending today and tomorrow in Cairo, conferring with the Arabs, and promised to come to Tel Aviv on Thursday for a first round of exploratory talks with us. He has set up his headquarters on Rhodes, where he is returning on Saturday, and to Rhodes in all probability we shall have to repair for further rounds. What his approach is going to be none of us knows, but I will indicate briefly the problems with which we shall probably be faced.

1. Territory. In the *Yishuv* there is a very strong body of opinion for sticking to Western Galilee, come what may. The coastal strip we are holding contains no Arabs with the exception of a small remnant left in Acre. The Jewish settlements declare that they will not stay there if the area goes back to the Arabs. Some of us think that our holding on to Western Galilee opens the way for the annexation of the whole of Galilee to Israel. If the present tension in the Lebanon leads to an internal upheaval in our favour, this proposition may enter the realm of practical politics.

General opinion does not rate Akaba and Southern Negev too highly. Nevertheless, Akaba has its fierce protagonists, including B[en]-G[urion], who would definitely give back Western Galilee rather than give up Akaba. So the issue in our thinking is still in the balance and even the remotest allusion at a commitment must be avoided.

2. Jerusalem. Our tragic experience in that regard on the one hand and the territorial gains we have scored at the cost of so many young lives on the other hand, have definitely reopened the whole question. Even if the idea of an international Jerusalem (I mean the whole city) survives whatever revision is undertaken, there can be no question of our again agreeing that Jerusalem should be separated by Arab territory from the Jewish State, unless indeed we were prepared to give up Jerusalem completely and evacuate ourselves from that city. Today we hold a continuous strip of territory from Tel Aviv to Romema,[1] which has been completely deserted by the Arab inhabitants. This occupation constitutes a tremendous bargaining position for us. Personally, I believe that the question of Jerusalem itself is now open to revision for two reasons: The claim of the Christian world for an international regime is morally bankrupt after their letting us fight it out alone; secondly, it stands to reason that when faced with a clear-cut choice between international Jerusalem and partitioned Jerusalem, the Arabs, not excluding Abdullah, will opt for the latter; but this may be mere speculation.

3. Arabs within the Jewish State. The most spectacular event in the contemporary history of Palestine — more spectacular in a sense than the creation of the Jewish State — is the wholesale evacuation of its Arab population which has swept with it also thousands of Arabs from areas threatened and/or occupied by us outside our boundaries. I doubt whether there are 100,000 Arabs in Israel today. The reversion to *status quo ante* is unthinkable. The opportunities which the present position opens up for a lasting and radical solution of the most vexing problem of the Jewish State, are so far reaching as to take one's breath away. Even if a certain backwash is unavoidable, we must make the most of the momentous chance with which history has presented us so swiftly and so unexpectedly.

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1. פרבר במערבה של ירושלים.

4. Jaffa. This may be considered as a mere item of the foregoing paragraph, but it is a very major one. Its implications are clear and I will not go into its detailed exposition.

All these considerations, if taken cumulatively, sum up to a fairly formidable total of maximal claims. It goes without saying that we shall not attain them all, but their strength lies in the facts created, and we should strive to turn to the greatest possible advantage these newly-won and so hard-won gains.

From all this you will see how highly complicated and delicate the question of the boundaries now is. Naturally, if from all this turmoil the original resolution of November 29th will emerge recrystallised, we shall have to abide by our pledged word, and we can definitely say so. This, however, hardly appears to be the most likely eventuality, and we must therefore maintain all possible reservations and in particular insist on the imperative need of drawing conclusions from the bitter lessons of recent experience.

Apropos of Western Galilee versus Negev, I am attaching an exchange of telegrams between Aubrey [Eban] and myself concerning certain imaginings on the part of our friend Beeley which I am sure you will find of interest.[2]

[.....][3]

Yours ever,

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י. רובינסון, א. אבן וא. לוריא אל מ. שרתוק
J. Robinson, A. Eban and A. Lourie to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 16 June 1948

Your MH400.[1] Issue is not change status but accurate designation existing status. Opposition of minority our procedure stems wrong assumption [Jewish] Agency still possessing title Security Council. Since May 15 no statement submitted to Council behalf Agency. Secretariat continued for time listing Israeli Government's documents as emanating Agency, but this practice was dropped June 10, as we cabled you.[2] April 17 truce resolution[3]

2. מס' 163, 184.
3. חלקו האחרון של המכתב, שלא הודפס כאן, עוסק באירגון הנציגות הישראלית בלונדון ובשמועות על מגעים שמנהל גולדמן עם ממשלת בריטניה.

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1. מס' 187.
2. ראה מס' 182.
3. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך, עמ' 632־634.

last to address itself to Jewish Agency. Agency losing nothing, having nothing to lose under existing circumstances. Resolution May 18[4] used expression "Jewish Authorities", but even this expression disappeared resolutions 22 and 29 May,[5] referring "Governments and Authorities concerned". Term "Authorities" now discard, Mediator negotiates exclusively governments, informs Security Council accordingly. Actually Israeli Government now officially described as one of eight concerned.
Our representative still being invited Council table as representative Jewish Agency despite his title Acting Representative Government, which title Secretariat and many delegates acknowledge. Reason — lesser evil Syrian eyes. United States, Soviet [Union], refuse ever mention Agency, latter only receives Israeli representatives, similarly Ukraine — next month's Chairman. Existing position perpetuating unnecessary camouflage, undignified, harmful, creates inertia, which the longer it exists the more difficult it will be to break. Surely New York should adjust itself to Tel Aviv, Rhodes,[6] not the other way around, and Jewish recognition Israel must be unqualified. Our own minority playing hands our enemies, creating perplexity friends. Such policy is in addition contrary general idea young state has to uphold its rights. Moreover scarcely any real opposition this step Council members or by anybody outside own ranks. We presume minority unaware our de facto progress towards U.N. recognition, now requiring purely formal seal. Toff reports all references to Agency are adversely affecting recognition campaign.

Robinson, Eban, Lourie

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 9/335. נשלח: 17.6 ; התקבל: 18.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/17
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 16 June 1948

Ross approached me twice /last/ two days for long talks. Insists rumours Anglo-American agreement territorial revision unfounded,[1] believes such revisions might ensue only after Arab recognition Israel. Twice emphasized

4. השאלון האינפורמטיבי שהופנה אל "השלטונות היהודיים" — מס' 29.
5. ההחלטות על ההפוגה בארץ־ישראל — נספחים ד, ה, עמ' 666, 666־667.
6. מושבו של הרוזן ברנאדוט ועוזריו מאז 16.6.1948 — ראה מס' 189.

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1. ידיעות אלה, שעיקרן הסכם אנגלו־אמריקאי על החלפת הנגב בגליל המערבי, נפוצו בלונדון ובניו יורק מאז תחילת ההפוגה. (ראה "הארץ", 11.6.1948 ; אבן אל שרתוק, 10.6.1948, 93.03/95/2).

importance Israel's admission United Nations by fall, emphasized American support international regime Jerusalem, expressed belief British influence Arabs now exercised against resumption /war/, assured me American policy remains peaceful integration independent Israel in Near East. I enquired American view Abdullah's ambitions. He expressed ignorance, promised ascertain. He inquired what degree political cooperation Arab neighbour or Arab League we might accept. I emphasized impossibility accept any encroachment /sovereignty, also profound fallacy think now/ in terms confederation, pointing out separation had advanced to point at which even operation Economic Union would now become considerable achievement. I pointed out our stiffer, more suspicious, attitude to Abdullah even as candidate occupation Arab areas, fully explaining reasons, also that failure win aggressive war didn't entitle aggressor face-saving concessions. Therefore idea confederation independent states with Abdullah at head fantastic, beyond bounds of reason. He assented any limitation sovereignty now inconceivable, since Arabs themselves had failed exploit unifying elements November plan, but /would we/ agree to free contractual arrangements with Arab state or states ensuring regional unity /in/ main objectives foreign policy? I replied would seek your reaction, but my personal view Israel had no reason admire Arab policy so much as to commit itself to emulation. Explained our desire, while upholding democratic cause, to develop purely United Nations orientation. He inquired our view /Israel representation/ Middle East Economic Council,[2] emphasizing association Israel with neighbours joint enterprise highly valuable. I assured him in familiar terms our support idea regional cooperation, but on basis complete freedom, independence. He requested detailed account our political structure, evinced keen interest de facto military position, appeared surprised position Negev in view British theory Egyptian control.[3] I stressed importance American counter-pressure Mediator, offsetting British initiative /in favour/ amputation Israel. No response from him.

Eban

2. באותה עת התנהלו דיונים להקמת ועדה כלכלית למזרח התיכון, במסגרת המועצה הכלכלית והחברתית של האו״ם, לצד ועדות איזוריות אחרות שכבר פעלו. המושב השביעי של המועצה הכלכלית והחברתית, שנועד ליולי 1948, היה אמור להחליט על הקמת הוועדה, אך דחה את הדיון למועד מאוחר יותר. ראה גם מס׳ 208.

3. ראה מס׳ 163.

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א. אבן אל ס. רוזנמן (ניו יורק)
A. Eban to S. Rosenman (New York)

מקור: תיקי א. אילת

New York, 16 June 1948

Dear Judge Rosenman,

Following the very interesting conversation which I was privileged to have with you last week, I have set down on paper some of the ideas which might usefully be introduced into the circles with which you are in touch.

I hope that we might arrange to meet soon at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban

נספח

APPENDIX

CURRENT ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES PALESTINE POLICY

1. It is clear that the four-weeks truce will mark an attempt to reach a permanent adjustment of the Palestine situation under the auspices of the Security Council Mediator. There are many indications that this attempt will be mainly directed towards territorial revision with the aim of curtailing the area of the State of Israel.

2. The main pressure and initiative on behalf of territorial curtailment comes from the British Government. It is clear from British official and press statements that the excision of the Negev from the Jewish State and its allocation to King Abdullah constitute clearly defined aims of British policy.

3. Such territorial revisions are not justified either in terms of the November 29 Resolution or in terms of the de facto military situation. Indeed, under present conditions, Jewish control is complete throughout the entire area of Israel, as well as in western Galilee and Jaffa. Egyptian forces in the Negev are operating exclusively in the Arab coastal district, and even here they are hard-pressed and in a precarious situation. Many Arab villages in the northern Negev have been evacuated and only Jewish services operate.

4. There are other indications, though not so clear, that British policy aims at installing King Abdullah in Jerusalem.

5. The Jewish reaction to these attempts is as follows:

a. There is no justification, either in law or in the de facto position, for any curtailment of Israel's area.

b. While Israel hopes for peaceful relations with the neighbouring states, it does not feel called upon to make one-sided concessions for the purpose of saving the face or prestige of its invaders. Indeed, as a result of recent events, Jewish opinion is less tolerant of the idea of King Abdullah occupying the Arab areas than it previously was.

c. In no circumstance would the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem, who form the great majority of the city's population, agree to become the subjects of King Abdullah. They were prepared to yield certain rights and claims in favour of an international regime, but if this regime does not materialize, they will probably insist on creating the closest possible links with the State of Israel. It is surely inconceivable that the Christian world, which has expressed such keen interest in the destiny of Jerusalem would agree to its being forced by conquest to revert to Moslem rule.

The Role of the United States

6. At present British initiative, along the lines indicated above, is not being counteracted by any other pressure favouring the maintenance of the political and territorial integrity of Israel. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the State Department is encouraging and abetting these British designs, regardless of the policy to which the President's word and honour are committed. So long as there is no United States positive action, the prospects are that these British political aims will make progress and that the President of the United States will be involved in the consequent discredit. It is clear that public sentiment in the United States is overwhelmingly in favour of maintaining the integrity of Israel and assisting its development. Any policy which does not conform to this public sentiment is likely to incur disfavour.

What Can the United States Do?

7. a. Indicate to the Mediator in the most formal way that the United States upholds the full political and territorial integrity of Israel, and will not endorse any frontier rectifications which are not voluntarily agreed to by the Government of Israel.

b. Make it abundantly plain in advance that any resumption of Arab aggression or invasion would be followed immediately by full assistance to Israel by the lifting of the embargo and other material aid. (This assurance would probably have a marked effect in preventing any resumption of hostilities.)

c. Expedite the exchange of diplomatic representatives, as a sign to the world of United States consistency in its recognition of Israel.

d. Take immediate steps to extend de jure recognition.

e. Ensure direct Presidential control of Palestine policy by the appointment of a suitable successor to General Hilldring.[1]

f. Give early and favourable consideration to Israel's application for a loan through the Import and Export Bank.

Conclusion

Any or all of these steps taken in the immediate future would confirm public opinion in its confidence that the United States is consistently sincere in its recognition and support of Israel. The effect would be to create greater stability and equilibrium by countering the British pro-Arab pressure which is likely to lead to new conflicts and dissensions. This is not a case in which a passive attitude by the United States is adequate or sufficient. While the President has won great support for his active recognition on May 15, the effects of that support will only be maintained if the logical consequences of recognition are carried through.

The key to a peaceful adjustment in Palestine lies in the hope of convincing the Arabs that they must reconcile themselves once and for all to the existence and integrity of Israel. Whoever helps to implant this conviction advances the prospects of peace and provides a deterrent to renewed hostilities.

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א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

מברק מוצפן 45/119. התקבל: 17.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 16 June 1948

Conversations State [Department] and Export-Import [Bank] proceeding respect loan.[1] Truman told them only that he wished Israel's application for loan to be handled like any other application. Three of five members of Board of Directors Export-Import, including Chairman,[2] favour some loan, but tend to emphasise more specifically project and use public development financing [—] as channel for loan rather than direct transaction [?with] State treasury. Have indicated that mechanism and project specification can be adjusted to meet their preference. Martin assured me yesterday that he has been working hard [—] speedy decision. Export-Import however waiting State [Department] assurance of peace

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1. הגנרל הילדרינג מונה בסוף אפריל 1948 לעוזר מיוחד לענייני ארץ־ישראל למזכיר־המדינה, במטרה לתאם בין מדיניות הבית הלבן ומחלקת־המדינה. בסוף מאי 1948 נמסר, כי בגלל מצב בריאותו הילדרינג לא ייכנס לתפקידו. (ראה *FRUS*, 1948, V, p.879).

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1. ראה מס' 130, 165.
2. ויליאם מארטין.

and stability Israel. Believe State [Department] will not [—] any action until satisfied regarding peace settlement. Meanwhile Thorp and staff meeting us frequently.

Gass

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 11/37
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 16 June 1948

View critical situation fuel are sending special emissary Rumania negotiate purchase benzin.[1] Tanker should arrive during truce. Ask Soviet support our application Rumanian Government this regard. Shall cable name representative separately.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל ל. הנדרסון (ואשינגטון)
E. Epstein to L. Henderson (Washington)

העתק: 130.02/2420/4

Washington, 16 June 1948

My dear Mr. Henderson,

While I was discussing the problem of the reopening of operations at the Haifa refinery with you yesterday, my economic adviser, Mr. Oscar Gass, was discussing the same problem on a somewhat more technical level with Mr. Moline of the State Department's Petroleum Division.[1] As a result of our exchanges of views, both a precise statement of the issues and an outline plan of action have been formulated; they are embodied in the enclosed memorandum.

We trust that you will be in a position to give this matter your urgent attention.

Sincerely yours,

Eliahu Epstein
Special Representative

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1. ראה מס' 173, הערה 4.

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1. גאס דיווח לקפלן ב־17.6.1948, שמולין הסכים ליזמה אמריקאית באמצעות חברות הנפט ובצינורות דיפלומטיים, בתנאי שתאושר על־ידי הנדרסון. הנדרסון עצמו לא היה מוכן להתחייב לנקיטת יזמה כזאת. (ראה מברק בתיק 130.09/2329/21).

נספח
APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS AT THE HAIFA REFINERY

1. The Haifa refinery is normally capable of processing some 90,000 barrels of petroleum per day. The refinery is now closed, and the stocks accumulated by its previous operations are being exhausted.

2. It is submitted that there is a substantial community of interest among a large number of parties who are concerned in one way or another with the operation of the Haifa refinery, which affords a basis for the early resumption of refinery operations.

a. Israel has a substantial interest in the reopening of the refinery. The Israeli economy is based on liquid fuels. The securing of petroleum products from other sources than Haifa would commit Israel to burdensome dollar expenditures and might involve negotiations into which the Provisional Government would prefer not to enter.

b. The Arab States of the Middle East also have a substantial interest in the reopening of the refinery. It is their principal normal source of supply. It sells sterling oil, and they cannot afford to pay for oil with dollars.

c. The oil companies — American, British and French — which have ownership interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Consolidated Refineries, further have much to gain from the reopening of the Haifa refinery. The present position deprives them of sizeable output at a time when there is a shortage of petroleum products all over the world. Moreover, oil companies which are also traditional large distributors in Palestine, such as Socony Vacuum, are naturally under strong pressure to meet their customers' minimum essential requirements by bringing in dollar oil; such arrangements, while possible and inevitable when essential requirements are concerned, are financially burdensome particularly to American distributors, and necessarily deprive other parts of the world of desired supplies.

d. The Government of the United States has a special interest in the restarting of petroleum operations in Haifa, because the Haifa refinery makes a contribution to European needs and therefore to the accomplishment of the European Recovery Plan. Even in the large perspective of E.R.P., Haifa's annual supply of over 4,000,000 metric tons of refined output is not inconsiderable. Moreover, the stoppage at Haifa has prevented continuation of the expansion which is scheduled to bring Haifa's refined capacity to about 9,000,000 metric tons in 1949.

3. It is clear that a practical plan for the immediate reopening of the refinery can be formulated.

a. The Provisional Government of Israel is prepared to guarantee the refinery an adequate labor supply. This offer has already been made, both publicly and privately.

b. The Provisional Government of Israel is also prepared to guarantee that the output of the refinery will be allowed to be exported in accordance with past usage. All the countries of the Middle East will benefit from the refinery's output, and none will be deprived of its past share. The Provisional Government has also made public its views on this matter.

c. While the international character of the refinery's ownership is sufficient to guarantee adherence to the principle of sale of products in accordance with historical pattern and usage, the Provisional Government would be willing to accept the good offices of the U.N. Mediator to establish a U.N. observation point at the refinery to guarantee freedom from any suspicion of bias in interpretation or administration of traditional supply patterns.

4. It is suggested that the Government of the United States may be in a position to facilitate this generally beneficial step of reopening the Haifa refinery through two channels.

a. Through guidance and assistance to the American oil companies (and secondarily through the American oil companies' contacts with oil producing and consuming interests in Britain, France and the Arab States).

b. Through direct Governmental contact with officers responsible for petroleum policy (and related questions) in Britain, France and the Arab States.

5. Attention is called not only to the commercial and economic aspects of the reopening of the Haifa refinery but also to its contribution to peace and stability. The peoples of the Middle East must learn to work together. They must use their resources in common for constructive purposes. Israel has a refinery and the Arab States have crude petroleum; these things must be knit together. The stronger the ties of mutual interdependence, the firmer the basis for peace, and the greater the reluctance to rupture peaceful relations. This is peculiarly a time when these economic relations of interdependence must be knit as closely and as firmly as possible. The peace of the Middle East demands it.

Oscar Gass
Economic Adviser to the
Provisional Government of Israel

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מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (לונדון)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (London)

מברק מוצפן 48/36
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2318/1

Tel Aviv, 16 June 1948

Regarding oil,[1] pending solution question future Refineries, let them authorise companies Haifa sell us existing stocks all kinds, totalling 80 to 90,000 tons. This will be test case whether they play ball or out do us in. Cable.

Shertok

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ד.ב. יוסף[1] אל ז׳. ניואנהויס (ירושלים)
D.B. Joseph to J. Nieuwenhuys (Jerusalem)

העתק: אצ״מ S25/5176

Jerusalem, 16 June 1948

Dear Sir,

At our meeting about one o'clock this afternoon, you were good enough to inform me that satisfactory arrangements had been arrived at between yourselves and the Arab authorities relating to the convoys from Tel Aviv. You informed me that the road was clear for the convoys, but asked that we postpone taking the first convoy through Ramle today and bring it up through the Rehovot-Ekron-Latrun road, so as to give the Arab authorities an additional day in which to make sure of their security arrangements as regards the convoy passing through Ramle and other Arab territory. I had understood previously from Colonel Begley[2] that he had been assured by the Arab High Command that all mines had been removed from their part of the road. Pursuant to our conversation, as you know, I arranged to proceed to Tel Aviv by car with Colonel Begley. On arrival at the Jewish lines in front of Bab el-Wad, Colonel Begley asked me to wait whilst he proceeded on foot to interview the local Arab commander at Deir Ayoub

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1. ראה מס׳ 179.

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1. ד. ב. יוסף מונה למקשר בין ממשלת ישראל ובין המתווך בירושלים. ראה מס׳ 140.
2. קולונל פראנק בגלי, קצין־ביטחון ראשי של האו״ם בניו יורק, הגיע לארץ־ישראל בראשית יוני והצטרף לצוות משקיפי האו״ם.

village. On his return an hour later, he informed me that matters were not in order, that he had learned from the local Arab commander that the road between Bab el-Wad and Latrun was not clear of mines, and that the road required repair in a number of places.

I beg respectfully to enter a vigorous protest against this further delay in making the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road available for convoys bringing food and supplies to Jerusalem, in the present case due to what I must characterise as procrastination and furnishing inaccurate information to the United Nations by the Arab authorities. It was one of the conditions of the Truce Agreement that we should be entitled to bring food and supplies into Jerusalem. Of the 28-day period fixed for the Truce, six days have now elapsed without a single truck of food having been brought in through the offices of the U.N. Mediator's Mission. I need hardly emphasise how seriously we must necessarily view this matter. We can only trust that your Commission will be able to arrange for the convoys to commence coming into Jerusalem by not later than tomorrow.[3]

Yours sincerely,

Bernard Joseph

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י. ידין אל ד. בן־גוריון
Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion

העתק: 130.02/2426/10

תל אביב, 16 ביוני 1948

הנדון: המצב בנגב.

המצב ברגע זה הוא, שהנגב מנותק וכל אספקה לא מגיעה זה 5 ימים.[1]

נציגי או"ם מתחמקים מתשובה כיצד תגיע האספקה — וממשיכים להקפיא את המצב.

מחוץ לעובדה שבעיית האספקה לנקודות מתחילה להחמיר, המשך הקיפאון עלול ליצור עובדה מכריעה נגדנו. חושבני שיש הכרח מידי להודיע לאו"ם שאם לא יודיענו כיצד עלינו להעביר אספקה לנגב, נצטרך תוך 24 שעות לחזור לשיטות שבהן נהגנו לפני ההפוגה, עם כל המסקנות הנוגעות.

הבעיה היא רצינית ודחופה ביותר, ונראה לי שרק הדרך הנ"ל תביא לפתרון מהיר.

ידין
מנהל האג"ם

3. השיירה הראשונה יצאה לדרכה בבוקר של ה־18 ביוני; לאחר מכן התנהלה תנועת השיירות באופן סדיר.

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1. ראה מס' 184 והערה 3 שם.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 248
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 17 June 1948

Accordance procedure agreed between Mediator, Security Council,[1] suggest you file official complaint with former on oil blockade, reserving right appeal Council next meeting if still unresolved. If matter raised initially here, bound to be referred Mediator before discussion, thereby losing time. Does Government intend register formal complaint wholesale retention immigrants Cyprus?

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 251
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/6

[New York], 17 June 1948

Acceptance French proposal restoring Jerusalem Statute agenda Trusteeship Council gives us formal possibility reopen question there when time appropriate.[1] Would like be informed earliest of proposals, if any, to be made by Government to Mediator for adjustment Jerusalem situation. Soviet abstention French proposal was through absence direct support November Statute.[2] British delegation was against any maintenance Jerusalem question Trusteeship Council agenda. Comay studying Jerusalem problem in case it arises Trusteeship Council after Eliash's departure.[3]

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 186.

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1. בפתיחת המושב השלישי של מועצת־הנאמנות נכללה בסדר־היום, ביזמתה של צרפת, שאלת "המצב הנוכחי של שאלת התקנון החוקתי לעיר ירושלים." (ראה *TCOR, Third Year*, 1st Meeting, 16.6.1948, pp. 1-10).
2. הכוונה מן־הסתם לפרק השלישי בהחלטת החלוקה של נובמבר 1947, הקובע, בין היתר, שמועצת־הנאמנות תחבר ותאשר תקנון חוקתי מפורט לעיר ירושלים. הפרק כולל הנחיות וקווי יסוד לתקנון זה.
3. עניין התקנון החוקתי לירושלים נדון במועצת־הנאמנות בסוף יולי 1948. על־פי הצעת הנציג הבלגי, שטען כי דיון בתקנון עלול לשבש ואף לסכן את פעולות המתווך בארץ־ישראל, הוחלט להסיר לפי שעה את הנושא מסדר־היום, בלי לקבוע מועד לחידוש הדיון (ראה *TCOR, Third Year*, 35th Meeting, 29.7.1948, pp. 469-75).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 8/73
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 17 June 1948

1) Presume you aware of necessity establish intelligence and liaison machinery Rhodes.[1] Arabs here discussing such steps.

2) Ross informed us message received Jerusalem: "Bernard Joseph saying he unable to assume responsibility activity Stern Gang, Irgun Zvai Le'umi Jerusalem," asked us to clarif[y], give exact source.

3) Ruffer, myself, conveyed Andre [Gromyko] at his request detailed account of military position with maps. View Meyerson's impending appointment,[2] should I introduce her at this stage or await formal exchange? Please telegraph.[3]

Eban

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א. שטרן אל משרד־החוץ
A. Stern to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

מקור: 130.02/2426/8

רומא, 17 ביוני 1948

הנדון: עלייה מאיטליה.

הנני מעביר לתשומת לבכם את הדברים דלהלן:

מיניסטריון החוץ האיטלקי הוציא לפני ימים מספר חוזר־הוראה לכל השלטונות הנוגעים בדבר על איסור יציאתם מאיטליה של "עולים בגיל צבאי". החוזר מדבר על עולים בגיל צבאי, מבלי לפרט מושג זה.


מנהל ג'וינט ואנוכי נתקבלנו היום במיניסטריון החוץ בקשר לעניין זה. נאמר לנו שם באופן רשמי, כי הוראה זו הוצאה על-ידיהם לאחר פנייה משותפת אליהם מטעם הצירויות האמריקאית והאנגלית ברומא. בפנייה מטעם הצירויות מדובר על כוחות לוחמים — "fighting personnel". בשיחה הסברנו כמובן את עמדתנו בכלל. יחד עם זה הצבענו על הפירוש שניתן על-ידי ברנאדוט למושג "אנשים לוחמים" ("חברים של יחידות צבאיות מאורגנות או אנשים הנושאים נשק"), אשר

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1. ראה מס' 190, הערה 6. לתפקיד מונו ר. שילוח ול. כהן. ראה גם מס' 205.
2. גולדה מאירסון מונתה לכהונת ציר ישראל במוסקבה.
3. שרתוק השיב שהוא מבריק ישירות לגולדה מאירסון. (ראה מברקו אל אבן, 20.6.1948, 93.03/128/6).

PALESTINE

FIRST CEASE-FIRE, 11 JUNE 1948



איננו מזדהה בשום אופן עם פירוש מיניסטריון החוץ האיטלקי בקשר לאיסור יציאתם של אנשים בגיל הצבא.[1] כפי שהוסכם בינינו, הוגש על-ידי היום תזכיר בשם הסוכנות היהודית (הנוסח העברי מצורף),[2] אשר ישמש יסוד לתיקון להוראת מיניסטריון החוץ. בימים הקרובים נתחיל בשיירות עולים באוויר ובים, ורק אז נוכל לדעת כיצד תשתקף הוראה זו למעשה.

בברכה,

א. שטרן

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שיחת ל. כהן, ג. הירש[1] — אנשי הקונסוליה הבריטית בירושלים (בירושלים, ב־17 ביוני 1948)

Meeting: L. Kohn, G. Hirsch — Staff of the British consulate in Jerusalem (Jerusalem, 17 June 1948)

דין־וחשבון: אצ"מ S25/5634

Soon after the cease-fire came into force, Mr. Sheringham expressed his desire to pay a visit to the Jewish Agency. We arranged for him to be escorted by our military people to the Agency, and he arrived accompanied by Mr. Nigel Clive, a recent arrival at the Consulate, and Dr. Manson who came to inspect the Opthalmic Hospital of which he was the director, and which fell into Jewish hands soon after the 14th May.

In the course of the conversation, Dr. Kohn and Mr. Hirsch made the familiar points in relation to the British participation in the war, the Arab Legion officers, the British attempts to reduce the borders of the Jewish State, etc. Mr. Sheringham and his colleague made the following points:

1. If the cease-fire is to last — and he assumes that the Jews are interested in its lasting, since their line had been that time was on their side — it is worth removing minor causes of irritation, especially in the Jerusalem area, such as Jewish looting within the full sight of the Arabs, the Jewish demand for access to the Old City and the Wailing Wall, etc.

2. The British were absolutely neutral in this war; the outbreak of the war was bound to come about, since the establishment of Israel was bound to appear to the Arabs as armed conquest.

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1. ראה מס' 156, סעיף 6(ii). ראה גם מס' 242.
2. לא נמצא.

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1. גרשון הירש (אבנר), מאנשי המחלקה המדינית בירושלים.

3. The Jews had every reason to be grateful for the presence of British officers with the Arab Legion: the officers had succeeded in humanising the war. At Kfar Etzion and in the Old City thousands of lives were spared after the complete defeat of the Jewish forces. Whilst British officers were directing the shelling of Jerusalem, before they were withdrawn, the shelling was much less indiscriminate than later on.

4. But the real importance in the presence of British officers on the Arab side lay in the long-term aspect of the matter: in the course of battle the Jews were bound to be annoyed at the presence of British officers who were a tower of strength to the Arab Legion, but in the long run these officers would exercise a restraining influence on the Legion, just as Britain would exercise a restraining influence on the Arab States. The existence of the State of Israel was almost assured, and the time would come when the restraining influence of the British officers and British diplomats would make itself felt. The Arabs would come to reconcile themselves to the facts of the situation.

5. If the British were to withdraw their officers completely, as well as the arms which they had given to the Legion, they would lose all influence with the Arabs — even now that influence wasn't too substantial — and would not be able to exercise that pressure, from which the Jews would stand to gain when the appropriate time came.

6. The British wished the Jews and the Arabs well and they were bound to maintain good relations with them. Legally speaking, the British officers with the Legion were in the same position as a Britisher taking up employment with a South African Electric Company. But in the long run the Jews would stand to gain from the presence and influence of these officers. It was realised that in the immediate sense these officers were adding to the military difficulties of the Jews.

7. The attempt to hold the Jewish Quarter of the Old City was doomed from the start and a very bad military miscalculation had been made. The Jews should have taken out the Haganah and left the Jewish quarters under a Red Cross flag. The Arabs would not have molested them.

The above points are reproduced in their essence without the obvious comments from our side.

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תזכיר של משלחת ישראל לאו"ם

Memorandum by the Israeli Mission at the United Nations

93.03/72/16 :תזכיר משוכפל

[New York], 17 June 1948

RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL

The State of Israel seeks recognition on the following grounds:

1. *The General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947*

The November Resolution, which was adopted by 33 votes to 13, is the legal basis for Israeli statehood. This legal contention has been questioned in certain quarters on two grounds:

(a) It has been suggested that the UNSCOP Plan of "partition with Economic Union" was conceived as an "integral whole" consisting of four main elements — a Jewish State, an Arab State, Economic Union and the Special Regime for Jerusalem — and that it could not be fulfilled in part only. This suggestion is the exact converse of the real position. Faced with the Arab rejection of the scheme, the General Assembly set about revising it in such a way as to make the establishment of the Jewish State completely independent of Arab cooperation.

As regards the *two states,* the revised scheme provided that if the United Nations Commission found itself unable to set up or operate a Provisional Council of Government for one state, it should report that fact to the Security Council, which could then take any other action it deemed fit with respect to that state (Part I, B, Para. 4). The establishment of the other state could then proceed, without being blocked by the refusal of one state to take the initial steps with regard to itself.

As regards the *Economic Union,* the original UNSCOP draft provided for a treaty to be signed by the two states; in the light of the Arab attitude, this was altered by the General Assembly, so that all that was required from any one state in order to attain its independence and be admitted to the United Nations, was a unilateral declaration of willingness to enter into an Economic Union (Part I, D, Para.1; Part I, F).

As regards *Jerusalem,* it was made a "corpus separatum"under direct United Nations administration, and the establishment of the Jewish State was in no way made dependent upon the Special Regime for Jerusalem.

It is clear, therefore, that the General Assembly went out of its way to make the different parts of the Plan independent of each other, and to avoid making the Jewish State subject to an Arab veto. Unless the

original scheme had been modified along these lines, there would have been no alternative but to abandon it altogether.

(b) It has also been suggested that there has been insufficient compliance with the procedure laid down in the Resolution. Even if this were correct, a distinction must be drawn between ends and means, between matters of substance and matters of procedure. The matter of substance here is the Jewish State which was approved by the United Nations and has since been established. This result is not invalidated by any modifications which became necessary in the procedure.

In any case, such modification as there has been was brought about by the United Nations itself, and not by the State of Israel, which has made and is still making the fullest possible compliance with the Resolution.

The Palestine Commission was an *ad hoc* United Nations organ set up to assist the nascent states to establish themselves. The Commission was to have set up a Provisional Council of Government, and after the end of the Mandate, to transfer full responsibility "progressively" to the Provisional Council of Government. Owing to the convening of another Special Session of the General Assembly, the Commission deferred formal approval of the Provisional Council of Government which had been formed. On May 14 the Commission was suspended by the General Assembly. On May 15, when the Mandate terminated, the Provisional Council of Government assumed full responsibility right away, and declared the State in existence. This was necessarily implied in the suspension of the Commission, and was moreover in full accordance with the language of the November 29 Resolution itself, which "calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this Plan into effect."

In its proclamation the Provisional Council of Government furthermore reaffirmed its intention of carrying out all its obligations and international commitments under the United Nations Plan; this reaffirmation was officially communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations on May 15.

In other words, through the actions of the United Nations organs concerned, the State of Israel was called upon to fill the vacuum in authority at the end of the Mandate, and assume the burden of full responsibility, sooner than had been originally contemplated, and with less international guidance and assistance than had been originally promised. This circumstance would be a curious ground for withholding recognition from Israel.

The legal basis of the November Resolution therefore remains intact as far as recognition of the State of Israel is concerned.

2. *The Moral Obligation.*

The 33 member-states that voted for the November Resolution assumed a moral as well as a legal commitment to recognize the Jewish State once it came into existence. This was a moral obligation not only to Israel, but to the United Nations itself. The obligation is even stronger in the case of those governments whose representatives played an active role in shaping the final [re]solution and securing its endorsement by the General Assembly.

3. *The Need for Stabilization.*

It may be felt that countries which withhold recognition at this stage are promoting the prospects of a final settlement through the good offices of the United Nations Mediator.

In fact, the converse is the case. Once Israel has been established as a sovereign state, has successfully repelled aggression by Arab armies, and has gained recognition from a dozen different countries (including the two greatest world powers), its independence is no longer open to discussion. There is, however, a wide range of political and economic problems which require to be settled in order to ensure peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. No fruitful discussion of these problems becomes possible until the Arab States acquiesce in the fact of Jewish statehood, and become willing to enter into permanent relations with Israel on equal terms. This situation can only be created by conclusively confirming the status of Israel through its general recognition and its early admission to the United Nations. Governments which voted for the establishment of a Jewish State on November 29, but now withhold recognition from it, are unwittingly encouraging the Arabs to believe that this is still an open question, against which they should continue to fight. While such a frame of mind persists, there is little prospect of any rapprochement. Recognition of Israel is now the key to final stabilization.

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שיחות מ. שרתוק עם הרוזן ברנאדוט וצוות עוזריו (בתל אביב, ב־17 ו־18 ביוני 1948)

Meetings: M. Shertok — Count Bernadotte and Assistants (Tel Aviv, 17 and 18 June 1948)

דין־וחשבון: אצ"מ Z4/20287

BRIEF SUMMARY OF TALKS WITH COUNT BERNADOTTE — JUNE 17 & 18[1]

Count Bernadotte, accompanied by Dr. Bunche, Dr. Mohn and Mr. Reedman, came to the Foreign Office at 3 p.m. on Thursday, June 17, and remained for four hours.

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1. הדין־וחשבון הוכן על־ידי ולטר איתן.

Count Bernadotte started by reporting briefly on his meetings with the Arabs. On June 15 he had had a short formal meeting with the Political Committee of the Arab League, at which he was informed that they had authorised a sub-committee to conduct their dealings with him, and asked him to meet this sub-committee, which consisted of the Prime Ministers of Egypt, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan, and Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League. He had met this sub-committee at two meetings on the following day. The only decision had been that four Arab representatives would proceed to Rhodes on Monday, June 21, as consultants. It was made clear that these representatives should have no authority to decide anything, but should merely be at the Mediator's disposal for information and advice when called upon. Count Bernadotte told us nothing whatever about the substance of his talks with the sub-committee, but indicated that these talks had been of an exploratory nature and that they had gone fully into the Arab attitude to the question of Palestine.

Count Bernadotte now made of us the same request that he had made of the Arabs — namely, to send representatives on the consultant level to Rhodes. He made it clear that this would not [be] a round table conference, but that our representatives, like those of the Arabs, would be called in for advice as and when necessary. They would also act as liaison officers with the Israeli Government on questions which required to be referred back here. Mr. Shertok promised that he would let Count Bernadotte have an answer the next morning on whether the Israeli Government was willing to delegate such consultants to Rhodes.

Dr. Bunche at this point interposed to explain more fully the purpose for which the consultants were required. He said that the Mediator and his staff would be sitting down at Rhodes for about five days to get their lines clear on the "basic issues" and to "work out formulations". For this purpose they needed to have experts at hand from both sides to help the Mediator.

Count Bernadotte at this stage invited Mr. Shertok to give him the Israeli Government's views on the main problems at issue.

Mr. Shertok began by saying that Israel was certainly willing to negotiate on the question of peace, but not for a political settlement, because such a settlement had already been effected by the United Nations decision of November 29, 1947, as well as by the facts created by the proclamation of the Jewish State. The facts created by the war had also to be taken into account, as they contributed to the bread outline of a political settlement as it existed. The Provisional Government, Mr. Shertok went on to say, derives its position and authority from the will of the Jewish people. The Government was in effective control of the country, and was being consolidated daily. If the truce negotiations were to be regarded as a preliminary to peace, the Government would be very happy to cooperate. If, however, this were not to be the case, the Government and the people would continue the

fight. There could be no going back upon what had been achieved.

Mr. Shertok admitted that this position naturally left a number of questions unanswered. The settlement of November 29 was a composite settlement which provided for the establishment of a Jewish State, a Palestinian Arab State, the internationalisation of Jerusalem and an economic union. We had accepted this settlement on the understanding that it would be implemented as a whole, and by this acceptance we still stood. If, however, this settlement were to be set aside, and if there were to be any fundamental change, we should naturally have plenty to say on the subject. For example, experience had shown us that we could not rely on the help of the international world to guarantee the safety of Jewish Jerusalem. The Christian world had not fought even for its own interests in Jerusalem, and it was only Jewish forces that had stood between Jerusalem and its enslavement by a Moslem ruler. If there were to be no internationalisation of Jerusalem, it was only territorial contiguity with the State of Israel that could guarantee the security of Jewish Jerusalem, and such contiguity in fact now existed. For the future, this could be either fought [or] negotiated; we, naturally, would prefer the latter, but were quite prepared for the former if the need should arise. Mr. Shertok concluded by stressing that the continued existence of the State of Israel within the boundaries fixed on November 29 was not a matter open to negotiation.

Count Bernadotte said that he wanted to mention an example of the sort of thing that might possibly form a subject for negotiation. He said we would agree that the boundaries of Israel were militarily difficult to defend, and possibly other boundaries might prove preferable from the Jewish point of view. He said he had understood from Dr. Goldmann, in a conversation he had had with him in Paris, that we would perhaps be prepared to discuss frontier modifications.[2]

Mr. Shertok replied that we wanted to keep Western Galilee. The experience of the war had shown us that we required this for the defense of Haifa. He said that he did not exclude entirely the possibility of slight frontier adjustments, but the Government was not prepared to agree to any far-reaching territorial changes. He pointed out that the Arabs had rejected the settlement of November 29 not on account of the boundaries it laid down, but because of the principle of the thing. As long as the Arabs persisted in this attitude, any discussion of any boundary modification must be meaningless. Mr. Shertok then went on to explain the close link that existed between the boundaries that had been fixed and the plan for an economic union. The plan for an economic union was based on the assumption that the three parts into which Arab Palestine was divided were to form a single Palestinian Arab State. If such a State were not formed,

2. השווה דין־וחשבון מהשיחה שנמסר על־ידי גולדמן — מס' 92.

there would probably be no sense in attempting to implement an economic union.

At this point Dr. Bunche pointed out the importance of friendly relations with the Arab States in the years to come. He asked what path we intended to follow in this regard on the assumption that we fought the war to a victorious conclusion. Even after we had won the war, the problem of our relations with the neighbouring Arab States still remained.

Mr. Shertok said in reply that the continued existence of the State of Israel was for us a matter that was irreducible. Peace was conceivable only in terms of the Jewish State as a neighbour of the Arab States, and not in terms of a Jewish community endowed with some form of "autonomy" and existing as a tolerated minority within an Arab State. The first step toward peace was the State of Israel itself. Mr. Shertok cited as an example the case of Greece and Turkey which, after centuries of war and accumulated hatred, had entered upon a period of solid good relations once a clear-cut decision of the matters at issue between them had been achieved.

In reply to a question by Count Bernadotte as to whether everything had gone in accordance with the Resolution of November 29 more or less as we had expected, Mr. Shertok said that basically this was the case. Three things, however, had come as a surprise. Firstly, there was the fact that 300,000 Arabs had left the Jewish areas of Palestine of their own accord, which he thought was a more spectacular event than the establishment of the State of Israel itself. Secondly, we had been surprised by the extent of British help to the Arabs. Thirdly, we had been disappointed at the absence of any effective international action to help implement the United Nations decision.

Dr. Bunche asked how we explained the violence of the Arabs' reaction to the establishment of the State of Israel. He had gathered that it was due mainly to the Arabs' fear that as the result of the establishment of the State there would be an intensification of international intervention in Middle Eastern affairs.

Mr. Shertok replied that he thought there were three main causes for the violence of Arab reaction. Firstly, and perhaps understandably, there was objection to the introduction of what was felt to be a foreign body into an otherwise unified Middle East. Secondly, power throughout the Middle East was held by a certain group of Arabs, who might be described as the Sunnite ruling class, and the establishment of Jewish independence in this region might lead to a weakening of this class through the encouragement it gave to the Kurds, the Shi'ites and other racial or religious minorities to assert their own independence. Thirdly, there was fear of the social changes which a modern and progressive State might, by its very existence, bring about in the neighbouring countries.

Mr. Shertok stated further that the Israeli Government could not accept

as part of the final settlement any restriction whatsoever of Jewish immigration, whether in respect of its volume or of its source.

Dr. Bunche at this point developed a theory of population pressures, and asked whether population pressure produced by large-scale Jewish immigration might not create an internationally dangerous situation in the Middle East. There was a good deal of discussion on this point, in the course of which Mr. Shertok pointed out that if there was to be talk of population pressure at all, it was pressure of the Arab population on us rather than the other way round. It was pointed out further that by accepting the existence and boundaries of the State of Israel, the Arabs would in fact be setting a limit upon the area into which Jewish immigration was allowed. Up to now Jewish immigrants had been at liberty to settle anywhere within the boundaries of the mandated territories of Palestine; in future, they would be restricted to the much smaller area of the Israeli State.

Count Bernadotte and his party came to the Foreign Office again for a much shorter visit on the morning of Friday, June 18, at which only three points were dealt with. Firstly, Mr. Shertok informed the Mediator that the Government had agreed to delegate consultants to proceed to Rhodes, as requested on the previous evening. Various details of the journey to Rhodes were fixed, and an assurance was given by Count Bernadotte that the Jewish representatives would enter Rhodes with exactly the same status and rights as he himself and the members of his staff enjoyed.

In the second place, Count Bernadotte asked what would be the policy of the Israeli Government with regard to the 300,000 Arabs who had left the Jewish areas; would they be allowed to return after the war, and would their proprietary rights be respected?

Mr. Shertok replied that the question could not be discussed while the war was on, and the Government had not yet fixed its policy about the ultimate settlement of this matter. Proprietary rights would certainly be respected, but he could give no undertaking at this stage about whether the Arabs who had fled would be allowed to return.

Finally, Count Bernadotte and Mr. Shertok signed copies of the agreement which had been reached on the subject of the camps at Haifa which were being evacuated by the British.[3]

W.E.

3. בהסכם נקבע שכל המחנות והמתקנים העשויים להביא תועלת ויתרון צבאי יימסרו זמנית לידי כוחות האו"ם למשך ההפוגה. ראה הסכם, 16.6.1948, 130.02/2424/20.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 16/266. התקבל: 19.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 18 June 1948

Long talk [Lie][1] today. He showed me 22 questions addressed by Mediator to Arabs, 14 to /us/;[2] general impression disquieting, with emphasis on need Jewish concessions, including immigration. Letter from Stoneman[3] with map emphasizes Jewish military success, impotence of Arab armies except Legion, belief Secretariat officials that with sufficient arms Jews could break all Arab resistance in two to six months. This letter /will be/ shown United States and other delegations. Map shows us in complete occupation Galilee, except area around Nazareth, also Egyptians /confined/ Arab coastal Negev. [Lie] expressed misgivings intentions, tendencies, Mediator; promised convey him confidentially our view controls, regulations, directed solely against us, with no simultaneous concern controls Arab states. He suggested myself address letter Bunche, /view/ personal regard, expressing strongest attitude along lines your statement Mediator. His impression utmost firmness, tenacity, required in dealing Mediator, view his tendency appeasement.

Jewish and friendly opinion here profoundly disquieted Mediator's activities, criticism mounting daily amidst hopes Government will maintain stubbornest attitude on political issues, not hesitating refuse negotiation unacceptable basis. Suggest as line for talks here that return to November position would now represent tremendous Jewish concession politically and territorially, to be justified only by certainty Arab recognition and peaceful intention. Please cable comment. [Lie] added Faris [el Khoury] despondent, reconciled to some Jewish State, so also Chinese representative, though still hopeful confederation link. Ourselves awaiting your impression /Count's/political line. /Worth/ point out he entitled by terms reference only seek agreement parties, not formulate his own recommendations, which have purely individual interest.

Eban

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1. השם נוסף על־פי הנוסח הנכנס.
2. השאלונים לא נמצאו.
3. ויליאם סטונמן, עיתונאי אמריקאי, יועץ מיוחד למזכיר הכללי של האו"ם, נלווה למתווך בביקורו בארץ־ישראל.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 17/130. התקבל: 19.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 18 June 1948

My 188 and following.[1] We believe problem can now be speedily solved by awaiting Ukrainian chairmanship[2] first July. He will invite representative Israel to table if Government applies. Such ruling sanctioned by precedent could only be overcome seven negative votes, whereas only one, perhaps two, available. Secretariat practice address Israel now persistent and unchallenged. This procedure reverts your original proposal, rules out necessity [Jewish] Agency self-exclusion.[3] Preliminary discussion Manuilsky and Lie Monday.[4] Please cable views, bearing in mind grave consequences if our passivity forces recognizing-state invite us to table as Agency. Problem therefore must be solved first meeting July. If you agree, please cable through me asking for Government be directly represented, also to Lie repeating my credentials, affirming willingness accept obligations of state under Charter.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 13/151. התקבל: 19.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 18 June 1948

Seventh session Economic Social Council convenes Geneva 18th July. Agenda includes consideration report committee appointed by Council, question establishment economic commission Middle East, subject final

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1. מס' 170 ומס' 182, 187, 190.
2. של מועצת־הביטחון.
3. ראה מס' 160.
4. דמיטרי מנואילסקי, נציג אוקראינה במועצת־הביטחון. רובינסון ואבן נפגשו עם מנואילסקי ב־24 ביוני. הוא הודיע על נכונותו לפסוק כדרישת ישראל אם יובטח לו, שלא יימצא רוב של שבעה נגד פסיקתו. אבן ורובינסון הבטיחו זאת על סמך שיחותיהם עם נציגי החברות במועצת־הביטחון. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 25.6.1948, 93.01/2180/21).

approval General Assembly.[1] Sending through Eliash complete UNO documentation subject. Believe Israel vitally interested following grounds: 1) Arab governments should not be allowed use Economic Social Council while defying Security Council by acts branded as aggression by three great powers. 2) Report completely ignores areas Palestine in its geographical definition. 3) Report assigns important place Arab League. Suggest our economic experts study problem carefully, prepare extensive memorandum session Council. You consider and advise action Geneva frustrate Arab intentions. Suggested team Geneva: Kahany, Najar, plus your economic experts. Suggest experts pay special attention to consequences of anti-Israel war national and state economy Arab states. Most important including analyses appropriations direct and indirect military budgets, also maintenance refugees gifts Arab Higher Committee, similar organisations.

Eban

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2382/8

London, 18 June 1948

Dear Moshe,

Continuing my letter of yesterday sent you via Berl [Locker],[1] this note may reach you first, as I give it to Jon Kimche who is leaving at once, while Berl's departure was postponed till tomorrow. Meantime I have had your letter sent through Mr. Winocour, for which many thanks.[2] It proves to me how important it is that I should be kept regularly and fully informed about the general situation, in order to be able to discuss our problems here intelligently. What you tell me about the military situation before the cease-fire, and of the problems of boundaries and Jerusalem, is most interesting and important for me to know, and I will certainly be guided in my talks here (i.e. in unofficial talks with British journalists, statesmen and M.P.'s) by what you say.

I had yesterday a long talk at the U.S. Embassy. They denied — I think quite sincerely — that there is any kind of agreement between London and Washington about area etc.,[3] but did not hide the fact that the State

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1. ראה מס' 191 והערה 2 שם. דין־וחשבון הוועדה, ראה מסמך או"ם E/AC.26/16.

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1. ראה גולדמן אל שרתוק, 16.6.1948, 130.02/2382/8.
2. מס' 189.
3. ראה מס' 191 והערה 1 שם.

Department's thinking is on very similar lines to the thinking here: namely reduction of area and some special arrangement with Abdullah. But that will not affect their recognition of the fact of the State of Israel. They regard the military positions, as crystallised at the beginning of the cease-fire, as much more reasonable than the boundaries outlined in the Assembly resolution. I made it quite clear to them that they should be under no illusions about our agreeing to accept such suggestions, and pointed out that, though no formal decisions had been reached (it being Bernadotte's task first to make some proposals), we should certainly not do so. They hinted that after the proposals had been made we might care to consult the American Government, and I said that I did not think we should ask advice on the question of area, etc., pointing out that they had asked us, before recognising us, to undertake to stick to the U.N. boundaries, and that we had agreed to do so. I think there is a certain difference of opinion between the State Department and the Foreign Office with regard to Abdullah: the State Department favouring some closer rapprochement between ourselves and Abdullah (hoping thereby to split the Arab League — I don't know if you saw Walter Lippman's column on this in the *Herald-Tribune* last week. Most interesting.[4] Specially as I have reason to think it was not uninspired by the State Department). But the Foreign Office, I am afraid, still clings to the idea of the Arab League, and would therefore not like Abdullah to jump out of it and reach an agreement on his own. Ibn Saud's invitation to Abdullah[5] would seem to point in the direction of these Foreign Office ideas. I would be very much interested to know what you think about it.

From my talk at the Embassy I had also the impression that they foresee a prolonged period of cease-fire — they think it will go on till after the American elections. I think it is hoped that during a long truce both sides will feel the burden of mobilisation and economic instability, and may become more ready to consider compromise solutions. As I formulated it, the idea seemed to be "a truce of atrition" — and that is one of the dangers which now face us, specially in view of the negative aspects of the cease-fire provisions as interpreted by Bernadotte, and about which I wrote you in yesterday's letter (sent through Berl).

4. ליפמן קרא לארצות־הברית ולבריטניה להפעיל את השפעתן על ישראל ועבר־הירדן למען סיום הקרבות ולכריתת ברית בין שתי הארצות בחסות האו"ם. הוא הטעים שהמערב יוכל לשמור על האינטרסים החיוניים שלו במזרח התיכון אם ירכז את השפעתו בארצות אלה. (ראה *New York Herald Tribune*, 10.6.1948).

5. בסוף יוני יצא המלך עבדאללה למסע ביקורים במצרים, סעודיה ועיראק. פגישותיו, ובמיוחד זו עם אבן־סעוד, לאחר שלא נפגשו במשך תקופה ארוכה, עוררו עניין וניחושים בדבר שינוי מערך בעולם הערבי. בין היתר הושמעה הסברה, שעבדאללה מבקש הכרה של השליטים הערבים בסיפוח החלקים של ארץ־ישראל שבשליטת הלגיון הערבי, לממלכתו.

Both Smuts and Amery,[6] whom I have seen in the last day or two[7] (I hope to see Stanley[8] and Salisbury[9] in the next few days, and possibly also Churchill) told me that they felt confident that the Foreign Office is ready to accept the fact of a Jewish State, but would like to cut down the area considerably. Smuts especially warned us to resist this. Amery advised that we should stress publicly our readiness for some closer co-operation with Abdullah on the basis of a Jewish State — something which might be even more than an economic union, as for instance a Council of Defence to discuss questions of common defence for us both, but not going so far as a clear alliance. Amery thought that such a public statement would influence British public opinion. I pass it on to you for what it may be worth.

At the U.S. Embassy I also discussed with them the oil question. I urged them to do something about it in view of their position as shareholders in the Iraq Oil Company (I asked Najar in Paris to do the same thing with the French). The Embassy people thought the best way to solve the problem would be through Bernadotte. They have a feeling (and they stressed it so much that it may be they have even some knowledge about it) that the Iraqi Government would be amenable to some agreement for pumping oil if this could be arranged under Bernadotte's auspices and under guarantee that it would not be used for military purposes. This would also, of course, supply oil to the Arab States. They thought that this would make it easier for the British to re-open the refineries as part of their arrangements under the truce. Please let me know what you feel about this. I am still awaiting a reply to my question whether we should start talks here,[10] and in that case, what our proposals should be.

I have just received your cable[11] about taking up the question of the 18,000 - 19,000[12] tons to be released to us, and will discuss it with my friend.[13] Amery advised us to bring the facts to public attention in Great Britain, either by a statement here, or by a press conference , but in order to do so I need a comprehensive statement of all the facts; all I have so far is just piecemeal information — very incomplete. I read for instance in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency [bulletin] that a spokesman of yours said that seven British boats had taken away oil in the last few days.[14] The fact that

6. ליאופולד אמרי, לשעבר שר־המושבות (1924־1929) ושר לענייני הודו ובורמה (1940־1945).
7. ראה דין־וחשבון מהשיחה, 15.6.1948, 130.13/2583/4.
8. אוליבר סטנלי, לשעבר שר־המושבות (1942־1945).
9. המרקיז מסולסברי, לשעבר שר לענייני הדומיניונים (1940־1942, 1943־1945) ושר־המושבות (1942).
10. ראה מס׳ 179.
11. ראה מס׳ 196.
12. כך במקור, אך צ״ל 80,000 — 90,000.
13. הקטור מקניל.
14. עובדות אלה ופרטים אחרים על נסיונם של הבריטים להבטיח אספקת נפט לערבים ולמנוע אותה מישראל פורסמו על־ידי משרד־החוץ. (ראה "Memorandum on oil", 16.6.1948, 93.08/365/6).

they have provided Transjordan with 6000 tons is explained by the British abiding by their obligation to give oil to both sides: as long as we get supplies from the stocks, they feel entitled and obliged to provide Transjordan also with some oil. As I told you, Bevan told me he would raise the question in the Cabinet if it proved that we were not getting supplies while Transjordan was. Please let me have a comprehensive statement of the facts, and your own views as to how to handle the whole situation so far as I am concerned.[15]

[.....][16] I cabled you yesterday about the office.[17] I do not think it can really wait till the Actions Committee — which can hardly meet before the middle of July because the Americans would not come earlier. I am strongly against keeping the office and the representation of Israel's Government at Great Russell Street, where it is impossible to invite people or to do satisfactory work. If we open a new small office for the representation here, the Jewish Agency could still carry on with internal arrangements, propaganda work, and other matters. I would like you to reach a decision now; otherwise I cannot be responsible for the effectiveness of the work which Linton[18] and I have to do here. The Foreign Office also hinted that a new address would be advisable, and though one does not attach too great importance to that, it is still advisable that the offices of Israel in foreign countries should reflect our new status.

I understand from Misha Lubin[19] that the Mediterranean Shipping Conference yesterday decided to continue their ban on sending boats to Israel. This is a very bad business. I took this matter also up with McNeil; but it looks as if we may have to buy or charter boats, especially tankers, if this policy continues.[20] I want in this connection to tell you something I think you should know: the Foreign Office has protested vigorously on two occasions when Egypt has held up boats (one Australian) with goods for us, and threatened them with reprisals — whereupon the boats were released. Is this true? I was also informed that there was a case of a British charter plane carrying radios bought in America for us from Tangier via Cyprus to Palestine. The Foreign Office was asked for permission for the plane to fly,

15. שרתוק הבריק אל גולדמן פרטים מלאים על מלאי הדלק בארץ לסוגיו השונים. הוא הורה לו לפנות אל הבריטים בהצעה לרכוש את מלאי הדלק תמורת תשלום ביתרות השטרלינג המוקפאות של ארץ־ישראל ולחדש את עבודת בתי־הזיקוק, תוך מתן ערובה לחלוקת התזקיקים לכל הצדדים המעוניינים. (ראה מברק מיום 22.6.1948, 130.02/2329/24).
16. קטע אחד, שעניינו אישי, לא הודפס כאן.
17. גולדמן המליץ להפריד בין משרדי ההסתדרות הציונית בבריטניה לבין משרד הנציגות של ישראל. (ראה מברקו, 18.6.1948, 130.09/2318/4).
18. איוור יוסף לינטון, מזכיר מדיני של הסוכנות היהודית בלונדון ואחר־כך קונסול כללי ויועץ בנציגות ישראל שם.
19. מיכאל לובין (נעמני), איש עסקים יהודי בריטי. לשעבר מזכיר המחלקה המדינית של ההנהלה הציונית בארץ־ישראל.
20. מאוחר יותר הבהיר משרד־החוץ הבריטי, שאין כל הנחיה ממשלתית למנוע הפלגת ספינות לארץ־ישראל. (ראה דו״ח של לינטון, 6.7.1948, 93.03/127/8).

and gave it. Another fact which may be indicative is that when the Imperial Chemical Industries wanted to authorise their Israel branch to subscribe £30,000 to our loan, and asked the Foreign Office if there were any objections, the reply was that the Foreign Office had no objections, but did not want to be asked to confirm this in writing. Whereupon the Imperial Chemical Industries authorised their branch to subscribe to the loan. I mention these facts to show you that the generally negative attitude of the Foreign Office is not one hundred percent negative. They are beginning to move towards more positive attitude — but very slowly, and always dead scared of antagonising the Arabs too much. Their main problem, as they see it, is to find a way to convince the Arab Governments and Arab public opinion that they can safely accept the Jewish State, and they are ready to press for as many concessions on our part as possible to make the thing more palatable to the Arabs. They realise that in any case this will be a long, slow process, in view of the state of mind in the Arab world. (It is true that they are themselves largely responsible for this state of mind, but that does not change their position.)

That's all for to-day. I hope to see McNeil again before I leave for Montreux[21] — "for a real talk", as he said — and shall, of course, inform you at once.[22]

As ever yours, Nahum

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH427 מברק
130.09/2328/4 :נוסח יוצא
93.03/95/2 :נוסח נכנס

Tel Aviv, 20 June 1948

Your 248.[1] Regarding oil, taking action.[2] Regarding Cyprus, cabled London: "Cyprus evacuation now at standstill owing confusion created by unilateral Foreign Office instruction placing ban on all men military age, and lack contact between Mediator and British. Mediator stated to me he is ready control immigration from Cyprus on same principles as he applying immigration from other countries, and soon as we notify him /impending/ embarkation, he would send observer Cyprus check transport. Please represent Foreign Office [that] Sir Godfrey Collins be instructed restart evacuation all ages subject Mediator's control."

Shertok

21. למושב הקונגרס היהודי העולמי, שהתכנס בסוף יוני.
22. ראה מס' 211.

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1. מס' 199.
2. העניין נדון בשיחות ברודוס בין צוות המתווך ובין שליחי ממשלת ישראל, ל. כהן ור. שילוח — ראה מס' 230.

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 51/168. התקבל: 24.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 20 June 1948

Saw Foreign Office. 1) Kenya.[1] They have asked Bernadotte for ruling; did not promise but indicated would accept ruling and will discuss it with us date removing.[2] 2) Cyprus.[3] Sir G. Collins telegraphed to them, informing them our representative asked permission transfer people non-military age, which they accepted. If we ask removing military age, they will ask Mediator; hinted practice, if Mediator agrees, start on families — not separating men from wives; no promise was made. Urge you to instruct representative Cyprus ask permission to evacuate especially husbands, fathers, then can discuss on the basis of our requests. 3) Oil.[4] Surprised to hear that 80-90,000 tons still available Haifa, promised investigate, inform us in a few days. 4) Mail. Obtained consent in principle allow Postmaster General restore mail communication, hope announcement in the near future best possible arrangement. 5) Transport. Complained decision Mediterranean Shipping Conference no boat sailing Palestine even during truce.[5] They denied influencing decision, agreed that matter urgent, taking it up. Will discuss again in a few days. Asked permission to charter English tankers for oil if necessary. Promised will reply in a few days. 6) Security Council. Instructed Cadogan not to oppose our sitting as representative Israel,[6] but without reference to chapter 39 Charter.[7] Linton seeing them Wednesday, Thursday, as I will be Montreux.

Goldmann

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1. בקניה היו עצורים כ־250 ארצישראלים, מרביתם אנשי אצ״ל, שהוגלו מהארץ בשל פעילות פוליטית ומחתרתית. חלקם הוחזקו במעצר מאז תום מלחמת העולם השנייה. הבריטים הבטיחו לשחררם לפני תום המנדט, אך דחו את העברתם ארצה בתואנות שונות. (ראה אבן זהר אל שרתוק, 15.6.1948, 130.02/2398/12).
2. ברנאדוט פסק שתנאי ההפוגה אינם מונעים החזרת הגולים, אך כשיגיעו לא יורשו להתגייס. (ראה מברקו של ארגון ״לאסירינו״, 28?].6.1948], שם. הגולים שבו ארצה ב־12 ביולי.
3. ראה מס׳ 210.
4. ראה מס׳ 209.
5. ראה שם.
6. הזמנתם של נציגי ישראל לשולחן הדיונים כנציגי ממשלת ישראל — ראה מס׳ 179.
7. כך במקור. למעשה מדובר בתקנה 39 מהתקנות הזמניות של מועצת־הביטחון, המרשה למועצה להזמין בפניה כל אדם המוסמך לדעתה לתת מידע או עזרה אחרת בעניינים המצויים בתחום סמכותה.

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י. רובינסון וא. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Robinson and A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 289. נשלח: 22.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 21 June 1948

While continuing struggle recognition, suggest not neglect admission United Nations, the two not necessarily interdependent. Apart from external obstacles, internal ones exist, whose removal matter Israel Government. Calling attention [Partition] Plan part I section F.[1] Consider designation "Provisional" connected Government hampering factor. Could Constituent Assembly be convened early date purpose adopting constitution, declaration forming permanent Government? If not, could "Provisional" be dropped by some other device? Please airmail regularly *Iton Rishmi.*

Robinson, Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 51/66. התקבל: 22.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 21 June 1948

Reliably informed British ready renew oil supply Haifa and reopen refineries, provided before signing the agreement internationalization Haifa or at least grant them exterritorial rights harbour. They approached American Government with this proposal, explaining Arabs will otherwise not agree supply oil to refineries on issue territory.

Learned State Department plans appointment M. Gordon Knox, adviser to U.N. delegation, as special United States representative to Israel.

Epstein

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1. שם נקבע שהמדינה היהודית והמדינה הערבית שיקומו בשטחה של ארץ־ישראל, יזכו לדיון אוהד בבקשתן להתקבל לאו"ם.

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מ. שרתוק אל ת. בונדה[1] (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to T. Bonde (Tel Aviv)

העתק: אצ"מ Z4/20017

[Tel Aviv], 21 June 1948

Sir,

With reference to our conversation this morning, I have to inform you of the following conclusions reached by the Provisional Government of Israel on the two points under discussion.

1) We agree to evacuate our fifteen wounded from Kfar Darom with a view to their being transferred first to a hospital in Tel Aviv and then, after their recovery, to some other suitable place under the surveillance of the United Nations observers. We also propose to take our unit of forty-odd men out of Kfar Darom and post it elsewhere in that area.[2]

Our acceptance of the conditions set by you for the evacuation of the wounded is due solely to humanitarian reasons. On the merits of the case and from a purely military point of view we cannot agree that the conditions are warranted. We deny that Kfar Darom is completely encircled and besieged, and we do not accept the position that the treatment of those who were wounded in its defence can properly be assimilated to that of prisoners of war.

Consequent on the removal of our unit, which entered Kfar Darom after the truce, we believe that there will be no justification for the invading Egyptian forces remaining in the position which they occupied to the east of Kfar Darom by way of reaction to the entry of that unit. We should, therefore, be grateful if you would take steps to prevail upon the Egyptian forces to withdraw from that position.[3]

2) With regard to the supply and replacement convoys to our settlements and defence posts in the Negev area, south of the point of intersection of the roads Majdal-Faluja and Julis-Bureir,[4] we note that you agree that it is perfectly legitimate for us, within the terms of the truce, to arrange for the above convoys to travel south and return north through that point of intersection, and that an attempt of the Egyptian unit now in occupation of that point to interfere with the normal movement of our convoys would be

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1. קולנל ת. בונדה, ראש מטה משקיפי האו"ם.
2. הכוונה לשיירה של אספקה ותגבורת, שהצליחה להגיע לכפר דרום לאחר תחילת ההפוגה.
3. ההסכם עם האו"ם לא בוצע; שיירת התגבורת חמקה מכפר דרום עם אחדים מן הפצועים. כפר דרום עצמו פונה עם תום ההפוגה, אור ליום 8.7.1948.
4. ראה מס' 184 והערה 3 שם; מס' 198.

tantamount to a breach of the truce.[5] I was gratified to hear that on this vital point you had made your attitude clear to the Egyptian authorities concerned. Given the clear circumstances in this instance, the fact that the Egyptian reply has not yet been received is no reason why we should defer action indefinitely. It is eleven days since the truce has been in operation and no convoys have passed. The provisioning of the Israeli Negev, including the Israeli forces stationed there, cannot be left at the mercy of the unilateral interpretation of the truce terms by the invading army.

I therefore beg to inform you that we propose, at a time which would appear to us appropriate, to take a convoy of supplies and replacements across that point of intersection even if no satisfactory reply has by then been received from the Egyptian side. We are extremely anxious to avoid any clash with the Egyptian or any other forces during the truce period, but we must make it clear that if our convoy finds itself attacked, its guards will return the fire, and we shall then accuse the enemy of having broken the truce. Moreover, we shall consider ourselves free to retaliate against an Egyptian attack on our convoy by taking similar action against any Egyptian convoy which might pass along any route where our forces hold a commanding position such as is held by the above Egyptian unit on the roads in question.

I repeat that we are most anxious to see this conflict in the Negev peacefully resolved, and would therefore urge you to make a further effort to prevail upon the Egyptian authorities not to oppose a procedure which you have agreed is right and proper.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

M. Shertok,
Minister of Foreign Affairs

5. שיירת אספקה שיצאה ב־25 ביוני בליווי משקיפי או״ם הותקפה על־ידי המצרים. רק לאחר התערבות המתווך הודיעו המצרים ב־28 ביוני, כי הם לא יפריעו למעבר שיירות אספקה, בתנאי שיודיעו להם מראש על מעבר השיירות, מהות האספקה והישובים העומדים לקבלה. (ראה באנץ׳ אל בונדה, 29.6.1948, 130.02/2426/10). השיירה הראשונה לנגב יצאה ב־2 ביולי ומאז ועד תום ההפוגה הלכו השיירות כסדרן.

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מ. שרתוק אל ת. בונדה (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to T. Bonde (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2426/9

[Tel Aviv], 21 June 1948

Confidential

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that it came to the knowledge of the Provisional Government of Israel today that a boat carrying a load of arms has early this morning anchored off Kfar Vitkin in Israel, the transport having been organised by the dissident military Jewish organisation calling itself the Irgun Zvai Le'umi.[1] Orders were immediately issued to the military forces of Israel in the vicinity to rush to the spot in order to prevent the landing of the cargo. On having arrived on the scene, our forces found a considerable body of members of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi armed and prepared to resist. Orders were then issued to overpower them by force, and reports to hand indicate that our commander proceeded to act in accordance with the orders received. Two Israeli naval units have been summoned from Tel Aviv to stand by and take such action as may be necessary.

I understand that our liaison reported to you on the appearance of the boat earlier in the day.

It should be clear that what is happening in this instance is an open armed defiance of state authority. The Provisional Government is firm in its determination to use every possible means in its power to enforce the law and prevent a breach of the truce. According to our information at the moment, the arms have not yet been offloaded. We defer our proposals as to the disposal of the arms till after the situation on the foreshore of Kfar Vitkin has been brought under control.

It would be appreciated if, pending the completion of today's operation and a further clarification of the position, no information were given about the incident to the press.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 161.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH462
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/72/16

Tel Aviv, 22 June 1948

Long last Executive Jewish Agency meeting first time since statehood, while tension around highest pitch account Etzel excesses,[1] decided unanimously half-hour ago agree regularization status our delegation Security Council. You authorized act according your 17/130,[2] but if unavoidable, self-exclusion procedure also approved. Cabling tomorrow Secretary-General and yourself as proposed.[3]

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 306
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 22 June 1948

Your MH462.[1] View decision await end of month,[2] suggest deferment your cable Lie until hear from us, so that we consult friends exact form your letter. Will cable after preliminary discussion mentioned in my 17/[1]30,[3] being held probably tomorrow. Security Council today issued document containing Mediator's reference to "agreement between Mediator and Provisional Government Israel" relating Haifa camp affair.[4]

Eban

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1. ספינת האצ"ל "אלטלנה" — ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 161.
2. מס' 207.
3. ראה מס' 217.

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1. מס' 216.
2. ראה מס' 207.
3. מס' 207.
4. מסמך או"ם S/846. בעניין המחנות בחיפה — ראה מס' 205 והערה 3 שם.

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א. אבן אל נ. גולדמן (מונטרה)

A. Eban to N. Goldmann (Montreux)

העתק: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 22 June 1948

My dear Nahum,

With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday, I would summarize the position here as follows:

1. *United Nations.* The centre of gravity has temporarily shifted to the Near East and Rhodes, and Security Council meetings are for the moment purely formal in character. The tendency, of course, is to support the Mediator in his interpretation of the truce proposal. It is generally recognized, however, that he is unlikely to have explored the possibilities of agreement very far by July 5, and another month's prolongation seems certain.

The de facto situation at the time when the truce came into operation is regarded in Lake Success as favourable to us, and there is not a single delegation which has any doubts that the existence of the State of Israel is a permanent and established fact. Even Faris el Khouri, in private conversations, recognizes this, although he hopes for far-reaching territorial concessions to be arrived at through British pressure. Trygve Lie tells me that the Chinese representative is similarly convinced of the stability of Israel, though he still hankers after some formal political link between Israel and its Arab neighbour. The feeling has grown that the Arab war effort ended in failure; and with the exception of Abdullah, the Arab governments have incurred, not merely failure, but disgrace.

The general feeling is that the strongest card which we have is the fact that the de facto situation is a better position than that of the November resolution. This is true not merely territorially, through our possession of Western Galilee in addition to the entire area of Israel; it is also true politically, since our separation and sovereignty are much more clear-cut than they would have been if the November resolution, with the Economic Union, etc., had gone through. There is also the factor that the Jewish State is evidently going to have a much smaller Arab minority than was anticipated by the Assembly. In our talks here, we are concerned to emphasize this de facto position as strongly as possible, and it clearly has important effects. The United States representatives, in private conversation, assure us that their position on the State remains firm, but that they must refrain from any open initiative while the truce lasts.

I enclose a copy of a cable which I sent to Shertok, giving an account of

recent conversations with Ross.[1] You will notice that the positive measure which he suggests is the assurance of our entry into the General Assembly by the next session. The Americans explain that if we are members of the United Nations, it becomes politically easier for them to grant us some support within the terms of the Charter, without performing a conspicuously anti-Arab act. This passivity, of course, would be satisfactory if all other factors were equally passive. The trouble is, however, that American silence leaves the full initiative with Great Britain. Our talks here confirm your own impression that Mr. Bevin's intentions towards Israel are intentions no longer of murder, but only of amputation. The British delegation here is fairly frank about this, as you can deduce from the accounts of British newspaper correspondents at Lake Success. However, they find themselves slightly embarrassed by the de facto formula which was invented in London in the clear expectation that four weeks of war would find the Arabs in possession of large portions of Jewish territory. Since the opposite has occurred, the de facto formula offers no comfort, and the argument which is used instead is that Israel would be obliged to make concessions out of fear of what the results of a long war would be.

It is not denied, even in British circles, that several Arab regimes are badly shaken now that the results of the military failure are becoming apparent. British circles try to make up for the de facto situation by describing it in inaccurate terms. Thus the story is put around that, while the Jews control Western Galilee, the Egyptians control the Negev.[2] We have pointed out successfully that the Egyptians are exclusively in the Arab part of the Negev, and even there they are in a terribly precarious situation. They therefore control the Negev in the same way as a lunatic controls his straitjacket.

The United Nations Secretariat has given the Secretary-General a picture of the de facto situation which fully bears out our own version. The Secretariat reports also indicate the atmosphere of Jewish military victory and the reluctance of certain regimes to risk the consequences of further war.

It is obvious therefore that the key to the situation lies with the prospects of British success in influencing the Mediator, and so long as there is no American counter-pressure, they may make some progress here. In talks with the *Mazkir*,[3] he fully shares my apprehensions about the Count, though he is unable to point to anything specific. The general feeling is that the Count is likely to recommend Jewish concessions to the Arabs, unless we either impress him with a sense of great firmness, or secure some

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1. מס' 191.
2. ראה מס' 163, 184.
3. טריגווה לי — ראה מס' 206.

American counter-pressure to the British demand for territorial concession.

To be fair, I must add that some people assume that British intentions comprise not merely the subtraction of territory from us in the south, but also some compensating addition in the north. Lopez, whom I saw before his departure, expressed this view, and clearly he was not speaking without knowledge or contact.

I see a great deal of Parodi, whose attitude is becoming increasingly friendly. He helped us out considerably in our fight to secure some immigration freedom during the truce. As you may know, Austin did not support me in this, and it was Parodi's amendment which came to the rescue.[4] (Incidentally, there is nothing more absurd than the contention of the London press that the truce was a triumph of British diplomacy, since all the provisions which made the truce possible for us were produced by amendments of other delegations to the original British proposal, which could not have ensured a truce for five minutes.) I have not received from Moshe [Shertok] any detailed impression of the Count. It is clear, however, from experience, that he responds to firmness on our part as well as to pressure on the Arab part. Trygve Lie received from Bunche a long account of your talk with Bernadotte,[5] but I did not know the contents of the report.

As regards our procedural struggle, we have made a great deal of practical progress. All United Nations communications are addressed to me now as Representative of the Government of Israel, and no trace remains of the old position except the little blue sign on the table. We have decided to attack this last remnant next month, since Faris el Khouri's chairmanship[6] is an embarrassing circumstance. Procedural matters, such as invitations to non-members, usually begin as chairman's rulings, which stand, unless seven members oppose them.

After speaking to you, I was rung up by the British delegation, which told me that they fully recognize the need for changing the anomaly of calling us the Jewish Agency — but would we not, for the period of the truce, be satisfied with being called "the Jewish authorities"? The very grotesqueness and dishonesty of this suggestion shows how compelling the case is, and this morning the Security Council published a document containing what is called "the text of an agreement between the United Nations Mediator and the Provisional Government of Israel."[7] I passed this on to the United Kingdom delegation, with other documents and letters addressed to me, which show that the issue is merely the accurate description of what already exists.

4. ראה מס' 114 והערה 3 שם.
5. ראה מס' 92.
6. של מועצת־הביטחון — ראה מס' 133.
7. ראה מס' 217 והערה 4 שם.

I may have misunderstood your telephone call, but I did deduce that the Foreign Office people gave you the impression that they would not object to our correct designation, provided that we kept within Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure and did not raise the question of recognition or status.[8] I would be glad if you would clarify this for me by cable immediately. No other delegation seems to show any objection in this issue.

Michael Comay has gone to Ottawa and is making a concerted and consistent effort to soften up the situation there. He is staying the whole week. It is interesting that in his first talk, the Canadians reflected the American view that it is important for us to arrange admission by September. There was a hint in one of Ross' conversations with me that this might be taken together with Transjordan's application, in the hope that the Soviets might do a deal.

There is nothing new on the Soviet front. They are as straightforward and consistent as ever. I have met Malik briefly and he appears to have specialized knowledge of Near Eastern affairs. I am introducing Golda [Meyerson] next week.

Belgium remains a terrible blot on the landscape. Nothing that we do seems to get a response from them. It is astonishing that they cannot be brought around at least to the French position, considering that they do not have the Moslem preoccupation of the French.

Our people in Buenos Aires are hard at work and hopeful of results.

2. *United States.* I have said that the State Department line is to remain on the position as it was after recognition, going neither back nor forward. There are, however, influences at work which may push them towards some act of further commitment. The Republican Convention was about to produce a very platonic resolution in our favour. Eventually, however, after a hard struggle, they came out with a pledge of specific measures, including full recognition, support of our full integrity, and economic aid.[9] I have never been an enthusiast about these resolutions, but it is clear that they now have greater importance than before, since the United States is no longer a spectator of British troubles, and since it is inconceivable that Truman will allow the Republicans to steal all his thunder, as they would if he took no further step of a significant nature within the next few weeks. It is believed here that the thing which they are most likely to do is the appointment of a United States representative, and some statement which will indicate support for our territorial position. Nevertheless, they are unlikely to shut their minds completely to the prospects of territorial adjustment. The political picture, however, would prevent them from following Britain into an extreme policy of curtailment. The President has

8. ראה מס׳ 211 והערה 7 שם.
9. הסעיף הישראלי שהתקבל על־ידי ועדת המצע של כנס המפלגה הריפובליקנית בפילדלפיה, ב־22 ביוני, דרש להבטיח לישראל ״עצמאות מלאה בתוך הגבולות שאושרו על־ידי האומות המאוחדות, וסיוע לפיתוח כלכלתה.״

been seen by *Shutaf*[10] and will be shortly seen by *Shofet.*[11] I shall let you know what transpires within the next few days.

It is clear that the United States has no definite views at the moment on territorial changes, and British circles appear to be underestimating the inhibiting effects of the political situation on the State Department. To give an example, it was the State Department which attempted, but failed, to persuade the Republican Convention to satisfy itself with a mere abstract expression of sympathy.

I should be glad, if you have a few moments, to hear your summary of the position in London. I should especially be glad to know if you have any specific indication of the territorial concessions which they hope to achieve on behalf of the Arabs.

With best wishes, Very sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 53/126. התקבל: 23.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 22 June 1948

At my request Jacobson from Kansas City[1] today discussed with Truman our situation. Truman said United States will not support any Arab or British demand on our territories as defined 29th November. Second, [?no] de jure recognition for duration truce period only and will be granted on its conclusion. Three, loan will be granted to us for constructive purposes and primarily for D.P. resettlement.

Truman sick, bitter, about Bevin and condemned British intrigues responsible for his personal difficulty settle Palestine problem. Truman said Henderson will soon be sent as ambassador abroad, and he would like appoint Hilldring as Minister to Israel, or pending that, as special representative.[2]

Truman said he received good references about me from Marshall, Lovett and Weizmann, and would see me as soon as exchange mission arranged.

Epstein

10. אדוארד ג'ייקובסון, לשעבר שותפו בעסקים של הנשיא טרומן — ראה מס' 219.
11. השופט סמואל רוזנמן.

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1. ראה מס' 218 והערה 10 שם.
2. ראה מס' 192 והערה 1 שם.

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ר. שילוח אל מ. שרתוק
R. Shiloah to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

רודוס, 22 ביוני 1948

משה היקר,

אני עייף מדי כדי לתאר את הנסיעה ואת קבלת־הפנים. אעשה זאת פעם אחרת ואגש ישר לעניין.

בדרך משדה־התעופה למלון סידרתי את העניינים כך שנסעתי במכונית יחד עם באנץ׳. סיפרתי לו את פרשת האצ״ל, ונתברר לי כי עד שבאנו אנחנו לא הגיע אליהם שמץ מכל מה שקרה בארץ, מלבד שקיבלו מברק דחוף מבונדה, המבקש שהרוזן יבוא מיד לתל אביב. לפי עצתו של **באנץ׳** החלטתי להביא את עניין האצ״ל לידיעת הרוזן בלי כל דיחוי.

מיד לאחר שהגענו למלון, נפגשנו עם הרוזן והצגנו בפניו את הדברים ברוח מכתבך לבונדה.[1] הרוזן הביע את צערו על הדם שנשפך ועל הקשיים שממשלת ישראל נתקלת בהם, אולם שיבח את התנהגותנו ואמר כי התנהגותנו זו תוכיח לעולם כולו, כי אנו ממשלה העומדת בדיבורה, אשר יש לה כוח לנקוט גם באמצעים דרסטיים בשעת הצורך. הוא אמר כי התנהגותנו זו תהיה "feather in our cap". לאחר שיחה קצרה זו נפרדנו ממנו ונפגשנו אתו בשעה מאוחרת יותר לארוחת־ערב עם הפמליא שלו.

לאחר ארוחת־הערב נפגשנו לשיחה נוספת. בשיחה שנייה זו השתתפו, מלבד הרוזן ובאנץ׳, גם מוהן, סטאוורופולוס, רידמן ולאדאס. מסתבר כי בין שיחתנו הראשונה לארוחת־הערב הספיק לאדאס[2] למסור לרוזן גרסתו הוא של פרשת האצ״ל והאנייה. ברנאדוט פתח ואמר כי קיבל תלונה שלא אפשרנו למשקיפים לבקר במקום המערכה. הוא סבור כי זה היה משגה מצדנו, בייחוד לאור השמועות שמספר ניכר, העולה למאות, של עולים הספיקו לרדת מן האנייה ולהתפזר על־פני כל הארץ. אמרתי כי הצענו לקולונל בונדה ללוות את אנשיו למקום המערכה, וקולונל בונדה אמר כי אין לו צורך בליווי וכי המשקיפים יגיעו בכוח עצמם למקום. על זה השיב לאדאס כי אמנם כן היה בבוקר, אולם אחר־הצהריים ביקש הוא ממ[שה] ש[רתוק] אפשרות להעמיד משקיפים על־יד מפקד המחוז על־מנת שיוכלו להיווכח ולעקוב אחרי מהלך הפעולות. מ[שה] ש[רתוק] הבטיח כי יתן הוראות למטה להיענות לבקשה זו. לאחר שהמשקיפים חיכו שעות אחדות, הודיע להם קולונל ברוך,[3] כי לא יוכל להרשות למשקיפים לבוא למטה הקרב, מחשש שמא יתגלו על־ידי כך למשקיפים דרכי מלחמתנו, סוגי נשקנו וכו׳. אמרתי כי יש הבדל בין ביקור בחזית לבין ישיבה במטה קרבי. אשר לביקור בחזית, הצענו ליווי למשקיפים. יתר על כן, כשהמשקיפים שאינם

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1. מס׳ 215.
2. אלכסיס לאדאס, מצוות משקיפי האו״ם בארץ־ישראל.
3. סגן־אלוף ברוך (קומארוב), קצין־קישור ראשי למשקיפי האו״ם.

מלווים הגיעו למקום, הורשה להם על־ידי אנשינו לעבור את קווינו. אשר לביקור במטה, אין אנו רואים כל הצדקה לכך, כי המשקיפים, לדעתנו, נועדו רק לפקח שלא תופר ההפוגה בינינו לבין הערבים ושלא נעבור על תנאי שביתת־הנשק. אולם אין בתנאי שביתת־הנשק כל סעיף אשר לפיו רשאים המשקיפים לתבוע זכות של ישיבה ופיקוח במטה.

לאדאס חזר ואמר כי דבר זה הובטח לו במפורש על־ידי מ[שה] ש[רתוק]. אמרתי כי אמנם לא הייתי בשעת מעשה, אולם כפי שידוע לי, לא הובטח כך, וכי כל מה שהבטיח מ[שה] ש[רתוק] הוא, כי ימסור למטה לברר אם וכיצד אפשר לקחת את המשקיפים למקום המערכה.

סוכם כי אבקשך להבהיר נקודה זו.

אשר לשמועות על עולים אשר הצליחו לרדת ולהסתנן לפינות שונות של הארץ, אמרתי כי אין לי כל אישור לידיעה זו, ואף שאלה זו אני מעביר אליך. ציינתי כי עד סוף המערכה לא נוכל לאסוף ידיעות מפורטות בעניין זה. בדרך־כלל היה ידוע לנו כי אנייה זו, כל חשיבותה שהיא הביאה נשק לארץ בלי ידיעת ובלי הסכמת ממשלתנו, וכי את פריקת מטען הנשק אנו מעוניינים למנוע. מסרנו להם גם פרטים על תוצאות המערכה בכפר ויתקין.

מכאן עברנו לבירור בעיית העלייה מקפריסין ושאלת העברת השיירות לנגב.

בעניין קפריסין[4] חזר וטען הרוזן, כי בלי שתפנה אליו הממשלה הבריטית לא יוכל לגלות יזמה. אמרתי כי לפי הידיעות שבידינו גילה הרוזן יזמה בחוזר לכל הממשלות חברות או״ם, בו הוא מבקש מניעת יציאת עולים לארץ בלי הודעה מוקדמת לרוזן.[5] אין איפוא כל יסוד, שהרוזן יימנע מלפנות לממשלה הבריטית כאשר ממשלה זו, בהסתמכות על החלטת שביתת־הנשק, מפריעה לעלייה יהודית. הצענו איפוא לרוזן שיפנה לממשלה הבריטית, ואם זה קשה עליו, שישלח משקיפים לקפריסין. הרוזן טען כי כבר הסכים עם מ[שה] ש[רתוק] בנקודה זו, וכי עתה הוא מחכה שיפנו אליו האנגלים. אמרתי כי בינתיים עוברים ימים רבים; למעשה כבר עברו 14 יום מהכרזת ההפוגה, והעלייה מקפריסין לא זזה. הילכך נצטווינו על־ידי מ[שה] ש[רתוק] לעורר את הבעיה מחדש. על זה השיב הרוזן, כי אם זוהי בקשתו של מ[שה] ש[רתוק], הוא מוכן לדון בעניין מחדש ויודיע לנו תשובתו מחר.

אשר לעניין השיירות לנגב הודיע הרוזן, לאחר קריאת העתק מכתבנו לבונדה, כי החליט להתחיל בהובלת שיירותינו החל מיום השישי, וכי הוא מודיע על כך בהודעה שאינה משתמעת בשתי פנים למצרים. כדי לספקנו על האיחור שנגרם, הוא מסכים כי השיירות שתלכנה לנגב תהיינה יותר גדולות, על־מנת לספק לנגב גם את מנת 14 הימים שעברו כבר. הוא מבקש מאוד שניתן הוראה לאנשינו לדחות כל פעולה עד יום ו׳. הבטחתי להעביר בקשה זו אליך.[6]

לעת־עתה החליט הרוזן לדחות נסיעתו לתל אביב ולהסתפק בבירור שהיה לו אתנו, והוא מחכה לתשובות לשאלות שאני מעביר אליך במכתב זה.

4. ראה מס׳ 211.
5. ראה מס׳ 186.
6. ראה מס׳ 214 והערה 5 שם.

לישיבה בעניינים המרכזיים עוד לא הגענו. שיחה ראשונה בעניינים אלה תתקיים מחר בשעה 11.30, ונראה שאת השיחה הראשונה ינהל באנץ׳ עצמו ולא ישתתף בה הרוזן.

השעה מאוחרת וכולנו עייפים ועל־כן אפסיק כרגע. אבקשך רק להטיל על מישהו במשרדך להמציא לנו בקביעות חומר מפורט עד כמה שאפשר על המצב בארץ, בייחוד פרטים מלאים על מהלך המערכה נגד אצ״ל.

החל ממחר יוקם קשר תקין בין רודוס לתל אביב. אבקשכם לנצל קשר זה. בקשר זה אפשר גם לשוחח טלפונית, אולם לשיחות אלו יקשיב כל מי שרדיו טוב בביתו, ולכן לא נוכל לדבר דברים שאינם ניתנים לפרסום.

לאדאס, אשר יביא לך מכתב זה, הבטיח להסדיר את נסיעתה של רנה [ברוזה].[7] חשוב מאוד שהיא תבוא, כי לפי כל הסימנים תהיה לנו עבודה מרובה. מרוב חיפזון השארנו במשרד־החוץ שתי מכונות כתיבה (עברית ואנגלית). אבקש להזכיר לרנה לקחת עמה שתי המכונות. שלח נא באמצעותה גם צרור עיתונים וכל חומר אשר יוכל לעזור לנו בשיחותינו.

הרוזן וכל הפמליא שלו שולחים לך ברכת שלום. כולנו כבר מתחילים להרגיש עצמנו מנותקים, וכבר מחכים בכליון־עיניים לרגע שנוכל לשוב.

שלך,

ראובן שילוח

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (וושינגטון)

M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 16/54

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 23 June 1948

Was not informed in time Hacohen's[1] conversation with Grom[yko] and negative reply on account of truce.[2] Please approach them again, either you or Eban, suggesting they might discuss with us now sale planes, other heavy equipment for delivery after truce /if terminates, indicating truce/ terms do not prohibit purchase arms abroad.

Shertok

7. רנה ברוזה, מזכירה במשרד־החוץ.

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1. דוד הכהן עשה אז בשליחות מטעם המגבית היהודית המאוחדת בארצות־הברית.
2. ראה מס׳ 173.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 308
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/6

[New York], 24 June 1948

My understanding position Mediator interprets resolution: 1) as not requiring indiscriminate detentions Cyprus;[1] 2) as not necessitating further detention Kenya.[2] I base latter assumption report your statement Palcor.[3] If correct, suggest we submit formal note Security Council stating unilateral British action impeding possibility more satisfactory arrangement ourselves and Mediator. Placing this on record important in likely event further prolongation truce and consequent discussion its terms. Awaiting instructions.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 479
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/2

Tel Aviv, 24 June 1948

Your 308.[1] Ask Arthur [Lourie] telephone Nahum [Goldmann] immediately inquire position concerning Cyprus. Imperative get British agree defer Mediator's discretion as to who, how many, can be evacuated. Once agreement secured, observer be sent and evacuation resumed. Regarding Kenya, Foreign Office replied they inquiring Mediator whether repatriation permissible during truce; ask Nahum whether they actually cabled Rhodes. Cable. Meanwhile defer action Security Council.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס' 210.
2. ראה מס' 211 והערה 1 שם.
3. סוכנות ידיעות. ההצהרה לא נמצאה.

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1. מס' 222.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 58/118
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 24 June 1948

Consider Republican platform regarding Israel of utmost importance and expect far-reaching effects on Truman's attitude coming week.[1] Prompt appointment McDonald undoubtedly connected with this platform.[2] Learned today also significant improvement Forrestal[3] position on Israel resulted from 1) Enormous impression Haganah successes made on Defence Department, and 2) Pressure Democratic Party leaders on all branches Administration in our favour. Foresee possibility de jure recognition before Democratic Convention, also support our application for loan. Truman's personal readiness follow this line, as expressed his conversation with Jacobson,[4] will be strengthened pressure Party bosses and make more difficult State Department obstructing. Suggest you weigh this evaluation situation with necessary caution and reserve as fact insufficient for more definite conclusion.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 59/93
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 24 June 1948

Following additional facts related McDonald appointment:[1] 1) State Department tried obstruct appointment because his pro-Zionist view. Truman replied: "I am not expected to appoint to Israel an anti-Zionist."

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1. ראה מס' 218 והערה 9 שם.
2. ב־22.6.1948 הודיע טרומן על החלפת נציגים בין ארצות־הברית וישראל ועל מינויו של ג'יימס מקדונלד, שהיה חבר הוועדה האנגלו־אמריקאית לעניין ארץ־ישראל ב־1946, לתפקיד של נציג ארצות־הברית בישראל.
3. ג'יימס פורסטאל, שר־ההגנה של ארצות־הברית.
4. ראה מס' 219.

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1. ראה מס' 224.

2) We suggested last minute to Lovett include in official announcement following: "Mission established pending exchange ministers and opening of legation." Lovett objected "pending etc." 3) Hilldring refused appointment health reasons, but expects to be available appointment member United States delegation next session U.N. Paris, primarily to be able to support our interests there. 4) I am pressing McDonald earliest departure for Israel.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 63/195, 64/211, 65/162. התקבל: 26.6/25.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 24/25 June 1948

My own observations and recent conversations between high officials State, Defence, Treasury Departments and friends may provide useful background:

1) British domestic economic position bad and rapidly deteriorating. Highly probable that apart from Marshall Plan, Britain will request large second loan by midwinter. British thus forced give renewed consideration American public opinion.

2) Experts agree public sentiment United States continues strongly favourable Israel and generally regard British position inconsistent with United Nations future welfare and American Middle East interests. American /sympathies/ reinforced by election campaign just begun with specific Israeli support Republican platform.[1] British undoubtedly aware these American attitudes serious barrier further aid and recognize necessity for avoiding overt clash.

3) Changing attitude American military particularly due belated recognition Arab League impotent, that only possible useful buffer areas between Soviet Union and Middle East are Turkey and Iran, that Middle East /probably/ cannot be defended against all-out Soviet attack, that maximum Western military achievement under such circumstances would be denial oil to Soviets, that continuance immediate investment steel and capital in Middle East pipelines probably unwarranted and that tanker programme probably preferable to pipelines. Credit for this tardy understanding explicitly given and due Haganah.

4) Assumed here British will seek continue use Transjordan as focal point influence in area. Whether United States will join British reportedly

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1. ראה מס' 218 והערה 9 שם.

depends outcome existing differences between Navy, which prefers rely large floating carriers, and Air Force, which regards land bases mandatory.

5) As camouflage and if necessary alibi, British apparently developing double policy *vis-à-vis* United States involving, first, continuation concealed assault on Israel, and second, appeasement of American public opinion by ostensibly supporting November 29 Resolution. Through influential individuals and columnists, British circulating following plausible programme Washington and Lake Success as basis Anglo-American understanding on Palestine:

a) American de facto recognition Transjordan, including Arab portion Palestine, simultaneously with British de facto recognition Israel within United Nations frontiers.

b) Minor concessions by Abdullah from Arab portions in favour Syria.

c) Negotiation mutual defence and non-aggression pact between Israel and Transjordan as independent states, perhaps with United Nations mediation.

d) De jure recognition both Israel and Transjordan on successful conclusion foregoing.

e) Economic developmental assistance both states through United Nations agencies under Economic Union. Alleged purpose hold two states together and offer tempting bait Abdullah.

f) Apparently understood here that effective programme must at least be started during truce period.

6) Despite alleged British reversal attitudes and despite softening American military attitudes, no evidence change policy State Department. Evidence of continued basic hostility State Department found in opposition /McDonald/,[2] refusal export licenses for non-military vessels and planes, inactivity *Marine Carp.*[3] /toleration/ illegal traffic arms to Arabs, inactivity on Haifa Refineries etc.

7) Major hopeful factor /current/ situation remains President's support on essential issues. In this position President buttressed by close advisors and Party leaders, who agree President can profit only by action and not by words. This gives some hope for de jure recognition, economic assistance and perhaps embargo. De jure recognition will probably be first step.

8) Friends /agree/ that need to strengthen United Nations will ultimately force British and United States return to complete support November 29 Resolution. Therefore see as danger not denial resolution but weakening through /interpretation/. These factors suggest we avoid any evidence willingness compromise or violate any fundamental aspect United Nations resolution except required by war situation. Please acknowledge receipt.

Epstein

2. ראה מס' 225.

3. ראה מס' 148.

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פ. קרמונה[1] אל מ. שרתוק
P. Cremona to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2426/9

Tel Aviv, 24 June 1948

Sir,

I am instructed to inform you that Count Bernadotte has been apprised of the contents of your letter of 21 June 1948 to Colonel Bonde concerning the arrival of a ship carrying arms to Israel,[2] the transport of which had been organized by the Irgun Zvai Le'umi. Count Bernadotte has noted with satisfaction the steps taken by the Provisional Government of Israel in order to prevent a breach of the truce. He was, however, unable to accept this as an entirely satisfactory solution of the incident, in view of the fact that his Observers were prevented by the Jewish military authorities from proceeding to the scene in order to carry out their functions. This regrettable occurrence has made it impossible for them to ascertain to what extent men and materials from the above-mentioned ship were landed in Israel, as well as the steps taken by the Provisional Government of Israel to prevent their dispersal and to guarantee that they would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations in their entirety.

The Observers had requested the Jewish military authorities to give them the required facilities to proceed to the spot in order to ascertain whether war materials and men of military age had been landed. They were told that their presence on the scene of military operations could not be allowed, since it was not possible to permit foreign officers to witness the combat technique of the Jewish Army and observe its equipment. This statement by the Jewish military authorities cannot be accepted by the Mediator.

Count Bernadotte would like to make it quite clear that unless immediate measures are taken by the Provisional Government of Israel to prevent the obstruction of United Nations Observers in the exercise of their duties by the Israeli authorities, and unless a satisfactory account is received regarding the men and munitions landed in Israel from the ship *Altalena [Zabotinsky]* in contravention of the terms of the truce, he would be placed in the position of having to report to the Security Council that the truce had been broken by your side.

I would like to take this opportunity to call to your attention the following specific incidents for which Jewish military personnel are responsible:

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1. פאול קרמונה, נציג מיוחד של המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם בארץ־ישראל.
2. מס' 215.

1. Jewish motor transport has been seen using the southern by-pass round Latrun[3] and avoiding the check post at Bab-el-Wad by the use of side roads.

2. On 21 June, a United Nations Observer in a white jeep, carrying a United Nations flag, was denied passage through the road-block one mile south of Bab-el-Wad.

3. On 21 June, United Nations Observers were prevented from making their way towards the ship lying off Kfar Vitkin by Jewish guards. On 22 June, another Observer approaching Nathanya from the north in a jeep was refused permission to inspect the cargo which had been unloaded from the above-mentioned ship.

4. On 21 June, a plane (Auster), painted white with United Nations markings, was twice fired at from the Nathanya area while observing the *Altalena*.

5. On 20 June, in the vicinity of Al Quabab, at approximately 15:00 hrs, Jewish troops fired on a group of about twenty Arabs, killing three women, wounding one woman and five men.

6. On 20 June, Jewish troops set fire to Arab crops in Khulda, Deir-Miheisem,[4] Britqar[5] and Imusasq.[6]

I would appreciate it if you could indicate at your earliest convenience the measures which the Provisional Government of Israel proposes to take to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

Paul Cremona
Special Representative
of the Secretary General

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מ. שרתוק אל ל. כהן ור. שילוח (רודוס)
M. Shertok to L. Kohn and R. Shiloah (Rhodes)

העתק: 130.02/2423/8

תל אביב, 24 ביוני 1948

לליאו ולראובן שלומות,

תודתי הרבה לראובן על הדין־וחשבון המפורט והמהיר[1] אשר הגיעני באמצע ישיבת מועצת־המדינה אמש, בשעה של סערת־רוחות רבה. הנני כותב בהנחה כי רנה [ברוזה] תטוס היום או מחר, אם כי לעת־עתה אין לנו ידיעה ברורה על אפשרות הטיסה.

3. "דרך בורמה".
4. הכוונה כנראה לכפר דיר מוחסין, כ־5 ק"מ מערבית ללטרון.
5. המקום לא זוהה.
6. הכוונה כנראה לכפר אימוואס, כ־2 ק"מ צפונית מזרחית ללטרון.

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1. מס' 220.

א. הנני ניגש מיד לנקודה העיקרית בדין־וחשבון המחייבת תשובה והיא, טענותיו הטרדניות של לאדאס על שלא ניתן לו ולחבריו לגשת למקום המערכה בכפר ויתקין.

ברגע שהתחלתי להכתיב מכתב זה הגיעני מכתב חתום בידי קרמונה,[2] אשר העתקו מצורף. אינני צריך לומר עד כמה הרגזתני אגרת מחוצפת זו. עוד אין די להם באמצעים המזעזעים שאחזנו בהם ובשפיכת־הדמים שנכנסנו לתוכה, והם באים עלינו בדקדוקי־עניות להרשיענו. מכתב זה מחייב תשובה כדבעי ויש בדעתי להשתמש בהזדמנות שהוא לא נכתב על־ידי הרוזן עצמו, אף לא בידי בונדה, כדי להרביץ בכותבו כהוגן, למען יתרשמו כיאות גם העומדים ממעל לו.

עד לתשובה בכתב הנני לציין נקודות לבירור בעל־פה ביניכם לבין הרוזן ובאנץ׳.

1. כאשר בא אלי לאדאס בבקשת אפשרות לבקר במקום המערכה בחוף כפר ויתקין, נכון הדבר שנעניתי בחיוב, אך הוספתי ואמרתי כי אפנה מיד אל המטה ואציע להם לסדר את העניין.

היה צריך להיות מובן מאליו כי בעניינים כאלה מכריע הצבא ולא משרד־החוץ, ואין משרד־החוץ יכול לשמש אלא מליץ־יושר ומסייע. משפניתי אל המטה, נתברר לי כי לא חזיתי מראש את כל התוצאות המעשיות הנובעות מביקור כזה, וקיבלתי את דעת המטה, כי חדירה לפני ולפנים אינה אפשרית.

2. אם החשד שלהם הוא שהסירוב בא למנוע בעדם מלראות את העולים שבאו באנייה, הרי חשד־שווא הוא. נכון כנראה שבאו עולים באנייה, אבל — ייאמר בגילוי־לב — לא לכך היתה דאגתנו. אילו באה אניית עולים בלבד, היתה בזה סכנת הפרת ההפוגה ויש להניח כי כל דאגתנו היתה מופנית לנקודה זו. מכיוון שעיקר עניינה של האנייה היה במטען הנשק שבה, ואילו העולים, כפי שבררנו, נלקחו רק בהיסח־הדעת, שלא להוציא את הנפח לבטלה — האפיל עניין הנשק על עניין העולים מבחינת סכנת ההפרה. למה הדבר דומה, אם בא פושע לגזול ולרצוח, הרי כל מעיינך להתגונן בפני הרצח, ואילו הגזל אינו נחשב הרבה. אשר למניעת פריקת הנשק, הרי זו היתה משימה כבדה וחמורה. היה הכרח לגייס כוח ניכר מאוד לכיתור המקום ולחסימת המבואות לתגבורת. ההכנות החלו עם חצות, וכל הלילה עבר בריכוז הכוח הדרוש ובעריכתו. בינתיים עלו כנראה העולים בחוף והסתננו לעברים שונים. (הנני מציע בזה להודות כי היו עולים, באשר העיתונות מלאה פרטים על כך, וכל נסיון להסתיר יהיה לשווא). איך עמדנו בפני הורדת הנשק — הרי הם יודעים: במערכה בחוף כפר ויתקין, בה נפלו הרוגים ופצועים משני הצדדים, ובמערכה בימה ובחופה של תל אביב, בה שוב נפלו הרוגים ופצועים והאנייה הועלתה באש.

ממשלה העושה מאמצים כאלה כדי לעמוד בהתחייבויותיה הבינלאומיות רשאית לצפות שלא יבואו אליה בטענות של מה בכך. למעשה, לפי מיטב ידיעתנו, לא נפרק נשק מן האנייה בחוף כפר ויתקין, כי לא היה סיפק בידה. הנשק שמצאנו על החוף לאחר הכניעה היה נשקם של ארבע־מאות חברי אצ״ל אשר רוכזו להגנת הפריקה. נשק זה עם הרכב נמסר לידינו. כל הנשק שהובא באנייה עלה באש.

2. מס׳ 227.

3. אשר לעצם הטענה על סירוב המטה להרשות את נוכחותם במקום המעשה, הריני להחזיר את הטענה לבעליה. עוד בשעת ביקורו הראשון של הרוזן אצלי, ביום א׳, 13 ביוני, הסבתי תשומת לבו שעברו כבר מ״ח שעות מתחילת ההפוגה ועדיין לא נקבע קשר מרכזי בינינו לבין מנגנון הפיקוח. הצבעתי על תקלה, שעדיין לא ברור מהם סדרי הפיקוח שאנו נדרשים לשתף פעולה בהם, ומהם סמכויות המפקחים שעלינו לכבדם. ציינתי כי כל עוד לא נקבעו בעניינים אלה סדרים ברורים, ולא ניתנה לנו אפשרות להעיר עליהם מתוך נסיון ולהתאימם להשקפתנו, אל יתפלאו אם בבוא אחד המפקחים לאיזה מחנה או עמדה, ייתקל בסירוב הממונה עליו מצדנו להרשות כניסתו. היה לי רושם כי הרוזן הודה בצדקת טענתי. על־כל־פנים, הוא הבטיח להורות לראש המטה שלו לבוא אתנו במגע אישי בלי כל דיחוי. אך עברו ימים ללא כל מגע כזה, ורק ביום ו׳, 19 ביוני, נתקיימה הפגישה הראשונה בין אנשינו לבין הקולונל בונדה. מכיוון שבינתיים נצטברו כמה בעיות ממשיות חמורות, טבעי היה הדבר שבפגישה טופל קודם כל בהן, ולא היה דיון מספיק — או לא היה דיון כלל — בשאלה הכללית והקודמת של סדרי הפיקוח. הבירור על נושא זה הוחמץ והשאלה נשארה תלויה ועומדת. מכאן אי־ההבנה לגבי הביקור בחוף כפר ויתקין.

איני צריך להוסיף כי עליכם לאמץ את כל שכלכם וסבלנותכם לסיים את כל העניין בשלום, ולא להביא לידי קרע ביניכם לבין המתווך, וקובלנה מצדו למועצת־הביטחון.

ב. אשר לטענות אחרות הכלולות במכתבו של קרמונה, הרינו מבררים אותן וניתן תשובתנו. אם יש לראובן מה להעיר על מקרים אלה, אדרבה ומיד.

ג. שלחתי לכם היום מברק בשאלת גולי קניה.[3] לוקר מסר לי בבואו, כי תשובת משרד-החוץ הבריטי לפנייתנו בשאלה זו הייתה, כי הם עצמם פונים אל ברנאדוט בשאלה, אם החזרת הגולים האלה תוך ההפוגה מותרת או אסורה. הקיבל הרוזן שאלה זו מלונדון? אם לא קיבל — הודיעונו מיד והבריקו זאת ישיר לנחום גולדמן (זיוניבירו)[4] בלונדון; אם קיבל — החישו תשובתו, ושוב הבריקו לי ולנחום מה ענה. אם יעורר הרוזן שאלת נאמנותם למדינה ולהפוגה של הבחורים האלה, השיבו כי זאת דאגתה ואחריותה של המדינה. אם נראה צורך לעצור אותם בארץ — נעשה זאת. אם נראה אפשרות להסתפק בנטילת התחייבות מהם על התנהגות טובה — נסתפק בזאת. ננהג בזה לפי ראות־עינינו, הן לשם מניעת הפרת ההפוגה והן להבטחת הסדר הפנימי בארץ. אין שיקולים אלה נוגעים לעניין ההחזרה. האנשים הם תושבי ישראל ואזרחיה. ייתכן שמקומם בבתי־הסוהר של ישראל, אך על־כל־פנים אין למישהו זכות להחזיקם בחוץ־לארץ.

ד. אני מרוצה מאוד שעוררתם את שאלת קפריסין ותקוותי כי עלה בידכם להניע את הרוזן לפעולה. לדאבוני לא קבלתי עדיין תשובה מלונדון, והבוקר הברקתי לאוברי [אבן] ולארתור [לוריא] שיתקשרו בעניין זה עם נחום טלפונית לדרבנו.[5] לפי

3. לא נמצא. ראה מס׳ 223.
4. הכתובת הטלגרפית של משרדי הסוכנות היהודית בלונדון.
5. מס׳ 223.

שעה העלייה מקפריסין נתונה בקיפאון גמור. ה"פאנים"[6] נעצרו בידי הבריטים בחיפה, ויש לנו אתם דין־ודברים קשה. אם לא נצליח לחלצם, נפנה למקשר או"ם בחיפה ונטען כי תפיסת האניות הרעה מצבנו תוך ההפוגה. במקרה כזה נבריק לכם לשם לחץ מקביל.

ה. המצב בארץ עודנו חמור, אם גם היריות פסקו. יש שמועות על תכונה לחטיפות מצד אצ"ל, בתגובה למאסרים. גם המצב הציבורי רעוע מאוד. מקוצר הזמן אין לי ברירה אלא להשאיר לכם להיבנות מהעיתונות.

היו שלום.

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ד.ב. יוסף אל ז'. ניואנהויס (ירושלים)
D.B. Joseph to J. Nieuwenhuys (Jerusalem)

העתק: 93.03/95/2

Jerusalem, 24 June 1948

Dear Sir,

I have the honour to place before your Commission our protest against the violation of one of the terms of the cease-fire agreement to the serious detriment of the Jewish population of Jerusalem.

It was agreed that the Jews of Jerusalem should be entitled during the cease-fire period to receive their normal supply of food and water.[1] I explained to Count Bernadotte, when I had the privilege of meeting him on Saturday, the 12th June, that Jerusalem's normal water supply could only be provided by operating the Ras el Ain water system. When your Commission first broached the matter with the Arab authorities, the latter informed you that the machinery at the Ras el Ain pumping station was damaged beyond repair. On learning this from you, we requested facilities for our technical experts to examine the Ras el Ain pumping station to ascertain what the condition of the machinery actually was. After some days' delay, and apparently to prevent such a visit, the Arab authorities informed you that they would themselves send some military engineers to examine the machinery. It transpired from this examination that your Commission had been misinformed and misled by the Arab authorities, since in fact the machinery was in good running order, having suffered no serious damage whatever, and all that was needed was a few spanners and tools and the changing of some fuses. I complained at the time to the Chairman that this

6. ספינות המעפילים "פאן יורק" ו"פאן קרסצ'נט", שהיו עצורות בקפריסין מראשית ינואר 1948, הגיעו לחיפה ב־19.6.1948 לשם תיקונים והצטיידות בדלק. הבריטים סרבו להכניס את האניות לנמל ועצרו את אחד מרבי־החובלים.

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1. ראה מס' 156.

was a clear case of procrastination by the Arabs to prevent the Jews from receiving the water supply to which they were entitled.

When it was finally ascertained that the Ras el Ain pumping station could be operated, we immediately requested permission to send a Jewish crew to Kilometre 27 on the Jerusalem - Tel Aviv road to repair the break in the water pipeline. The Arabs objected to this, and proposed instead that they should make this repair. After further delay, it was discovered that they had done nothing to carry out this undertaking, and it was only after further insistence by us that we be permitted to do the repair ourselves and after tireless efforts by the Chairman of the Commission, that the Arab authorities were prevailed upon to allow our workers to proceed to the site yesterday morning to carry out the repair to the pipelines. Even at this late date we have not yet been afforded an opportunity of checking whether the Latrun pumping station is in order. After 14 days of the truce, the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem have remained without the supply of water to which they are entitled. I respectfully submit that this withholding from the Jews of Jerusalem of their supply of water constitutes a grave breach of a vital condition of the truce agreement. I regret that in these circumstances I have no alternative but to put the matter before our Government, which will have to draw such conclusions and take such action in the matter as it may deem proper.[2]

Yours faithfully,

Bernard Joseph

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ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק
L. Kohn to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

רודוס, 25 ביוני 1948

משה היקר,

שיחתנו הראשונה לעצם העניין התקיימה ביום רביעי ב־11.30 בבוקר. השתתפו בה באנץ', שישב בראש, רידמן, מוהן, ויז'ייה וסטאוורופולוס. באנץ' פתח בסקירה מקיפה והאריך דברים כדרכו. הוא הגדיר את המטרה העומדת לפניהם במלים to prepare suggestions aiming at a peaceful adjustment. כוונתם בהזמנת מומחים משני הצדדים הייתה לקבל ידיעות נוספות שתעזורנה להם בעיבוד הצעותיהם. השתתפותנו בשיחה היא בלתי־פורמלית, ובשום אופן לא תעשה אותנו

2. אספקת המים לירושלים מהמעיינות בראש העין לא חודשה במשך כל ימי ההפוגה — ראה מס' 287. אספקת מים חלקית הגיעה לעיר ממקורות אחרים בצינור מאולתר שהונח לאורך "דרך בורמה".

שותפים להצעות שהם יגישו בסוף. הוא סיכם את המצב שנוצר במשך חצי השנה שעברה מקבלת החלטת או״ם בביטויים גמישים מאוד, דבר שהוציא ממני קריאת־ביניים ראשונה: ״אבל אין אתם עובדים בחלל ריק!״ לזה הוא הגיב בצורה מאוד חיובית, וגם אחרים הדגישו שמובן שיש רקע, והוא החלטת או״ם. רידמן, שדיבר אחרי־כן, הגדיר זאת בצורה אחרת במקצת, באמרו שמובן להם היטב ומקבלים את העובדה שהחלטת או״ם יש לה מקום יסודי בעמדתנו, ועל־ידי זה באופן בלתי־ישיר גם בראייתם את הבעיה.

אחרי שבאנץ׳ גמר את פתיחתו הארוכה, אמרתי שאוכל לתאר לי שתוכלנה להיות להם שתי גישות לבעיה: האחת היא שנקודת־המוצא שלהם היא החלטת או״ם, וכי הם ישתדלו למצוא דרכים להשיג את הסכמתם, או לפחות השלמתם של הערבים עם החלטת או״ם, למשל על־ידי השתתפותה של מדינת ישראל בתכניות פיתוח לטובת המזרח־הקרוב כולו וכדומה. הדרך השנייה — שהם נכנסים לדיון חדש על עצם הבעיה וזורקים הכול מחדש לכור־ההיתוך, גישה שכמובן אנחנו לא נוכל להסכים לה בשום אופן. פה באנץ׳ הפסיק אותי באמרו שתוכל להיות גם עמדה שלישית, דהיינו, החלטת או״ם קיימת, אבל יש להתחשב בעובדה שבמשך ששת החודשים שעברו קרו כמה שינויים במצב. למשל, אי־אפשר כבר לקיים את התאריכים שנקבעו על־ידי החלטת או״ם ב־29 לנובמבר. שנית, יש להתחשב בעובדה שאו״ם לא היו מוכנות (והוא הדגיש זאת כאילו בצער) להשתמש באוטוריטה שלהן כדי להוציא לפועל מה שהחליטו. זוהי עובדה שאי־אפשר להתעלם ממנה. שלישית, יש להתחשב בעובדה שפרצה מלחמה בארץ־ישראל אחרי החלטת או״ם.

מטרתם עכשיו היא למצוא הסדר שיתן סיפוק לצרכינו החיוניים ושיאפשר לערבים להשלים אתו. עניתי שעמדתנו ידועה. השאלה בשבילנו לא עניין של power politics כי אם של צרכים חיוניים אשר קיומנו בתור עם תלוי בהם. נחוץ לנו שטח שיאפשר לכל יהודי אשר מוכרח או רוצה להתיישב בארץ־ישראל לעשות זאת, ונחוץ לנו סטטוס של אומה חופשית, שאין שולט עליה. אם רוצים לקחת מאתנו את סטטוס החופש, הורגים את רוח מפעלנו. בסדר העולם הקיים, הדרך היחידה להבטיח חופש מדיני היא הקמת מדינה בעלת ריבונות מלאה. גם פיתוח הארץ תלוי בזה, שאלה אשר מוכשרים לפתח אותה יהיו שולטים על מקורותיה הכלכליים. גם שאלת יחסינו בעתיד עם הערבים תלויה בהכרת עמדתנו כעם חופשי ושווה.

ראובן [שילוח] הדגיש בפרוטרוט את רצוננו הטוב לבוא להסכם עם הערבים, כמובן בתנאי שריבונותנו, הביטחון והגבולות יובטחו.

בקשר עם הערותיו של באנץ׳, שקרו שינויים במצב במשך חצי השנה שעברה, הדגיש ראובן שגם מנקודת מבטנו קרו שינויים יסודיים: ההתקפה של כל העולם הערבי, חוסר־האונים של או״ם והפקרת יהודי ירושלים על־ידי העולם הנוצרי.

נאמרו כמה וכמה דברים נוספים בשיחה הגמישה הזאת. לבסוף אמר באנץ׳ שעלינו להמשיך את הדיון, וביקש שבפעם הבאה ניתן לו הסברות מפורטות על שלוש השאלות הבאות:

א. מהו הסטטוס הנוכחי של הסוכנות היהודית?
ב. באיזה שלב נמצאת בקשתנו להתקבל כחבר באו״ם?
ג. איזה שינויים קרו בעניין מצבם ומספרם של הערבים בשטח מדינת ישראל כתוצאה מהמלחמה?

בזה נגמרה השיחה, שנמשכה כשעה וחצי. שלחנו לך מיד טלגרמה[1] וביקשנו חומר כדי לענות על שתי השאלות הראשונות. עד רגע הכתיבה, יום שישי, 11.30, לא קיבלנו תשובה מכם.

אחר־הצהריים ב־5 נפגשנו עוד פעם אתם, וראובן נתן להם את כל המספרים שברשותנו על דבר בריחת הערבים. הם קיבלו זאת בצורה יפה והתפתחה שיחה בלתי־רשמית על ההתפתחות במחנה הערבי, שבה ראובן סיפר להם כמה עובדות פיקנטיות שעניינו אותם יותר מהמספרים.

בערב היתה לי שיחה קצרה עם רידמן, שבה הדגשתי עד כמה עניין העלייה בוער, גם מצד העולים וגם מצד הישוב במדינה, בעיקר בעניין קפריסין. הוא רשם לפניו את הדברים.

ביום ה׳ ב־7.30 בערב נפגשנו שוב — הפעם עם באנץ׳ ורידמן בלבד — לדבר על עניין הנפט. הסברנו להם את כל הבעיה. באנץ׳ עורר שתי שאלות:

א. האם מותר לאנגלים לפי תנאי החוזה להוציא נפט מחיפה לפני שסופקו צרכי הארץ?

ב. האם העברת הנפט לבירות וניקוי הצינור כדי להכשיר אותו לקבלת נפט מזוקק הוא בניגוד לתנאי ההפוגה?

הוא הדגיש שאין לפניו רשימת חומרי מלחמה שאסור להביא לארץ, אבל אם אנחנו נדרוש איסור הוצאת נפט, יצא שזהו מצרך צבאי, ולפיכך אפשר יהיה לאסור גם להכניסו. הוא ביקש שנשלח לו עד שעה 11 הבוקר תזכיר על בעיית הנפט. אחרי שקיבלנו את מכתבך[2] (שרנה [ברוזה] הביאה) ובהתחשב עם הסכנה שבאנץ׳ עורר בסוף, החלטנו לא לעורר יותר את השאלה לפי שעה.

הבוקר בשעה 11 קרא לי הרוזן ומסר לי את הדברים הבאים:

א. הוא קיבל ידיעה שהממשלה המצרית לא קיבלה את דעתו בדבר השיירות לנגב;[3] ושהבוקר ספיטפייר מצרי ירה על אווירון של או״ם. הוא מסר לי שהגיב באופן חריף לדבר זה, ומסר לבא־כוח המצרי הנמצא פה, שיודיע לממשלתו שהוא עומד על פירושו של תנאי ההפוגה, ושעליהם להפסיק כל הפרעה.

ב. הוא הודיע לי את הדברים הבאים על כוונותיו לעתיד: השיחות שהיו בין המזכירות ובינינו לא היה בהן משום משא־ומתן. אין אנחנו יודעים באיזה כיוון הם חושבים. הוא בכוונה לא הצטרף לשיחות האלה כדי שלא נוציא מסקנות שהן באיזה כיוון הולכת מחשבתו. ביום א׳ הוא יתן לנו מסגרת של הצעות ויאפשר לנו לשאול שאלות ולקבל הסברות. הצעות אלה לא תהיינה מעובדות, כי אם רק טנטטיביות, והכוונה תהיה לברר אם יש בסיס למשא־ומתן משותף. באותו זמן ימסור אותן גם לערבים. ביום ב׳ ניסע כולנו חזרה לתל אביב ורידמן יילווה אלינו, והוא ימסור בשם הרוזן את ההצעות יחד עם הסברות. הוא יבקש אותנו לא להעביר את הדברים במברק לתל אביב ביום א׳, יען כי קיצור הדברים עלול להביא לידי רושם מוטעה. בזה ייגמר תפקידנו בתור מקשרים, לכל הפחות לעת־עתה.

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1. לא נמצאה.
2. מס׳ 228.
3. ראה מס׳ 214.

בסוף השיחה שאל באנץ' אם לא יקבל מאתנו תזכיר בעניין הנפט. אמרנו לו שאין לנו החומר על תנאי ההסכם עם החברה, ומשום כך אין בכוחנו לעבד את התזכיר על המקום. אמרנו שיש אצלנו נכונות לדבר על שאלת הפעלת בתי־הזיקוק תחת פיקוח או"ם לטובת כל הגורמים והעולם כולו.

ראובן גם עורר את שאלת מכתבו של קרמונה,[4] ואמר שאין אנו יכולים לקבל את המכתב הזה, הן מבחינת תוכנו והן מבחינת הטון שלו. הם ענו שעוד לא קיבלו את העתק המכתב, ושתהיה לנו עוד הזדמנות לדבר על זה.[5]

אני מוכרח לסיים. רוצה אני רק להוסיף שבמשך שיחה בלתי־רשמית עם הרוזן נתברר עד כמה שהמרירות שנכנסה בלבם בעניין נתניה[6] עודנה קיימת. נעשה היום מאמץ לטפל בדבר לאור מכתבך.

שלום וכל טוב,

ליאו

פ.ס. אחרי גמר שיחתנו הגיע הקונסול הבריטי כדי למסור לברנאדוט ידיעות שקיבל מממשלתו על עניין קניה ועל עניין קפריסין. הרוזן הבטיח להעביר לנו את הידיעות האלה במשך היום, ונמסור אותם אליך במברק.[7]

תוכל, אולי, להוציא המסקנות על מהלך־רוחם מהחומר שדרשו מאתנו.[8]

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ר. שילוח אל מ. שרתוק
R. Shiloah to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

רודוס, 25 ביוני 1948

משה היקר,

ליאו [כהן] כבר הכתיב דין־וחשבון מפורט על שיחותינו עם באנץ' וחבריו.[1] אוסיף בזה רק דברים אחדים שקלטתי בשיחות פרטיות אחדות, ביחוד אחת שהיתה לי הבוקר עם רידמן. שיחה זו התקיימה ביזמתי. אמרתי לרידמן כי אין אנו מבינים לשם מה הזמינו אותנו לכאן. כל האינפורמציה שקיבלו מאיתנו עד עכשיו היתה ידועה לו

4. מס' 227.
5. המתווך הביע בפני הנציגים הישראליים את מורת־רוחו ממכתבו של קרמונה; הוא עצמו הורה לנציגיו לפנות בעל־פה בלבד, להביע הערכה על צעדי הממשלה לסיכול הפרת ההפוגה ולבקש פרטים נוספים. (ראה ל. כהן אל שרתוק, 25.6.1948, 130.09/2329/25).
6. הכוונה לפרשת "אלטלנה".
7. מאוחר יותר הבריק כהן, שהידיעות שהגיעו מהבריטים סותרות; המתווך ביקש הבהרות, וציין שהוא מוכן לשלוח משקיפים לקפריסין. (ראה ל. כהן אל שרתוק, 25.6.1948, 130.02/2426/10).
8. המשפט האחרון נוסף בכתב־יד.

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1. מס' 230.

ולבאנץ׳ עוד לפני בואו, ובשביל כך לא היה צורך להביא אותנו לכאן. התנצל ואמר כי אכן צדקנו, אבל לא היתה ברירה אחרת. ברנאדוט חדש בבעיה הארצישראלית, והרגיש כי חשוב שבשעת־הצורך יוכל לבחון דעותיו וידיעותיו על מומחים משני הצדדים, ולא להסתפק בחומר שהוא מקבל ממומחים שלו. נסיתי לברר מפי רידמן אם כבר נתגבשו אצל הרוזן הצעות לפתרון הבעיה ומה גישתו לעניין. הרושם הכללי מדברי רידמן הוא, כי הרוזן ניגש לבעיה גישה מציאותית מאוד. הוא יוצא מתוך הנחה, כי מדינת ישראל היא עובדה וכי אנו לא נוכל בשום פנים לוותר על צרכינו היסודיים. הבעיה העומדת לפני הרוזן היא למצוא דרך של כבוד לערבים להשלים עם העובדות. הקושי הוא גדול כי הערבים מפולגים ביניהם, וגם אם תימצא הצעה אשר תתקבל על דעת חלק מן הערבים, תימצאנה תמיד בלי ספק מדינות ערביות אשר מטעמי פרסטיג׳ה ומטעמים ערביים פנימיים לא יקבלו את ההצעה בשום פנים. ביחוד הדגיש את עקשנותם ועקשותם של המצרים. הם עוד אינם מוצאים הסבר לעובדה שהמצרים, אשר לפני פרוץ המלחמה היו מתונים ביותר, נקטו עתה את העמדה היותר קיצונית. הוא מייחס זאת בעיקר למצב פנימי קשה של הממשלה. אי־אפשר גם להתעלם ממקומם ותפקידם של האנגלים והאמריקאים בתסבוכת הארצישראלית, ויחסם של שני גורמים אלה להצעות ברנאדוט יקבע לא מעט את התוצאות. בנקודה זו הכחיש רידמן בכל תוקף את הסברה כי ברנאדוט פועל בשליחות בריטית או בריטית־אמריקאית. בהמשך השיחה הזכרתי את התיאוריה של אליאס [ששון] בדבר שימוש בנגב כמקום קליטה לכוחות הבריטיים אשר יפונו ממצרים. על זה הגיב רידמן כי שמע דברים דומים מפי קריץ׳־ג׳ונס[2] בלייק סאכסס.

מסקנתו של רידמן, אני מניח שזו גם מסקנת כל החבורה, כי בלי פילוג בליגה הערבית אי־אפשר יהיה להגיע לפתרון מניח את הדעת. הוא ניסה לחקור אם אין לנו קשרים עם חלקים מסוימים של הליגה אשר נוכל לשתף אתם פעולה. רידמן ציין את הקשיים שהוא וחבריו נתקלים בהם בשיחות עם ארבעת המומחים הערבים. ארבעה אלה אינם מהווים גוף אחיד. כל אחד מהם מייצג השקפה אחרת.

רידמן נאחז מאוד בהערה שהערתי בשיחה קודמת, על נכונותנו לשתף פעולה עם העולם הערבי, לאחר שעולם זה ישלים עם קיומנו כמדינה עצמאית. אני סבור כי אילו היתה מוכנה בידינו תכנית ברורה לשיתוף־פעולה כלכלי וכו׳ לפיתוח המזרח־התיכון, היה זה מקדם מאוד את שיחותינו.

על האווירה הכללית אין לאמור הרבה. בשלב הנוכחי של השיחות אין ניכרת כל פעילות רצינית בריטית או אחרת. הערבים נפגשים כפעם בפעם עם עיתונאים אנגלים ואחרים, אולם יש לי הרושם כי אם נרקמת איזו מזימה, יש לבקש עקבותיה בלונדון, בוואשינגטון ובניו יורק, לעת־עתה לא ברודוס.

בשעת הכתבת מכתב זה יושב הקונסול הבריטי ברודוס אצל ברנאדוט ומוסר לו דברי הממשלה הבריטית בעניין קפריסין, קניה ואולי גם בענייני נפט, אולם המטוס יוצא עוד מעט וכנראה לא נספיק לקבל תשובה בעניינים אלה לפני צאתו.[3]

שלום רב לחברים ולצפורה.

ראובן

2. ארתור קריץ׳ ג׳ונס, שר־המושבות הבריטי.
3. ראה מס׳ 230 והערה 7 שם.

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מ. שרתוק אל י. לינטון (לונדון)
M. Shertok to I.J. Linton (London)

מברק
נוסח נכנס: 72.9/687/2

Tel Aviv, 25 June 1948 (15.00)

Goldmann's 51,[1] two — untrue. Collins approached for evacuation persons non-military age in order make use *Pan* ships which were then available.[2] He replied negatively, pleading absence instructions. Meanwhile ships went Haifa for refuelling where they detained by [Royal] Navy, so that deadlock now complete. We urging Navy release, urging Collins restart evacuation, please support. Three — figure related first week June, since then considerable removal; hope you received my message indicating position June 17th.[3] Getting less daily.

Shertok

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א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

מברק 125
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/129/11
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2420/4

Washington, 25 June 1948 (17.02)

Discussed reopening Refinery State Department June 25th. State [Department] says no fundamental objections raised by London. Suggests initiative now lies Haifa and Rhodes. State [Department] requests information on reactions your approaches Refinery and Bernadotte. Require full information these reactions to maximize usefulness further approaches here.

Gass

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1. מס' 211.
2. ראה מס' 228 והערה 6 שם.
3. בעניין מלאי הדלק בארץ, ראה מס' 209 והערה 15 שם.

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מ. שרתוק אל פ. קרמונה (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to P. Cremona (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2426/9

Tel Aviv, 26 June 1948

Sir,

I am in receipt of your letter of June 24th[1] and must express surprise at its general tenor and, in particular, at the linking-up of the staggering events at Kfar Vitkin and Tel Aviv with purely local and partly trivial incidents.

With regard to the former event, the determination to prevent a violation of the truce shown by the Provisional Government, and the extremely drastic measures to which it resorted before the eyes of the whole world, should have proved sufficient to raise its good faith above any possible doubt or reproach.

The fact that the U.N. Observers were unable to proceed to the scene of events at Kfar Vitkin may be regrettable, and I would admit that more than one view can be held as to the rights and wrongs of the case. This aspect of the problem must, however, recede to the background as compared with the major feature of the occurrences, which is the determined character of the steps taken by the Provisional Government to prevent a violation of the truce.

According to my information, the facts as regards the inability of the observers to witness the events at Kfar Vitkin are as follows:

1. At about 2:00 P.M. on Sunday, June 20th, our chief liaison-officer, Colonel Baruch, reported to Colonel Bonde on the arrival of the ship and offered to accompany him to the scene. Colonel Bonde, who was then about to proceed to Haifa, declined the offer.

2. Earlier in the day, two observers of the U.N., escorted by our liaison, attempted to reach the scene at the foreshore of Kfar Vitkin. They passed without let or hindrance through the lines held by the units of the Israeli Army which were operating in the area. They were stopped at a road-block erected by the Irgun Zvai Le'umi — a body of irregulars who acted in open rebellion against the Provisional Government.

3. Later in the afternoon, I was asked by Mr. Laddas whether arrrangements could be made for him to proceed to the scene of action. I was not then aware of the previous offers and attempts made, and replied that I thought the matter could be arranged, but that I would have to apply to Army Headquarters. By the time the

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1. מס' 227.

matter was referred to the Army, firing on the beach of Kfar Vitkin was already in full swing and the Army authorities could not see their way to arrange the visit.

In this connection I should like to recall that at my very first meeting with the Mediator after the commencement of the truce, on Sunday, June 13th, I drew his attention to the fact that though 48 hours had already elapsed since the truce had come into effect, no arrangements had been agreed with or even communicated to us as to the manner in which the Observers would exercise their functions. I pointed out that in the absence of clear rulings on the subject, which would be laid down after our comments on them had been fully considered, our men on the spot could not be given detailed instructions as to their cooperation with the Observers.[2] Count Bernadotte seemed to appreciate the point and promised to ask his Chief of Staff to establish personal contact with us without delay. The first meeting between our officers in charge of the truce arrangements and Colonel Bonde took place only on Thursday, June 17th, and was devoted to a discussion of several concrete issues which had by then accumulated. The question of regular arrangements as to observation by members of the Mediator's staff and our practical cooperation with them remained unclarified.

As to the point now at issue, the following facts and considerations should be borne in mind:

1. From the moment the Israeli authorities learned of the arrival of the ship, their primary concern was to prevent the off-loading of the arms, which they regarded as the chief menace to the truce.

2. In view of the refusal of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi to submit to the authority of the Provisional Government, and its readiness to back up this refusal by the use of force, evidenced by the drawing together on the spot of over 400 armed men, it became necessary for the Israeli Army authorities likewise to concentrate a considerable force on the scene of action. This preparation was completed in the forenoon of Monday, June 21st.

3. If immigrants arrived in the *Altalena*, they must have landed and dispersed during the night. When the units of the Israeli Army surrounded and went into action against the rebellious Irgun Zvai Le'umi force on Monday at noon time, they found themselves confronted only with local members of Irgun Zvai Le'umi, as was subsequently proved from the list of those who surrendered.

4. In the course of the engagement six Irgun Zvai Le'umi members were killed and 18 wounded. The Israeli Army lost two men killed and six wounded.

5. When the Irgun Zvai Le'umi forces at Kfar Vitkin surrendered to the Army on Tuesday morning, all their arms were given up and

2. ראה שדר של שרתוק אל ברנאדוט, 15.6.1948, 93.03/95/2.

their names were taken down. They were found in possession only of their personal arms. It was thus proved that the off-loading of arms and other war materials reported to have been brought by the ship had not yet started, and the Provisional Government is satisfied that the whole quantity of such arms and war materials was actually consumed by the flames when the *Altalena* took fire off Tel Aviv.

6. Two vessels of the Israeli Coastal Patrol proceeded to Kfar Vitkin during the night and, when the *Altalena* tried to escape, tracked her to Tel Aviv.

7. On Tuesday morning units of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi were rushed to the shore of Tel Aviv and occupied a few buildings along the beach. They made an attempt to establish contact with the ship. As it was feared that this might result in an attempt to off-load the arms by force, and after the warning issued had not been heeded, fire was opened on the *Altalena*, as a result of which the vessel went up in flames and a number of Irgun Zvai Le'umi men on board and on the shore were killed and wounded.

The Provisional Government trusts that the Mediator will accept these factual statements and explanations as completely disposing of the tragic incident. A Provisional Government which, in its determination to uphold its international obligations, goes to the extreme lengths of firing on its own People, of sacrificing the lives of its supports [*sic*] and of burning down arms of which it is so sorely in need, and which it could have hoped to preserve for use after the truce, can calmly appear before any international tribunal to answer the charge that it has not yet done enough to prevent the violation of the truce.

I now address myself to the specific incidents to which you call my attention:

1. It is perfectly true that Jewish motor transport has been using the southern by-pass round Latrun, to be more precise the parallel road opened by the Israeli forces over Beit Susin and Beit Mahsir. This has been due to no intention of "avoiding the check post at Bab-el Wad". The parallel road had been in use by the motor transport of Israeli forces before the commencement of the truce. Military communications along that road are thus part of the status quo which is to be preserved during the truce. The motor transport observed along that road serves the purpose of supplying the Israeli posts of occupation on the hills leading to Jerusalem, again in the manner in which these posts were being supplied before the truce. The road has not been used for food convoys to Jerusalem, which have all passed through the check-post at Bab-el-Wad.

2. The incident is regretted. It is believed to be due to the lack of clarity as to the functions of U.N. observers and the duties of our men on the spot to cooperate with them. In this particular instance the

appearance of a U.N. observer *within* an area of Israeli military occupation must have caused some confusion.

3. These incidents have already been commented upon in the first part of this letter. The reference to "the cargo which had been unloaded" does not accord with our information.

4. We have no knowledge of this incident and cannot account for it. Members of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi may have been responsible for the firing.

5. This incident occurred after numerous warnings had been issued to the local Arabs, both directly and through U.N. observers, not to approach Israeli lines. Despite all warnings made verbally and warning shots fired over their heads, considerable numbers of Arabs approached the Israeli lines through the wheat fields, some of them armed with rifles and automatic weapons. After all warnings had proved fruitless, the party was fired on from a reasonable distance. It is regretted that women were among the casualties; they could not be discerned through the wheat fields and because of the distance. Earlier in the day Arabs in that area had fired at Jews. This latter incident is not mentioned in your letter.

6. This report does not accord with the facts as known to us. No fire was set to Arab crops by Israeli troops. Crops did indeed take fire, but only by accident, the ignition having been caused by exhaust sparks from passing vehicles in the convoys to Jerusalem and by the carelessness of drivers who threw off lighted cigarettes. Similar damage was also caused to Jewish crops in the vicinity.

I am writing to Colonel Bonde to suggest that a meeting may be arranged at the earliest possible date to discuss and fix definitively the exact arrangements regulating the access of U.N. Observers to Israeli lines and positions, with a view to avoiding misunderstandings in this regard during the remainder of the truce period.

Yours truly,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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ח. וייצמן אל מ. שרתוק
C. Weizmann to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2391/70

Paris, 26 June 1948

My dear Moshe,

I am most grateful to you for your letter.[1]

I had a long talk with Fischer, who gave me an idea of what is going on in the country. Of course, I fully realize how difficult it must be to get things going, with the enemy at the gate and internal frictions. Neither the Irgun nor the Mizrachi appreciate the great harm which they are doing to the integrity of the State. One can expect little from the Irgun, but I thought that the Mizrachi might know better. I was particularly disturbed by the outside intervention of Rabbi Berlin,[2] and I am sure that he[3] will not allow the party bosses to run the Government.

With regard to the Presidency, I am in full agreement with you that the American model would not suit our conditions, but I do not think that the French model is more desirable. I think that the middle course approximates to the Czech model. I am not thinking of it because I may have to serve as President, but more as a general proposition, in the interest of the State. There must be some institution not torn by party strife, and which stands above them.

I am somewhat disturbed about some remarks in your letter to Goldmann,[4] concerning the boundaries and particularly Jerusalem. If we try to press for revision, we open the door to all sorts of intrigues and we may lose everything. I have recently had word — which is supposed to be a message from the President of the U.S. — that he adheres to the boundaries, as they emerged from the discussions in the U.N.O. It would be a great mistake, for which we might have to pay heavily, if we reopen now the question. I quite agree that the Christian world has not shown much piety with regard to Jerusalem, but if we tamper with the status of Jerusalem, we shall render

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1. מיום 20.6.1948 (130.02/2391/70). שרתוק תיאר את האווירה הקדחתנית שבה שרויה הארץ, במיוחד לאור פרשת "אלטלנה". בעניין משרת הנשיאות ציין שרתוק, שעדיין לא נקבע אופיה המדויק, אך יש מגמה לעשותה דומה יותר לנשיאות הצרפתית מאשר לזו האמריקאית.
2. בהשפעתו של הרב מ. ברלין, שטען כי הממשלה פעלה באופן קיצוני ונמהר בפרשת "אלטלנה", פרשו שרי ה"מזרחי" י. פישמן ומ. שפירא מהממשלה. הם חזרו בהם מפרישתם אחרי שנרגעו הרוחות.
3. בן־גוריון. ביום הקודם הבריק וייצמן אל בן־גוריון, ציין שפעולתו של הרב ברלין פוגעת בסמכויות המדינה, וביקש לדעת מה כוונתו לעשות בעניין זה. (ראה המברק בתיק 130.02/2329/23).
4. מס' 189.

ourselves guilty in the eyes of the very same Christian world of disobeying the resolutions of the U.N.O., and whatever they might overlook in the case of the Moslems, they will not do in our case. We must press for the internationalisation of the city, and possibly Bernadotte might be helpful. But I am really fearful of opening up new questions, which may come to fall outside the decisions of the U.N.O.

This again applies to the problem of Western Galilee, which is outside the boundaries as adjudicated to us. As much as I would like to see it incorporated in the Jewish State, I think one has to go very slowly. On the other hand, I agree with B[en] G[urion] that the Negeb and Akaba are all-important. Moreover, this has been assigned to us at Lake Success, and we should therefore keep it. If Western Galilee does not contain any Arabs, it will come into Jewish hands in due course. Of course, one must guard against the danger of having it ceded to the Lebanon. In brief, I am very fearful of revising too much.

I hope you will find the work of Bernadotte satisfactory. I am afraid that Fischer has grave misgivings, but he may be unduly pessimistic. Fischer also mentioned that your department is not sufficiently staffed for the enormous quantity of work which has fallen to it. I wonder whether it is not worth your while trying to obtain some assistance from the U.S. I think if David Ginsburg would be invited to come to Israel and offered a suitable position, he might be willing to accept, and he would be invaluable. The same might be true about Linton. I do not think he relishes the prospect of staying in London.

I have just seen Mr. Blumel,[5] who has returned from Israel on [the] whole very pleased with what he has seen. He expressed very high admiration for B[en] G[urion] and yourself, also for some of your other colleagues. But the main criticism which he has made was that the regime is still very much influenced by party views. You will remember that I mentioned the same thing in one of my letters to you, warning against the "key" principle.[6] I need not tell you that even the Russian Government has abandoned this system. I hope that this advice will be taken to heart, and I may be forgiven for offering too much criticism. I am not doing so in any carping spirit.

I was also informed that there is a considerable opposition to the Government, and I believe that the main reason is due to what I have stated above.

My stay here is coming to an end, and I shall be leaving for Switzerland next Tuesday, the 29th. We shall stay at the Grand Hotel & Righi Vaudois, at Glion s/Montreux.

5. אנדרה בלימל, יושב־ראש ה־Union Sioniste Française ; יושב־ראש הוועדה המדינית של ההסתדרות הציונית בצרפת.
6. חלוקת משרות במנגנון הציבורי על־פי יחסי הכוחות הפוליטיים.

There was only one important problem which I was trying to solve here, namely the recognition of Israel by France. The example of France is very important for the rest of Western Europe, and even England. I have seen Prime Minister Schuman, the Foreign Secretary, and other Ministers. They were lavish and generous in their promises and in their expressions of sympathy for Israel. But so far I have received no definite commitment when the recognition will take place. There are two important reasons responsible for the delay: the attitude of England, and the Arabs of North Africa. The best I could do after having spoken to everybody, was to hand the matter over to the care of Mr. Samuel Spanien,[7] whose name is no doubt familiar to you in connection with the trial of Mr. Blum. He is a highly competent and respected person. He has good contacts with the Government, and he is a good Zionist. I did all that on the advice of Mr. Blum and our other friends here.

My letter is getting unduly long, and I better conclude it for today, in the hope that I shall have more time in Switzerland and write to you again.

Fischer tells me that you are overworked, and I am not surprised, but you must really — in the interest of the State — take a holiday, if it is only a short one. And it must not be a busman's holiday but a real one. In the end it will economise time and effort, and do not let yourself run down too low. You had a great a deal [*sic*] in Lake Success and the present effort comes on top of it.

Much love from both of us, to you all. As ever, Yours,

Ch. Weizmann

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH 506
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2328/4

Tel Aviv, 27 June 1948

Your 316.[1] Prefer following letter to Secretary General which please transmit accordingly. Begins: Memisrael considers that time has come for it to be directly and explicitly invited in its own name participate meetings Security Council at which Palestinian question discussed. Memisrael bases itself on facts: 1) Has received from and replied to many communications

7. שמואל ספאניין, עורך־דין צרפתי, חבר הוועדה למען הכרה במדינת ישראל.

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1. אבן אל שרתוק, 23.6.1948, 93.03/72/16. אבן הציע נוסח מכתב אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם בעניין צורת הפנייה אל נציגי ישראל על־ידי מועצת־הביטחון.

Security Council. 2) Has consistently complied cease-fire appeals. 3) Mediator appointed General Assembly negotiated directly, explicitly, with Memisrael on Security Council resolutions and seeking views Memisrael possibilities peaceful adjustment situation. [4)] Since 15.5. Memisrael has exercised full legislative, administrative, judicial, authority within State Israel and controls all armed forces Israel wherever operating in their military, administrative, functions. [5) On] 17.5. Memisrael informed Secretary General appointment Eban its direct representative.[2] Since then he communicated exclusively views Memisrael to Security Council and transmitted communications, decisions, Security Council to Memisrael. [6)] Furthermore, State Israel now recognized many states members U.N. Therefore clear that Memisrael having been treated in practice as party to dispute entitled invitation participate meetings Security Council. Ends.[3]

Shertok

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י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק
I.J. Linton to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 61/117
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 27 June 1948

Saw Foreign Office Saturday regarding your telegram.[1] They repeated ready transfer non-military age persons (which also heard from Martin[2] of the Colonial Office Thursday) and cabled Mediator last week about arrangements observers Cyprus, and cabled reminder Rhodes Friday. They stated unaware why ships left Cyprus for Haifa, nor reasons for detention; they said no difficulty ships returning when Mediator replies about observers. They remind Mediator Kenya.

Made firm offer purchase all oil stocks for blocked Sterling according yours 22nd June,[3] urging quick reply. They said already referred purchase to Ministry Fuel, expecting reply shortly. Asked why we worried stocks, as we getting supplies from stocks for current needs. I mentioned, view importance all parties concerned, we ready start discussions for re-opening Refineries.

Linton

2. ראה מס' 9.
3. על־פי הנחיות אלה הוכן מכתב אל המזכיר הכללי (אבן אל לי, 28.6.1948, 93.03/72/16), אך ספק אם הוא נשלח — ראה מס' 259.

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1. מס' 232.
2. ג'ון מ. מארטין, עוזר למנהל־הכללי של משרד־המושבות.
3. ראה מס' 209 והערה 15 שם.

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 17/92, התקבל: 28.6
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2344/4

Paris, 27 June 1948

1) I once more lodged protest Quai [d'Orsay] against help to *Altalena*.[1] Have been told got help against advice Afrique-Levant,[2] Ministry Interior, but Quai aware made a mistake. I replied our Government not satisfied explanations but wants assurance for the future. 2) France intends suggest special arrangements protection Haifa Refineries. I replied my personal opinion such arrangements acceptable only if we are assured oil supplies. 3) Quai reject Neuville proposal referring French holy places,[3] prefers maintain position formal protest without insistence. 4) Recognition position unchanged. 5) Najar in charge 10 days more, while I undergo medical treatment.

Fischer

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הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק
Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

Rhodes, 27 June 1948

Dear Mr. Shertok,

Mr. John Reedman will present to you information regarding my suggestions for the future of Palestine.

It is quite possible that you and your colleagues will not agree with all of my suggestions, but I earnestly hope that you will consider them seriously and understand that some kind of compromise has to be reached in order to ensure peaceful development in Palestine.

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1. לא ידוע על התערבות קודמת של פישר בעניין "אלטלנה". על עזרת השלטונות הצרפתיים ברכישת הנשק בצרפת ראה ש. נקדימון, אלטלנה, עמ' 84־108; מס' 328.
2. מחלקת אפריקה־לוואנט במשרד־החוץ הצרפתי.
3. נוויל הציע להציב קצינים צרפתיים במוסדות הצרפתיים בירושלים, לאחר שיפונו על־ידי הצבא. נציגי ישראל שדנו אתו בעניין זה השמיעו הסתיגויות חמורות לגבי ההצעה, אך הודיעו שיעבירו אותה למפקד מחוז ירושלים. (ראה דו"ח של איתן על פגישה עם נוויל, 5.6.1948, אצ"מ S25/6595).

My representative, Mr. Reedman, will fully inform you of the thoughts behind my suggestions, and he will also be available to answer any questions which you might wish to put to him.

After you and the other members of your Government have had the opportunity to study carefully my suggestions, I hope that I will have occasion to discuss the matter further with you. I therefore cordially invite you and such of your colleagues as you may consider appropriate to join me in Rhodes on one of the first days of July, and to remain there for two or three days for the purpose of further discussion with me. If you and your colleagues should feel that you are not prepared to come to Rhodes, I will consider the possibility of meeting you at Tel Aviv.

For many reasons and especially to save time, I would strongly urge that you make every effort to come here.

There is one thing that I wish most urgently to emphasize, namely, that you will not flatly reject my suggestions without affording me an opportunity to talk personally with you and other representatives of your Government.

May I propose that my suggestions or any comments from your side, or from other members of your Government, will not be transmitted to the press for publication before I have been informed of your first impressions. You can always get in touch with me through Mr. Reedman.

I have sent a similar letter to the Prime Minister of Egypt, and if both parties should accept my invitation, it is not my intention to start the conferences at Rhodes with "round-table talks", but rather to hold separate meetings with both parties concerned.

Hoping that you and your colleagues will grant to my suggestions your most earnest and kind consideration, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

F. Bernadotte

נספח
APPENDIX

I. Introductory Statement

1. The resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948 provides *inter alia* that the United Nations Mediator is to use his good offices to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".

2. It follows that my prime objective as Mediator is to determine on the basis of the fullest exploration, whether there is any possibility of reconciling, by peaceful means, the divergent and conflicting views and positions of the two sides.

3. The co-operative attitude manifested thus far by both sides has made possible the truce which began on 11 June. This truce has brought a calmer atmosphere, more favourable to the task of mediation entrusted to me by the General Assembly. In this improved atmosphere I have talked with the representatives of both sides and have obtained a very clear impression of their positions on the question of the future of Palestine. I have also profited from the information afforded by the technical consultants whom each side has designated in response to my request.

4. The basic issues arising from the positions taken by the opposing parties relate to partition, the establishment of a Jewish State, and Jewish immigration.

5. I have thoroughly studied, weighed and appraised the positions taken by the two parties. I interpret my role as Mediator not as one involving the handing down of decisions on the future situation in Palestine, but as one of offering suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place and possibly counter-suggestions be put forth looking toward a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. My suggestions at this stage, then, must clearly be of such nature as to provide a reasonable framework of reference within which the two parties may find it possible to continue their consultations with me toward the end of a peaceful adjustment.

6. My analysis has taken into account the equities involved, and the aspirations, fears and motivations of the parties. It has also taken account of the realities of the existing situation. It has convinced me that on grounds of equity as well as on practical grounds, it is impossible for me as Mediator to call upon either party to surrender completely its position. In the light of this analysis I see a possibility of an adjustment which would give adequate reassurance to both parties as regards the vital factors in their respective positions. But the realisation of this possibility depends upon the willingness of the parties to explore all avenues for a peaceful adjustment and their readiness not to resume armed conflict as a means of settling their differences.

7. Despite the present conflict, there is a common denominator in Palestine which, happily, is acceptable to and affirmed by both sides. This is the recognition of the necessity for peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and of the principle of economic unity.

8. It is with this common denominator especially in mind that I put forth the accompanying suggestions in outline as a basis for discussion. These suggestions, I must emphasize, are submitted with no intimation of preciseness or finality. They are designed solely to explore the possible bases for further discussions and mediation, and to elicit from the parties their reactions and further views. Moreover, any plans which might result from these suggestions could be workable only if voluntarily accepted and applied. There can be no question of their imposition.

9. I should make perfectly clear my intentions as regards future proce-

dure. If it develops that the suggestions herewith presented, or other suggestions subsequently presented, which may arise from reactions to those now put forth, provide a basis for discussion, I will carry on with the discussions as long as may prove necessary and fruitful. If, however, these or subsequent suggestions, if any should emerge, are rejected as a basis for discussion, which I earnestly hope will not occur, I shall promptly report the circumstances fully to the Security Council and shall feel free to submit such conclusions to the Security Council as I may consider appropriate.

Count Folke Bernadotte
United Nations Mediator on Palestine
Rhodes, 27 June 1948

II. Suggestions Presented by the Mediator on Palestine

The Mediator advances the following suggestions as a possible basis for discussion.

1. That, subject to the willingness of the directly interested parties to consider such an arrangement, Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1922, that is, including Transjordan, might form a Union comprising two Members, one Arab and one Jewish.

2. That the boundaries of the two Members be determined in the first instance by negotiation with the assistance of the Mediator and on the basis of suggestions to be made by him. When agreement is reached on the main outlines of the boundaries, they will be definitively fixed by a boundaries commission.

3. That the purposes and functions of the Union should be to promote common economic interests, to operate and maintain common services, including customs and excise, to undertake development projects, and to co-ordinate foreign policy and measures for common defence.

4. That the functions and authority of the Union might be exercised through a Central Council and such other organs as the Members of the Union may determine.

5. That, subject to the provisions of the Instrument of Union, each member of the Union may exercise full control over its own affairs, including its foreign relations.

6. That immigration within its own borders should be within the competence of each Member, provided that following a period of two years from the establishment of the Union, either Member would be entitled to request the Council of the Union to review the immigration policy of the other Member and to render a ruling thereon in terms of the common interests of the Union. In the event of the inability of the Council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue could be referred by either Member to the Economic

and Social Council of the United Nations, whose decision, taking into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be binding on the Member whose policy is at issue.

7. That religious and minority rights be fully protected by each Member of the Union and guaranteed by the United Nations.

8. That Holy Places, religious buildings and sites be preserved, and that existing rights in respect of the same be fully guaranteed by each Member of the Union.

9. That recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property.

Count Folke Bernadotte
United Nations Mediator on Palestine
Rhodes, 27 June 1948

III. Annex to the Suggestions: Territorial Matters

With regard to paragraph 2 of the Suggestions it is considered that certain territorial arrangements might be worthy of consideration. These might be along the following lines

1. Inclusion of the whole or part of the Negev in Arab territory.
2. Inclusion of the whole or part of Western Galilee in Jewish territory.
3. Inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, with municipal autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.
4. Consideration of the status of Jaffa.
5. Establishment of a free port at Haifa, the area of the free port to include the refineries and terminals.
6. Establishment of a free airport at Lydda.

Count Folke Bernadotte
United Nations Mediator on Palestine
Rhodes, 27 June 1948

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 68/66, 69/119, 70/134. התקבל: 30.6/29.6
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 28/29 June 1948

Following information received from reliable sources:

1) British and United States have broken code utilized by Haganah and local commanders within Israel. Prompt revision including use alternate codes recommended.

2) Lebanese and Egyptians recently sent note Britain asking guidance. British immediately forwarded text United States, asking suggestions, requesting joint action. State Department refused advice, but agreed act in concert within framework following programme: a) "Compact state" of Israel must be established and recognized. This seems imply revision boundaries. b) United States and Britain agree to population exchange. c) Speedy establishment Customs Union between Israel and Transjordan. d) Support Israel as bulwark against Soviet penetration Middle East.

3) British have agreed that if truce fails, Chapter VII Charter will be used.[1] Advised that United States observers are entering-wedge for this purpose.

4) Recognition by maximum number other countries before General Assembly meeting September of urgent importance. United States position would be markedly strengthened by additional recognitions. Suggested that we ask President send personal, not Departmental, emissaries to Latin American, Western Union[2] and Commonwealth countries to speed recognition.

5) Transjordan recently submitted informal protest State Department against speedy recognition Israel but continued failure recognize Transjordan. State Department friends suggest McDonald be used negotiate with Transjordan, promising recognition and economic assistance in exchange for recognition Israel, plus mutual assistance and non-aggression pact between two countries.

6) Last week American Ambassador Douglas sent lengthy dispatch from London, advising [State] Department complete change British attitude, Bevin much subdued, subordinated now to Cripps' Economic pro-

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1. השווה מברק מאת מארשאל אל דוגלאס, 22.6.1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1133-4.
2. מדינות מערב אירופה — בריטניה, צרפת, הולנד, בלגיה ולוכסמבורג — הקשורות בהסכם בריסל לשיתוף־פעולה כלכלי, חברתי וצבאי, שנחתם במארס 1948.

gramme. Reasons given for change here: first, sharp adverse reaction British public to news British participation Arab Legion; and second, Congressional treatment Marshall Plan Aid Programme.[3]

7) Further advised State Department deeply concerned Haifa Refineries in view importance Marshall Aid Programme. Friends suggest if possible we use Refineries as bargaining counter.

President planning appoint shortly Henderson Ambassador to India or Turkey.

Epstein

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

361 מברק
93.03/95/2 :נוסח יוצא

[New York], 28 June 1948

Your 532.[1] Have spoken Linton twice; obvious vicious circle can be broken only by direct communication Mediator to London, stating he willing establish suitable controls for emigration Cyprus and no general ban required. Foreign Office claims have twice attempted elicit this from Mediator, latest action last Friday, but no reply received. Formal responsibility ban therefore now rests Mediator, and British position unassailable unless he replies.

Eban

.3 בראשית יוני 1948 אישר בית־הנבחרים את ההקצבה לתכנית מארשאל, אך קיצץ כ־25% מהסכום שדרש הממשל. בדיון נמתחה ביקורת על הפזרנות שנתגלעה בסיוע־חוץ.

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.1 שרתוק אל לוריא, 28.6.1948, 130.09/2328/4. שרתוק ביקש למסור טלפונית ללינטון בלונדון, שהנציב לענייני מחנות העצורים בקפריסין מסרב להתיר את פינוי העצורים, בכלל זה נשים וילדים, ללא הוראה מלונדון. הוא ביקש שלינטון ישתדל להניע את משרד־החוץ לתת הוראה לשחרור העצורים, להוציא אנשים בגיל גיוס; בעניינם של הללו יכריע המתוך.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 360
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/95/2

[New York], 28 June 1948

Our emphatic opinion we must make formal representations Security Council misinterpretation truce resolution many governments, involving restrictions far above those laid down in text. Examples: Swiss Government's announcement banning exit men between fifteen and fifty; action European governments withhold ships carrying immigrants within provisions truce; wholesale bans on immigrants where truce requires only control.[1] Absence such official letter Security Council may be interpreted acquiescence existing practices, prejudicing our position when renewal truce discussed. Propose letter moderate terms this effect addressed Secretary-General, asking him circulate governments, saying only measures provided May 29th resolution and subsequent interpretation can be based on terms resolution. Robinson, self, analyzing governmental replies[2] and actions, and drafting accordingly.[3] Please cable views. In talks delegations are emphasizing prospects our renewal truce agreement influenced by whether terms faithfully, honestly, carried out.

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 202.
2. הכוונה, מן־הסתם, לתשובותיהן של הממשלות על מברק המתווך בעניין תנאי העלייה במשך ההפוגה, מסמך או"ם S/855. ראה גם מס' 186.
3. ראה מס' 253, 260.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH543
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2328/4
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/95/2

Tel Aviv, 29 June 1948

Your 361.[1] British position definitely assailable, at least inasmuch as their man on spot stopped evacuation, even women, children, alleging must await instructions. According Mediator, he cabled Foreign Office ready send observer Cyprus;[2] we now urging him do so without awaiting further advice. Shall cable.

Shertok

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י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק
I.J. Linton to M. Shertok

מברק L101
נוסח יוצא: 72.9/687/2

[London], 29 June 1948

Your MH542.[1] Foreign [Office] received replies from Mediator on points one and two. Regarding one,[2] now consulting with Colonial [Office], others, method transportation. I proposed air to Benghazi, thence ship. Regarding two,[3] Foreign [Office] maintains decision only non-military age, which involves some 14,000. Proposes cable Consul-General Haifa get in touch with Jewish authorities there regarding transport arrangements, suggesting return *Pan* ships with observers on board if that possible.[4] Your suggestion Cyprus abides by observers' ruling not accepted.

Linton

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1. מס' 241.
2. ראה מס' 230 והערה 7 שם.

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1. לא נמצא, אך עוסק ככל הנראה בעניין עצורי קניה וקפריסין.
2. עצורי קניה — ראה מס' 211 והערות 1, 2 שם.
3. עצורי קפריסין.
4. הקונסול הבריטי בחיפה פנה אל משרד־החוץ ב־30.6.1948 בעניין סדרי הפינוי של העצורים. (ראה מאריוט אל ביילין, 30.6.1948, 130.02/2398/10). ה"פאנים" הפליגו לקפריסין ב־2.7.1948 ומיד הוחל בפינוי העצורים שאינם כשרי־גיוס. עד אוגוסט נותרו בקפריסין כ־11,000 עצורים — עולים כשרי־גיוס ובני משפחותיהם שסרבו לעזבם.

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מ. שרתוק אל ג׳. רידמן (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2397/3

[Tel Aviv], 29 June 1948

Dear Mr. Reedman,

I should be grateful if you would kindly transmit, as quickly as possible, the following message to Count Bernadotte:

> Beg draw your attention to fact that although 19 days have passed since announcement truce, Jews in Jerusalem have not been granted access to Wailing Wall. Beg refer in this connection to express provision in second paragraph resolution of Security Council, dated May 29th, regarding 'access to all shrines and sanctuaries for purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them'.[1] Understand when question was brought to your notice by our liaison Jerusalem, Bernard Joseph, on occasion your first visit, you agreed that this specific provision of Security Council's resolution is binding. Now am amazed to learn that Acting American Consul-General[2] took upon himself to argue at meeting Truce Commission Jerusalem, that this provision of Council's resolution has been invalidated by absence any reference to access to Holy Places in your own communication of June 8th.[3] Consider this contention untenable, as assume you agree that terms truce formulated by you supplement but in no way supersede resolution of Security Council. Should be grateful for confirmation of this point and for clear ruling that if Arabs impede Jews from visiting Wailing Wall and worshipping there, they will be guilty of breach of truce.

I should be grateful for confirmation that the message has been sent.[4]

Yours sincerely,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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1. ראה נספח ה, עמ׳ 666־667.
2. ויליאם ברדט. על עמדותיו העוינות של ברדט, ראה שרתוק אל אפשטיין, 27.6.1948, 130.09/2329/22.
3. מס׳ 156.
4. ראה גם מכתבו של יוסף אל יושב־ראש ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים, 24.6.1948, 130.02/2397/3.

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מ. שרתוק אל י. לינטון (לונדון)
M. Shertok to I.J. Linton (London)

מברק מוצפן 58/33
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2318/1

Tel Aviv, 29 June 1948

My 57. Call on Swedish Ambassador, warn him we have reasons believe Count proposing turn Jerusalem Arabs, in glaring contradiction Sweden's strongest advocacy international regime.[1] Suggest attitude Swedish Government be made known Count.

Shertok

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מ. קומיי אל ו. איתן
M. Comay to W. Eytan

העתק: 93.03/126/3

[New York], 29 June 1948

Dear Walter,

This is a rather rushed note on the eve of Arthur [Lourie]'s rather rushed departure.[1] I had myself intended to return shortly unless there was any reason to the contrary, but will not [?now] await Arthur's return.

By way of report:

A. *On Dominions' Recognition.* I just spent a week in Canada — most of it talking to people in Ottawa. I had an appointment with the Prime Minister,[2] which he failed to keep because an emergency Cabinet meeting intervened, but I spent forty-five minutes with St. Laurent, the Minister for External Affairs, shorter periods with Ilsley, the Minister of Justice, and Howe, the Minister of Trade and Commerce; and had lengthy discussions with the senior officials of the Department of External Affairs, including our old friends Mayrand and Miss Macallum, Riddell, the head of the U.N. Section, and Hopkins, the legal adviser. Mr. Pearson was unfortunately away. I also spoke to a number of other people — members of Parliament, press people, and of course our own community.

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1. ראה מס' 239.

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1. ארתור לוריא יצא להתייעצות בישראל.
2. ויליאם ל. מקנזי קינג.

The general conclusion I formed is that the Canadian Government is definitely stalling on the recognition at this stage. As St. Laurent put it to me frankly, they think that the merits of recognition now are outweighed by its disadvantages. I think I succeeded in putting them straight on the legal position of the November 29 Resolution,[3] and also made great play with the de facto position, which was an eye-opener to them. It was clear, however, that the real difficulties did not arise from either the de jure or the de facto position. They have been much influenced by London, and are reluctant to go ahead of them any longer. On the other hand, they feel completely insecure about following any lead set by Washington, the Palestine policy of which they refer to contemptuously as "the revolving door."

As you know, Canada regards its main role in world affairs to be that of a bridge between the Commonwealth and the United States, and any divergence of policy between London and Washington makes Ottawa acutely unhappy and scared to put a foot forward. The argument with which they made most play, but which probably weighs less with them than the London-Washington axis, is that of the truce. They maintain that they should not rock the boat for Bernadotte by doing anything which might upset either side, and that a cooling-off period is the best thing that can now happen.

My own contentions appear sufficiently in the *aide mémoire* which I subsequently sent to the Prime Minister, to the Minister of each Department. I enclose a couple of copies for you.[4]

I came away from Ottawa feeling that our friends in Canada should pursue an active public relations policy on this issue, because the Government would be only too happy to let it slide if nobody was worrying them. I had press conferences in Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto, which were given a fair amount of publicity. I spoke to certain non-Jewish groups; I talked matters over with the public relations committees in Montreal and Toronto of the United Zionist Council, in order to get them to exploit the federal and [provincial][5] elections now pending. They are having a joint meeting in Montreal today about it. One useful result of my visit so far is that the *Toronto Star,* the leading Government organ in Canada, has come out for recognition after a talk I had with the Editor.

To sum up, there is hardly any prospect of immediate recognition, but some hope that judicious pressure may produce results. You will realize Canada is particularly important to us because she is a member of the Security Council.

It is also clear to me from my contacts with John Hood[6] and Sir Carl

3. ראה תזכיר של קומיי "Canada's recognition of Israel", 21.6.1948, 93.03/69/16. התזכיר דומה בעיקרו למס׳ 204.
4. ראה קומיי אל מקנזי קינג, 28.6.1948, 93.03/69/16.
5. במקור, בטעות: provisional.
6. ג׳ון הוד, נציג אוסטרליה באו״ם.

Berendsen[7] [that they] are similarly laying off for the time being. In both countries this is now a matter to be dealt with at cabinet level, and I was told that they are not only in touch with each other but with London about it. I handed Hood and Berendsen memoranda along the lines of the Canadian one,[8] and they immediately forwarded them to their Governments. At the same time, I asked Hood to sound Evatt[9] unofficially about my visiting Australia to discuss matters. The answer was that they [*sic*] would not be welcomed at the moment, and the publicity which would arise might have an adverse effect. In the face of this very definite "brush-off" there is no point in pursuing this suggestion until there is some change in the general picture.

B. *On Dominions' Representation.* One of the matters which I want to take up with Moshe and yourself as soon as I get back is the type of representation which we should consider for the various Dominions, and finding suitable people to fill these posts. Except in the case of South Africa, this is of course a little premature, but I am pretty sure there is a time-lag of only a couple of months at most. I must confess that I was astonished to receive copies of an interchange of cables between Moshe [Shertok] and Dr. Malan, the new South African Minister,[10] in which we offered to exchange Ministers with South Africa and were told that the time had not yet come to do so.[11] I feel that I might have been consulted, or at least informed, before this action was taken — not only because South Africa is part of my desk, but because I know the situation there better than anybody else amongst us. For one thing, it may have been advisable to carry out some unofficial soundings on the spot before cabling. I am also mindful of the fact that representation in South Africa raises a similar question for all the other Dominions, whether they have yet recognized us or not. For instance, if we have a Minister in Pretoria, we should contemplate that someone of similar status would have to be sent to Ottawa. I hope that Arthur will be able to bring back to us some indication of what is in your minds on these questions.

C. *On Britain.* We get very little information from London, and do not know what kind of an Israeli set-up is either shaping there or is being considered for the future. Since this is now part of my parish, I hope to spend a short while in London on my way back to Tel Aviv.

Arthur will give you all the other news about us. You people must be working under great pressure, and we were relieved to hear that you personally had reached Tel Aviv and could help Moshe more directly.

My love to everyone. Sincerely,

Michael S. Comay

7. סר קארל ברנדסן, נציג ניו־זילנד באו"ם.
8. מס' 204 (ראה קומיי אל ברנדסן, 18.6.1948, 93.03/72/5; קומיי אל הוד, 18.6.1948, 93.03/125/17).
9. הרברט אווט, שר־החוץ של אוסטרליה.
10. מאלאן היה ראש־הממשלה ושר־החוץ.
11. ראה מס' 149 והערה 2 שם.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 34/24. התקבל: 1.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/6

New York, 30 June 1948

Learned here Arabs probably will turn down Mediator's suggestions. Lie and friends advise we refrain reaction until Arabs clarify their attitude, am sharing this view.

Eban

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א. אבן אל ג'. רוס (ניו יורק)
A. Eban to J. Ross (New York)

העתק: 93.03/73/4

[New York], 30 June 1948

Personal - Confidential

Dear John,

I enclose herewith a paraphrase of a somewhat obscure cablegram which I received from Mr. Shertok last night.[1] The text is not altogether clear, but it gives an adequate general impression of the proposals.

I shall let you know, confidentially, what the Government of Israel's reactions are after their meeting today. At this stage, I cannot avoid giving a personal impression. The proposal to hand Jerusalem to Abdullah will almost certainly be regarded by us as an act of contempt for Jewish history and religion and for the authority of the United Nations which committed itself to the view that Jerusalem belonged to the world. The idea of one hundred thousand Jews of Jerusalem living under King Abdullah is too fantastic for serious discussion.

This, I am sure, is the major point in our objection, but the most serious difficulty is also bound to arise through any effort of the Economic Board[2]

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1. ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 30.6.1948, 93.03/73/4. במברק מובאים עיקרי הצעותיו של המתווך. (ראה מס' 239).
2. כך במקור, אך צ"ל: Central Council (ראה מס' 239, עמ' 233). המונח [Joint] Economic Board לקוח מתכנית החלוקה בהחלטת ה־29 בנובמבר 1947.

to attempt the coordination of foreign and defence policies. In fact, if Israel's neighbour is not to be a separate, independent, Arab Palestinian state, even the elements of economic union accepted in the November Resolution become inoperative, and Israel would be in no way committed to them in advance.

It is amusing to see the international concept transferred from sanctity to oil.[3] My final comment, of a purely personal nature, is that these proposals are identical with those which we heard from United Kingdom sources a few weeks ago, except that even those sources did not venture openly to suggest the Arabization of Jerusalem.

Very sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל ג'. רידמן (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2426/9

Tel Aviv, 30 June 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to reply to the questions transmitted to us by Colonel Bonde.[1]

Q.1: Number of persons who landed from *Altalena* and their whereabouts.

A.: The circumstances attending the possible landing of immigrants who were reported to have arrived on the *Altalena* have already been described in my letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, No.446/48, dated 26th June.[2] According to published boasts of those at the head of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi, about 800 persons had landed. We are not in a position to ascertain the accuracy of this or of any other figure. Nor do we have any knowledge as to the whereabouts of such persons, with the exception of some who are in hospital.

Q.2: The number of wounded and their whereabouts.

A.: At the time of writing there are 19 wounded from among the members of the crew of the *Altalena* in the Municipal Hospital of Tel Aviv and two in the Beilinson Hospital of Kupat Holim. 37 men treated in the

3. מוסב על הצעתו של המתווך לכונן בחיפה נמל חופשי, שיכלול את שטח בתי־הזיקוק. (ראה מס' 239, עמ' 234).

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1. השאלות נמסרו כנראה בעל־פה. ראה גם מס' 227.
2. מס' 234.

former hospital, and 11 in the latter, have been released, their names being on record. 14 dead were brought to the Tel Aviv Municipal Hospital from among those who came on the *Altalena* after the sea and shore battle of Tuesday, 22nd June.

Q.3: The quantity of war materials unloaded from the *Altalena* and their whereabouts.

A.: As already stated in my above-mentioned letter, we were satisfied that no war materials had been unloaded at Kfar Vitkin, and that the whole cargo which was on the boat when it came to Tel Aviv was consumed by fire.

Q.4: Do we still refuse to let U.N. Observers take care of the war materials and the men landed?

A.: In the light of the foregoing the question does not arise.

With a view to avoiding any unnecessary difficulty or misunderstanding as regards the access of the Observers to military positions or scenes of military action, I would reiterate the suggestion repeatedly made in the past that a conference be held between the Mediator's Chief of Staff and our representatives with a view to determining as precisely as possible the rules of procedure to be followed in this regard.[3]

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH556 מברק

130.09/2328/4 :נוסח יוצא

93.03/95/2 :נוסח נכנס

Tel Aviv, 30 June 1948

Regarding Cyprus, three weeks wasted during which British completely stopped evacuation on pleas Mediator must be consulted. Our notification Foreign Office of Mediator's readiness send observers Cyprus unaccepted.[1] Now that direct contact between Mediator and Foreign Office arranged,

3. בתשובתו עורר בונדה השגות על כל אחד מהסבריו של שרתוק. אשר להצעה להיפגש לצורך דיון בסדרי גישתם של המשקיפים לאיזורים של פעילות צבאית, הוא ציין שחופש התנועה וזכות הגישה של המשקיפים לשטחים צבאיים נקבעו על־ידי המתווך ואינם נושא למשא־ומתן. (ראה בונדה אל שרתוק, 5.7.1948, 130.02/2426/9).

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1. ראה מס' 244.

Mediator stating he ready send observers, Foreign Office maintains original decision only non-military age evacuable. Please raise matter Security Council, protesting against this astounding procedure, first invoking Mediator's authority even for proceeding with non-controversial immigration, then reflecting his authority regarding controversial category and asserting their arbitrary unilateral ruling.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 95/164
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 1 July 1948 (17.05)

Government reaction Count's suggestions[1] utterly negative, views objectionable not all features, but we not interested be first reject, therefore playing for time, letting Arabs show hand first. Also our armies vitally interested extension truce at least another 6 weeks, therefore [general][2] trend our tactics should be categorically oppose specific provisions, without total rejection, so as drag out negotiations. Myself consider rejection key feature, which unavoidable, tantamount to total rejection, will cause Count report failure; yet do not fear such report will result termination truce, as United Kingdom, United States and Arabs all anxious prolong. Therefore Council will probably order parties maintain it, threat[en] sanctions against violating parties. Cable whether you endorse this analysis, conclusion. Government meets Friday formulate reaction. Myself ready proceed Rhodes if Arabs do likewise, otherwise invite Count Tel Aviv. Consider Count Jerusalem proposal complete capitulation to Anglo-Arab pressure, disastrous blunder. You should mobilise opinion against it, informing confidentially trusted, chiefly French, Scandinavian, Benelux, Commonwealths, Soviet delegation. Inform Epstein.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס' 239.
2. שני שיבושים במברק הזה תוקנו בסוגריים מרובעים — על־פי נוסח מברק דומה ללונדון (130.09/2318/1 ,1.7.1948).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH565
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 1 July 1948

Your 360.[1] Fully agree you write Secretary-General these lines and address [Security] Council when meets. Suggest following argument: Violation terms truce on part interested party by scoring illegitimate advantage, and departure from terms truce on part third party by inflicting on interested party illegitimate disadvantage, are equally inadmissible. If prolongation truce is raised in Council, you should attack practice keeping men military age under surveillance in camps, arguing men acquiesced denial freedom after arrival Israel only on understanding limited duration, but prolongation truce will make position untenable, as continued detention in Israel of those who went through Nazi camps, D.P. camps, Cyprus internment camps, is inhuman, intolerable. Without threatening terminate truce, if this unaccepted, you should press relaxation /this/ regard. Please send us full documentation governments' replies and measures taken.

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 390
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 1 July 1948

Your MH565.[1] Document S/855[2] with Arthur [Lourie]. Canadian, Panamanian, Swiss governments have notified Secretary-General they discourage all journeys men military age to Middle East, Swiss defining military age as fifteen to fifty. United Kingdom applying similar ban from

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1. מס' 242.

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1. מס' 253.
2. תשובות הממשלות על חוזר המתווך בעניין הגבלות על עלייה — ראה גם מס' 260.

Cyprus. Information reaching Teddy[3] — West European governments, though not announcing, also actually interpreting truce as justifying general ban emigration. Robinson drafted careful memorandum explaining these measures not in accordance truce.[4] Having received your 565, propose submitting this Secretary-General for forwarding to governments concerned and discussion [Security] Council.

Eban

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א. אבן אל פ. ג׳סאפ (ניו יורק)
A. Eban to P. Jessup (New York)

העתק: 93.03/73/4

[New York], 1 July 1948

Dear Mr. Jessup,

Dr. Robinson and I were very grateful for the opportunity of discussing with yourself and Mr. Ross the anomaly of our false designation in the meetings of the Security Council.

I have now been instructed to present, at an early meeting of the Security Council, the request of the Provisional Government of Israel to be addressed in its own name here, just as it is addressed in its own name by the Mediator, who even signs agreements and accords explicitly with it (S/846).[1] In supporting this request, we shall invoke the following words of Senator Austin, who spoke at the 295th meeting of the Security Council on 18 May:

> I guess it would be alright to those who seem so anxious not to ask questions of the Provisional Government of Israel if we took this whole thing right out and did not ask them any questions. . . We should call this Government by its true name. It is the 'Provisional Government of Israel'.[2]

Earlier on the same day, Senator Austin said:

> Have we attained that degree of finesse that we must see to it, as the Security Council, that we do not address this Provisional Government of Israel by that name for fear that we have made a political decision?[3]

3. טדי קולק היה אז בארצות־הברית בשליחות משרד־הביטחון.
4. מס׳ 260.

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1. מוסב על ההסכם בין המתווך ובין ממשלת ישראל בדבר מחנות נטושים של הצבא הבריטי סמוך לחיפה — ראה מס׳ 205 והערה 3 שם.
2. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 295th Meeting, 18.5.1948, p. 38.
3. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 294th Meeting, 18.5.1948, p. 18.

In our efforts not to prejudice discussions of substance, we have allowed this anomaly to continue until it has reached a point of absurdity. But the Security Council must now clearly decide whether, like the Mediator, it is interested in the views of the Provisional Government of Israel or not. If it is, then those views will be made available. If it is not, then of course we shall not force our company upon the Security Council if it thinks that it is adequate to hear the views of four Arab states, called properly by their names, and not to hear the views of the only Jewish body authorised to express them.

I communicate these ideas to you now, since it has come to our notice that the United Kingdom delegation may raise difficulties in what would otherwise be a trivial procedural matter, to be settled in accordance with law, practice and precedent. To raise such a difficulty will be to incur responsibility for leaving the Security Council in no position to hear the views of both interested parties; for we shall certainly not sit under a euphemism. It seems to me that whether or not any expediency is being served (and our proper designation raises no question of substance whatever), the most elementary considerations of personal integrity require that those who wish to hear the views of a certain organization cannot avoid addressing that organization, with whatever reservations concerning recognition or status they choose to make.

We should be sorry and astonished if the thesis that only the Arab states should be heard, and not the Provisional Government of Israel, were to receive any serious attention in the Security Council. In view of the outspoken, honest and irrefutable truths spoken by Mr. Austin on May 18, we venture respectfully to hope that United States influence amongst members of the Security Council will be exercised in the interests of accuracy and equity.

For these reasons, we were deeply grateful for the sympathetic hearing which you gave to us on this matter the other day.

I have the honour to be,Very sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 37/49. התקבל: 3.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 2 July 1948

Fully agree your analysis, conclusions, except no evidence here Arab enthusiasm for truce, least of all from Egyptians, Syrians.[1] Ross just conveyed his belief British influence still in favour truce and Security Council will certainly support extension if Mediator requests it.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 38/56. התקבל: 3.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 2 July 1948

Lie informed me yesterday United Nations Secretariat violently hostile any idea international control Haifa port, Refinery, since this creates new Trieste problem, involves United Nations oil and power politics, and was conceived in utter disregard United Nations interests. He conveying this Bunche and urgently asked me report it yourself. Still maintains Jerusalem only proper object international control.

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 252.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 39/126. נשלח: 3.7; התקבל: 4.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 2 July 1948

Ross invited my impressions,[1] which I gave in accordance your cable,[2] strongly emphasizing Jerusalem, immigration objections. He asked me what we could /do/ on immigration, I replied nothing beyond factual statement our actual plans immigration, absorption, with no statutory commitment. He expressed astonishment Jerusalem suggestion, conviction Count has tactical objective only, believed few governments available support incorporation Arab State; though some British circles support it, British policy far from committed Arab incorporation. He urged ourselves adopt liberal tone return Arab refugees, though other powers should strive maintain existing population uniformity Israel, encouraging development, resettlement /Transjordan/. Confirmed keen American interest truce prolongation, inquired our view Negev-Galilee exchange, to which I was non-committal. Most important — invited my suggestions, counter-proposals, which he could commend his Government as American policy.[3] Please cable me suggestions if any.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 403
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 2 July 1948

Robinson, self, saw delegation mentioned my 339.[1] He will insist invite Memisrael, whether or not your application[2] submitted, and will rule

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1. בעניין הצעות ברנאדוט — ראה מס' 239.
2. מס' 252.
3. השווה נוסח השיחה כפי שנרשם על־ידי רוס, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1191-2.

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1. אבן אל שרתוק על פגישה עם משלחת אוקראינה בנושא זימונה של משלחת ישראל לשולחן מועצת־הביטחון. (93.01/2180/21 ,25.6.1948).
2. ראה מס' 236.

accordingly. All other delegations interviewed assure us would not oppose Presidential ruling or take any initiative. Our impression still remains: insufficient votes overrule President. British, while admitting need for factual representation Memisrael, will advocate euphemism "The Jewish Authority in Palestine". Only danger some tactical move before Presidential ruling by British delegation, submitting proposal for participation "Jewish Authority", which may pass. If this formula accepted, please instruct how we proceed. We favour not approaching table and reserving position without commitment future, believing that general criticism, ridicule, will force Council think again, as when it refused accept Philippines Indonesian question and reversed refusal following day.[3] Our view political position and first sentence above make forcing issue inevitable, and nothing losable any case, since perpetuation "Jewish Agency" implies even less recognition than "Jewish Authority Palestine". Moreover, non-appearance will demonstrate absurdity British role and compel our proper invitation. No meeting Council likely before middle week. Please cable views.[4]

Eban

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א. אבן אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
A. Eban to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.08/365/29

New York, 2 July 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to convey to you the deep concern of the Provisional Government of Israel at the action of certain governments which have imposed migration restrictions which, though purporting to rest upon the Security Council Resolution of 29 May 1948,[1] are not warranted by the terms of that Resolution, or by the interpretation laid down by the Mediator on 7 June (S/829).[2]

The only immigration restriction imposed by the Resolution relates to "fighting personnel", which was interpreted by the Mediator to mean

3. ב־7.8.1947 דחתה מועצת־הביטחון את בקשת הפיליפינים לקחת חלק בדיון על השאלה האינדונזית; כעבור שבוע בוטלה ההחלטה והפיליפינים הוזמנו להשתתף בדיון. (ראה *SCOR*, *Second Year*, 178th Meeting, 7.8.1947; 184th Meeting, 14.8.1947).
4. ראה מס' 265.

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1. ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.
2. מס' 156.

"persons identified as belonging to organized military units as well as persons bearing arms."

The draft Resolution originally proposed before the Security Council by the United Kingdom representative also barred the entry into Palestine or the Arab States of "men of military age." By a French-United States amendment, which was accepted by the United Kingdom representative, this restriction was deleted, and it was merely provided that men of military age should be subject to certain controls *after* they had entered the countries concerned. The clause adopted reads:

> calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease-fire.

In moving the amendment, the representative of France, who was also at the time President of the Security Council, stated:

> The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the introduction into these various territories of fighting personnel, but not of men of military age . . . It aims at preventing combatant fighting personnel from entering these various countries, but to allow men of military age to come into these territories on the condition, however, that at least during the truce they are not mobilized, and that they do not receive any military training.[3]

In the truce proposals which he elaborated on June 7, the Mediator went beyond the terms of the Resolution itself, by assuming the right to

> exercise his discretion during the period of the truce in determining whether men of military age are represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give one side a military advantage if their entry is permitted, and in such event shall refuse them entry. (S/830)[4]

Even here, there was no suggestion of any general or complete ban on the entry into Israel of "men of military age".

The Government of Israel has learned with keen regret that certain governments have since gone even further and have, on their own initiative, imposed restrictions called for neither by the Resolution nor by the Mediator.

In the case of two governments, Canada and Switzerland, these restrictions are disclosed in their replies to your communication conveying the terms of the Security Council Resolution and of paragraph 6 of the Mediator's truce proposals. In the Canadian reply (S/855, p. 5), it is stated:

> The Canadian Government has done whatever has been possible by administrative measures to discourage persons of military age from proceeding from Canada to the named areas. . .

3. המובאה מתוך הפרוטוקול הזמני של מועצת־הביטחון (S/P.V. 310, p. 81). בפרוטוקול הסופי הנוסח שונה — ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 310th Meeting, 29.5.1948, p. 41.
4. כך במקור, אך צ״ל S/829, ראה מס׳ 156, סעיף (ii) 6.

In the Swiss reply (S/855, p. 7), it is stated:

> As a measure contributing to the implementation of the truce proposals, the Swiss Government has also decided to suspend the granting of travel allowances for the duration of the truce and the issuing of travel credentials or identification papers to all aliens between 15 and 50 years of age, at present in Switzerland, who state their intention of leaving Switzerland for Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, Yemen and Palestine.

The Government of Panama is also reported in the press to have issued a decree "forbidding ships and planes under Panamanian registry from transporting men of military age and arms to Palestine and Arab countries." (Associated Press, June 29.)

There are also indications that certain European Governments are misinterpreting the truce provisions by placing or permitting obstacles in the way of the movement to Israel of immigrants who do not fall within the definition of "fighting personnel". These obstacles include a refusal to allow ships flying the flags of these countries to convey such passengers to Israeli ports.

The Provisional Government of Israel is of the opinion that this widening gap between the actual text of the Security Council Resolution and its application in practice, is likely to prejudice the maintenance of the truce. The Government of Israel accepted the truce proposals in good faith, although mindful of the serious disadvantages imposed upon Israel under its terms. It assumed that the other governments who were called upon to assist in the implementation of the Resolution whould also adhere faithfully to its text. It was never contemplated that independent action by such governments would progressively enlarge the restrictions on migration and make them increasingly burdensome for one party. Still less was it contemplated that various governments would attempt to reinstate a restriction which the Security Council itself deliberately deleted from the original draft proposal put before it. Clearly, the truce is capable of being violated not only by the interested parties themselves, but also by third parties who introduce new and superfluous restrictions beyond those specified in the Resolution, and thereby alter the basis on which it was adopted.

Nor should the human aspect be ignored. These unwarranted restrictions affect the liberty of movement of many thousands of individuals, most of whom have lived as displaced persons for years, and have been eagerly anticipating their entry into Israel and their resettlement there. The separation of families is being prolonged; and men who have spent years behind barbed wire still languish there as a result of unjustified misinterpretation of a United Nations resolution. The hardship is most acute and the injustice most flagrant in the case of Cyprus, where the United Kingdom Government is detaining all men of military age in contravention of the

truce resolution. This matter will be the subject of a special submission at an early date.

It would be appreciated if the contents of this letter could be brought to the attention of all the governments to which the Resolution of the Security Council was originally communicated, and circulated for the information of the Security Council.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

Aubrey S. Eban
Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
to the United Nations

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שיחת ו. איתן — ס. מאריוט[1] (בחיפה, ב־2 ביולי 1948)

Meeting: W. Eytan — C. Marriott (Haifa, 2 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/9

Confidential

Mr. Marriott came to see me in Mr. Beilin's[2] office at the Zion Hotel, Haifa.

He started by mentioning that he had planned to come to Tel Aviv and that he had hoped to see Mr. Shertok "on the side" through the good offices of the Mayor. He stated that he had strict instructions from London not to do anything which might in any way imply recognition of the existence of a State of Israel, and consequently he was addressing all his communications to the Jewish authorities through the Mayor of Haifa. He hoped that the Mayor of Haifa was passing on to the proper authorities all the various communications he had handed to him.

I replied that the British Government was being excessively punctilious in ordering its Consul in Haifa to communicate only with the "Jewish Authorities". I told him that the French Consul in Tel Aviv, whose Government was in exactly the same position as the British in the matter of recognition of Israel, had no inhibitions on this score, and regularly addressed his communications to the Foreign Secretary of Israel, and was received at the Foreign Office whenever he asked for an interview. The French Government apparently did not feel it was compromising itself, and we saw no reason why the British Government should act otherwise. As long as the British Consul in Haifa stuck on punctilio and recognised nobody except the vague entity whom he described as the "Jewish Authorities", he would not be welcome at the Foreign Office. On the other hand, we should be very glad to see him if he applied for an interview with the

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1. סיריל מאריוט, הקונסול־הכללי הבריטי בחיפה.
2. האריביילין, נציג משרד־החוץ בחיפה.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel. I made it clear to him that we should welcome his coming on this latter basis, and it was this positive aspect that I was trying to stress rather than the negative one of his keeping away as long as he was not willing to talk with any person or body more concrete than the "Jewish Authorities". He said he understood perfectly and would inform his Government accordingly, expressing privately his hope that he would be allowed to come to Tel Aviv on the basis suggested.

Mr. Marriott was worried about his exact status in Haifa and asked me what was our attitude in this matter. I told him that, in spite of the fact that his Government had not recognised Israel and that therefore there could be no question of an Exequator, we were perfectly content that he should for the present remain in Haifa as British Consul. It was to be understood, however, that if we desired to appoint a Consul in London with identical status, the British Government would not put difficulties in our way. We should require for our Consul in London exactly the same status as that enjoyed by Mr. Marriott in Haifa — we should not ask for more, but neither should we be content with less. If the British Government put any difficulties in our way, for example by refusing our Consul a visa, this would automatically make Mr. Marriott's position in Haifa impossible, and he would have to leave. Mr. Marriott said he understood this perfectly too, and would inform his Government accordingly.

I told Mr. Marriott that we regarded the British Government's ruling in the matter of the Cyprus refugees as an openly unfriendly act.[3] If there was ever to be any hope of better relations between Israel and Britain, pin pricks of this kind from the British side would have to stop. Mr. Marriott was very poorly informed about the facts of this case, so I took him back over the Security Council's Resolutions and their various amendments, to make it quite clear to him why we were bound to regard the British Government's action as having no foundation whatever in law, and as an arbitrary and unilateral decision which could not be reconciled with the Security Council's intention.

Various other minor matters arose in the course of the conversation. For example, Mr. Marriott asked me whether we were "happy about the I.Z.L." I replied briefly by saying that while it was quite possible that the I.Z.L. would again attempt *coups* of one kind or another, if he had in mind any possible danger to the stability of the State or of the present Government, then he could dismiss any such notion at once. He told me that according to his information there was probably a small number of Englishmen serving with the I.Z.L., and he said that if at any time we wished to use his good offices to expel these men from our territory, he would be very glad to help. He had already been instrumental in getting rid of one such person.

Walter Eytan

3. ראה מס' 244.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH579
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/127/3

Tel Aviv, 3 July 1948

After lengthy negotiations we agreed place University and Hospital under United Nations flag and supervision,[1] condition being our military forces replaced by Jewish armed police and skeleton staff maintained, which responsible, and normal supplies assured. Mediator urged we should undertake remove police when United Nations guards ready take over. We replied regard this as experiment, cannot take undue risks by leaving Scopus without any armed Jewish protection and relying Legion honour immunity Scopus if truce terminates and fighting resumed all round. Shall cable final results.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH578
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 3 July 1948 (15.30)

Gass 125 addressed Kaplan.[1] Informed by Mediator British approached him couple days before evacuation, suggesting he take over Refineries, guard them, appoint manager view reopening. He was astounded such haphazard last minute offer for which he utterly unequipped and lacks any competence, replied negatively. He subsequently included Refineries in proposed Haifa free port, which we opposing, as shall explain in detailed comments tomorrow.[2] Inform Eban.[3]

Shertok

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1. ראה מס' 65.

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1. מס' 233.
2. לא נמצא, אך ראה מס' 286.
3. לבקשתו של אבן, שרצה לדעת אם הממשלה מתנגדת עקרונית לנמל חופשי בחיפה או רק להכללת בתי־הזיקוק בו, הבהיר שרתוק שהממשלה דוחה את רעיון הנמל החופשי מפני שהוא גורע מריבונות המדינה, אך נכונה לאפשר איזור חופשי בנמל חיפה לעבר־הירדן, במסגרת הסכם כללי עם אותה מדינה. (ראה חילופי מברקים אבן־שרתוק, 7.7.1948, 93.03/94/9).

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א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

העתק: 93.08/365/1

New York, 3 July 1948

Dear Mr. Kaplan,

This is our fourth of July week-end in the United States. The American people is celebrating its independence with a three-day holiday (July 3-5). Many people manage in one way or another to begin the holiday a day early or end a day late, and all over the country no work is done. No other holiday is so universally observed.

We have profited from the calm to come up to New York for a few days to attend to a few chores, and I find myself with the luxury of a Saturday afternoon in which I can write a letter about general things, without attending to any particular business. Edna is here with me in New York, and she has agreed to type out my scribblings. You are the sufferer.

I have had a long talk this morning with Teddy Kollek, yesterday with Eban, this afternoon with Golda Meyerson — as she lies in her hospital bed with a sprained ankle. We have been, in these last days, turning over and over in our heads the general position of Israel, the truce, the war, relations with the United States, the character of a permanent settlement and the method of achieving it. I have profited much from a daily exchange of views with Eliahu Epstein and with Dave Ginsburg. Nothing in our thinking can be wholly novel, yet it has specific emphasis and inclination that it is no doubt influenced by its Washington background. Perhaps it will be helpful to you.

Any optimism with respect to United States policy on the question of Israel during the next four months based merely on the fact that this is an election period is, in my judgment, quite unfounded. The election prevents some things: it prevents the United States Government from opposing Israel publicly or denouncing Israeli acts in a public manner. But it does not assure — or even greatly facilitate — positive and private acts of assistance. In particular it does not assure (1) private diplomatic assistance, (2) formal de jure recognition, (3) assistance in getting Israel into the U.N., (4) loan assistance. I would call to your attention that my reserve on these points does not grow out of any long-term general conviction about a negative character of U.S. policy (as Moshe Shertok can testify, I did not, in the past, regard it as improbable that the U.S. Government would give Israel early recognition, even when many of its diplomatic acts were most unfriendly). It grows out of immediate and particular observations.

Such impact of friendly feeling and political shrewdness in the White House as led to recognition has now accomplished about as much as can be

expected of it. It has not penetrated or moved the frosty layer at the top of the State Department. That layer stands firm in Under Secretary Lovett (Marshall is of little importance). It will not be changed by Henderson's going as Ambassador to India or Turkey: Henderson to Henderson will succeed. It does not matter greatly that James McDonald has been named Special Representative; the Department will absorb McDonald before he them. Israel is hardly a political issue in the Presidential campaign: Dewey[1] and Truman keep pace on this issue, and it is not a hot pace. If Eisenhower[2] should replace Truman, he will be beholden to no one and may do anything, nobody knows what. There is no assurance that Dulles[3] (Dewey's prospective Secretary of State) does not see eye to eye with Lovett: they have very similar backgrounds. The general interest in Israeli affairs in the United States is much less now than it was a month ago, and it will — in all reasonable probability — be still less a month hence, if the truce is extended. This argues for less pressure on the U.S. Government to befriend Israel. These, I believe, are facts. We shall try, to the best of our ability, to transform them, but first we must recognize them.

It is impossible for me here to have any firm, reasoned judgment on the probability of the truce being extended. We know that the U.S. Government would like a truce extension, to defer trouble and keep the matter out of the election campaign. We are told by some of our own people here in New York that the British also want the truce extended; it may very well be true, but I am not acquainted with the evidence. I am clear in my own mind that, if the Arabs intend to fight at all in Palestine, they should fight now. But their policy has never been a rational one; their internal conflicts, their indecisions, and their unwillingness either to alter their ends or to reorient their means could, I suppose, lead to anything. I gather that there is a moderate optimism among our people that the Arabs will accept a truce extension. I hope that this optimism has a basis.

What seems clear from this vantage-point is that four weeks hence Bernadotte will hardly have advanced beyond where he stands today. (I pray only that his negotiations will have resulted in one solid accomplishment — the reopening of the Haifa refinery.) Something like four weeks after July 9, then, the fighting will begin again. At the moment, seen from here, this seems a maximum breathing-space, though any judgment is a rank speculation: the interval of peace may well be shorter. We do not see how it can be dragged out for a longer period, unless the Arabs are really ready to give up the whole issue.

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1. תומאס דיואי, מועמד המפלגה הריפובליקנית לנשיאות ארצות־הברית.
2. דווייט אייזנהאואר, ראש המטה של כוחות היבשה של ארצות־הברית עד פברואר 1948. מקיץ 1948 — נשיא אוניברסיטת קולומביה.
3. ג'ון פוסטר דאלס, חבר משלחת ארצות־הברית למושב השני והשלישי של עצרת או"ם.

In so far as we can ascertain, the American State Department and the British Foreign Office have converged sharply during the past few weeks. Their programme, as stated in Washington, is simple. The Arab League, it says, is an empty show. But Israel and Transjordan should "get together". They are "spunky little fighters". They should constitute themselves a "bulwark" against Soviet penetration into the Middle East; then they could jointly receive far-reaching American economic and military assistance. They would provide air bases for British and American bombers. Then everything would be O.K.

The Washington version of this programme lays no stress whatsoever on the Bernadotte proposals regarding Jerusalem or regarding immigration. (My own guess is that, even in the British plan, these are merely trading points.) Washington is surely for internationalizing Jerusalem; neither American Catholics nor American Protestants are going to take quietly Moslem rule in Jerusalem. Moreover, it is my conviction that Washington will not put up a last-ditch fight to put immigration under the U.N. Economic and Social Council: this is a trading point. On the other hand, the State Department does not stick to the November 29 frontiers: they talk of a "compact Israeli State". Moreover, they are constantly referring vaguely to the advantages of a "customs union" or "economic union", without drawing any clear distinction between the two.

I presume that this Anglo-American programme, the extravagant and conflicting ambitions of the Arab States, and the necessary claims of Israel, taken together, do not constitute any basis for believing that the Mediator will come much closer to a permanent settlement in July than he did in June. I presume also that the Arab States will not simply give up the whole Palestine issue. I conclude therefore that in August, at latest, there will be fighting again.

Despite my contact with Teddy and his boys, I do not delude myself that I have any basis here for military prognostications. Yet I assume, for sake of analysis and policy formation, that the Israeli forces will by August be in a position to achieve things that were impossible in May-June. I assume that both the Transjordanian and Egyptian forces in Palestine will be struck very hard blows. Galilee will be cleared. The Tulkarm-Lydda line will be improved beyond the November 29 limit. All Jerusalem will be occupied. The link with the Negeb settlements will be broadened and strengthened. These are my optimistic assumptions.

The Department of State will initially take a very surly attitude towards these accomplishments. While refusing to implement November 29 themselves, and while plotting now to dispense with it to the disadvantage of Israel, it will later acquire quite some respect for November 29. I can expect Mr. Lovett to speak quite sternly to Israel's Washington representative about the danger of unbridled imperialistic ambitions. The U.S. will deter its entourage of minor States from recognizing Israel and will block early

Israeli admission to the U.N. It will not extend credits — but will continue to promise them, in exchange for good behavior. But unless we fail terribly to reveal the justice of each step we take — and that is a public relations matter — I do not see that the United States Government will have the nerve to denounce Israel publicly for succeeding in its own defense after the United Nations failed to act and after the United States imposed the arms embargo. In private, the State Department will no doubt regard Israel as a very bad boy, but a bad boy who succeeds in so just a cause will come eventually — and in not too long a period — to be regarded as a good boy. We need only a good set of nerves.

I do not regard my above statement as a forecast. I am not in a position to forecast. I have merely made an analytical projection, for the purpose of considering the policy that is appropriate to that projection.

If we look at it from the point of view of probability, the one obvious Achilles heel of the whole projection is petroleum supply. We hope of course that you will be able to solve the problem by reopening the refinery or, second best, by purchasing nearby at reasonable prices. I have myself, however, been involved in a series of false starts with respect to petroleum. Inquiries from Israel have been piled upon inquiries, but each of the two times we have been in a position to act, we have been told nothing for a long time — meanwhile losing all our good-will among our prospective suppliers — and then have been told not to act. Cables on petroleum have come from Shertok, from Bernstein, from your department — and the only one instructing that payment be made for a purchase was not signed at all! The only purchase authorized for payment in dollars here has been entirely outside our control and at so high a price (54 cents per gallon c.i.f. in barrels) as we never even considered, and for delivery to Marseilles or Genoa! Meanwhile we could have bought for a lower price (42 cents per gallon in barrels) in the *same* place and with delivery to Haifa or Tel Aviv on a boat under our own control which will otherwise go partly empty! I will not refer to my earlier American offers for delivery via tanker at much lower prices than these; no funds having been allocated, we could never even try to get export licenses.

You may imagine that I am not anxious to spend dollars to buy petroleum, but if we *do* buy with dollars, let us at least get our money's worth. I do also appreciate that there may be reasons, known to you, which we here cannot understand. From this vantage-point, it looks as if co-ordination on the petroleum problem has been bad. I would not mention the matter were it not so important. I trust that if I knew the whole picture, I would see that the matter had been co-ordinated as well as possible. But, frankly, I have been worried, and David Ha'Cohen, Golda Meyerson and Teddy Kollek have shared the worry.

I wish that you will feel free to show all or any part of this letter to your colleagues or others.

Edna joins me in sending her best regards also to your family. We would like to hear from them also if they have time and the disposition for correspondence in these difficult times.

Cordially,

Oscar Gass

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH583
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/72/16

Tel Aviv, 4 July 1948

Your 403.[1] Try at all cost ruling should precede tactical move. Abolition present status without replacement by governmental status will be regarded as serious set-back by Jewish public. In last resort, agree you not approaching table, but you will appreciate this is extreme course, not necessarily leading eventuality you visualize. Suggest you see person mentioned your 339[2] again on tactics, view making assurance doubly sure.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט
M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte

העתק: 93.08/377/8

Tel Aviv, 5 July 1948[1]

Sir,

On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, I have the honour to offer the following observations on the Suggestions presented by you, under cover of your letter of June 27th,[2] as a possible basis for discussion in discharge of your task to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine."

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1. מס' 259.
2. דמיטרי מנואילסקי, נציג אוקראינה והנשיא התורן של מועצת־הביטחון בחודש יולי. על הפגישה הראשונה עמו ראה מס' 207 והערה 4 שם.

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1. המכתב נמסר למתווך ב־6 ביולי — ראה מס' 281.
2. מס' 239.

1. The Provisional Government has noted with surprise that your Suggestions appear to ignore the Resolution of the General Assembly of November 29,1947, which remains the only internationally valid adjudication on the question of the future government of Palestine. The Provisional Government also regrets to find that in formulating your Suggestions you do not appear to have fully taken into account the outstanding facts of the situation in Palestine, namely, the effective establishment of the sovereign State of Israel within the area assigned to it in the Assembly's Resolution, and other territorial changes which have resulted from the repulse of the attack launched against the State of Israel by Palestinian Arabs and by the Governments of the neighbouring Arab States.

2. The Provisional Government begs to recall that the Jewish people accepted the settlement laid down in the General Assembly's Resolution as a compromise entailing heavy sacrifices on its part, and the territory assigned to the Jewish State as an irreducible minimum. It is, indeed, the conviction of the Provisional Government that the territorial provisions affecting the Jewish State now stand in need of improvement, in view both of the perils revealed by Arab aggression for the safety and integrity of Israel, and of the results achieved by Israel in repelling this aggression. In this connection the Provisional Government desires to point out that the territorial settlement laid down in the Resolution was based on the partition of Western Palestine between the Jewish people and the Arab population of Palestine. The inclusion of the Arab portion of Palestine in the territory of one of the neighbouring Arab States would fundamentally change the context of the boundary problem.

3. The Provisional Government cannot agree to any encroachment upon or limitation of the free sovereignty of the people of Israel in its independent State. While it is the basic aim and policy of Israel to establish relations of peace and amity with her neighbours on the basis of the closest possible collaboration in all fields, the international arrangements which may be necessary to give effect to this policy cannot be imposed upon Israel, but can only be entered into as a result of an agreement negotiated between the interested parties as free and sovereign States.

4. The Provisional Government would be ready to accept the provisions of the Economic Union as formulated in the Assembly's Resolution, if all their basic premises were to materialise. This is not, however, the eventuality envisaged in the Suggestions. The partner State whom Israel is invited to join in a Union is, both in its political identity and in its geographical dimensions, wholly different from the Arab State provided for in the Resolution. Jewish consent to the Economic Union in the context of the Resolution cannot therefore be binding in the new situation. It must now be left to the free and unfettered discretion of the Government of Israel, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, to determine what arrangements should

govern Israel's relations with her neighbour or neighbours in the field of economic cooperation.

5. The Provisional Government must be particularly emphatic in its opposition to any infringement of Israel's independence and sovereignty as regards her immigration policy. Complete and unqualified freedom to determine the size and composition of Jewish immigration was the very essence of the Jewish claim to Statehood. The recognition of the moral validity and practical urgency of that claim in connection with the issue of immigration lay at the roots of its acceptance by the international world. There can be no question of any Israeli Government accepting the slightest derogation, in favour of any joint or international body, from Israel's sovereignty as regards control of her immigration policy.

6. The Provisional Government was deeply wounded by your suggestion concerning the future of the City of Jerusalem, which it regards as disastrous. The idea that the relegation of Jerusalem to Arab rule might form part of a peaceful settlement could be conceived only in utter disregard of history and of the fundamental facts of the problem: the historic associations of Judaism with the Holy City; the unique place occupied by Jerusalem in Jewish history and present-day Jewish life; the Jewish inhabitants' two-thirds majority in the city before the commencement of Arab aggression — a majority greatly increased since then as a result of Arab evacuation; the fact that the whole of Jerusalem, with only a few minor exceptions, is now in Jewish hands; and not least, the fact that after an exhaustive study of the problem and as a result of an overwhelming consensus of Christian opinion in its midst, the General Assembly resolved that Jerusalem be placed under an international regime. The Provisional Government must make it clear that the Jewish people, the State of Israel and the Jews of Jerusalem will never acquiesce in the imposition of Arab domination over Jerusalem, no matter what formal municipal autonomy and right of access to the Holy Places the Jews of Jerusalem might be allowed to enjoy. They will resist any such imposition with all the force at their command. The Provisional Government regrets to have to say that your startling suggestion regarding Jerusalem, by encouraging false Arab hopes and wounding Jewish feelings, is likely to achieve the reverse of the pacifying effect which you undoubtedly had in mind.

7. The Provisional Government does not find it necessary at this stage to comment upon other points raised in the Suggestions, as it hopes that the examination of its present observations on the major aspects of the scheme of settlement tentatively outlined by you may cause you to reconsider your whole approach to the problem.

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Reedman to M. Shertok

העתק: 130.02/2424/20

Tel Aviv, 5 July 1948

Dear Mr. Shertok,

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying message from the Mediator for Palestine, concerning a prolongation of the truce. This identical proposal has been presented to Arab representatives at Cairo.

In view of the fact that the present truce officially expires on Friday, July 9th, the Mediator requests your decision on this proposal by Wednesday, July 7th, at the latest.

Yours sincerely,

John N. Reedman
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

נספח
APPENDIX

PROLONGATION OF THE TRUCE

The truce which took effect on 11 June was for a period of four weeks. During that very short period, a first effort has been made to explore the possibilities for effective mediation of the Palestine dispute. It could never have been expected that in these four weeks a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine could have been finally achieved on the basis of agreement between the parties.

On the whole the truce has worked well. There have been complaints from both sides as to alleged violations of the terms of the truce agreement, there have been incidents of violence, but all fighting on a major scale has been stopped, and it may be said quite confidently that the truce has worked well, and that by 9 July neither state will have gained any significant military advantage from its application. In the meantime, through the operation of the truce, much bloodshed and destruction have been avoided and many lives spared. The expiration date of the truce, 9 July, is now imminent. The parties to the truce must answer the question whether, in the absence of agreement on the procedure and substance of mediation, they will again resort to conflict.

There can be little doubt that a decision to resume fighting in Palestine will be universally condemned, and that the party or parties taking such decision will be assuming responsibility which will be viewed by the world with utmost gravity.

The truce now in effect is based on the Resolution of the Security Council of 29 May.[1] It was the fighting in Palestine which induced the Security Council to adopt that resolution. Unless the parties themselves agree to extend the truce beyond 9 July, it may be assumed that the Security Council will again consider the matter and take such action as the circumstances may demand.

In order that the efforts toward mediation of the dispute may continue, and in the interest of peaceful settlement of this problem by means of patient, tolerant effort and reciprocal good will, I as United Nations Mediator on Palestine, urgently appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator.

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מזכר מאת ג׳. רידמן[1]
Note by J. Reedman

מזכר: 130.02/2424/20

[Tel Aviv], 5 July 1948

DEMILITARISATION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

In earlier conversations with the representatives of both sides, the Mediator had raised the question of the advisability of demilitarising the City of Jerusalem. On both sides, while no commitments were made, there was an indication of a willingness to consider such a suggestion.

In order to preserve the City of Jerusalem and its surroundings from warfare and destruction, a proposal is herewith put forward for the demilitarisation of the area concerned.

An instrument to this effect would have to be signed by both parties. This instrument should contain provisions concerning the extent of the area to be demilitarised, the position and functions of United Nations bodies which might be used in the supervision of the demilitarisation, the procedure of demilitarisation, the prohibition of military operations in the demilitarised area, the prohibition of the entry of fighting personnel, the prohibition of the entry of arms, ammunition and other military supplies, the rights of the civilian population, the entry of food, water and other civilian supplies, and the access to the Holy Places.

Note: Mr. Reedman indicated that a similar proposal will be made regarding Haifa port area and refineries.[2]

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1. ראה נספח ה, עמ׳ 666־667.

268
1. במקור התעודה מצורפת למס׳ 267.
2. פרטים במס׳ 281.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 98/23
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 5 July 1948 (21.05)

Government decided agree prolongation truce 4 to 6 weeks. Cabling you separately line regarding immigration,[1] but this will not be absolute condition. Inform Epstein. Do not publish.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH592
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 5 July 1948

Reference my 98.[1] Shall press relaxation restriction men military age and abolition condition they be kept in camps as humanly unbearable. We ready offer special recruitment cards to entrants military age during truce period, absolving them from service for duration truce, also arrangements whereby at any time random tests can be carried out by producing men required or taking observers to their place work or residence, view proving they unconscripted nor receiving military training.

Shertok

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1. מס' 270.

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1. מס' 269.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 410
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 5 July 1948

Your MH583.[1] Will certainly concert action as suggested. Cannot understand reference setback since maintenance present status always possible, though we consider this implies least possible recognition of status acquired since May 15th. Our present status at table is of persons able supply information, indicating non-existence any Jewish authority in Israel. Are not raising question exclusion Agency, thus no danger absence if deadlock ensues. Najar cables favourable attitude his friends.[2] Please cable why public belief maintenance present status under rule 39 is any improvement even on euphemistic reference to Memisrael. *Nasi*[3] wishes raise matter himself without submission letter from us, and may follow this course if considered more likely succeed.

Eban

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שיחות י. לינטון — ג'. מ. מארטין ול. ג'ונס
(בלונדון, ב־23 וב־25 ביוני 1948)
Meetings: I.J. Linton — J.M. Martin and G.L. Jones
(London, 23, 25 June 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.04/37/12

London, 5 July 1948

Secret
No. 4.

(a) *Mr. J.M. Martin.*[1]

I lunched with Mr. J.M. Martin on Wednesday, June 23rd. We discussed first of all the events at Lake Success during my visit to the United States,[2]

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1. מס' 265.
2. במברק אל נג'ר (פאריס) ציין אבן, ש"כל מה שאנו רוצים מצרפת הוא שתיקה והימנעות." נג'ר דיווח שצרפת נוקטת עמדה חיובית, אך הכרח לשמור על סודיות מוחלטת. (ראה אבן אל נג'ר, 1.7.1948; נג'ר אל אבן, 3.7.1948, 93.03/127/9).
3. נשיא מועצת־הביטחון.

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1. ג'ון מארטין, ממשרד־המושבות.
2. לינטון שהה בארצות־הברית בזמן דיוני העצרת הכללית של האו"ם, בסתיו 1947, וגם בחודשים ינואר־מאי 1948.

and then the desirability of establishing normal relations as quickly as possible between Israel and Britain.

I mentioned that we had heard rumours that, though British policy was to accept the fact that a Jewish State existed, there was still a hope that it might be possible to cut off some of its territory, particularly the Negev. Mr. Martin said that he had always been in favour of partition, and had thought that Akaba[3] should be in the Jewish State; but in view of what had happened, he doubted whether Ibn Saud, or Abdullah, would agree to it. He wondered whether we would be wise to stake our future for Akaba. I told him that those who believed that we would be prepared to compromise on the Negev were deluding themselves. There would be the strongest opposition to any attempt to deprive the Jewish State of the Negev and Akaba. I mentioned as an example how strong[ly] Dr. Weizmann felt on the matter.[4]

Mr. Martin told me that the Colonial Office was winding up its Palestine Department, and that there were now only two officials dealing with Palestine affairs: Mr. Gutch and Mr. Higham. The Colonial Office was still interested in two problems (though the decision with regard to them was with the Foreign Office): these were the problems of the detainees in Cyprus and Kenya. As regards Kenya, Mr. Martin said that if they heard from the Mediator that there was no objection to these people being transferred to Israel, action would be taken immediately. As regards Cyprus, they were prepared to transfer people of non-military age, and were awaiting a reply from the Mediator.

(b) *Mr. Lewis Jones.*[5]

I had a long talk with Mr. Lewis Jones on Friday, June 25th. I reminded him that before I had left for America in January, I had assured him that the Jewish State would come into being shortly, and that there would be very little resistance on the part of the Palestine Arabs, and not much from the Arab States — unless they were instigated and helped by other Powers.[6] I said that I would venture another prophecy, and that was that if America remained firm, and gave de jure recognition to Israel, and if Great Britain could be persuaded at least to remain neutral, then there were good prospects of a beginning of a tolerable relationship emerging between Jews and Arabs in the not too distant future.

Mr. Jones said that de jure recognition by the American and no doubt other Governments would depend to a great extent on the way the Provi-

3. הכוונה לשטח מפרץ עקבה שבתחומי הגבול הבינלאומי של ארץ־ישראל.
4. ראה מס׳ 235.
5. ג׳ורג׳ לואיס ג׳ונס, משגרירות ארצות־הברית בלונדון.
6. הכוונה אולי לשיחתם ביום 5.1.1948 (ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס׳ 101). הדברים אינם נזכרים בדין־וחשבון על השיחה.

sional Government handled the Irgun affair:[7] this was a test whether the Provisional Government could maintain its authority. He asked me whether I knew why Rabbi Fishman and Mr. Shapiro had resigned.[8]

After we had discussed a number of other topics, Mr. Jones led me to the other side of the room where he had 3 or 4 maps. He pointed to a large map, which he said had been prepared for him by the Embassy's military experts. He indicated how the present military positions corresponded to the boundaries of the Peel Plan,[9] and asked whether I did not think that these boundaries were, from the point of view of defence, much better than those proposed in the resolution of the 29th November. He then said that it seemed to him that it would be in the interest of Israel if the Jews would agree to exchange the Negev for Western Galilee. I asked him whether Western Galilee was really available for exchange. He said that Western Galilee was not included within the Jewish boundaries of the resolution of the 29th November. I said that if the Arabs would agree to the resolution of the 29th November, then we could discuss the matter. But he could not on the one hand argue in favour of altering the boundaries of the 29th November resolution, and then, for the purpose of his argument, maintain that those boundaries should apply.

Mr. Jones then pointed to Haifa, and said that he doubted whether the Jews could be allowed to retain full control over that port. There was a vast Arab hinterland to Haifa which needed an outlet to the Mediterranean, and for that purpose Haifa would have to be a Free Port, or at least a part of the Port would have to be set aside for Arab use on the lines of what had been done in Salonica.

I said that there would be the strongest Jewish opposition to giving up the Negev, and asked him whether the Arabs were more likely than the Jews to be able to keep the Negev from a defence point of view. He replied that the frontiers would be guaranteed by the United Nations, to which I said that such a guarantee could work just as well as if the Jews held the Negev. I remarked that he probably thought of Akaba as being a cause of dissension between Jews and Arabs; but sooner or later the Arabs would have to accept realities, and that would mean the beginning of co-operation between us; Akaba would then become a point of contact, and a means of co-operation and joint economic advance, rather than a focal point for trouble. I warned him that the people who were talking lightly about giving the Negev and Akaba to the Arabs were not taking sufficient account of Jewish opinion on the subject, and that they were in for a severe shock. I mentioned that Dr. Weizmann was absolutely opposed to any proposals

7. פרשת ״אלטלנה״.
8. ראה מס׳ 235 והערה 2 שם.
9. תכנית החלוקה של ועדת פיל (1937) הועידה למדינה היהודית את הגליל, השרון ושפלת יהודה. איזור ההר של שומרון ויהודה וכל הנגב (בכלל זה איזור החוף הדרומי) נועדו למדינה הערבית.

for giving up the Negev. I then came to the question of Jerusalem, and said that I interpreted that attack by the British-officered Arab Legion on Jerusalem, and the fact that the British had opposed the American attempt to put Jerusalem under a Trusteeship, as meaning that there were persons toying with the idea of giving Jerusalem to the Arabs and installing Abdullah in the Holy City. I did not know what Christian opinion would do about that; I was not too sanguine, because of the inexplicable silence of the leaders of the Churches when the Arabs had shelled the Holy City for the first time in its history. Nonetheless, I could scarcely imagine that Christians would accept lightly the prospect of the Holy City being given back to the Moslems. In any case, so far as we were concerned, we would not have it. At the urgent request of a number of delegations at Lake Success, including the Americans, we had agreed to its being internationalised. That was not an easy decision for us to make, and there was a great deal of opposition to it in the Zionist Movement, not only from Orthodox circles; Zionism without Zion was not an easy thing to swallow. But the decision had been taken, and we were sticking to it. We were still prepared to accept that solution. But even if Jerusalem were internationalised, the experience of the past few weeks had shown us that we must ask for special safeguards for the 100,000 Jews there.

I.J.L.

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שיחת י. לינטון — ה. בילי (בלונדון, ב־1 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: I.J. Linton — H. Beeley (London, 1 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.04/37/12

London, 5 July 1948

Secret
No. 5


In the course of lunch, Mr. Beeley showed me a press telegram giving a summary of the Mediator's proposals as leaked in *Al Misr.* He asked me whether I could tell him if the *Al Misr* version was correct. I pointed out one or two discrepancies: for instance in the press telegram version immigration was to be left in Jewish hands, subject to economic absorptive capacity to be fixed by the United Nations; Jerusalem was to be placed under the control of the United Nations; and there was no mention of Haifa being converted into a Free Port.

I asked Mr. Beeley whether he could tell me something about present British policy. He said that they desired to see a peaceful settlement as quickly as possible. I replied that His Majesty's Government could do a

great deal to help towards a peaceful settlement. But His Majesty's Government must realise that for us the Palestine problem had been settled by the resolution of November 29th. I felt sure that we had been right when we said that partition would arouse comparatively little armed opposition from the Palestine Arabs, and that the Arab States would act only in proportion to the amount of encouragement and aid they might receive from outside. Our prediction that the only real force with which we would have to contend with would be the Arab Legion had in fact proved true, and even the Arab Legion would have been far less effective had it not been led and serviced by British officers and personnel. As regards the future relations between Great Britain and the Arab Legion in case of a renewal of hostilities, I could only point out the reports appearing recently in the press that two of Glubb Pasha's officers had come to London to see the Foreign Office, and had complained of shortage of ammunition etc; and that they had been promised further supplies — albeit in an indirect manner. Mr. Beeley interrupted to say that he knew nothing of any such visit; he had been back for two weeks, and it certainly had not happened during his stay, nor had he seen any documents on the subject. He doubted very much whether there was anything in these reports. The Government was keeping to the terms of the Security Council truce decision.

I said I was glad to hear that British policy was for an early and peaceful solution; that could be obtained if His Majesty's Government realise — and made the Arabs realise — that the Jewish State had come to stay. There were certain things on which we were not prepared to compromise: (i) Jewish control of immigration: we were not prepared to share such control with any outside body; (ii)Jerusalem — we had gone to the limit of sacrifice in agreeing that Jerusalem should be internationalised; on no account would we agree to Jerusalem being within the Arab area; (iii) we would not agree to diminution of the area allotted to us in the plan of November 29th: we would certainly not agree to give up the Negev.

Mr. Beeley said that, speaking privately, he agreed as regards immigration; also as regards Jerusalem. He felt that the best course would be for Jerusalem to be internationalised. As he saw the problem, the Mediator was working between two well-defined limits: (a) the Jewish attitude that they would accept nothing short of sovereignty, and, (b) the Arabs' completely negative attitude to the partition plan of the 29th November. That being so, the Mediator had to find a middle course — and that would mean that the Jews would have to give up the Negev. He thought that the Arabs could not agree to Egypt being cut off from direct land contact with the rest of the Arab States. I asked him how much use Egypt had made in the past of Akaba and the Negev for contact with the rest of the Arab States. Mr. Beeley laughed and said that in any case, from the point of view of the cartographer, it looked a much tidier map if the Negev were put into the Arab area. I explained to him how strong Jewish opposition would be to


PALESTINE
SECOND CEASE-FIRE, 18 JULY 1948
0 10 20 30 40 50 Km
0 10 20 30 40 Miles
International boundary
U.N. partition lines, 29 Nov. 1947
Main road
"Burma" road
Front lines at the beginning of the second truce, 18 July 1948
Areas occupied by Israel 9 July – 18 July 1948
Areas occupied by Arabs 9 July – 18 July 1948
N
Ras an Naqura
Dan
Tall al Azaziyat
Mishmar Hay Yarden
Acre
Haifa
Sakhnin
Shafa 'Amr
Tiberias
Saffuriya
Lubiya
Ar Reina
Ilut
Sejera
Nazareth
Ein Gev
Deganiya A
Samakh
Afiqim
Sha'ar hag Golan
Ashdot Ya'aqov
Massada
Naharayim
Al Tira
'Atlit
Jaba'
Ein Ghazal
Zikhron Ya'aqov
Beit Yosef
Jenin
Kefar Vitkin
Natanya
Tulkarm
Nablus
Ramat hak Kovesh
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Ras el 'Ein
Wilhelma
Beit Nabala
Lydda
Beer Ya'aqov
Ramle
Ramallah
Buweiriya
Jericho
Allenby Bridge
Gezer
Hulda
Latrun
Bab el Wad
Qiryat Anavim
Neve Ya'aqov
Beit Susin
Beit Mahsir
Abu Ghosh
Isawiya
Beit Ha'arava
Har Tuv
Ein Karim
Jerusalem
Nitzanim
Beit Jala
Bethlehem
Al Majdal
Negba
Iraq Suweidan
Al Faluja
Gush Etsyon
Yad Mordekhai
Gaza
Nir'am
Hebron
Ruhama
Kefar Darom
Rafah
Beersheba
Nirim
Hatserim

any proposal to hand the Negev over to the Arabs. The Arabs could do very little with it; we, on the other hand, were the kind of odd people who could; and we had already done some very unexpected things in and with Palestine in the past twenty-five years. I repeated an argument which I had used on a previous occasion with someone else, namely, that Akaba would become a focus of co-operation and joint development, rather than a bone of contention.

At one stage, Mr. Beeley wanted to know what we felt about a prolonging of the truce, and whether there was any decision about it. I said that I was not aware of any decision: the Israel Government would probably be guided by circumstances as they developed. In any case, we were not the aggressors, and we had no war-party in Israel, clamouring for war for war's sake. We were all anxious for peace, because it was only in peace that we could proceed with our constructive work. If we are not attacked, we shall not need to defend ourselves.

We then discussed the question of establishing some kind of satisfactory relationship between His Majesty's Government and the Provisional Government. I explained that we were anxious that representatives of both sides should be recognised as soon as possible; it could not be advantageous to His Majesty's Government that they should have no official representatives in Israel; apart from political questions, there were commercial and other British interests to be looked after. I pointed out that there was a British Consul-General in Haifa, but I did not quite know to whom he was accredited.[1] Mr. Beeley said that the position of the Consul-General in Haifa was really anomalous. I said I was not raising the question; I only wanted to show how anomalous the situation would become if matters were allowed to drag on without some kind of formal decision. When we parted, Mr. Beeley asked whether I should be remaining in London, and I replied that that was the intention for the time being anyhow. Mr. Beeley said that my remaining in London would be welcomed.

I.J.L.

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1. ראה גם מס' 261.

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שיחת י. לינטון — הבארון ואן בוצלאר ואן אוסטרהאוט
(בהאג, ב־2 ביולי 1948)

Meeting: I.J. Linton — Baron van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout
(The Hague, 2 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/127/8

London, 5 July 1948

Confidential
No. 7

The interview was arranged by the Dutch Zionists. Mr. Voet[1] had seen a member of the Dutch Government some two weeks ago about recognition and had heard from him that Holland had been influenced by the British Foreign Office in its decision not to recognise for the time being the Provisional Government. The minister had thought that it would not be possible for Holland to give recognition during the Truce period, but that the chances would be better after July 9th. Therefore he had suggested that an interview should be sought with the Foreign Minister a week or so before the Truce period expired.

Mr. Voet and I were received by the Foreign Minister at 3 p.m. on Friday, July 2nd. Mr. Voet opened by expressing his thanks for the re-establishment of air communications between Holland and Israel by the KLM, and also of postal communications. After a few words from me on the traditional friendship which the Dutch people and Governments had always shown to Zionism and Jewish aspirations, I said that the Provisional Government was very anxious to receive recognition from the Dutch Government for three reasons: (i) because Holland was a democracy of freedom-loving people; (ii) because recognition by Holland would serve as an example and encouragement to other States. I wanted to be quite frank, and would not hide the fact that we wished to break the ice — if Holland took the plunge, other States would follow; and this was true not only of the Benelux countries; (iii) because there was a moral obligation on Holland to give us recognition: Holland had voted for the resolution on the 29th November — the resolution which had created the Jewish State. She was therefore present at the birth, and it was only right that she should attend the confirmation. Finally, I felt sure that Holland was interested in having an early and peaceful settlement of the problem. There would be no such settlement until the Arabs recognised the reality of the Jewish State. So long as they felt that the Jewish State could be wished away, or fought

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1. י. פוט, מזכיר ההסתדרות הציונית בהולנד.

away, they would do everything in their power to thwart a settlement. The fact that so many countries were still hesitating about recognising us had encouraged the Arabs in this attitude. If, however, we received much wider recognition, and eventually became a member of the United Nations, that would bring the Arabs to their senses. Once the Arabs realised that the State of Israel had come to stay, there would be increased possibilities of Arab-Jewish co-operation.

The Foreign Minister replied that there was a great deal of sympathy for us in Holland, and it had often found public expression. But he was afraid the time had not yet come for recognition. We must realise that the Netherlands also had a Moslem population to deal with. I said I would not venture to express any views on this problem, but I might perhaps be allowed to quote what was recently said to another Foreign Minister, who also had to take account of Moslem reactions, and that was that our experience in dealing with Arabs and Moslems was that once you gave way to their threats, you found yourself in a worse position than you were at the beginning. The Foreign Minister said that it was not a question of threats — they simply had to take account of possible reactions. I said that if the Moslem reaction was to be the decisive factor, it would mean that Holland would never be in a position to recognise the State of Israel. The Foreign Minister said he had not said it was the decisive factor — but it was one consideration which they had to bear in mind at the present moment. After all, there were many other states which had not yet recognised us, and Holland was not the last. He assured us that the matter was under constant consideration. I said that it would be wrong if I were not to say that I was disappointed, but that I would not pursue the matter at the moment, and would leave it in his sympathetic hands.

I said that there was one other point I would like to touch upon, and that was the question of Jerusalem. We had reason to believe that Count Bernadotte was thinking of proposing that Jerusalem should be included in the Arab area. I explained that such a proposal would meet with the most strenuous opposition from Jewish quarters. We had made a great sacrifice, which had not been easy for us, when we agreed under pressure from a number of delegations at Lake Success (among them the Netherlands Delegation) to Jerusalem being internationalised. We would never agree to its being handed over to the Arabs. I should imagine that Christian opinion, too, would be shocked by any such suggestion. In any case, there should certainly be a reaction on the part of those countries which had counselled us to make the renunciation — there was an obligation on them to see to it that we had not made it in vain. The Foreign Minister asked whether we still adhered to our position. I replied in the affirmative, and said that we would still agree to the internationalisation of Jerusalem, though in view of our experiences there in the last few months, we should expect much stricter guarantees for the safety of the 100,000 Jews in the

Holy City. The Foreign Minister said he had had no information about the matter, but would look into it.

When we were about to rise, the Minister said that he on his part would like to bring up one subject — to get some facts from us to enable him to reply to certain accusations which had been made. He had heard that the Jews had been using Christian buildings and institutions for war purposes. I spent a few minutes giving him the necessary information. On the way out, the Minister asked whether I had recently been in Belgium on the subject of recognition.

IJL

(Note: I understand that general elections will shortly take place in Holland; should there be a change in the Government or Foreign Office, another visit might be necessary in the near future.)[2]

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 46/41. התקבל: 7.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 6 July 1948

If affirmative reply truce contemplated, tactically useful if transmitted before tomorrow morning [Security] Council meeting, which would then develop into pressure Arabs. Also furnish favourable background several conversations *Ishemet*[1] with view action eve Convention.[2]

Eban

2. בעקבות הבחירות הוקמה באוגוסט 1948 ממשלה חדשה בהולנד. במשרד־החוץ החליף ד. א. סטיקר את ואן בוצלאר.

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1. הנשיא טרומן.
2. ועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית עמדה להיפתח ב־12 ביולי.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 47/64. התקבל: 7.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/19

New York, 6 July 1948

[Lie][1] informed me confidentially: 1) Americans strongly support his objection any internationalization Haifa on grounds this Israeli city. Therefore he surprised no direct mention that point your reply Mediator.[2] 2) He resisted strong pressure Mediator come to Rhodes. 3) Will /facilitate/ dispatch U.N. police if designed Jerusalem, but apply [Security] Council if Haifa involved, hoping for veto. 4) Has direct knowledge Jerusalem suggestion emanated Britain.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 48/69. התקבל: 8.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 6 July 1948

French representative confirmed Paris instructions not object ruling our designation, therefore acceptance likely.[1] President informed us even if Council approved invitation Jewish Authority, he would rule "I invite Jewish Authority Palestine by which I understand Memisrael." We would thereon approach table. Therefore obvious "Authority" formula not setback but step towards fuller recognition. Memisrael designation from Chair seems assured two months, making difficult British reversal.[2]

Eban

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1. נוסף על־פי הנוסח הנכנס.
2. בתשובתו הבהיר שרתוק, שהמתווך לא הציע לבנאם את חיפה, אלא להפוך את הנמל, יחד עם בתי־הזיקוק, לנמל חופשי (ראה מס' 239). עם זאת, ממשלת ישראל רואה גם בהצעה זו פגיעה בריבונותה, מה גם שבהקשר הכללי של הצעותיו, פירושה מינהל משותף ערבי־יהודי בנמל, בנוסח "האיחוד הכלכלי" של תכנית החלוקה. בתשובתו למתווך (מס' 266) הסתפק שרתוק בדחייה מוחלטת של כל פגיעה בריבונות המדינה. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 9.7.1948, 93.03/94/9).

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1. ראה מס' 271 והערה 2 שם.
2. ביולי כיהן נציג אוקראינה כנשיא־תורן של מועצת־הביטחון. הנשיאות היתה עתידה לעבור לידי נציג ברית־המועצות ב־1 באוגוסט ולנציג בריטניה — ב־1 בספטמבר.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 414
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 6 July 1948

American delegation asks me clarify Jerusalem position. Am not clear following points: 1) Presume both military and Joseph administrations directly responsible Memisrael. 2) Presume Government policy towards Dissidents uniform within Israel and occupied areas. 3) Does Government acknowledge any liberties, immunities, Dissidents Jerusalem, arising from fact non-Israel territory involved?[1]

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 99/64
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 6 July 1948 (19.15)

According Mediator staff who visited Cairo, only slight chance Arabs agreeing prolongation truce. Their conception unrealistic; they magnified out of proportion Irgun Zvai Le'umi affair,[1] believe we may now collapse under attack, also flustered by unity established as result visit.[2] They will probably reject Mediator appeal, but submit Security Council order, using it as face-saver.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס' 283.

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1. פרשת "אלטלנה".
2. מדובר כנראה בביקורו של המלך עבדאללה במצרים, בסעודיה ובעיראק — ראה מס' 209 והערה 5 שם.

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י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק
I.J. Linton to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 74/38. התקבל: 8.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 6 July 1948

Learned stubbornness Foreign Office regarding Cyprus due commitments made to Arabs during truce negotiations. Understand Colonial Office interested in total evacuation and pressing accordingly possibility commitments not stand in the way after 9th of this month.[1] Will take up again with Foreign Office without showing knowledge of their commitments.

Linton

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שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט וצוות עוזריו (בתל אביב, ב־6 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: M. Shertok — Count Bernadotte and Assistants (Tel Aviv, 6 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 6 July 1948

Confidential

Mr. Shertok began by saying that politically we had been ready to meet Count Bernadotte in Rhodes, but that we had decided against this visit on two grounds: (a) the Arabs had insisted on Count Bernadotte coming to see them in Cairo, and if we had acted otherwise, this might have been misunderstood, and (b) the substance of Count Bernadotte's Suggestions[1] had become public and had made a painful impression here, so that we did not wish to appear to have gone out of our way to meet the Mediator for the purpose of discussions on such a basis.

Mr. Shertok went on to say that the Israeli Government had given careful attention to Count Bernadotte's Suggestions and to the annexe which accompanied them, and had couched its reaction in a letter,[2] which

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1. מועד סיום ההפוגה.

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1. מס' 239.
2. מס' 266.

had been approved the previous evening at a meeting of the State Council.[3] Mr. Shertok at this stage handed a letter to Count Bernadotte, who proceeded to read it, saying, as he laid it down, "you don't see many merits in my Suggestions!"

Mr. Shertok said that Count Bernadotte had apparently been searching for a new compromise, which was in effect a compromise not between two extreme opposite views, but between a compromise already accepted on the Jewish side and an intransigent attitude still maintained by the Arabs. When the Palestine question had originally come up before the United Nations, it had been a matter of two wholly contradictory claims — the Jews had claimed a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine, and the Arabs an Arab State in the whole of Palestine. The United Nations had drawn a line somewhere half-way between these two extremes, and to this line, which Mr. Shertok called the "United Nations Line", the Jews had, by way of accepting a compromise, agreed. What Count Bernadotte was proposing to do now was to take this United Nations Line, call it a Jewish line, and try to find something half-way between it and the Arab line, from which the Arabs had never budged. Mr. Shertok felt bound to say that if the original United Nations compromise were now to be dropped, the Jews would return to what had been their first line — namely, the claim of a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine.

Count Bernadotte, in reply, said that the General Assembly had instructed him to try to achieve a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem, and by this he understood an adjustment of the settlement that had been envisaged in the Assembly's Resolution of November 29th last. If that were not taken as a starting point, and if modifications thereof were to be ruled out, he could not see that there was any hope of achieving an adjustment. He was not prepared at this stage to discuss in any detail the points which Mr. Shertok had set out in his letter, as he had only read through them once, but he would like to say straightaway that the Arab representatives whom he had seen a couple of days previously had told him that they regarded his Suggestions as 100% Jewish, since they were based on the status-quo in Palestine and envisaged the continued existence of a Jewish State. They told him that he had gone right back to what the Jews had always desired, namely, a reunion of Palestine with Transjordan as a single entity. He had taken the State of Israel as the basis for his Suggestions, and had never envisaged its limitation.

He knew, of course, he went on, that the Israeli Government would not like the suggestion which he had made for the future of Jerusalem, but he had made it for two main reasons:

3. תשובת ממשלת ישראל הובאה לדיון בישיבה סגורה של מועצת המדינה הזמנית, ב־5 ביולי; לאחר שהוסרו כמה הצעות תיקון, אושר הנוסח ברוב דעות. (ראה מועצת המדינה הזמנית, פרוטוקול הדיונים, כרך א׳, ישיבה שמינית, 5.7.1948).

a) Experience showed that an international enclave, such as had originally been proposed for Jerusalem, invariably turned out to be an international trouble spot, and

b) the Trusteeship Council had proposed an arrangement for the internationalisation of Jerusalem whereby only the Governor and the Chief Secretary were to be paid out of United Nations funds, and he thought that the time might come when the people of Jerusalem would object to financing a special governmental apparatus out of their own resources. He agreed that the majority of Jerusalem's inhabitants were Jews, but he said that there were a number of places elsewhere in Israeli territory where the boot was on the other foot, and where there were Arab majorities under Jewish rule.

Mr. Shertok intervened to stress the unique position of Jerusalem in Jewish, and indeed Christian life. All previous Commissions that had dealt with the problem of Palestine had reserved a special status for Jerusalem, and the same had been true through all the stages through which the question had gone since it had become a matter for the United Nations. Never before had it been suggested that Jerusalem should become 100% Arab and Moslem. On account of the consensus of Christian opinion, and of heavy pressure in the United Nations, the Jews had agreed that Jerusalem might be internationalised, but they had never agreed, and they would never agree, that it should be handed over to the Arabs. Count Bernadotte's suggestion would have the effect of strengthening the Arabs' hand — here was a Christian gentleman, an emissary of the United Nations, who suggested to the Jews that they should abandon Jerusalem to Arab rule. The Arabs would naturally derive great encouragement from this proposal.

Count Bernadotte at this stage asked whether the Israeli Government had discussed the plan which he had put forward for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem and Haifa.[4] Mr. Shertok replied that the Government had not yet had an opportunity of doing so, and that it would welcome further explanations. He told Count Bernadotte at once that the Government's inclinations were negative as regards the demilitarisation of the Haifa port area and the refineries, but that it still had an open mind on the question of Jerusalem.

Count Bernadotte said that he wanted to make it quite clear that if both sides agreed on the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, this would not influence the question of the future settlement for that city, the intention being solely to save Jerusalem. As neither side would be committing itself with regard to the future, he thought that the Jews should regard the demilitarisation of Jerusalem with favour, for the sake of preserving the city itself. He went on to explain that the United Nations would have to get people there to take charge of security, and he had envisaged a force of 1,000 men to be

4. ראה מס' 268.

recruited from the U.S.A., France and Belgium. He realised that there would be difficulties in connection with the food supply, but he was suggesting the use of the railway line, on which United Nations trains could be run into Jerusalem from Haifa. He stressed that in the event of Jerusalem's being demilitarised, there would be no limitation on the amount of food that could be taken into the city by this United Nations route.

At this point the discussion developed into a series of questions and answers on points of detail.

MR. SHERTOK: Would you allow the Arabs to bring food into Jerusalem from the adjacent Arab areas?

COUNT BERNADOTTE: Yes.

MR. SHERTOK: Would you allow us to do the same through the territory which we control militarily?

COUNT BERNADOTTE: Both parties would be allowed to bring food into Jerusalem by whatever route they chose, in addition to the food brought by the U.N. trains.

MR. SHERTOK: With regard to security, do I understand that there would be no Jewish and no Arab armed forces in a demilitarised Jerusalem, and that the defence of the city would be in the hands of a U.N. Force?

COUNT BERNADOTTE: That is right. All Jewish and Arab forces in Jerusalem would be removed. The defence of Jerusalem would be in the hands of the U.N. Force.

MR. SHERTOK: You said "removed". But most of the Jewish defenders of Jerusalem were residents of the City. There can be no question of removing them.

COUNT BERNADOTTE: But in that case the Arab Legion in the Old City can claim the right to stay on, provided they took off their uniforms.

MR. SHERTOK: Surely you must differentiate between citizens and foreign invaders.

COUNT BERNADOTTE: All these questions will have to be gone into.

MR. SHERTOK: Can you give me further details about the plan you envisage for Haifa?

COUNT BERNADOTTE: The docks, the port area and the refineries would be demilitarised. As long as the war is on, oil would not be pumped through the pipe lines, and the refineries would not operate. I have received specific requests from the British, French and American Governments to ensure the protection of the refineries, which are of great importance for the successful operation of the Marshall Plan. Such an arrangement would benefit the whole world, and consequently the Jews as well. The demilitarisation of these areas is suggested only as a temporary measure for the duration of the war.

Mr. Shertok, I am leaving Tel Aviv this afternoon for Cairo to receive the Arabs' answer to the two questions which I have put to them:

(a) my plan for demilitarisation.

(b) the prolongation of the truce.

I am planning to return to Tel Aviv tomorrow at 4 o'clock and shall be able to stay for 1½ hours before moving on to Haifa, where I shall have to conduct some technical discussions with my staff. I should like to have your Government's reply tomorrow to my proposal for a prolongation of the truce. Even if your Government should decide in principle not to prolong the truce, I would urge you to agree at least to an extension of the truce for three or four days to give me time to withdraw my observers, for whose personal safety I am responsible. The same applies to the valuable material supplies which are the property of the United Nations, and which I would also have to get out before the truce comes to an end.

MR. SHERTOK: I should like to ask you two further questions with regard to the truce. The first concerns the Jerusalem water supply. We are now in the 24th day of the truce and not a single drop of water has been pumped to Jerusalem.[5] It was the intention of the truce terms that our position in Jerusalem should remain as it was, namely, that it should not be improved as far as supplies were concerned, but that at the same time it should not be worsened. As a result of the difficulties which the Arabs have placed in the way of our pumping water to Jerusalem, our position there has worsened materially. This is a clear breach of the terms of the truce, and we regret that there has been no ruling to this effect by you.

COUNT BERNADOTTE: I agree that the position of the Arabs in this matter is 100% wrong. I said this to the Prime Minister of Transjordan when I saw him in Cairo on Sunday. I cannot make too many public statements to the effect that the truce has been violated, because after all it might bring up other awkward matters such as the *Altalena.* I hear that you have in the meantime arranged your own water supply. This is a good thing, but, of course, it does not excuse the attitude adopted by the Arabs. I shall speak about this again to the Prime Minister of Transjordan when I see him in Cairo this afternoon.

MR. SHERTOK: The second question concerns immigration. We have now had over three weeks' experience of the way in which various Governments have interpreted your appeal to cooperate in the implementation of the truce terms.[6] Some Governments have interpreted this appeal far too strictly; the Swiss Government, for example, just to be on the safe side, has placed a total ban on the departure for Palestine of all men aged between 18 and 50. The British Government, in connection with the Jews interned in Cyprus, has also gone far beyond the terms of the truce, and we have, indeed, instructed our representative at Lake Success to raise the matter before the Security Council.

5. ראה מס' 229.
6. ראה מס' 242.

DR. BUNCHE: This was a purely unilateral decision on the part of the British, and had nothing to do with the Mediator.

MR. SHERTOK: A very important matter is that of the men now detained under surveillance in camps in Palestine.[7] They agreed reluctantly to internment on the understanding that they would be released by July 9th, the date on which the four-week truce was to end, and it will be impossible to keep them in confinement beyond that date. The position is quite untenable, and if we attempt to detain them further, they would start running away, and we should be guilty of a breach of the truce. We cannot operate this arrangement after July 9th. We would like to suggest an alternative arrangement. In Israel cards are issued to men of military age, defining their status in relation to military service. We are prepared to issue special cards to all the men at present confined under U.N. surveillance, exempting them from military service, and we would give your observers every facility for checking on them and making sure that the holders of these cards were in fact not in the army. We would be prepared to take your observers to see these men in their homes or at their places of work at any time.

COUNT BERNADOTTE: You will remember, Mr. Shertok, that I have said this all along about confining people in camps; that it meant imposing upon them an unendurable hardship.

MR. SHERTOK: Yes, but you will remember that we drew different conclusions from this. Your original position was that men of this category should not be admitted into the country at all on account of this hardship, while we preferred to accept the hardship as long as we could get the men away from Europe.

At this point Count Bernadotte and his party withdrew, promising to return at 12.30 p.m.

At 12.30 Count Bernadotte and his staff again came to the Foreign Office. Count Bernadotte handed over his reply[8] to the letter which Mr. Shertok had given to him earlier in the morning.

Mr. Shertok read the letter and said that at this stage he wished only to comment on paragraphs 7 and 8, which concerned the two crucial points of immigration and Jerusalem. The Israeli Government could not under any circumstances agree to international control of Jewish immigration into its territory. Admittedly immigration into all countries had international ramifications, and if there were a world immigration authority, Israel would accept the same obligations as all other countries. But there was no such authority, and as long as all other countries exercised their sovereign rights in deciding upon immigration, the Israeli Government must do the same. Any submission to international control of Jewish immigration into

7. על פי תנאי ההפוגה — ראה מס' 156, סעיף (II) 6.
8. מס' 282.

Israel would mean an abrogation of Israel's sovereign rights. Dr. Bunche interposed to say that if Israel entered into a voluntary agreement on the subject of international control over its immigration, this would in no way infringe its sovereign rights. The conclusion of such an agreement would in itself be an act of sovereignty. He pointed out, too, that every agreement that is entered into between one country and another represents a limitation of the sovereignty of the parties concerned. If the U.S.A., for example, enters upon an agreement with another country, it is performing a sovereign act, but by the content of the agreement limiting its own sovereignty.

Mr. Shertok commented on this that there was no question here of an agreement between Israel and other countries, but only of an agreement on Israel's part to submit to international control in a matter that affected her vitally. There was no hope whatever of any agreement between Israel and her neighbours on the subject of immigration. Their interests were diametrically opposed.

Count Bernadotte said that surely the Israeli Government would itself have to impose some limitation on the rate of immigration into its territory, and therefore it looked as if Mr. Shertok was standing upon a point of prestige.

Mr. Shertok replied that the number and quality of immigrants we admitted into our own territory was a matter for ourselves to decide, and that doubtless we should have to make rules and regulations. But King Abdullah could not be allowed to save us from any mistakes we might make in our immigration policy. Any agreement with Israel's neighbours must be based on common interests, and here there was no such thing. Israel was anxious to get immigrants in, while the Arabs were bent on keeping them out. He claimed that there was in any case no precedent for the acceptance of international control in such a matter.

Dr. Mohn said that of course there was no precedent. The case of Palestine was unique in many ways, and there were many things here for which there was no precedent elsewhere.

Mr. Shertok now turned to the question of Jerusalem. He said that the experience we had had would justify us amply in demanding a Jewish Jerusalem, but in fact we did not insist on this. Israel had agreed to the internationalisation of Jerusalem but could not under any circumstances accept Arab rule in that city. We had never said that we would fight for the inclusion of Jerusalem into the Jewish State, but we certainly intended to fight against its inclusion in the Arab State.

In reply to a remark by Dr. Bunche to the effect that the question of Jerusalem was separate from that of a Jewish or an Arab State, Mr. Shertok said that a Jewish State with Jerusalem internationalised was an entirely different thing from a Jewish State with Jerusalem in Arab hands. There were the closest ties between Jerusalem and the State of Israel, and the internationalisation of Jerusalem would make it possible for these ties

to be preserved. The inclusion of Jerusalem in an Arab State would mean that these ties would be severed. Israel must insist upon the continuity of its connection with Jerusalem.

At this stage Count Bernadotte intimated that he had decided to accept Mr. Shertok's proposal about the men at present detained in the camps. These men would be released regardless of whether the truce was prolonged or not, and the new system proposed by Mr. Shertok would apply both to them and to any men of the same age category who might reach Israel after July 9th.

Mr. Shertok said he very much appreciated this decision, which would greatly facilitate the Government's decision on the question of the prolongation of the truce.

Count Bernadotte said that in his original Suggestions submitted to the Israeli Government he had asked for any counter-proposals which the Government might care to submit. He noted that Mr. Shertok's letter which had been handed to him that morning contained no counter-proposals of any kind.

Mr. Shertok said that the one counter-proposal we had to make was that the Arab world should make peace with the State of Israel. If the Mediator could bring the Arabs to sit down with us to discuss arrangements on that basis, he would have all our blessings.

From this stage on, a number of points of detail were discussed for purposes of clarification:

a) Mr. Shertok stated that it would take another twenty days before water ran through the alternative pipe-line to Jerusalem which was at present being built.

b) Mr. Shertok complained that the Arabs were still barring access to the Wailing Wall, which Count Bernadotte denied.[9] The Arabs had said they would not stop people going to the Wailing Wall, but they could not accept responsibility for the actions of individual Arabs, such as snipers, who might interfere. This meant, Mr. Shertok said, that access was in fact impossible, and that an express provision of the Security Council's Resolution on the truce was being flouted.

c) Mr. Shertok inquired whether demilitarisation meant simply that an area could not be used for military purposes, or did it imply a measure of United Nations administrative control. Count Bernadotte replied that there will be only U.N. Police, and no Israeli Police, in the harbour area of Haifa, but that administrative control of the port, the customs, etc. etc., would remain entirely in the hands of the Israeli Government. If a theft occurred, the U.N. Police would catch the thief and turn him over to an Israeli Court. Count Bernadotte stressed the distinction between internationalisation, which was not

9. ראה מס' 245.

being suggested, and demilitarisation. Mr. Shertok inquired whether, if arms were imported through Haifa port, the U.N. Police would limit itself simply to seeing that the arms did not remain within the port area. Dr. Bunche replied that the whole plan would have to be worked out in greater detail, but essentially it had been put forward solely for the purpose of ensuring protection of the oil facilities. In Jerusalem too, municipal services would continue to be run by the same authorities that ran them at present, and there might even be a Jewish Municipal Police Force. It was pointed out to Count Bernadotte that the demilitarisation of Jerusalem would create a void, which the Arabs, who encircled the city on all sides, might well attempt to invade. This, said Count Bernadotte, would be Arab aggression against the U.N. force, and that would be a very serious thing and have grave consequences. Count Bernadotte made it clear that the U.N. would run the trains from Haifa to Jerusalem and would protect them, but that it would not be responsible for maintenance of the permanent way. If demilitarisation for Jerusalem were agreed to, the truce, even if it were not prolonged elsewhere in Palestine, might by agreement be extended just for Jerusalem until the U.N. was able to send its force there.

Mr. Shertok suggested that the State of Israel might run the Haifa refineries, subject to certain agreements providing for the sale of oil to the Arabs — this as an alternative to demilitarisation, if the purpose of demilitarisation was solely to protect the oil installations. To this Count Bernadotte replied that the Arabs would not allow the oil to come through under such conditions, and that in any case this would not be a guarantee against war damage, such as might be caused by Arab air-raids.

It was decided to adjourn the meeting until 4.30 tomorrow, by which time Count Bernadotte asked to have replies to his four questions:

1) Whether the Israeli Government agreed to a prolongation of the truce.

2) Whether, in the event of their not agreeing, they would agree to extend it for three days until July 12th, to enable him to get his observers and stores out of the country.

3) Whether the Israeli Government accepted his plan for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem.

4) Whether the Israeli Government agreed to his plan for the demilitarisation of Haifa port and refineries.

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הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק
Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

Tel Aviv, 6 July 1948

Sir,

I have studied carefully the observations on my Suggestions set forth in your letter to me of 5 July 1948,[1] and take this opportunity to communicate to you briefly my comments upon them.

1. You will appreciate, I hope, the spirit in which my Suggestions have been advanced and the objectives which were sought. As indicated clearly in the Introductory Statement to my Suggestions, these ideas were put forth with no intimation of finality; they were exploratory only and designed specifically to invite further discussion and counter-suggestions from the interested parties. The success of my Mediatory effort, you will agree, must inevitably depend upon the possibility of finding some common ground on which further discussions with the two parties might profitably proceed. There was involved, therefore, no question of formal acceptance or rejection of the specific ideas advanced, but only a determination as to whether there might be in those ideas some framework of reference within which progress toward ultimate agreement on details might be reasonably hoped for.

2. In this regard, I note your specific objections to some of the ideas outlined in my Suggestions. I also note the hope expressed in paragraph 7 of your letter that I might reconsider my "whole approach to the problem". I interpret this to mean that you do not consider the general framework which I have outlined to be a suitable one for further discussion, looking toward a "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine." You have not, however, taken advantage of my invitation to offer counter-suggestions, unless I am to understand that your references in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your letter to the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, imply that you will be unwilling to consider any suggestions which do not correspond to the provisions of that resolution.

3. In paragraph 1 of your letter it is stated that my Suggestions "appear to ignore the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947..." I cannot accept this statement. As United Nations Mediator, it is true that I have not considered myself bound by the provisions of the 29 November resolution, since had I done so, there would have been no meaning to my mediation. The failure to implement the resolution of 29 November 1947,

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1. מס' 266. הצעות המתווך — ראה מס' 239.

and the open hostilities to which the Arab opposition to it led, resulted in the convoking of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly to "consider further the future government of Palestine." This special Assembly, taking into account the new situation, adopted on 14 May 1948, the resolution providing for a Mediator.[2] It is equally true, however, that the basic objectives of the resolution of 29 November 1947, as regards a separate political and institutional existence for the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine and for close economic ties between these communities, are maintained in my Suggestions, although in a somewhat different framework. I may also assure you that in working up my Suggestions I took fully into account the facts of the actual existence of the Jewish State in a defined area, the military situation and the present territorial situation as a result of the conflict thus far. But I could not ignore the fact that there is nothing really stable in Palestine so long as the prospect of early resumption of hostilities remains, and that the violent reaction of the Arab world to these very situations is also a vital factor in the equation, if one must focus on the possibility of peaceful adjustment.

4. As regards paragraph 2 of your letter, I may say first of all that it would not impress me as an argument of very great merit that the boundaries of a Jewish State in Palestine, which had been acceptable to the Jewish community, would require revision in the Jewish favour solely because the Arab part of Palestine might, by its own volition, decide to enter into a closer relationship or even a merger with a neighbouring Arab State. As regards any territorial adjustments to which either party might lay claim as a result of successes on the field of battle, it must be said that, quite aside from the question of fundamental principle involved, the conflict was only in its very early stages when the truce began, and the military outlook for either side is by no means clearly predictable.

5. With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, it need only be said that it was made abundantly clear in my Suggestions that *all* of the arrangements proposed could have practical meaning only in the sense of voluntary agreement on the part of the parties concerned. It was specifically emphasized in paragraph 8 of my Introductory Statement that there could be no question of imposition. In view of these clear statements in my paper, I find myself at a loss to understand the reasons for your statement.

6. As regards paragraph 4 of your letter, I note that your Government no longer considers itself bound by the provisions for Economic Union set forth in the 29 November resolution for the reason that the Arab State envisaged by that resolution has not been established. In paragraphs 1 and 2, however, the same resolution is taken as your basic position. Whatever may be the precise legal significance and status of the 29 November resolution, it would seem quite clear to me that the situation is not of such

2. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך, עמ' 786־787.

nature as to entitle either party to act on the assumption that such parts of that resolution as may be favourable to it may be regarded as effective, while those parts which may, by reason of changes in circumstances, be regarded as unfavourable, are to be considered as ineffective.

7. Paragraph 3 of your letter relates to immigration. The question of immigration into Palestine must be considered within the context of the total problem. Even within the limits of full sovereignty, the question of immigration is related to the absorptive capacity of the country. Palestine from this point of view has become the object of international concern. It would, therefore, seem justifiable that the Economic and Social Council might be given an eventual say in the matter. Furthermore, such an arrangement might serve the useful purpose of maintaining a sympathetic international interest in and assistance for the settlement of Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Should unrestricted immigration indefinitely continue in Palestine, there might in the future arise a serious economic and political problem beyond the control of any Jewish Government. It cannot be ignored that immigration affects not only the Jewish State and the Jewish people but also the surrounding Arab world.

8. Jerusalem stands in the heart of what must be Arab territory in any partition of Palestine. To attempt to isolate this area politically and otherwise from surrounding territory presents enormous difficulties. The special condition of Jerusalem — its large Jewish population and its religious associations — needs special consideration, and the way for discussion of these questions was left open. Arab domination of legitimate Jewish and other non-Arab interests in Jerusalem was never intended or implied in the Suggestions. Moreover, while I fully appreciate that the question of Jerusalem is of very great concern, for historical and other reasons, to the Jewish community of Palestine, Jerusalem was never intended to be a part of the Jewish State. In this sense, the position of the Jewish State is unaffected and the question of Jerusalem has no relationship to its status. The status of Jerusalem, therefore, is separate from the question of the constitution and boundaries of a Jewish State. My Suggestions fully safeguard the historical and world-wide religious interests in Jerusalem.

9. I wish you to know that I have but one interest in the future of Palestine, and that is to do everything within my power to bring peace to this troubled land. I am willing at all times to carry on such discussions and seriously to consider all suggestions which may hold any promise for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

With cordial regards, I am, Sincerely yours,

Count Folke Bernadotte

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH603
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948

Your 414.[1] One yes, two yes, three no. Regarding one, this is reply *klapei hutz*, actually some lack clarity prevails delimitation functions between Bernard [Joseph],[2] *Iriya* under Daniel [Auster][3] and *Kehilla*,[4] all loosely united in *Va'adath Yerushalaim.* Appointment *Moshel Zvai* equipped full powers behalf Memisrael, under consideration. This explanation unaffects fact direct nexus all local authorities, particularly Bernard, *Mamaz*[5] and Memisrael.

Shertok

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מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק 428
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 7 July 1948

President Security Council ruled Eban seated Israeli representative;[1] Britain, Canada, China, Syria, Belgium, voting against. Ruling therefore standing, as veto not applicable. Jamal [al-Husseini] stated unable partici-

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1. מס' 278.
2. דב ברנארד יוסף (ג'וזף), יושב־ראש ועדת ירושלים (ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 473, הערה 2) ובא־כוחה של ממשלת ישראל במשא־ומתן עם המתווך ובמגעים עם ועדת ההפוגה הקונסולרית.
3. בסוף אפריל 1948 התכנסו ששת החברים היהודיים של מועצת עיריית ירושלים המנדטורית והכריזו על הקמת עירייה בשטח היהודי של ירושלים. דניאל אוסטר נבחר לראש המועצה העירונית של ירושלים.
4. ועד הקהילה עסק בעיקר במתן שירותי דת וביחסים בין העדות בירושלים.
5. מפקד מחוז ירושלים — דוד שאלתיאל.

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1. נוסח ההזמנה של נשיא מועצת־הביטחון היה כדלהלן: "עתה אני מזמין את נציגי המדינות הבאות והצדדים המעוניינים לתפוס את מקומם ליד שולחן מועצת־הביטחון: נציגי מדינת ישראל, עיראק, מצרים ולבנון; ואם אינני טועה, נציג הוועד הערבי העליון." (ראה *SCOR*, *Third Year* 330th Meeting, 7.7.1948, p. 2).

pate discussions while Israel officially represented, and walked out. Discussion now commencing regarding extension truce. Aubrey [Eban] stated you communicating views direct Mediator, Aubrey unable comment this stage. Please communicate your official reply earliest with instructions our attitude here.

Comay

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH606
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948

Government's decisions: 1) Favour prolongation truce few weeks. 2) Ready discuss demilitarization Jerusalem (internal: we feel must study further military implications), stipulate continuation essential supplies and reversion military *status quo ante* if, when, international regime established, unless we agree otherwise. (Internal: purpose is preclude use international force envisaged for demilitarization period as instrument automatic establishment international regime regardless our wishes.) 3) View ensuring supplies Jerusalem, including requirements international force, ready provide safe conduct through Israel for road convoys, railway trains under U.N. auspices, but opposed demilitarization railway line as derogation sovereignty. 4) Similarly regarding Haifa, opposed demilitarization port area but ready devise arrangements ensuring safe unloading supplies, equipment, [for] international force Jerusalem, say by fixing special days when no other cargo unloadable. 5) Oppose demilitarization Refineries. (Internal: cabling separately.)[1]

Shertok

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1. מס' 286.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 1/63
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948 (19.25)

My 606.[1] We determined utilise bargaining power resulting from 1) Our physical control of region. 2) British anxiety safeguard and reopen them. 3) Our potential ability bomb Tripoli (Syria) and Kirkuk. 4) Needs Iraq for royalties paid on oil flowed. We know British are about to make alternative proposal to Mediator, which still unsatisfactory,[2] but we hope by holding out elicit more favourable offer.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH609
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948

Mediator appeared today without promised Arab reply, which postponed till tomorrow morning.[1] Our decisions communicated previously[2] releasable tomorrow, Thursday, 12 noon G.M.T. Do not publish earlier. Cabling their text separately.[3] Please canvass delegations from now regarding sanctions against recalcitrant party. Mediator telegraphed Security Council condemning behaviour Transjordan Government in obstructing

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1. מס' 285.
2. לפי מידע שהגיע לידי שרתוק, עמדו הבריטים להציע שתחודש הזרמת הנפט לבתי־הזיקוק, בתנאי שכל התזקיקים ייוצאו ולא יימכרו לערבים או ליהודים. (ראה שרתוק אל לינטון, 8.7.1948, 130.09/2318/1).

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1. בבוקר של ה־8 ביולי הודיעו מדינות ערב שהן דוחות את הצעת המתווך להארכת ההפוגה, אך מסכימות באופן עקרוני לפירוז העיר העתיקה של ירושלים.
2. מס' 285.
3. מוסב, כנראה, על ההודעה הרשמית של ממשלת ישראל בעניין הארכת ההפוגה. ההודעה פורסמה בניו יורק ב־8 ביולי. (93.03/94/9).

resumption Jerusalem water supply, as being in clear violation truce.[4] Explain all concerned and mention in Council, according our authentic information Transjordan Government's attitude based express opinion British Minister that in his interpretation terms truce unprovide for water supply. According Mediator's statement to us, Iraqi Government, whose troops in occupation Ras el-Ain source, share with Transjordan responsibility for this violation, of which Mediator takes particularly grave view, since it is deliberate policy pursued by Governments and not mere infringement by local commanders.

You can use freely in presentation Council arguments contained in my telegrams 603 to 607[5] and coded,[6] and embroider on canvas. Avoid commitments on points regarding which have repeatedly warned. Communicate Eliahu [Epstein] all copies.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 100/27
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948 (12.40)

Explain Soviet delegation we interested prolongation truce for consolidation State and army, therefore hope they will not oppose order by Security Council if Arab League refuses.[1]

Shertok

4. ראה מס' 289; ברנאדוט אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם, 7.7.1948, מסמך או"ם S/869.
5. ראה מס' 283, 285, ומס' 263, הערה 3. במברקים האחרים המוזכרים כאן (MH604, MH605) נמסר תוכן מכתבו של המתווך (ראה מס' 282) ועיקרי השיחה עמו (ראה מס' 281).
6. מס' 286.

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1. לאחר פגישה עם (ראש?) המשלחת הסובייטית הבריק אבן (7.7.1948, 93.01/2180/21), שקיימת הרמוניה מלאה בין שתי המשלחות: הסובייטים תומכים באופן עקרוני בהארכת ההפוגה, אך יש להם השגות על כמה מתנאיה.

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שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט (בתל אביב, ב־7 ביולי 1948)[1]

Meeting: M. Shertok — Count Bernadotte (Tel Aviv, 7 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2426/5

Confidential

Count Bernadotte said that, although he had been in Cairo the previous evening for the purpose of obtaining the reply of the Arabs to his proposal for a thirty-day extension of the truce, this reply had not been forthcoming. He would now be proceeding immediately to Haifa, where he would wait for the Arab reply. The reply of the Arabs would be published simultaneously with ours on the following day at 12 noon GMT (4 p.m. Israeli time).

Mr. Shertok said that as the Arabs had not yet given their reply, he would ask that the reply of the Israeli Government, which he was about to give the Count, should be treated as strictly confidential. What he was about to say would be the Israeli Government's final reply, unless the Count heard from him to the contrary before the deadline on the following day. The Israeli Government had decided to agree to a prolongation of the truce for thirty days, subject to discussion of certain details. One of the outstanding questions was that of the water supply for Jerusalem; the Government agreed to a prolongation of the truce on the understanding that during the new thirty-day period water would be pumped up to Jerusalem.

Count Bernadotte said that he had spoken to the Prime Minister of Transjordan on this subject the previous evening in Cairo. The Prime Minister had said that he had been in Cairo all the time and had received no reply from his Government to the message he had sent them about the Jerusalem water supply. Count Bernadotte said that he regarded this as a very serious matter and would report accordingly to the Security Council. It was all the more serious because it was not a breach of the truce by an army unit in the field, but the failure of a Government over a period of four weeks to implement one of the truce terms. He realized that the Iraqi Government was also implicated, owing to the presence of Iraqi troops at Ras-el-Ain pumping station. He thought, however, that the matter would be straightened out if the truce continued.

Mr. Shertok doubted whether it would be straightened out unless the Security Council took a strong line. This was not a one-time infringement of the truce, but a continuous state of sin. Count Bernadotte agreed that the position of the Transjordan and Iraqi Governments could not be defended. He would send a cable to the Security Council, to arrive in time for their

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1. ראה מס' 281.

meeting which was due to start within the hour. (At this point Count Bernadotte instructed Mr. William Epstein, a member of his staff, to draft a cable on this subject to Lake Success — which Mr. Epstein proceeded to do.)

Mr. Shertok now passed to a discussion of the various demilitarisation projects, and said that the Israeli Government differentiated between the various proposals. The Government felt some reserve about them all, as demilitarisation inevitably limited its jurisdiction. The Government, however, was ready to discuss the project for demilitarising Jerusalem, with a view to clarifying some of its implications. The Government agreed to the prolongation of the truce for a few more days in Jerusalem, in the event of the truce not being extended in the country as a whole, in order to enable a final decision to be arrived at on the subject of the city's demilitarisation. (It was agreed that this separate, temporary Jerusalem truce should be referred to as a "cease-fire".) It was understood that supplies of water, food and fuel to Jerusalem would be maintained without limitation of quantity as long as Jerusalem remained demilitarised. Mr. Shertok also made it clear that the Israeli Government would not wish the transition from a demilitarised Jerusalem to the institution of a permanent regime for that city to be automatic; i.e. the Israeli Government reserved its full rights and claims with regard to any future political settlement for Jerusalem that might be proposed, and it would agree to the demilitarisation of the city only on the understanding that its future political status remained unaffected by its demilitarisation. Militarily, Jewish forces would be entitled to revert to the *status quo ante* immediately demilitarisation came to an end. Count Bernadotte accepted all these conditions.[2]

Count Bernadotte said that he understood from this that if the Arabs rejected the proposed prolongation of the country-wide truce, but accepted the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, the Israeli Government would agree to the proposed "cease-fire" in Jerusalem. Mr. Shertok indicated assent.

Mr. Shertok now passed on to the Count's proposal for a demilitarisation of the railway from Haifa to Jerusalem, and stated that the provision of civilian supplies for Jerusalem did not, in his Government's opinion, require the demilitarisation of the railway. The Government would be prepared to grant safe-conducts to trains and road convoys run by the U.N. through Israeli territory for the purpose of bringing food and other civilian supplies to Jerusalem, and was of the opinion that this was all that was required to ensure their safe passage. Count Bernadotte agreed.

Mr. Shertok said that in the view of the Israeli Government, the same principle applied to Haifa. The Government would distinguish between the use of the port for oil, whether crude or refined, and its use as a port of transit for goods destined for the civilian population or the international

2. המשפט האחרון נוסף בכתב־יד.

force in a demilitarised Jerusalem. He suggested that for this latter purpose one or two days could be set apart each month for the unloading of such goods, on the understanding that the port would during those days not be subjected to Arab attack, and that it would on those days not be used for any purpose other than the unloading of Jerusalem supplies.

With regard to the refineries at Haifa, the Israeli Government did not favour their demilitarisation. He explained that 85% of the oil refined at Haifa was shipped abroad, only 15% remaining in Palestine. There was no reason at all why the refineries should not operate normally on Israeli territory, supplying oil, as they had always done in the past, for Jews, Arabs and the rest of the world, and making a vital contribution to the European Recovery Programme. He pointed out, too, that of the oil refined in Haifa, only 50% was piped from Iraq, the remaining 50% being brought by tanker from Abadan. The refusal of Iraq to allow oil to be piped through to Haifa was therefore no obstacle at all to the continued operation of the Haifa refineries, as oil could still be brought by sea from Abadan, which was in Persia.

At this stage Mr. Reedman, on behalf of Count Bernadotte, and Mr. Eytan, on behalf of Mr. Shertok, were instructed to draft an agreed statement on the subjects that had been discussed, for simultaneous publication by Count Bernadotte in Haifa and by the Israeli Government in Tel Aviv on the following day at 4 p.m., Israeli time.

The agreed statement is attached.[3]

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י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק
I.J. Linton to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 75/73. התקבל: 10.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 7 July 1948

In reply to renewed enquiry for oil stocks,[1] said no reason for bulk purchases by us as these stocks anyhow being used for Palestine current needs. Amount used for fuel ship very small. In any case, stocks not Government property but belong to private company. General Government policy to see Palestine receives sufficient stocks month by month for civil requirements, not for stocking up. Regarding question whether Government agrees our use British tankers from Continental ports to Israel,[2] reply "yes", if oil did not originate Middle East and not being shipped back.

Linton

3. המשפט הזה נוסף בכתב־יד. הנוסח המוסכם, מיום 9.7.1948, באותו תיק.

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1. ראה מס' 211.
2. ראה שם, סעיף 5.

הערת-עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבות ה־330 וה־331 של מועצת־הביטחון, ב־7.7.1948, נדונה פנייתו של המתווך להארכת ההפוגה. בסיום הדיון הוחלט לשגר "פנייה דחופה אל הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר לקבל בעיקרון את הארכת ההפוגה לתקופה שתיקבע בהתייעצות עם המתווך." (*SCOR, Third Year*, 331st. Meeting, 7.7.1948, p. 35).

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מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

מברק MH620
נוסח יוצא: 130.02/2424/20

Tel Aviv, 8 July 1948

Have honour acknowledge receipt your telegram 2320 July 7th.[1] Have already communicated yesterday to Mediator decision Provisional Government Israel accept prolongation truce for thirty days, and extension truce for three days if other side rejects prolongation, also expressed readiness discuss demilitarisation whole city Jerusalem. Informed by Mediator this morning Arab Governments rejected both proposals maximum and minimum for extension truce, and as regards Jerusalem accepted demilitarisation principle only for Old City. This morning, 1 a.m. G.M.T. Egyptian force consisting two armoured columns and infantry launched offensive against our positions in south Palestine. Battle now in progress. While its armed forces are ready for most determined action on all fronts, Provisional Government of Israel is most interested learn what Security Council will decide in present emergency.

Shertok

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1. פניית מועצת־הביטחון להארכת ההפוגה (בתיק 130.02/2424/20).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 439
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2414/22

New York, 8 July 1948

Your MH621.[1] Ross phoned with personal views — [Security] Council should refuse accept negative reply, issue last-minute warning consequences Chapter VII and universal world opinion if Council appeal flouted. Believed this would give Arab pro-truce elements last chance. I replied this course only rational if Council met within matter of hours, drafted warning in strongest solemn terms, proceeding Chapter VII immediately if unheeded. Contacting several delegations today. Will cable.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 438
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 8 July 1948

[Security] Council accepted my understanding any truce requires food, water, essential non-military supplies, will flow Jerusalem under U.N. control. Council informed Mediator accordingly, instructed him communicate parties.[1]

Eban

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1. המברק, מיום 8.7.1948, בתיק 130.09/2829/1. נמסר בו נוסח מברקו של שרתוק אל ט. לי — מס' 291.

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1. ראה *SCOR, Third Year,* 331st Meeting, 7.7.1948, pp. 40-1.

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מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק 448
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/7

[New York], 8 July 1948

Proceedings[1] abortive and no resolution proposed, largely owing unclear message Mediator, particularly no unequivocal statement Arab rejection and no reference actual violation.[2] Only United States, Syria, discussed substance, others silent. Meeting adjourned for day or two pending receipt full Arab reply and further information actual truce violation.

Comay

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 2/51
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/26

Tel Aviv, 8 July 1948 (17.40)

In view of Egypt offensive and in order score certain indispensable tactical advantage, also prevent enemy anticipating us, we decided strike tonight several fronts. When this happens, explain, if necessary, after Arab rejection extension truce and Egypt proceeded to violate it, it was strategically inconceivable for us to meekly await deadline.

Shertok

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1. דיוני מועצת־הביטחון ב־8 ביולי.
2. בהודעתו ציין המתווך, שעדיין לא הגיע לידיו הנוסח המלא של תשובת הערבים, אך על־פי הדיווחים הטלגרפיים מנציגו בקהיר, "אין הם מוכנים להסכים להארכת ההפוגה בתנאים הקיימים, לאור נסיונם בארבעת השבועות שחלפו." (ראה "Statement of the Mediator on the Arab and Jewish replies", 8.7.1948, 93.03/94/9).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH628
נוסח נכנס: 93.08/364/10

Tel Aviv, 8 July 1948 (21.10)

Please inform State Department Harry Beilin, our liaison Haifa, transmitted me this afternoon, July 8th, message given him today by Lippincott, American Consul Haifa, behalf United States Government, urging Provisional Government Israel accept extension truce as proposed by Bernadotte. Lippincott added he had been instructed make his representations to our Foreign Ministry in strongest terms.[1] Fact is Provisional Government decided Monday, July 5, accept in principle Mediator's proposal regarding extension truce, made its decision definitive Tuesday, July 6, in light Mediator's further explanations, and informed Mediator accordingly yesterday, 16.30 hours, which was time fixed by him. Feel sure United States Government will be happy learn delay in communication of their attitude did not adversely affect position as far as our eagerness maintain truce was concerned. Actually we were in no doubt as to what their stand on prolongation of truce would be. They now know that it is other party which has rejected and already violated truce.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 20/32. התקבל: 9.7
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 8 July 1948

Our acceptance, Arab rejection, prolongation truce offers new opportunity pressing lifting embargo our favour. Most essential urgent requirement planes. Assume you will mobilise all influences, inform Eban.

Shertok

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1. ראה ה. ביילין אל מ. שרתוק, 8.7.1948, 130.02/2414/26.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: 79/95, 80/196, 81/36. התקבל: 10.7/9.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 8/9 July 1948

Hour conversation Lovett today. Explained Israël /reasons/ accept extension truce. Requested United States leadership U.N. action against Arab aggression under Chapter VII and prompt lifting embargo in our favour. Lovett expressed appreciation our "statesmanship and cooperativeness". Added U.S. taking all possible diplomatic action deter Arab aggression, but meeting difficulties especially Egypt, Syria. Indicated British also trying restrain Arabs, especially Abdullah. Lovett further said U.S. trying push U.N. action far as seven vote requirement permits. Stated embargo situation might be rapidly transformed if Arabs declared /aggressors/. Details follow.

★

Continuing my 79/95. Conversation Lovett my request. Found him cordial, /expansive/. He began by criticising Israel resolution Republican platform,[1] /saying/ that Republicans unduly minimized significance U.S. recognition Israel state which "unconditional and unreserved". He emphasized that de facto recognition referred Government only and contrasted [with] de jure because Israel Government still provisional and not result complete constitutional process. This contrasts sharply his previous expressions and interpretations this matter.[2]

/Lovett said/ he believed Arabs would be beaten by Israel, and that he had warned /Arab/ states against aggression as arousing world opinion and depriving them sympathy U.S. Government. Lovett explained Arab aggression alone does not automatically insure application Chapter VII, and that U.S. needs to assure seven votes before pressing forward. Said U.S. working most actively to make adequate preparation for determined action Security Council. Emphasized modification embargo only possible within framework U.N. action.

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1. ראה מס' 218 והערה 9 שם.
2. ראה מס' 107.

Promised frequent availability for Israel urgent matters, and welcomed being called upon and kept informed.[3] This attitude no doubt largely influenced prevailing climate preparation Democratic Presidential Convention. Proposed Democratic platform Israel almost identical Republican, but White House advisors reported suggesting some action before convention July twelfth.[4]

★

Further to my 79/95. Spoke to Rosenman today. He explains background Lovett attitude by White House discussion regarding Israel July sixth, in which Lovett been persuaded that State Department advice on Israel hitherto consistently wrong.

Epstein

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 77/177, 79/114, 80/74. התקבל: 11.7/10.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 8/9 July 1948

Talked with McNeil. 1) Cease-fire: British pressing strongly Arabs accept cease-fire, making clear no military help, arms or otherwise from them if fight restarts. Emir Abdullah not unwilling continue truce; chief difficulty Egypt, which for internal reasons interested Palestine victories. British advised Arabs their military prospects poor in renewed fighting, also threatened with America lifting embargo in favour Jews. British told Arabs they cannot protect them against sanctions Security Council in case they restart fight. 2) Count's proposals British regard foolish, they and America advised him to insist Abdullah withdrawing from Jerusalem, offering compensation parts (?) Haifa free port for everyone. They think Count's proposal Jerusalem damaging [—] Jews or Christians. British feel time for definite peace proposals not come, Count premature. Their opinion he should have concentrated on solving Jerusalem problem and continuing truce. Urged friends try to get British officers out of Arab Legion in

3. השווה הדין־וחשבון על השיחה ב־9 *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1198.
4. ראה מס' 312.

case of resumed fighting [—] Glubb and Lash.[1] Friends told us already advised Glubb resign Arab Legion, not sure whether he will accept their advice, as he more for Arabs than British. Glubb [—] accusing Government. All British in Arab Legion lost their Army pension. 3) Mutual relations: British Government has decided send Sheringham Tel Aviv act as Consul. We said will have to be accredited Provisional Government, he replied if we are asked for facilities we should take this position. He promised definite reply next week my status here. Asked us urge you to do utmost to protect Marriott[2] Haifa, afraid him being kidnapped Irgun Zvai Le'umi action, must have fatal reaction (?) here. 4) Refineries: They hope settle it by agreement on free port including Refineries. Told him matter free port difficult, may drag long time, especially if not accompanied by Abdullah consent give up Jerusalem. Asked his [?opinion] suggestion Count establish supervising Refineries [*sic*]. Friend thinks that good idea. [—] discuss it with Count in case they ready intervene. British ready press Iraq Government accept temporary arrangement allowing pumping oil Haifa. 5) Cyprus: Made strongest representati[ons]. Friend's position in overruling Count's interpretation difficult to defend, promised to take up the matter with Bevin, will reply next week. Hopeful change their decision. 6) He said repeatedly they and America no direct contact with Count, who consulted them only Haifa [and] Jerusalem problem, disregarding their advice. Am convinced that British do not support Count's proposals Jerusalem. 7) Advises us if you, Kaplan, ready talks here on financial assets, understand British ready for discussions. Advise us what line to take.

Goldmann

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ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק
L. Kohn to M. Shertok

העתק: 93.03/94/9

[Tel Aviv], 9 July 1948

In going over the material concerning the breaches of the truce, I notice that Count Bernadotte in his final statement on the Arab and Jewish replies, issued at Rhodes on July 8th,[1] sums up the situation created by

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1. בריגדיר נורמן לאש, קצין בריטי, מפקד הדוויזיה הראשונה של הלגיון הערבי.
2. ראה מס' 261.

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1. ראה מס' 294 והערה 2 שם.

these replies in a manner which is contrary to the facts and calculated to convey a false impression.

In the third and fourth paragraphs of his statement he announces that the Jewish reply agreed to a prolongation of the truce for thirty days, while the Arab reply stated that the Arabs were not prepared to accept the prolongation of the truce. In the last but one paragraph of his statement, however, Count Bernadotte writes: "Since it appears quite impossible for me to obtain agreement of the two parties not to resume hostilities, I will now concentrate my efforts on Jerusalem". The impression conveyed by this summing up is that both sides were equally unwilling to agree to a prolongation of the truce, while as he himself states in the earlier paragraph, the Jews agreed and the Arabs did not agree. This is the kind of pseudo-objectivity which undermines confidence in the Mediator's impartiality and to which, I think, his attention should be drawn.

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ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Reedman to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2424/20

Tel Aviv, 9 July 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the following message from Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator for Palestine:

I find it imperative to proceed to Lake Success immediately, for the purpose of presenting to the Security Council of the United Nations a full report on my negotiations and the Arab and Jewish replies to my several proposals.

I am particularly and most keenly disappointed that my proposal for a prolongation of the truce was not favourably acted upon by the Arab representatives. In this regard, I may also call attention to the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July addressing 'an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator'.[1] The Security Council is now actively and urgently engaged in the consideration of appropriate steps looking toward an assurance of peace in Palestine, and it is my intention to place myself fully at the disposal of the Security Council towards this end.

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 298.

I plan to return to the Near East from Lake Success within a matter of days, for the purpose of resuming my efforts at mediation.

For the above reasons, in the interest of peace and the peoples of Palestine, Arabs and Jews alike, and with grave concern for the preservation of Jerusalem, I make this appeal to both parties with utmost urgency to accept an unconditional cease-fire in Palestine for a period of ten days, extending from 12 o'clock noon, G.M.T., Saturday, 10 July 1948.

I earnestly hope that both parties will demonstrate their sincere desire for peace in Palestine by accepting this urgent appeal, and that their acceptance will be notified to me at my headquarters at Rhodes at the earliest possible moment.

Count Folke Bernadotte
United Nations Mediator on Palestine

I have the honour to be your obedient servant,

John N. Reedman
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 457
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 9 July 1948

[Security] Council awaiting definite message Mediator whether Arab rejection valid and final. On reflection, yesterday's meeting not entirely abortive, view clear American commitment renew attempt Chapter VII if Arabs refuse prolongation. Delegation here believes British unlikely obstruct this time. Council convenable soon as Mediator's report Arab reply received. Myself protested strongly Mediator's allusion responsibility both sides for early resumption hostilities.[1] Worst feature yesterday's meeting — refusal most members even reiterate warnings on non-prolongation. Possibilities Council action remain obscure until British attitude clarified.

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 300.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 461
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 9 July 1948

My personal view: if ten day cease-fire accepted,[1] your presence here short visit desirable unless outweighed home considerations. Reasons follow: 1) Mediator's visit obviously linked win support his programme and represents British attempt rescue Arabs from imminent international action. 2) Discussion peaceful adjustment may arise Council in context Mediator's discussions Tel Aviv, Cairo, with which you intimately familiar. 3) American policy Palestine now in highly formative stage. 4) Public relations effect undoubtedly favourable. 5) Our proper designation Council gives you opportunity and justification travel here for purpose making statement Council. Doubtless on arrival Washington contacts also possible. 6) Will be very glad see you. 7) All feel urgent need intimate consultation for effective discharge duties here. 8) Epstein and all colleagues New York concur. Please cable views.

Eban

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א. אבן אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
A. Eban to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 9 July 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to refer you to my letter addressed to you on July 2, 1948,[1] to which I am instructed by the Government of Israel to add further comment to the detention of some 11,000 Jewish men of military age on Cyprus, by the United Kingdom.

In the above mentioned letter to you, it was stressed that the Security Council Resolution of May 29 contained no restrictions on the movement of men of military age, other than "fighting personnel". On the contrary, such a restriction was deliberately deleted from the original draft resolution, and the amended version was approved by the United Kingdom

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1. ראה מס' 301.

304
1. מס' 260.

representative. It will be recalled that in moving the amendment, the representative of France, who was also at the time President of the Security Council, stated:

> The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the introduction into these various territories of fighting personnel, but not of men of military age. . . It aims at preventing combatant fighting personnel from entering these various countries, but to allow men of military age to come into these territories on the condition, however, that at least during the truce they are not mobilized, and that they do not receive any military training.[2]

There can therefore be no suggestion that the United Kingdom Government failed to appreciate the import of the Resolution on this point.

The Government of Israel has also been informed by the United Nations Mediator that he did not regard the entry into Israel of this group of men of military age from Cyprus as being contrary to the provisions of the truce as laid down by the resolution and interpreted by him, and that he conveyed this ruling to the United Kingdom Government.

The United Kingdom Government has not, however, deferred to the Mediator's ruling, and are continuing to detain this group and prevent their movement from Cyprus to Israel. This is an arbitrary action taken by the United Kingdom Government on its own initiative, without its being in any way justified either by the terms of the resolution or by the exercise of the Mediator's discretion.

The persons in question were originally intercepted while *en route* from Europe to Palestine, and forcibly detained on Cyprus by the United Kingdom Government while the Mandate was still in operation. The Government of Israel denies that this action was warranted at the time, but even if it was, there can be no valid ground on which the detention could be continued at this stage, when the United Kingdom has no concern with the immigration policy of Israel.

This continued detention is inhuman as well as illegal. It imposes still more suffering upon persons who have already endured too many years of confinement and hardship, and for whom a further delay in resettlement means prolonging a severe physical and psychological strain. Furthermore, since the restriction applies only to men of military age, it involves splitting of families on a large scale.

It would be appreciated if this letter were brought to the attention of members of the Security Council.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

Aubrey S. Eban
Representative, Provisional Government of Israel
to the United Nations

2. ראה שם, הערה 3.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: 55/118. התקבל: 10.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 9 July 1948

Shofet[1] informed me Lovett told him American legal theory full unreserved recognition has been granted State Israel, de facto recognition only Memisrael, pending Constituent Assembly under November Resolution.[2] We explained to *Shofet* this inconsistent with present designation [of] /diplomatic/ representative[3] and genuineness demonstrable only by proper designation. However, Democratic Party leaders admit Presidential statement expanding recognition essential for public relations purpose. This may be expected within days. Lovett also raised doubt whether America can unilaterally lift embargo, view 17th April resolution[4] still in force. Jurists declare that this fantastic, ourselves preparing memorandum.[5] Conversation took place before Arab truce rejection. Epstein informed.

Eban

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י. שמעוני[1] אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
Y. Shimoni to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 3/279
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/20

Tel Aviv, 9 July 1948

Since Sasson went abroad, I shall try keep you informed on Arab affairs, much as building up department and scantiness information allow. First instalment: My impression is Arab rejection Mediator proposals and even

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1. סמואל רוזנמן. 2. ראה מס' 298. 3. ראה מס' 107.
4. החלטת מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש ואיסור הכנסת לוחמים, נשק וציוד צבאי לארץ־ישראל — ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך, עמ' 632־634.
5. התזכיר בג"ו, מצורף למכתב של אבן אל רוזנמן מיום 9.7.1948. בתזכיר נאמר שהחלטת ה־17 באפריל אינה עוד בתוקף מפני שנועדה לפרק הזמן שעד לסיום המנדט הבריטי; ההחלטה התקפה היחידה של מועצת־הביטחון בעניין ארץ־ישראל היא ההחלטה מיום 29 במאי, וזו אוסרת הכנסת נשק לארץ־ישראל במשך תקופת הפסקת־האש. (ראה נספח ה, עמ' 666־667). סיום הפסקת־האש, נאמר בתזכיר, מאפשר לממשלת ארצות־הברית לייצא ציוד צבאי לכל מדינה הראויה לכך, לפי דעתה.

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1. יעקב שמעוני, ממלא־מקום מנהל מחלקת המזרח התיכון במשרד־החוץ.

cease-fire extension (if Western powers will not apply strongest pressure — this hinted even by Arab sources) influenced mostly by internal Arab considerations. Mediator proposals regarded as strongly pro-Abdullah, Abdullah's visit to Farouk and Ibn Saud attempted get their approval but apparently failed.[2] Many signs growing friction between Egyptians and Transjordanians: One is Hebron-Bethlehem area friction in matters administration (still two competing military governors acting there), supplies, customs and smuggling, winning over of local notables support. Two — Mufti reappearing political scene, participating meetings, apparently supported by Egyptians and Syrians. Three — Mufti's men attempting get key positions in occupied Palestine administration, mainly as high police officers, and to infiltrate Abdullah's Palestine administration. Azzam's visit to Syria and Lebanon was parallel to Abdullah's visit to Farouk, intended convince Sulh[3] and Kuwatli[4] keep Arab unity with Abdullah predominance, but apparently failed. Syria and especially Lebanon took Kawukji's Liberation Army under their wing. This army reorganised in central Galilee, even established civil administration with Nazareth as capital. Its nuisance attacks and cease-fire breaks last week understandable as attempt frustrate Abdullah's endeavours achieve settlement and extension cease-fire. Summary: Arab unity possible in anti-Israel war only. All this more guesswork than exact information. Please pass copy to Epstein.

Shimoni

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מ. שרתוק אל ג'. רידמן (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2424/20

[Tel Aviv], 10 July 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 9, 1948, transmitting a message from Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator, regarding a ten day's unconditional cease-fire,[1] and to confirm on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel the following answer,

2. ראה מס' 209 והערה 5 שם.
3. ריאד אל־צולח, ראש ממשלת לבנון.
4. שוקרי אל־קוואתלי, נשיא סוריה.

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1. מס' 301.

the substance of which was given to you orally on my behalf by Mr. Shiloah last night:

The Provisional Government of Israel accepts in principle the new cease-fire proposal for a period of ten days, and is ready to issue the necessary orders as soon as it is notified by the Mediator or his representatives that the proposal has been accepted by the Arab governments and authorities concerned, and *that orders to cease all hostilities have actually been issued to all commanders of Arab forces operating in the field against the forces of Israel.* The Provisional Government would prefer the time for the commencement of the cease-fire to be fixed in the forenoon, Israel's time.

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 82/78. התקבל: 11.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 10 July 1948

Lovett today told reliable friend that U.S. delegation U.N. been instructed demand application Chapter VII case Arabs continue /fighting/, and that they have already assured British support this line. Lovett further said that lifting embargo for Israel can be revised after Arabs declared aggressors, otherwise British may renew supply arms to Arabs ground their treaties Arab states. Lovett also stated Arabs been informed that U.S. recognition Israel is full and unqualified. This conversation confirms Lovett's general line with me, July eighth.[1]

Epstein

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1. ראה מס׳ 298.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 56/65. התקבל: 11.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 10 July 1948

Consider our interest requires early termination Bernadotte mission in order he not report Assembly, raising question future Government Palestine, advocating his proposals. His existence constantly exploited Council avoid action against aggression. If removed, no organ of potential revision remains, question becomes narrowed to peace preservation. If you concur, we can work discreetly, /fruitfully, here in circumstances/ Presidency Council,[1] Secretary-General, favourable Washington atmosphere. Please cable views.[2]

Eban

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א. אבן אל ח. וייצמן (מונטרה)
A. Eban to C. Weizmann (Montreux)

מקור: ג"ו

New York, 10 July 1948

My dear Chief,

I have been meaning for some time to write you a detailed survey of the situation here. Between making that decision and carrying it out, I saw Dave Ginsburg's letter to you[1] containing an estimate of the position, with which I entirely concur. Since then the political position has improved in our favour, owing to the Arab rejection of the truce proposals; the consequent weakening of British ability to champion Arab interests openly; the imminence of United States Presidential elections; and the passage of time, bringing with it a process of consolidation in the affairs of the State. In this

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1. ראה מס' 277, הערה 2.
2. שרתוק הסכים שכדאי לנסות ולפעול בכיוון המוצע, אך הביע ספק אם מועצת־הביטחון תוכל להפסיק את שליחות המתווך, שהרי הוא אחראי כלפי העצרת הכללית. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 12.7.1948, 93.01/2180/21).

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1. המכתב, מיום 1.7.1948, בתיק 93.08/375/17. עיקר תוכנו מובא במס' 226.

sense, every week that passes is in our favour. The idea of Israel's non-existence becomes increasingly grotesque. For this reason, I believe that our people were wise to accept all the truce proposals despite restrictive conditions which should not have been imposed.

In talks with the United States delegation here, they constantly emphasize that for them, the State of Israel is an irrevocable fact. There have been many attempts to lure them into the British camp on the question of frontiers, but so far the British Government has had no success. It has obtained a purely procedural agreement from the United States Government — not to take drastic steps without prior consultation — but I am satisfied that there is no specific agreement on substance. The President, especially, is standing firm on this point.

The desire of the President to do something in our favour is persistently hampered by State Department arguments, which exploit his lack of acquaintance with the details of the subject. Here is an example: When it was suggested that he should immediately lift the embargo after the end of the truce, State Department officials argued that the United States had no power to do this unilaterally without a prior decision of the United Nations. It was even argued that the Security Council Resolution of April 17 forbade unilateral action of this kind. In point of fact, the April 17 Resolution simply does not exist; it expired quite categorically with the end of the Mandate, and was succeeded by the May 29 Resolution, which has also since expired. The enclosed memorandum will make this plain.[2] The position is that the United States imposed an embargo by a unilateral sovereign act and can similarly cancel it. This is so obvious, that an attempt to argue otherwise is implicitly dishonest, and it shows to what lengths State Department officials will go to exploit Presidential ignorance on their own behalf. By working through Rosenman, as you suggested, I have attempted to arm the White House against these attacks.

Another example may be instructive: In an effort to stave off de facto recognition,[3] the Department is arguing that full recognition to the State of Israel has already been granted, while de facto recognition applies solely to the Government, owing to the latter's provisional nature. This argument is more plausible than the one about the embargo. It is, however, discredited by the fact that McDonald and Epstein are not given the title or immunities of regular envoys.[4]

Despite all this, it is clear that the logic of the political situation here, especially after the Republican platform,[5] will not only prevent any steps taken against us, but can still become the motive of positive acts on our

2. ראה מס' 305 והערה 5 שם.
3. כך במקור.
4. ראה מס' 305.
5. ראה מס' 218 והערה 9 שם.

behalf. Apart from de facto recognition, the embargo, and the loan, the most important function which we can get the United States to perform is to secure a resolution of the Security Council determining Arab aggression. Such a resolution would solve all other problems: the embargo, the loan, and extended recognition would flow automatically from it; and such a resolution can be obtained if there is genuine United States pressure and at least a willingness on the British side not to obstruct. The reports coming from London indicate that Bevin is seriously embarrassed in his pro-Arab policy, firstly, by the strength of pro-Israel sentiment in the United States, and secondly, by the persistent acts of the Arab States in putting themselves in the wrong. Dispatches coming from London this morning indicate that these two factors have now become so strong, that Britain may genuinely be forced to abstain from sabotaging an aggression resolution as she did on two previous occasions.[6] Past experience argues for caution on this point. While there is perhaps an increase in British realism, there is not the slightest sign of good will. However, should it be possible for Great Britain to keep Abdullah out of trouble, the British delegation may well support strong action against Egypt, Syria and any other of the non-Abdullah Arab forces. With this done, and the Arab pressure on Abdullah removed, a settlement based on the immediate recognition of Israel and the absorption of Arab areas by Abdullah might well become feasible. It is obviously absurd to think of Abdullah as an independent agent of policy. His acts flow as direct consequences from the pressures brought to bear upon him. If British and Arab League pressure are withdrawn, the dominant factors in his conduct become his interest in relations with Israel and his desire for recognition by the United States and the United Nations.

The President's most recent message contained a reference to our entry into the United Nations,[7] and two other hints of this sort have been dropped to me by members of the United States delegation here. They argue quite soundly that unless this matter is settled in Paris this autumn, a degree of uncertainty and instability will persist for another year. We are now undertaking preparatory work on this matter.

Entry into the United Nations raises no problems of individual recognition by each state. Indeed, some members of the United Nations have no more than two or three recognitions, and several of them have a smaller volume of recognition than we. If we can get sponsored by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and are supported by the Secretary-General, the matter should be capable of successful outcome. But we should, of course, feel much happier if the French could advance to a more positive attitude.

6. ראה מס׳ 299.
7. באיגרת ששיגר לוועידה השנתית ה־51 של ההסתדרות הציונית בארצות־הברית, שהתכנסה בראשית יולי בפיטסבורג, הצהיר טרומן, ש״ישראל צריכה למצוא את מקומה הראוי בתוך ארגון האומות המאוחדות.״

In talks with Parodi and other members of the French delegation, I am told quite candidly that British pressure alone is responsible for the delay in French recognition. If the Foreign Secretary were someone other than Bidault, perhaps this pressure would not be decisive, and a Socialist regime would certainly solve the question. Here again, if we could get a stronger United States attitude, the French would pluck up courage to resist British obstruction. Sumner Welles[8] is quite right in saying that the question of French recognition hinges upon a high-level Washington approach to Paris.

The Latin American frontier remains satisfactory, and odd recognition comes in here and there. Colombia is helpful on the Security Council, and Argentina is no longer obstructive.

Two of our major obstacles here are the attitudes of Canada and Belgium. The Canadians, after their independent and whole-hearted attitude for over a year, seem to have forgotten all about the Statute of Westminster,[9] and have become the hirelings of Mr. Bevin.[10] The absence of recognition from the three Dominions[11] is perhaps the most malicious blow that Bevin has struck against us recently. Not one of them would have withheld recognition of its own accord.

In order to expedite recognition and entry into the United Nations, a little conspiracy was developed here for being seated in the Security Council under the name of Israel. Manuilsky of the Ukraine ruled in our favour, put his ruling to the vote, and was upheld, despite British opposition.[12] This means that we now sit at the table as a state, non-member, under Article 32 of the Charter.

As I write, we are awaiting Bernadotte's visit here. It is quite obvious from the whole course of his mission that he lacks both character and ability. To this day, he fails to understand our sentiments about the Arabization of Jerusalem. The obtuseness, which led him to recommend Himmler to Churchill in 1945 as a proper partner of negotiation, still clings to him. I am convinced that our best interest lies in the termination of his mission by a report to the Security Council, so that he does not come with proposals to the next General Assembly. In fact, we must as soon as possible terminate the whole discussion of the "future government of

8. סאמנר ולס, מדינאי אמריקאי, לשעבר סגן מזכיר־המדינה, אחד מסגני היושב־ראש של הוועד האמריקאי הנוצרי למען ארץ־ישראל.
9. בחוק של וסטמינסטר (1931) נקבע מעמדם של הדומיניונים הבריטיים כחברים שווים ועצמאיים בחבר־העמים הבריטי.
10. למשלחת ישראל נגרמה אכזבה רבה מעמדתה של קנדה בעניין הזמנתה של ישראל לשולחן מועצת־הביטחון. (ראה מס׳ 284). למרות שהיו סימנים שקנדה תימנע, היא הצביעה נגד ואף היתה המשלחת היחידה שהתבטאה בחריפות נגד ההזמנה. (ראה קומיי אל שרתוק, 8.7.1948, 93.03/128/7).
11. קנדה, אוסטרליה וניו־זילנד. דרום־אפריקה הכירה בישראל ב־24.5.1948.
12. ראה מס׳ 284.

Palestine" and narrow it down to a discussion on the maintenance of peace between states, within the ordinary framework of the Charter's provisions for the settlement of conflicts between existing independent states. I hope that the Government in Tel Aviv will share this view and permit us to work accordingly.

The affairs of this delegation run smoothly and well. I communicate directly and exclusively with the Government in Tel Aviv, and the Executive of the Jewish Agency here no longer exists politically. There are occasional consultations in which I inform them of Lake Success work, but of course there is no question of their influencing policy, which emanates directly from the Foreign Office. I must say that American Zionists have been quick to recognize the logic of their new position. I personally enjoy the best relations with them, and neither this delegation nor the mission in Washington has the slightest reason to complain of any interference from outside. Perhaps the best thing about our mission at Lake Success is the abrupt drop in its average age (my colleagues are Comay, Lourie, Toff, Kenen, Ruffer). Indeed, the establishment of the State appears to have led to a general rejuvenation everywhere. It is comforting to have people like Walter Eytan in the Foreign Office in Tel Aviv. But I wonder whether more could not be done in this first impetus, before the forms and patterns are crystallised, to attract new people from the West. In particular, I often wonder whether Isaiah [Berlin] [13] might not find a more congenial framework in the new setup than in the old. I was shown a copy of your recent letter to Moshe Shertok,[14] and our legal adviser, Dr. Robinson, is preparing a memorandum on forms of Presidency which will reach you in due course.

I introduced Golda to Gromyko and they appear to get on well. In our relations with that part of the world, all is harmonious and serene.

The coming few weeks will be decisive in proving whether or not the United Nations can be an agent for the suppression of Arab aggression. The feeling that the organization itself has come to a blind alley, from which only strong action will save it, is one of the factors in our favour. But, of course, so long as our defence stays firm in Israel, we can get along with or without other factors in our favour. Judging from their attitude here, the Arabs are not very far from a state of mind of at least passive acquiescence in our existence. We need merely a last final push.

I shall be leaving here at the end of August when the Security Council rises, and would go in the first place to London. If you will be in Europe at that time, I should be very glad to come over for a day or two to talk at greater length before you leave for Israel.

13. ישעיהו ברלין, אז מרצה לפילוסופיה באוקספורד. בשנים 1942־1945 שירת בשגרירות הבריטית בוואשינגטון.

14. מס' 235.

My wife joins me in sending you and Mrs. Weizmann our most cordial and affectionate wishes.

Sincerely,

Aubrey S. Eban

Your strictures about my delay are justified; but, oh God, it is hot here for working a 15 hour day surrounded by the sharks on the Security Council. I'm sorry and will be more regular in correspondence.

Aubrey[15]

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 57/28. התקבל: 12.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 11 July 1948

If military considerations allow, we believe best policy to refuse anything but unconditional cease-fire. This important view possible attempt improve old truce resolution in favour Arabs.

Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 83/152. התקבל: 12.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 11 July 1948

Have had 9th July conference Clark Clifford and others, which reveal political election background Lovett's conversation,[1] and related to development of several meetings held White House last week, in which State Department participated with political officers in formulating platform Democratic Party relating Israel. Considerable pressure on Lovett. Lovett

15. התוספת בכתב־יד.

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1. ראה מס' 298.

weaker because Forrestal and Department Defence no longer supporting him. Democrat platform draft take line that Israel State already accorded full recognition, that de facto recognition relates merely to Provisional Government, and that de jure recognition Government will follow immediately after elections in Israel. Democrat platform draft also claims credit for 29th November, in support of partition, and will pledge no modification 29th November frontier without Israel's free consent. Platform draft treats embargo issue in terms right Israel to receive arms for self-defence, but with limiting phraseology about right to receive arms only within framework U.N. decision. Making every effort to improve position, especially on embargo but also on recognition.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH646
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 11 July 1948

Despite non-prolongation truce, British authorities Cyprus persist refusing exit men military age in contradiction previous British assurances that after May 15th exit would be unrestricted, and that exclusion men military age applied only truce period. Please raise matter Security Council.[1] Your 461.[2] Presumption unmaterialized; apart from this, consider visit impolitic as our position stronger when Government keeps background. As to visit Washington, must be subject special arrangement and necessitated by major state purpose. These reasons plus other urgent needs here outweigh your otherwise cogent reasons in favour visit. Your AE20.[3] View our record and course events no calamity if meeting held as intended.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס׳ 304. אבן עורר את העניין במועצת־הביטחון ב־13.7.1948, במהלך השאלות והתשובות לאחר הדין־וחשבון בעל־פה של המתווך (ראה SCOR, Third Year, 333rd Meeting, 13.7.1948, pp.13-14).
2. מס׳ 303.
3. לא נמצא.

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מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 103. התקבל: 13.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

[New York], 12 July 1948

Ross sought our reaction following line: Firstly, declare threat to peace arising from Arab rejection truce. Secondly, order renewal truce May 29 conditions. Aubrey [Eban] replied our attitude truce lapsed, aggression /committed/, Council must order aggression cease unconditionally. Suspect American approach determined by need obtain British agreement venturing into Chapter VII. Please /confirm our/ line, also signal urgently your instructions, comments, for meeting, probably tomorrow morning, when Aubrey likely speak soon after Mediator.

Comay

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א. אבן אל ג׳. רוס (ניו יורק)
A. Eban to J. Ross (New York)

העתק: 93.03/73/4

[New York], 12 July 1948

Dear Ross,

Your delegation might be interested to have an informal impression of the situation as it appears to me at this time.

1. There can be no doubt that the "flat rejection" of the truce prolongation, which Dr. Jessup foreshadowed on Thursday as imposing an inescapable duty to proceed under Article 39 of the Charter,[1] has in fact taken place. This is clear from the Arab League reply (S/876), in which the Arab states find it

> imperative *not to agree* to a prolongation of the truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to an end.

Perhaps even worse than the rejection of the truce prolongation was the Arab refusal to consider the Mediator's suggestion for a ten days unconditional cease-fire. It is obvious that to refuse peace for ten days is an act

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1. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 332nd Meeting, 8.7.1948, p.8.

which by its very nature lacks moral justification; and this particular Arab refusal will be found to have deeply affected the attitude of the Provisional Government of Israel for the future.

2. The "flat rejection" of the truce is, however, illustrated more vividly by the actual resumption of full-scale fighting than by any documentary evidence. The Mediator's observers have been withdrawn; the whole machinery set up after May 29 has collapsed; and the truce proposal, having been denied a new lease on life, has passed into history and must be considered void.

3. Without full documentation before me, I am unable to enumerate the full series of propositions under Chapter VI of the Charter which the Government of Israel has accepted and which the Arab states have refused. It is quite obvious from the tone of the Egyptian and Arab League replies that they regard the use of force against Israel as a legitimate means of preventing the peaceful pursuit of life in Israel.

4. In the circumstances, it is impossible to conceive that any room remains for further action under Chapter VI. I recall that when the United Kingdom proposed its truce resolution at the end of May, your delegation already doubted whether Chapter VI held out any fair hope. On that occasion, Senator Austin said:

> An existing, independent government, the Provisional Government of Israel cannot be blotted out in that way. It cannot be blotted out by just sitting at the Security Council table and ignoring it. The Arab States are taking the only course that can be taken to blot it out — and that is marching in with their armies and blotting it out. That is a matter of international concern, a matter of so great importance that we cannot sit here and say: "Oh, we wash our hands of it. We shall not do anything about it that will be effective. We shall just keep talking about negotiating a cease-fire — after we have tried five times and failed."
>
> We know, of course, that this is a violation of the Charter. We know that the Arab States did not come to the Security Council, submit the case and ask permission to go into Palestine and, as they say, restore peace. We know, from their own confession, that they are attempting enforcement by a regional manoeuvre, and we know that that is a violation of Article 53 of the Charter.
>
> How can the Security Council turn down the resolution presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the Council did turn down the United States resolution? In any case, the United States delegation will vote for that resolution.[2]

5. The May 29 Resolution was regarded by your delegation and many others as a last chance to apply to this question the methods of pacific

2. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 307th Meeting, 28.5.1948, p. 22.

settlement, specified in Chapter VI of the Charter. Judging from the reference to Chapter VII, in its concluding paragraph, the United Kingdom then shared this view. It would, of course, be a mockery of international principles if it were to appear that the Arabs' purpose in resuming this brutal warfare is to elicit a new truce resolution with conditions improved in their favour. Some such purpose may be discerned behind the phraseology of rejection which they have used. If the Mediator lent himself to such a purpose, Israel would have nothing of him. *The idea that rejection of a truce entitles the rejecting party to further concessions at the expense of the accepting party, would spell havoc and mockery to the Security Council.* Israel would certainly not listen to any such resolution. Indeed, after the Arab rejection of the truce prolongation and the resumption of hostilities, Israel's declared readiness even to prolong the truce automatically lapses.

6. The conclusion, however unpalatable, is that the situation has gone far beyond the capacity of the United Nations to influence it, except by the processes of Chapter VII. There is no going back. Nothing is to be gained from avoiding the plunge. Indeed, if it is avoided, Chapter VII will have been morally erased from the Charter. For to what circumstances can that Chapter properly apply if not to these, in which armed force is used, not alone against the recommendation of the General Assembly, but also against the reiterated appeals of the Security Council and its qualified representative?

7. All the information reaching us from the Middle East indicates that the first step by the Security Council in the application of Chapter VII would undermine the position of those who have prevailed upon the Arabs to reject the truce, and reinforce the position of such moderate elements as may exist who see the interests of the Arab world to lie along the road of speedy reconciliation with Israel under the auspices of the United Nations. Thus, the long and frustrating history of Arab-Jewish relations will record no setback more serious than that which would arise from any failure to proceed under Chapter VII at this time.

8. These considerations lead me to reflect on the future of Count Bernadotte's mission. *We indignantly repudiate the suggestion made in the Arab replies that mediation on behalf of a peaceful adjustment can still proceed while aggression and warfare go on simultaneously.* It is most fantastic to expect that, while Arab States flout the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Mediator, and embark upon illegitimate violence, organs of the United Nations will simultaneously deal with them on the satisfaction of their political aims. Israel takes the view [that] the Arabs must put their faith either in fighting or in processes of pacific settlement. The idea that the two can co-exist is the deepest cynicism. It would therefore be rash to expect the Government of Israel to discuss any proposals brought to it by the Mediator at a time when Arab armies are attacking its existence and integrity. Unless Count Bernadotte can somehow stop the Arabs from

shooting, his wider mission in terms of "peaceful adjustment" must logically be regarded as at an end. It is my further impression that if the Security Council takes no steps at all along Chapter VII, it will have lost all its influence with the Government of Israel, which will then rely exclusively on its own defence, and upon the active sympathy which it will generate and mobilise to the fullest degree throughout the democratic world.

9. I would be less than candid if I did not confidentially convey our feelings with respect to Count Bernadotte at this time. No blame can attach to him for having failed honourably, where many others have failed, to achieve an agreement between Israel and those who stipulate the extinction of Israel as a condition of peace. We may be permitted to question the historic imagination and judgment which led him to make his Jerusalem proposal, and to encourage the Arabs to expect a right of interference in Jewish immigration policy. All that, however, is past. The celebrated "Suggestions", in our view, no longer exist, since they failed to secure agreement. They do not possess the legal or moral status of the UNSCOP report or the Assembly's recommendations, which both proceeded from bodies charged, as Count Bernadotte was not charged, with the task of adjudicating between the two conflicting claims. What worries us is his journey across the world, punctuated by a series of ill-chosen loquacities, which have created a false and apparently deliberate obscurity around the essential simplicities of this problem. The clash of armies, in defiance of the United Nations and in violation of the Charter, [is] to him a mere "incident". While Arab states continue to fight, he apparently envisages it as his duty to mitigate their offence. While the Arab refusal is expressed in the firing of guns, he speculates on whether their refusal is or is not "official", and on whether it may not be "understandable".

10. Apart from the qualities of the Mediator himself, the question arises whether the very resumption of his mission is a factor of pacification. You and I, I think, will both agree that peaceful horizons will only open up when the Arab world comes near to reconciling itself with the existence of independent Israel. Does the existence of the Mediator bring that day forward? Does the presence of the only remaining organ of potential revision help the Arabs to regard the existence of Israel as irrevocable? If a man continually operates with a view to "adjustment of the future situation", is there an adequate incentive to the Arab world to make peace with the *existing* situation? And is there not some substance for the idea that the existence of the Mediator furnishes the Security Council with a perpetual excuse for not discharging its responsibilities?

The very act of allowing aggression to proceed for several days while awaiting his arrival with a report of failure illustrates the inhibitions on the Council, to which I have referred.

11. Because of the above, our objections to a mere truce renewal, without a determination of aggression, are not tactical, but substantive. We

should criticise such a Resolution as inadequate and try to mobilize all friendly world opinion against its inadequacies. We do not believe that the U.S.A. can logically sponsor a weaker resolution than that which it previously submitted for an order of unconditional cease-fire. Indeed the logical change would be for the term "act of aggression" to succeed the term "threat to the peace".

12. These are my own preliminary reflections on the situation. It is probable, however, that some of these sentiments will find expression in the views which we submit to the Council next week. I would have no objection to these views being made known to other members of the United States delegation, provided that their status as personal reflections is borne in mind. It may, in that case, not be irrelevant to note that they are the views of one who tries to represent the influence of moderation in Israeli policies.

Yours very sincerely,

Aubrey S. Eban

נספח
APPENDIX

Draft Resolution

Considering that the Security Council on May 29th called upon all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks;

Considering that the proposals of the United Nations Mediator were unconditionally accepted by all interested parties, and that the cease-fire became effective 11 June 1948 at 6:00 in the morning, GMT;

Considering that the Mediator on July 3 and 5, 1948, asked the parties for a prolongation of the truce;

Considering that the Security Council, on the strength of the United Nations Mediator's telegram dated 5 July, addressed an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator;

Considering that the Provisional Government of Israel agreed to the prolongation of the truce for a period of 30 days, while the Arab States rejected such prolongation;

Considering that the Mediator's demand for a 3 days prolongation was also accepted by the State of Israel and rejected by the Arab States;

Considering that the appeal of the Mediator of July 9, 1948, for an unconditional cease-fire for a period of ten days was accepted by the Government of Israel while no answer was given by the Arab States;

Considering that on [July][3] 8 the Egyptian Army resumed hostilities and that on [July][3] 9 all other Arab armies resumed hostilities;

3. במקור, בטעות: יוני.

Considering that on May 29, 1948, the Security Council decided that if the present Resolution, having been accepted, is violated or repudiated, the present situation in Palestine shall be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Security Council determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes an act of aggression by the Arab States within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

Orders the Arab States to cease all military operations within 48 hours from. . .

Decides in case of non-compliance with this order to consider urgently measures to be taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.

316

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 85/96. נשלח: 13.7 ; התקבל: 14.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 12 July 1948

Soviet Embassy inquired what best medium their Minister and staff travel Israel. Please advise.

From conversation Rusk[1] late yesterday learned they planning present resolution Security Council in two stages: First, calling both parties cease-fire; second, apply Chapter VII against aggressor. [State] Department expects have more support from Council through such procedure.

On Eban's suggestion, saw several friends White House and Department connection Eban's conversation Ross.[2] Rusk denied any intention Department interpret at this stage word "truce" more than "cease-fire", and said no desire their part /make/ truce conditions retrospective.

Epstein

316
1. דין ראסק, מנהל המשרד לענייני האו"ם במחלקת־המדינה של ארצות־הברית.
2. ראה מס' 314.

317

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 473
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 12 July 1948

Appears Government must within matter of hours formulate policy following questions: 1) If Arabs forced by [Security] Council action agree truce prolongation, will Memisrael repeat its offer Mediator four weeks truce on basis military situation existing when new resolution passed? 2) Will Government authorize me state principle Memisrael will refuse discuss political adjustment while aggression proceeds, and in discussing any proposals thereafter, will continue insist full sovereignty, integrity, non-interference immigration?[1]

Eban

318

א. אבן אל א. נג'ר (פאריס)
A. Eban to E. Najar (Paris)

מברק מוצפן
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/127/9
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/172/9

New York, 12 July 1948

Please cable urgent impression whether French readiness supporting Chapter VII action remains unchanged in circumstances making such action even more compelling.[1]

Eban

317
1. ראה מס' 319.

318
1. פישר השיב ב־14 ביולי (93.03/127/9), שעמדת צרפת לא השתנתה.

319

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH 670 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 13 July 1948

Your 473.[1] 1) On technical point Memisrael made no offers Mediator, merely reacted his proposal. On merits any truce necessarily based military *status quo.* We favour unconditional cease-fire. If truce is proposed, our attitude will depend on its precise conditions. 2) Confine yourself second principle. Consider unwise reject a priori any possibility political negotiations any time.

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

מועצת־הביטחון דנה במצב בארץ־ישראל בימים 13-15 ביולי. בפני המועצה היה מונח דין־וחשבון בכתב מאת המתווך. (ראה "Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the Security Council," 12.7.1948, מסמך או"ם S/888). נוסף על כך מסר המתווך דין־וחשבון בעל־פה וענה על שאלות חברי המועצה. במהלך הדיון הגיש הנציג האמריקאי הצעת החלטה, שקבעה שהמצב בארץ־ישראל מהווה איום על השלום וקראה לצדדים להפסיק את האש לתקופה בלתי־מוגבלת, תוך אזהרה שהמועצה עלולה לנקוט צעדים על־פי פרק ז' של מגילת האו"ם. (ראה נספח ו, חלק א עמ' 668־669). הנציג הבריטי הסכים לנוסח הזה, אך הציע להימנע מאיזכור מפורש של ממשלת ישראל [התיקון נדחה]; כמו־כן הציע להוסיף את המלים "מאז האחד־עשר ביולי" בהוראה למתווך לחקור את הפרות ההפוגה (סעיף 7) [התיקון התקבל]. תיקון אחד השמיט את הביטוי "על־פי סעיף 40 של המגילה", שבאו לפני המלים "להמשיך לשתף פעולה עם המתווך" בסעיף הרביעי של ההצעה האמריקאית. במהלך הדיון נוספו הסעיפים 9 עד 11. הסעיף התשיעי היה נוסח פשרה להצעת תיקון סינית בתמיכת הערבים, שקראה לוויתורים הדדיים בנוגע לאירגונה המדיני של ארץ־ישראל ובנוגע לעלייה. (ראה נספח ו, חלק ב, עמ' 669־671).

319
1. מס' 317.

320

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X106. התקבל: 14.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 13 July 1948[1]

Reference American resolution, /ours/ 483.[2] We regard clause 3, ordering cease-fire [and 6,7, ordering cease-fire,] demilitarization Jerusalem, acceptable. Our attitude opposed to clauses 5 and 9 /reviving/ May 29th resolution, particularly since period /unlimited, but anxious receive immediate instructions extent to which should press our opposition/. May we propose limitation to six weeks? British will press for omission any reference Government Israel, and Americans /doubtlessly/ will compromise this /connection in/ order obtain /required/ votes, but we will adopt stiffest attitude /principle/.

Eban

321

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 484
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/9

[New York], 13 July 1948

If draft resolution passed, unless you prepared complete acceptance, suggesting following possible reaction separating cease-fire and truce: 1) Memisrael prepared comply cease-fire order general and Jerusalem as soon as other party indicates compliance. 2) As soon as cease-fire acceptable other side, Memisrael willing consider appeal further cooperation Mediator. Please cable urgently.[1]

Eban

320

1. התאריך על־פי הנוסח הנכנס. בנוסח היוצא רשום, כנראה בטעות: 14.7.1948.
2. אבן אל שרתוק, 13.7.1948 (93.03/128/7) — במברק נמסרו עיקרי ההצעה האמריקאית.
3. המלים בסוגריים מרובעים חסרות בנוסח היוצא והושלמו על־פי הנוסח הנכנס.

321

1. ראה מס' 324.

322

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 86/173. נשלח: 14.7; התקבל: 15.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/21
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 13 July 1948

Early hours this morning powerful eighteen member Platform Committee Democratic Convention concluded bitter discussion Israel resolution. Following main parts resolution: 1) Pledge full recognition Israel. 2) Support boundaries November 29th. Modifications be made only if fully accepted by Israel. 3) Support Israel membership United Nations. 4) Pledge appropriate aid economic development. 5) Favour revision arms embargo to Israel, and pledge to work for modification of any resolution U.N. preventing such revision. 6) Demand internationalization Jerusalem.

Present text resolution contains important changes in our favour regarding recognition, but, although improved, still contains limitations on embargo.

Discussions committee faced strong opposition of State Department to immediate full recognition and lifting embargo irrespective of /U.N./ Fight our favour Committee been carried under leadership Celler[1] with strong support Senators Lucas,[2] Myers[3] and southern delegates. Main spokesman for State Department in Committee was Perlman,[4] recently appointed Solicitor /General/, assimilated Jew from Baltimore.

Platform still requires final adoption by large committee of 118, but no opposition expected to Israel /resolution/ as suggested by small committee.

Epstein

323

מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 25/6
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 13 July 1948

Have no words express desperate urgent need of planes.

M.S.

322
1. עמנואל סלר, חבר קונגרס מניו יורק. 2. סקוט וייק לוקאס, סנאטור ממדינת אילינוי.
3. פראנסיס ג'ון מיירס, סנאטור ממדינת פנסילווניה. 4. פיליפ פרלמן.

324

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH686
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

[Tel Aviv], 13 July 1948

Your 484.[1] Fully accept separation idea. Agree paragraph one, namely we comply cease-fire order general and Jerusalem soon as other party indicates compliance. /As/ for truce, reaffirmation resolution May 29 constitutes major obstacle, since in view indefiniteness period, this no longer mere truce but governmental regime. Result would be enthroning Mediator as supreme authority certain respects and indefinitely curtailing sovereignty. Therefore you should from outset voice strongest opposition any limitation whatsoever our freedom immigration policy under renewed truce, also opposition prohibition importation war materials. Cabling you separately this regard.[2] Matter discussable by Government later today, but unless you hear contrary, above instructions stand for immediate reaction in Council.

Mediator's assertions we expressed confidence in him and invited him continue mediation[3] unwarranted: Latter completely unfounded, former based my having indicated on certain occasion, in reply rather clumsy challenge, that we had highest regard for him as person no doubt actuated by highest motives. Instructed Pearlman[4] clarify point by means spokesman's answer to prearranged question, indicating our consent never sought to Count's appointment, we never called upon express confidence and never did.[5]

Shertok

324

1. מס' 321.
2. ראה מס' 325, 326.
3. המתווך כתב זאת בדין־וחשבון שלו למועצת־הביטחון מיום 12.7.1948 (מסמך או"ם S/888 סעיף 30). הוא חזר על הדברים במועצת־הביטחון, SCOR, Third Year, 333rd Meeting, 13.7.1948, p.8).
4. משה פרלמן, דובר צה"ל ומפקד יחידת הקשר לעיתונות של הצבא. מנהל מחלקת העיתונות במשרד־החוץ.
5. דברים ברוח זאת אמר גם אבן במועצת־הביטחון. SCOR, Third Year, 336th Meeting, 14.7.1948, p.21).

325

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן 6/23
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 14 July 1948

My 686.[1] If challenged whether our opposition immigration restrictions means that if it stands we reject truce, reply you must refer question Government.

Shertok

326

מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH695
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/9

Tel Aviv, 14 July 1948

Further to my 686.[1] Following result Government meeting: 1) Cease-fire[2] to be unconditional. 2) Drop opposition second point,[3] merely mention it as increasing difficulty accordance lengthy period. 3) Regarding immigration, some prefer use formula we can accept no interference regarding our freedom conduct immigration way we consider necessary.

Shertok

325

1. ראה מס' 324.

326

1. מס' 324.
2. הפסקת־אש, להבדיל מהפוגה — truce.
3. האיסור על יבוא חומרי מלחמה, ראה במס' 324.

327

נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק 85/28. התקבל: 15.7
נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ Z4/14834
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2814/2

London, 14 July 1948

Understand that affair five kidnapped[1] being used as reason for delaying de facto recognition, for which I pressing very hard. Please arrange matter quickly and give me full details. Surprised no reply my last cable regarding this matter.[2]

Nahum

328

מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 14 juillet 1948

Mon cher Shertok,

Je m'excuse, tout d'abord, de ne pas vous écrire en hébreu mais nous n'avons toujours pas de dactylo pour cette langue.

Avant-hier je suis rentré de ma période de repos. Je me sens beaucoup mieux et je regrette seulement que je doive recommencer le travail dans des conditions toujours aussi difficiles. En effet, malgré les promesses qui m'ont été faites, je n'ai pas eu de réponse au sujet du budget.

Voici quelle est la situation, telle que j'ai pu en juger depuis mon retour. Ces impressions sont basées sur les entretiens que j'ai eus au Quai d'Orsay et sur une conversation qui s'est déroulée hier entre Bidault et Blumel.

Le gouvernement regrette quelque peu de ne pas nous avoir reconnus dès la proclamation de l'Indépendance. Aujourd'hui, personne ne pense qu'il puisse le faire sans qu'un fait politique nouveau intervienne. Bidault affirme qu'il a envoyé des notes aux Pays arabes, les prévenant que la

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1. ב־6.7.1948 חדרו אנשי אצ"ל לתחנת־הכוח בירושלים ועצרו חמישה אזרחים בריטיים, מעובדי חברת החשמל הירושלמית, וביניהם המנהל בפועל תומאסברייאנט; הם הואשמו בשיתוף־פעולה עם האויב. העצורים הועברו לידי רשויות ממשלת ישראל לאחר שזו הבטיחה לחקור בהאשמות.
2. לא נמצא.

reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël pouvait se produire à tout moment. Mais le fait même que la non-reconnaissance ait été interprétée officiellement comme un geste de neutralité donnerait aujourd'hui à la reconnaissance une portée dont le gouvernement français ne croit pas pouvoir assumer la responsabilité. "D'ailleurs, ajoute M. Bidault, nous vous reconnaissons de facto comme vous reconnaît l'Amérique, seulement cette reconnaissance n'est pas publique." On considère la situation au Maroc comme extrêmement tendue et le général Juin[1] estime que la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël provoquerait au Maroc des troubles très graves.

Le Quai d'Orsay est parfaitement informé des réalités politiques et pratiques en Israël. La tendance est peut-être à exagérer notre potentiel militaire mais le rôle joué par l'Angleterre est très correctement jaugé.

J'ai fait savoir à Eban que l'attitude française, en ce qui concerne le Conseil de Sécurité, n'était pas modifiée.[2] Parodi lui-même, lors de son passage à Paris, a insisté pour qu'on lui permette de maintenir la ligne suivie. M. Parodi a encore raconté que l'attitude personnelle des délégués américains au Conseil de Sécurité nous était hostile. Le sentiment, au Quai, est que ce que nous pourrions attendre de mieux serait la levée de l'embargo.

M. Bidault a souligné qu'il attendait de nous le maintien de notre point de vue en ce qui concerne l'internationalisation de Jérusalem. Il a affirmé qu'il insistait pour que le Vatican élève sa voix dans cette question. On est particulièrement préoccupé par notre attitude vis-à-vis des établissements français et des religieux de toute nationalité qu'ils abritent. Le rapport fait par le médecin-chef de l'Hôpital Français à Jérusalem sur l'occupation du bâtiment pas nos hommes, a produit une impression déplorable. On espère que nous ne perdrons pas de vue l'importance très grande que la France attache à ces questions. Le bruit court, en particulier, que nous envisagerions le groupement des religieux et religieuses libanais et syriens, faisant partie d'établissements français, en un point déterminé. On demande, si ces religieux devaient être inquiétés, que nous consentions à leur rapatriement par les bons offices de la France.

M. Landy,[3] dans une de ses notes, a prétendu que le bruit courait "que nous envisagerions des sanctions à l'égard des ressortissants des pays qui ne nous ont pas reconnus." J'ai cru pouvoir affirmer qu'un tel bruit était absurde et je serais heureux que vous me le confirmiez.

Il n'est pas douteux que le Quai d'Orsay, dans son ensemble, considère l'existence d'un Etat d'Israël fort, comme conforme aux intérêts français. Mais on a tendance à croire que nos seules forces doivent suffire pour

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1. הגנרל אלפונס פ. ז׳ואֶן, המושל הכללי של מרוקו.
2. ראה מס׳ 318.
3. פייר לאנדי, הקונסול הצרפתי בחיפה.

mener la lutte à bonne fin. Sans contredire ce point de vue j'ai fait remarquer que les conditions dans lesquelles nous nous battons impliquent pour nous des pertes en vies humaines qui sont irremplaçables pour le travail constructif qui nous attendra après la guerre et que la France ne peut donc pas se soustraire au devoir de nous aider. Un membre du Cabinet a été désigné pour examiner cette question avec moi mais il est évident que ces négociations ne pourront donner de résultats que si une collaboration peut être établie entre ceux qui s'occupent de ces questions et moi. [.....][4]

J'ai obtenu des explications au sujet de l'affaire de l'*Altalena*.[5] Il m'a été confirmé que la responsabilité de l'aide française, apportée à l'Etsel, appartenait à certains parlementaires, à certains fonctionnaires du ministère de l'Intérieur, et à un membre du Cabinet de M. Bidault. Il s'agit du sous-directeur du Cabinet, M. Morin. M. Bidault a affirmé avoir donné l'ordre à M. Morin de s'en tenir désormais à des rapports avec moi et je dois rencontrer cette personne au début de la semaine prochaine. D'autre part, j'ai eu la satisfaction d'avoir sous les yeux la preuve de ce que le Département Afrique-Levant, auprès duquel j'étais intervenu, s'était opposé au départ de l'*Altalena*.

Le fonctionnaire du Quai d'Orsay, chargé des affaires de l'UNESCO, s'est mis en rapport avec moi au sujet de la conférence de l'UNESCO qui doit se tenir à Beyrouth.[6] J'avais mis à profit mes relations avec un fonctionnaire de l'UNESCO à Paris pour que le lieu de réunion de la conférence soit remis en question à la suite de l'agression libanaise. Or, la France avait contribué à faire désigner Beyrouth. Le Quai d'Orsay ne voudrait pas qu'il y ait une modification, mais il trouve que la situation doit être exploitée en faveur d'une action visant à éloigner le Liban de ses co-agresseurs. Il a donc fait connaître au gouvernement libanais que son soutien pour le maintien du lieu de réunion dépendait de l'attitude du Liban dans l'affaire de Palestine. On m'a suggéré qu'une action des Etats-Unis dans le même sens pourrait avoir un effet décisif. J'ai donc télégraphié à Epstein et à Eban le texte dont vous avez une copie.[7]

Les officiers français de la Commission de contrôle sont rentrés à Paris. Ils sont tous devenus nos très ardents partisans. Malheureusement, ils n'ont pas le droit de faire état publiquement de leur expérience. Ils sont tous révoltés de la mauvaise foi britannique et de l'asservissement des Suédois, des Belges et d'une partie des Américains aux directives anglaises.

J'aimerais avoir des précisions au sujet des conditions dans lesquelles l'officier français a été tué. La presse avait dit qu'il avait été tué par une

4. משפט אחד לא הודפס כאן.
5. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 161.
6. המושב השלישי של הוועידה הכללית של אונסקו עמד להתכנס בבירות באוקטובר 1948.
7. לא נמצא.

mine. Au Quai d'Orsay on prétend qu'il a été tué à coups de grenades et que les responsables seraient l'Irgoun Zwaï Léoumi.[8]

[.....][9]

Veuillez croire, mon Cher Shertok, à mes sentiments très dévoués et amicaux.

M. Fischer

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק: MH710
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 15 July 1948

Regarding return Arabs who left habitations Israel, please insist categorically our attitude no question their /return/ while war lasts, whose duration includes truce, and after war will depend general settlement.

Your /X107/.[1] Maybe, but what is likely prove strong enough induce acceptance is military situation. In this connection and on merits you should categorically oppose any restriction admission men military age during indefinite truce period.

Shertok

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י. פרוסקאואר[1] אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)
J. Proskauer to A. Lourie (New York)

מקור: 93.03/87/5

New York, 15 July 1948

Dear Lourie,

I am very grateful for your letter giving me the approximate text of the cable from Shertok.[2] I would be very grateful if you would convey to him my sincere thanks for his message.

8. הקצין הצרפתי לאבארייר נהרג בעלות מכוניתו על מוקש בדרך מלוביה לסג׳רה.
9. חלקו האחרון של המכתב לא הודפס כאן.

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1. אבן אל שרתוק, 12.7.1948 (93.01/2180/21). אבן דיווח שלפי דעתו של באנץ׳ הצעת ההחלטה האמריקאית אינה חזקה דיה כדי שתתקבל על־ידי הערבים.

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1. יוסף פרוסקאואר, נשיא הוועד היהודי האמריקאי.
2. שרתוק ביקש מפרוסקאואר להפעיל את השפעתו למען ביטול האמברגו האמריקאי וקיום החלטת האו״ם לבינאום ירושלים. (ראה מזכירו של לוריא אל פרוסקאואר, 12.7.1948, 93.03/87/5).

Before I came up here I received a call from Epstein. I told him that I thought it was exceedingly important there should be no crossing of wires. Accordingly, the only specific action I took was to write to the Under-Secretary urging on him again the view I have consistently expressed that America should for its own sake and the sake of the United Nations take an affirmative attitude in the Security Council, looking to the imposition of sanctions against aggression. While I do not suggest cause and effect, it is a fact as you know that that course has been followed in the resolution introduced by Dr. Jessup.[3]

I received yesterday a letter from London from Nahum Goldmann. One paragraph of it reads as follows: "As for my work here, it moves slowly, but I am making some progress. The Government here is beginning to be convinced that the State of Israel is there to stay, and they are just now exercising all their influence with the Arabs to stop the fighting." I sense a certain inconsistency between this and the statement in Shertok's message to me, referring to "the Mediator's shameful retreat from the proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem."

My tentative view, based of course on far less accurate information than that of the Government of Israel, is that on the whole Bernadotte's activities are being very useful to the Jewish cause. I think we must be very careful to make proper allowance for the necessary caution imposed on him by reason of his role as Mediator.

I think we should be most cautious in doing anything which will impair the great gain in public relations which has occurred in America by reason of the cooperative attitude with Bernadotte of the Government of Israel and the uncooperative attitude of the Arabs.

I hope you will not think it heresy if I say that we should give careful attention to the argument that the economic unity envisaged by the partition resolution necessarily involved some consideration of the effect of utterly unrestricted immigration on the Arab economy.

I post merely for consideration of those who have the responsibility of decision the thought that ultimate uncontrolled immigration may have to come in several stages, rather than in one initial stage.

I wish to make very clear to you that the thoughts I am here expressing are, for the time being at least, submitted for the consideration of your Government. I venture to suggest that you send a copy of this letter to Epstein, with my assurance to him that I shall be glad to cooperate with him within the limits of the obligations of myself and my associates as American citizens.

With kindest regards, I am, Yours faithfully,

Joseph M. Proskauer

3. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־671.

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2412/26

London, 15 July 1948

Dear Moshe,

I can't fly tomorrow on the one plane which is still going — both KLM and Air France have stopped their services and are waiting for the truce. And I have appointments with various people here and cannot leave abruptly. Furthermore, I'm afraid I don't attach too much importance to the present Actions Committee meeting, especially as practically nobody from the U.S. is coming, and the decisions as to the future of the Zionist Organisation etc. could wait another few weeks.[1] I may fly on Monday, or maybe only in the middle of next week, as Alice,[2] whom I have not seen for two months now, is arriving on Wednesday in Paris, and would be rather grieved to miss me by only a day. I am therefore sending this letter by Hadassah Samuel, who leaves by tomorrow's plane.

I enclose a copy of my to-day's cable.[3] There is not really much I need add. The exchange of letters about de facto recognition, which McNeil promised me a few weeks ago,[4] has, it seems, been held up through opposition from the Permanent Officials and the Legal Department. Bevin had agreed to it once, and then decided to hold it over for a little. Meantime, their main preoccupations are their position on the Security Council, and their strenuous efforts to get the Arabs to prolong the cease-fire. They have really made the strongest possible efforts over this, as I have informed you, threatening the Arabs with very serious consequences politically and military if they reject the truce, and indicating that they will in no circumstances countenance the delivery of arms to the Arabs, even should the Americans, if the Arabs defy the Security Council, lift their embargo on arms shipments to Israel. As I have informed you, the most intransigent of the Arabs is King Farouk; also Syria; whereas Abdullah is inclined to accept the truce and to be more moderate. In this respect McNeil today advised us to try and re-establish contact with Abdullah, and indicated they are working on him to be ready for some settlement with us.

It was not easy to get the British to agree to support the American resolution, and the Arabs are very angry with them. You will, I expect, have

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1. מושב הוועד־הפועל הציוני נדחה לשבוע השני של אוגוסט.
2. אליס גולדמן, רעיתו של נחום גולדמן.
3. גולדמן אל שרתוק, 16.7.1948, 130.09/2318/4.
4. ראה מס' 126.

seen the statements of the various Arab bodies here attacking British policy in the strongest possible terms as a complete sell-out of the Arab cause and a switch-over to the American line. I am told by various people who meet the Arabs here that the Arab representatives in London are fuming against the British and accusing them of a complete switch-over to the Jewish cause. This is the main reason for the British going slow on de facto recognition: They do not want to add another irritant in the Arab world.

They finally agreed, after I had hinted that I might have to give up my mission here, to my setting up an office as the Representation of the Provisional Government, without their confirming this in writing, but taking note of the fact and continuing their contacts with me and the office for the time being on an oral basis. They at first suggested that we establish the office as representing the "Jewish Authorities in Palestine", but that I naturally flatly rejected. They then agreed to the setting up of the Representation of the Provisional Government, and I feel sure that if the truce comes off, the exchange of letters will soon follow, maybe after I have seen Bevin, whom I have not tried to see yet, as I did not think the moment had come for it.

In the meantime, I am trying to influence the press and important people here. I had an off-the-record meeting yesterday with the diplomatic correspondents of the big London dailies, and I lunched today with the Chief Editor of the *Daily Herald,* who is very close to Bevin. He promised me, after a long and interesting talk, to speak to Bevin and try and help to speed up recognition. I am trying to see Dalton, and maybe Morrison.

On the Cyprus question they are also waiting for the results of the truce efforts. But I think that if the truce goes through, they will soon modify their position and accept Bernadotte's ruling on men of military age.

I hope you will soon settle the question of the five kidnapped men;[5] I am surprised not to have had any reply from you to my various cables about this incident. It makes a bad impression everywhere, as you will see from Oliver Stanley's rather nasty question in the House yesterday.[6] The Foreign Office, too, indicated to the journalists that this matter, too, is holding up recognition. I hope the Government will soon succeed in getting the men out of Irgun's hands; the best thing would be to expel those who are under suspicion. This everyone here would understand, but a trial would too easily become a *cause célèbre* and would have undesirable repercussions, so I do not see why we need risk it when we can get rid of any suspects by

5. ראה מס' 327.
6. במהלך דיון בעקבות שאילתא של אחד הצירים בפרלמנט, התבטא סטנלי, מי שהיה שר־המושבות בעת מלחמת־העולם, כי "קוצר ידם ואולי אי־רצונם של השלטונות היהודיים להטיל איזו שהיא מרות על הארגון הטירוריסטי הזה, מעורר ספיקות כבדים אצל כל אלה שעד עתה לא קבעו עמדה לגבי תביעתם למדינה נפרדת." (ראה *453 H.C. Deb.* 5s, col. 1183).

expelling them. By the way, is Bryant among those suspected?[7] Having known him for some time, I cannot imagine that he would act against us. I heard from people in Jerusalem (like Reifenberg)[8] that he behaved very well and bravely in supplying the Jews with electricity. Please let me know all the details about this case, as everybody asks me about it, and I know nothing more about it than what is in the newspaper reports.

That's all for to-day. There are a number of questions I shall have to discuss with you when I see you; but as I hope this will be in the course of the next few days, it does not seem worth while to write about them.

Yours ever,

Nahum

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ד. בן־גוריון אל מפקד חטיבת עציוני
D. Ben-Gurion to the Commander of the Etzioni Brigade

שדר: ארכיון בן־גוריון 1516

תל אביב, 15 ביולי 1948

בהול

לעציוני,

במקרה שתצליח לכבוש העיר העתיקה, יש סכנה חמורה והרת־אסונות מחיילינו: שישדדו ויחללו מקומות קודש נוצריים ומוסלמיים — ואם יש סיכוי ממשי של כיבוש עליך להכין כוח מיוחד, נאמן וממושמע, שישמור על כל המבואות ויאסור על חיילים כניסה לעיר העתיקה. כדאי לשם כך אפילו למקש כל הכניסות ולהודיע על כך.

תודיע לי אם אתה אוחז באמצעים אלה.

ד. בן־גוריון

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מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

מברק MH728

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1

[Tel Aviv], 16 July 1948

Have honour acknowledge receipt your telegram containing text resolution Security Council[1] and communicate you following resolution adopted by Provisional Government Israel after its consideration: "Provisional

7. תומאס ברייאנט, המנהל בפועל של חברת החשמל הירושלמית, היה בין העצורים.
8. אברהם רייפנברג, פרופסור למדע הקרקע באוניברסיטה העברית.

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1. ראה לי אל שרתוק, 15.7.1948, 130.02/2424/21. נוסח ההחלטה ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־671.

Government of Israel, having taken note of resolution of Security Council of July 15th, 1948, decided comply with Council's request for resumption truce in Palestine and for immediate unconditional cease-fire in Jerusalem. Provisional Government is ready issue necessary orders to both effects as soon as it is notified that all Arab Governments and authorities concerned have likewise accepted truce in Palestine and immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem, and have issued orders for these arrangements to take effect at respective times laid down in resolution. Provisional Government accepts resumption of truce in accordance with its declared attitude as to conditions to be observed."[2] Regarding cease-fire Jerusalem, have instructed our representative Jerusalem approach Consular Commission for receipt notification of Arab decision. As to truce, would appreciate earliest possible advise as to procedure whereby we can be notified in time of decision Arab Governments involved in aggression throughout Palestine.[3]

Moshe Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH731
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 16 July 1948

Connection resolution Security Council communicated me by Secretary-General,[1] following points appear require clarification: 1) Why is reference "prolongation" truce when no truce exists? We deliberately used word "resumption" in our reply and public statement.[2] 2) Is intention that full-fledged truce should commence Monday, with operation of all conditions May 29th, or at beginning mere cease-fire throughout country, with conditions to become operative later, when Mediator ready with his staff? 3) Are we right in assuming absence any reference in resolution to Media-

2. תנאי ישראל להארכת ההפוגה נמסרו למתווך בשיחה שהתקיימה ב־7 ביולי (ראה מס' 289) ופורסמו ברבים למחרת. (ראה הודעת הממשלה על תשובתה להצעת ברנאדוט, 8.7.1948, 130.02/2424/20).
3. ההפוגה נכנסה לתוקף ביום ראשון, 18.7.1948, בשעה שלוש אחה"צ לפי שעון גריניץ', שעה שבע בערב לפי שעון הקיץ בישראל.

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1. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־671.
2. ראה מס' 333.

tor's past interpretations means we now revert text May 29th, untrammelled by acquiescence ruling regarding admission men military age? Anyhow, purpose last sentence our resolution is reserve our position this regard. 4) What do they mean by proceeding now examination breaches truce since June 11th? 5) Does penultimate paragraph requesting Secretary-General recruit staff mean choice no longer limited three consular powers,[3] sprinkling Scandinavians? What are Secretary-General's intentions this regard?

Shertok

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א. אבן אל ח. וייצמן (מונטרה)
A. Eban to C. Weizmann (Montreux)

מקור: ג"ו

New York, 16 July 1948

My dear Chief,

Thank you for your letter of July 12,[1] enclosing Linton's letter. In the meantime, I hope that at long last you will have received my previous letter describing the situation here.

The reports which Linton hears from people in London, that there is an Anglo-American "agreement", are entirely false. American policy is firmly in the grip of domestic political conditions, a grip which it manages to evade here and there, but from which it cannot possibly escape in any fundamental sense for the next few months. For that reason, they have refused to endorse any specific part of the Bernadotte proposals. They have strongly opposed the Jerusalem provision publicly, and supported Trygve Lie diplomatically in his fierce opposition to the idea of a U.N. supervision in Haifa. Of the territorial propositions put forward by Bernadotte, the only one which has a chance of American endorsement is the Negev-Galilee exchange; even here, they would find this hard to achieve or to sponsor without at least acquiescence on our part.

I believe that the fact that no single government came out in support of Bernadotte's proposals, while both sides rejected it, has had a chastening effect on him. We hope to deepen this effect by persistent pressure and criticism. I shall know more of his current thinking this afternoon, after a talk with him.[2] The general lesson is that two important factors — the

3. ארצות־הברית,בלגיה וצרפת, שנציגיהן הקונסולריים היו חברי ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים.

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1. לא נמצא.
2. ראה מס' 338.

favourable military situation and the political situation here — have more initiative and effect than London policy. (For Ivor [Linton]:[3] Lewis Jones, I have always found, is quite out of touch with the real main-springs of American policy on Palestine.)

You can be assured that there is no development which Truman "knows nothing about". Never was contact more frequent or persistent. Rosenman, however, is more willing than effective.[4]

Since the establishment of the State, I frankly have ceased to regard every hare-brained, improvised political proposal as a "very grave matter".

We are all waiting here for the results of the cease-fire order. At last there is reason to expect that if the attack on Israel continues, the most drastic United States action may be expected, although the Security Council, by virtue of its pro-British composition, is a broken reed.

I shall continue this letter this afternoon, on my return from the Count.[5]

Very sincerely yours,

Aubrey

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 521
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/10

[New York], 16 July 1948

Following appreciation resolution:[1] Paragraph one contains first admission Arab responsibility hostilities, also status Memisrael as party to dispute. Together with paragraphs two, three and four, resolution is indirect determination Arab aggression. Paragraph five wording vague, not specific, may be taken reopen interpretation May 29 resolution in light new facts, especially indefinite duration. Paragraphs seven and eight emphasize Mediator's function on truce observance, not peaceful adjustment. Paragraph nine most negative of all. Paragraph ten pious appeal substituted by United States for Chinese proposal advocating specific concessions on immigration, political organization. This ceremony necessary to win Chinese vote on threat to peace and sanctions. American attitude [Security]

3. העתק המכתב נשלח אל לינטון בלונדון.
4. המשפט האחרון נוסף בכתב־יד.
5. לא נמצא המשך למכתב.

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1. ראה נספח ו, עמ׳ 668־671. ראה גם הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 326.

Council positive in substance but weak in manner; example — they intended yield on question our designation paragraph one but for our insistence. British amendment eventually received three votes only.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 513
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/10

[New York], 16 July 1948

Your 731.[1] 1) Word "prolongation" accurate in historical context first paragraph, since it refers to our reply Mediator's request for prolongation submitted before expiration. 2) Cease-fire must commence Monday, other conditions not yet defined pending establishment observer system. Your view correct. 3) Our acceptance implies only willingness cooperate Mediator in conformity May 29 Resolution; discussion actual means of cooperation will follow Mediator's arrival. Resolution contains no reference any agreement other than May 29 text. Your position men military age therefore tenable, especially after clear reservations made twice in Council. 4) Arabs' request for machinery investigate past alleged violations was embodied in British amendment,[2] ourselves felt obliged not object and promised submit our charges Arab violations and British contraventions, especially Cyprus. Mediator objected practical grounds, and may be doubted if will ever be applied. 5) Your assumption correct, intention associate Slav bloc, Dutch, Scandinavians and Canadians. Mediator envisages total three hundred for covering whole area Middle East. Am cabling you after conversation Mediator, on which these clarifications partly based. Cease-fire was to be midnight, Sunday, G.M.T., but ourselves requested daylight hour. Bunche to phone conveying decision.[3] Comay cabling full report.[4]

Eban

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1. מס' 334.
2. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 326.
3. ראה מס' 333, הערה 3.
4. מס' 338.

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שיחת א. אבן, מ. קומיי — הרוזן ברנאדוט, ר. באנץ'
(בניו יורק, ב־16 ביולי 1948)

Meeting: A. Eban, M. Comay — Count Bernadotte, R. Bunche
(New York, 16 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/10

[New York], 16 July 1948

1. At the invitation of Count Bernadotte, Mr. Eban saw him this morning accompanied by Mr. Comay. The talk lasted forty-five minutes, with Bunche present after the first ten minutes.

2. The Mediator opened the conversation by referring to his arrangements for reinstating the truce controls, and said that he had in mind a force of three hundred control officers, to cover the whole Near East area. He wanted to draw them not only from the three countries represented on the Truce Commission, but also from other countries, of which he mentioned Russia, Czechoslovakia and Scandinavian countries, Holland and Canada as possibilities.

3. Regarding the time for commencement of the cease-fire order, he claimed that he would be unable to exercise any proper control for the first few days, if the cease-fire came about, and he had informed Trygve Lie and others accordingly. He was, however, bound by the Resolution, and had in mind to fix the time at midnight G.M.T. on Sunday night. We objected to this, as a cease-fire at night was very difficult, and from past experience it would simply lead to unnecessary confusion and dispute. We suggested making it midnight New York time, which would be eight a.m. Tel Aviv time. In our opinion, the Resolution could be interpreted in this sense. Bunche promised to call us up later in the day about this.

4. Before Bunche came in, the Mediator said that he would speak freely to us, and expressed the view that, "The Arabs have lost the game. If they accept this Resolution, they accept partition. If they reject it, it is suicide for them." He then invited us to tell him quite frankly what our attitude was towards the resumption of his task. Eban thereupon distinguished between the supervision of the truce and his role as a political mediator. The tentative set of proposals put up by him had alienated public opinion in Israel and created "a crisis of confidence" in the Mediator. We were convinced that the only feasible approach now was to procure the settlement of certain outstanding questions, and the establishment of economic cooperation, through contractual relations between individual sovereign

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1. תמצית השיחה הועברה באותו יום במברק. (ראה קומיי אל שרתוק, 16.7.1948, 93.01/2180/21).

states. His present approach, which meant diminishing the sovereignty of Israel in order to make it more palatable to the Arabs, had no prospect of securing cooperation from our side. The Jerusalem proposal in particular had caused a very strong reaction from Jewish public opinion. The guiding formula should be that of political independence with regional cooperation, and one need not look further than the relations between Syria and Lebanon to see that this was essential.

The Mediator proceeded to defend the Jerusalem proposal, although he did so in a half-hearted way, and admitted that it was not a very happy answer to the problem. Amongst the arguments he adduced were:

A) Experience in Trieste, Berlin and elsewhere showed that international control did not work well.

B) After a year or two, the local population would start resenting the burden of maintaining an international regime.

At this stage Bunche came in, and Count Bernadottè sat back and left him to do the talking. He proceeded to argue the case for each of the proposals to which we had objected, and it became quite evident that he was the real author of them.

A) *Jerusalem.* Bunche said that we could not escape the fact that Jerusalem was surrounded by Arab territory. It would not matter very much to us if it was nominally Arab, because we could get a very high degree of local autonomy. We asked about citizenship in Israel for Jerusalem Jews. He said this could also be discussed. We assured them that there was no prospect whatsoever of our agreeing to Arab rule under any conditions.

B) *The Central Board.* He repeated the previous proposal, and when we again spoke about encroachments on sovereignty, he denied this was intended, adding that in any event, "which of the countries sitting at the United Nations were really sovereign today in the full sense?" When we pointed out that the Economic Union set up under the November 29 Resolution would have to be completely reexamined if the Arab partner was a different one, he airily conceded that this was a matter for discussion. On foreign policy and defence, he did not attempt to put up any argument of substance, merely suggesting that there was no reason why relations between the two states on these two essential aspects should not also be cleared through the common Council. Comay thereupon pointed out firstly, that no Council was needed for such consultation between neighbouring states, and even the British Dominions had consistently rejected United Kingdom proposals for a British Commonwealth Council, to be set up for purely consultative purposes, as they felt that this might hamper their independence; secondly, our foreign policy, which was based on the United Nations and a neutral role on world issues, differed fundamentally from that of Trans-Jordan, which was based

on the Arab League and on Britain. Bunche's only reply to this criticism was that we over-emphasized the significance of the references to foreign policy and defence, which really meant very little in practice.

C) *Immigration.* He admitted that we could force the pace during the two years and bring in the great bulk of displaced Jews, if our immigration policy after this was subject to scrutiny by the United Nations, "which country is really independent today?"

D) *Haifa.* He stressed that the general need for oil made it necessary to demilitarize the port area and oil installations, and so avert their destruction by aerial bombing. After that, Haifa could be made a free port, with special rights given to the Arabs. We asked why this question of oil could not be discussed by the interested parties, such as Iraq, the Iraq Petroleum Company, the British, Trans-Jordan and ourselves, outside the context of the political problem. He gave no satisfactory answer, except that it was bound up with the larger question, because the Arabs would not let the oil come through to Haifa under present circumstances. We insisted that this was an entirely separate question, which should not be made to involve any derogation of our sovereignty over our main port. If this were understood, we did not expect that there would be any difficulty from our side in discussing contractual relations about the maintenance of oil supply. Both Bunche and Count Bernadotte said that their proposals regarding Haifa had not met with an unsympathetic response from Reuven Shiloah on Rhodes, although they realized that he had no authority to commit the Israeli Government.

5. Two things emerged fairly clearly from this talk: a) that Bunche is the real originator of the Mediator's proposals; b) that Bunche is less interested in the practical sùbstance of these proposals than in their face-saving and prestige aspect for the Arabs, who might be induced to acquiesce in a Jewish State if the latter agreed to a discount from its formal sovereignty.

M.S. Comay

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א. לבבי אל מ. שרתוק
A. Levavi to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.11/2492/4

תל אביב, ט׳ בתמוז תש״ח
16 ביולי 1948

שיחה עם מר שמואל פטרפי ב־15 ביולי 1948

מר פטרפי נמצא בהונגריה מאז ספטמבר 1947. הוא נסע לשם כשליח מפא״י, אולם בבואו נתקל במצב אשר איים על המשכת הפעולה הציונית בהונגריה בכלל. כתוצאה מהתנגשות בין הציונים לבין המתבוללים והקומוניסטים, על רקע ההכנות לבחירות בקהילת בודאפסט, גורשו נציגי הסוכנות היהודית מהונגריה, עיתון ההסתדרות הציונית נסגר, והיה קיים חשש חמור שתפורק ההסתדרות הציונית בכלל. לאחר משא־ומתן הושג הסכם בדבר רשימה אחידה לבחירות קהילת בודאפסט. הציונים קיבלו 35%, למרות שבבחירות חופשיות היו זוכים בלי־ספק לרוב, אולם בין יתר 65% נכנסו רבים המתייחסים לעניין הציוני באהדה. בזה נמנע המשבר, ומאז משקיע מר פטרפי את עיקר עבודתו בקשירת קשרים עם חוגי המפלגה הקומוניסטית והסוציאל־דמוקרטית (זו האחרונה ״התאחדה״ לפני זמן־מה עם הקומוניסטים), מתוך מגמה למנוע גזירות ולהשיג הסכמה לפעולות שונות שאנו מנסים לנהל בהונגריה.

במשך כל הזמן הזה מגדירים הקומוניסטים בהונגריה את יחסם לתנועה הציונית כיחס של חשדנות סבלנית. אולם אין הקומוניסטים היהודים נוטים לרדוף את הציונות באותה מידה כמו ברומניה או בבולגריה. הסיבה היא שהמנהיגות הקומוניסטית היהודית בהונגריה תפסה את עמדות המפתח החשובות שלה בתוקף הוותק והמסורת (מאז ימי בלה קון), ואין המנהיגים הקומוניסטים היהודיים בארץ זו זקוקים לתמיכה ציבורית מצד ההמונים היהודים.

לעומת זאת גילתה הונגריה מהרגע הראשון יחס חיובי למדינת ישראל. מאידך, אין אמנם להונגריה כל מדיניות־חוץ עצמאית. בשיחה עם מר פטרפי הודה בכך נשיא המדינה טילדי בגלוי. על נכונות הונגריה להכיר במדינת ישראל נמסר למר פטרפי ב־16 במאי, וגם באו אליו בטענות על כך שלא פנינו במשך שבועיים בערך בבקשה להכיר במדינתנו.[1] עתה מתאוננים באזני מר פטרפי על כך, שאיננו מבקשים להחליף נציגים דיפלומטיים. בין התירוצים אשר בהם ניסה מר פ[טרפי] לתרץ את העיכוב היתה גם הטענה, שאנו מדינה ענייה, הנתונה במלחמה וכו׳. על כך באה התשובה, שאין להבין משום מה ביכולתנו להחזיק בהונגריה כ־30 שליחים בלתי־רשמיים, דבר

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1. בתחילת יוני הודיעה הונגריה לישראל באמצעות השגרירות היוגוסלבית בוואשינגטון על החלטתה להעניק לה הכרה. בקשה רשמית להכרה נשלחה אך ב־9 ביוני. (ראה אפשטיין אל שרתוק, 3.6.1948, 93.03/72/16; שרתוק אל שר־החוץ ההונגרי, 9.6.1948, 130.02/2424/20).

שממשלת הונגריה אינה מתייחסת אליו בהרבה אהדה, ולעומת זאת אין ביכולתנו לקיים אפילו נציג רשמי אחד. מר פ[טרפי] סבור על־כן, שחשוב הוא כי נמנה איזה נציג רשמי בעתיד הקרוב.

בעיית השתייכותו המפלגתית של נציג ישראל בהונגריה היא דחופה מאוד. כדי לשמור על אפשרויות פעולתה של התנועה הציונית בהונגריה נאלצנו במשך כל השנה האחרונה להדגיש את אופיה הפרוגרסיבי של התנועה הציונית. מצד השלטונות קיים בנידון זה עיקוב קפדני, המלווה בהתערבויות ישירות. הממונה על העניינים היהודיים הציוניים במדינה הוא למעשה המזכיר הארגוני של המפלגה הקומוניסטית, חבר מרכז המפלגה וחבר בית־הנבחרים, Istvan Szirmay. איש זה היה עד 1930 חבר "ההתאחדות"[2] בטרנסילבניה. הוא נוטל לידיו מדי פעם בפעם את היזמה. מזמין וחוקר את פ[טרפי] ומציג דרישות שונות. הנסיון מוכיח שגם כשפונים למוסדות שונים של הממשלה בבקשות שונות, מגיע העניין בסופו של הדבר תמיד לאותו האיש, הנותן את חוות־הדעת המכרעת.

במארס שנה זו כונסה בהונגריה ועידה של ההסתדרות הציונית. I[stvan] S[zirmay] הציג את הדרישה שנציגי המפלגות הלא־הסתדרותיות לא ישותפו בנשיאות, וזאת למרות שכוחם היה שווה בערך לכוח המפלגות השמאליות. לא הועילו כל הטענות ונאלצנו לקבל את הדרישה.

אחרי מקרה "אלטלנה" הזמין I[stvan] S[zirmay] את מר פ[טרפי], וטען באוזניו, שהתפטרות חברי ה"מזרחי" מהממשלה מוכיחה, כי אמנם קיים ביניהם לבין הקבוצות הפשיסטיות קשר ממשי — וזאת בניגוד לכל הודעותיו הקודמות של מר פ[טרפי].

בתחילת יוני נתפרסמה בכמה עיתונים בבודאפסט השמועה, כי מר יוסף פרנקל, יושב־ראש ה"מזרחי" בבודאפסט, נתמנה נציג ישראל בבודאפסט. האיש הלך אל מיניסטריון־החוץ ההונגרי ושאל אם יש שם טלגרמה כזו מאת ממשלת ישראל. ענו לו כי: א. מינוי כזה מותנה בהסכמת הממשלה המקבלת, ב. לא מקובל למנות אזרח של המדינה המקבלת, ו־ג. בוודאי יתקשרו שלטונות ישראל עם המועמד שלהם שלא באמצעות משרד־החוץ ההונגרי. התגובה על כל העניין בחוגים הקומוניסטיים היתה שלילית ביותר.

כדי לקדם עניינים מעשיים כגון: יציאה ועלייה, רכש, מגביות והעברות כספים, היה הכרח לטפל עם השלטונות במדינה שלא באמצעות ההסתדרות הציונית כי אם על־ידי מגע ישיר עם I[stvan] S[zirmay], ואחרים, בשם "התנועה הציונית הפרוגרסיבית". כאן יש להזכיר את ההישגים הבאים: מתן רשיון לערוך מגבית־ביטחון, הסכמה להעביר במשך 6 חודשים באמצעות הבנק הממשלתי בשער־החליפין הרשמי על־חשבון המגבית הנ"ל סכום של $120,000 (שער החליפין הרשמי פירושו רווח של 200%), מתן רשות לקנות בכספים מקומיים סוכר בשביל ישראל (אין נשק בהונגריה), אישור של 1000 דרכיות־יציאה בשביל מתנדבים לצבא ישראל, והבטחה לעיין באישור של עוד 1000 דרכיות לאחר שינצלו את הדרכיות שניתנו כבר.

מר פ[טרפי] סבור, שבמקרה שיוצע על־ידינו נציג ישראלי בהונגריה שלא ממפלגות השמאל, תאשר הממשלה ההונגרית את ההצעה, אולם הדבר יגרור אחריו

2. "איחוד פועלי־ציון — התאחדות".

פגיעות חמורות בתנועה הציונית. מצבה של התנועה איננו איתן בלאו־הכי, אמנם מבין 140,000 יהודי הונגריה נוטים 60,000-50,000 לציונות, ובחמש המפלגות הציוניות שבמדינה מאורגנים 16,000-15,000 חברים. אולם הנוער בגיל למטה מ־30 עבר רובו ככולו למחנה הקומוניסטי, היות ואפשרויות של עלייה חברתית בשביל קומוניסטים יהודים צעירים הן עכשיו גדולות עד מאוד. הבעיה היא בשביל רוב בני הנוער: "חלוץ בארץ־ישראל או פקיד גבוה למדי בהונגריה." בהכשרה נמצאים לא יותר מ־600 חבר, לא יותר מ־5000 מבין המאורגנים בתנועות ציוניות הם למטה מגיל 30, על חשבון 1000 דרכיות היציאה הנזכרות לעיל יצאו עד כה כ־300 איש בלבד, ומר פ[טרפי] חושב שבעתיד הקרוב אין לצפות ליותר מאשר עוד 400 מתנדבים. פגיעה נוספת במעמד התנועה הציונית בחוגי הנוער תבוא כתוצאה מהקמת בתי־ספר עממיים ממשלתיים, דבר אשר ישאיר בתחום ההשפעה הציונית רק שתי גימנסיות (גימנסיה "תרבות" אחת וגימנסיה בבודאפסט, על־יד הסמינר לרבנים). מר פ[טרפי] סבור גם, שהקמת המדינה, למרות שהיא תגביר את הפרסטיז'ה שלנו בהונגריה, אינה עשויה להשפיע על המוני הנוער שיחזרו לתנועה הציונית.

על רקע הלכי־רוח אלה עלולות גזירות חדשות מצד השלטונות להביא בעקבותיהן לידי התפוררות רבה במחנה הציונות. כמה מאות ציונים מאורגנים, ובכללם אנשי־מפתח, נאלצו כבר עכשיו להירשם במפלגה הקומוניסטית כדי לשמור על מקורות פרנסתם. לפי שעה אין איסור על חברי המפלגה הקומוניסטית להשתייך גם לתנועה ציונית.

בסיכום הדברים מציע מר פ[טרפי] את קו הפעולה הבא:

1. שלא למנות שום נציג ישראלי בהונגריה מבין חברי המפלגות הציוניות האזרחיות, וה"מזרחי" בכלל;
2. לדחות, אם יש הכרח בדבר, את המינוי של נציג דיפלומטי, ולמנות לעת־עתה קונסול בלבד;
3. קונסול זה מן ההכרח ששוב יהיה חבר מפא"י או מפ"ם. אי־מינוי כל נציג שהוא יתקבל בחוגים ההונגריים כפגיעה. מאידך, מינוי של קונסול מתאים עשוי לשפר בהרבה את יחס השלטונות לפעילות הציונית בהונגריה ויעודד את האישים הנוטים לסייע לנו, ובכללם מיניסטר הכלכלה, הקומוניסט היהודי Zoltan Vas, ועסקנים סוציאל־דמוקרטיים, אשר השפעתם גברה מאז ה"איחוד" בין הקומוניסטים והסוציאל־דמוקרטים.
4. מר פ[טרפי] הביע את הדעה, כי מינוי חבר מפא"י עשוי להתקבל על דעת הקומוניסטים ההונגריים משתי הסיבות הבאות:
   א. אנשי מפ"ם בהונגריה טרם הצליחו לקשור קשרים עם המפלגה הקומוניסטית;
   ב. מהותה של מפא"י בתור "מפלגה סוציאל־דמוקרטית" מוסברת לקומוניסטים היטב. לעומת זאת אין הם מבינים מפני מה אין מפ"ם בארץ־ישראל משתייכת למחנה הקומוניסטי אם היא אמנם מפלגה מרקסיסטית־לניניסטית, כפי טענתה.
5. לאחר חקירה ודרישה מצדי ומתוך היסוסים כנים מסר מר פ[טרפי] כי I[stvan] S[zirmay] רמז לו בבירור כי הוא, פ[טרפי], מועמד טוב לנציגות

ישראלית בהונגריה: "אילו היו מציעים לנו רשימה של 30 מועמדים ושמך היה מופיע במקום ה־30, כי אז היינו מבקשים למנות את המועמד מס' 30."[3]

מר פטרפי ישאר בארץ עוד כשבוע — 10 ימים, וישהה במשך התקופה הזאת בחוג משפחתו בקרית־עמל על־יד חיפה. אחרי־כן ישוב להונגריה.

א. לבבי

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH764

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/21

Tel Aviv, 18 July 1948 (21.10)

Your X 113.[1] As explained my MH731[2] point three, last sentence — this intended cover immigration, namely freedom bring in men military age, without numerical restriction, provided they not fighting personnel; also such matters as Jerusalem water supply, Negev supply convoys, access Holy Places, effective supervision Arab ports and frontiers.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH745

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1

נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 18 July 1948

Mediator in his cable from Lake Success, 16th July,[1] stated: "In order that each party may be informed intentions other, will you be so kind as

3. בסוף ינואר 1949 מונה אהוד אבריאל, ציר ישראל בצ'כוסלובקיה, לציר לא־תושב בהונגריה. שמואל בנצור (פטרפי) מונה לקונסול.

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1. מברק מיום 17.7.1948 (93.01/2180/21). אבן ביקש הבהרה של המשפט האחרון בתשובת ממשלת ישראל להחלטת מועצת־הביטחון על הפסקת־אש (ראה מס' 333).
2. מס' 334.

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1. ראה ברנאדוט אל שרתוק, 16.7.1948, 130.02/2424/21.

confirm to me issuance cease-fire orders in accordance decision above-noted, at my Rhodes headquarters, earliest possible moment." This was request for immediate issuance actual cease-fire order and confirmation. Nevertheless myself replied, as per MH741,[2] as we cannot obviously cease shooting if other side doesn't, whatever consequences Security Council. Actually we today critically handicapped by absence official indication Arab attitude, while ours been made clear.

Shertok

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א. אבן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
A. Eban to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק. התקבל: 19.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/127/9
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/172/9

New York, 18 July 1948

Would welcome action ensuring maintenance French abstention on submission to International Court.[1] French attitude November — this political, not legal matter.[2] Results adoption would be delay, uncertainty, instability, and strange principle Assembly recommendations appealable to non-principal[3] organ.[4]

Eban

2. שרתוק אל אבן, 18.7.1948, 130.09/2329/1. שרתוק העביר את נוסח תשובתו למברק של המתווך: "אנו מסכימים להפסקת־אש בזמן שנקבע על־ידך ונוציא פקודות בהתאם, מיד לאחר שנשמע ממך שהצד השני הסכים אף הוא."

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1. במהלך הדיון על הפסקת־האש במועצת־הביטחון הציע הנציג הסורי, שהמועצה תבקש מבית־הדין הבינלאומי בהאג לתת חוות־דעת משפטית על המעמד הבינלאומי של ארץ־ישראל בעקבות סיום המנדט הבריטי. (ראה SCOR, Third Year, 334th Meeting ,13.7.1948 pp. 52-54).
2. בנובמבר 1947 דחתה ועדת אד־הוק של העצרת הכללית ברוב של 21 נגד 20 הצעה לבקש מבית־הדין הבינלאומי חוות־דעת בדבר סמכותו של האו"ם לכפות תכנית חלוקה בארץ־ישראל. ראה גם תעודות מדיניות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 51 והערה 4 שם.
3. למעשה נמנה בית־הדין הבינלאומי בהאג עם הגופים הראשיים של האו"ם.
4. ראה מס' 371.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH750
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 18 July 1948

Reference two new despatches Consular Commission palcored here,[1] please, after consulting Robinson, address official protest Security Council against unwarranted insinuations, imputations fantastic motives, general meddling in matters which none their business. Am speaking my mind, relying yourself produce suitable wording. Explain /operations/ Jerusalem are natural development arising from our success liquidating Arab strongholds New City and impossibility leave military vacuum, which is universal physical principle of all wars. Stress [that] by one-sidedness and far-fetchedness, Commission forfeits last vestige confidence. Use Spokesman's statement written by me, palcored 15th July,[2] taking exception their previous excursions into politics; also see my 23/81 to Epstein,[3] after word "fear" might add "weakness and stupidity". Have published that am instructing you lodge protest as public here, Jerusalem, incensed.[4]

Shertok

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1. מדובר בשורה של שדרים ששיגר יושב־ראש ועדת ההפוגה בירושלים אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון בעניין מעצר חמשת עובדי חברת החשמל בירושלים (ראה מס' 327, הערה 1) ותפיסת מלון המלך דוד על־ידי כוחות ישראליים. (מלון המלך דוד נכלל בתחום איזורי הביטחון של הצלב האדום ובמשך ההפוגה שימש את משקיפי האו"ם בירושלים. לאחר שהמשקיפים פינו את המלון עם תום ההפוגה רצו חברי ועדת ההפוגה להקים בו את המטה שלהם). השדרים של ועדת ההפוגה נוסחו בלשון בוטה. (ראה מסמכי או"ם S/891, S/898, S/900, S/905).
2. ראה הודעת דובר משרד־החוץ מיום 15.7.1948, 130.02/2444/18.
3. מיום 12.7.1948 (130.09/2329/22). שרתוק ניסה לעמוד על המניעים לנסיונם של חברי ועדת ההפוגה להשתלט על מלון המלך דוד.
4. אנשי משלחת ישראל באו"ם ציינו, שיש סכנה בהעלאת העניין במועצת־הביטחון מפני שזו, קרוב לוודאי, תצא להגנת ועדת ההפוגה הממונה מטעמה. גם נציגי המדינות החברות בוועדה (ארצות־הברית, בלגיה וצרפת) יחושו בוודאי לעזרת הקונסולים שלהן. לדעתם מוטב להגיב בעיתונות, ומכל מקום להקדים למחאה פומבית שיחות פרטיות עם משלחות ארצות־הברית, בלגיה וצרפת. (ראה קומיי אל שרתוק, 19.7.1948, 93.01/2180/21). בתשובתו (21.7.1948, 93.03/94/10) הטעים שרתוק, שלא התכוון לעורר את העניין במועצת־הביטחון אלא להגיש מחאה בכתב. המחאה הוגשה בצורת מכתב מאת אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון, מיום 19.7.1948, ופורסמה כמסמך או"ם S/922 מיום 27.7.1948. נוסח שונה במקצת, שתאריכו 22.7.1948 ("לפרסום ביום א', 25 ביולי") ראה בתיק 93.08/377/8.

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מ. שרתוק אל ז׳. שארירון (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Charreyron (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 130.02/2413/11

Tel Aviv, le 18 juillet 1948

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement Provisoire de l'Etat d'Israël présente ses compliments au Comte Charreyron et a l'honneur de lui accuser réception de la note ref. 305 datée du 12 juillet 1948.[1]

En réponse, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères se permet de préciser, encore une fois, son attitude à l'égard de l'occupation temporaire des propriétés et établissements français par des détachements de l'armée d'Israël.

Il convient de noter que cette occupation n'a été faite que pour parer aux attaques dirigées par les troupes arabes contre la population juive. Dans ses efforts de repousser ces agressions, l'armée d'Israël fut contrainte à occuper, dans différents points du pays, des immeubles appartenant à des Etats et à des ressortissants étrangers. La situation des établissements précités explique d'elle-même leur occupation; ils sont, malheureusement, placés de façon à les rendre indispensables à la défense juive. Leur évacuation ne pourrait s'effectuer sans exposer à de graves dangers la population civile et les positions militaires juives, situées dans leur proximité.

L'exemple le plus frappant de cette nécessité est fourni par le cas de Notre-Dame-de-France. Comme les faits incontestables l'ont, à maintes reprises, démontré, l'armée d'Israël n'aurait jamais pu empêcher les sorties entreprises par des détachements arabes par la Porte de Damas et leur pénétration au coeur de la ville juive, n'eût-elle pas été en mesure de s'assurer, préalablement, la maîtrise dudit établissement.

Par ailleurs, à notre vif regret, l'expérience nous fait douter que les forces arabes s'abstiennent d'occuper des points stratégiques aussi importants, au cas où l'armée d'Israël consentirait à les évacuer.

Néanmoins, une assurance formelle est donnée au gouvernement français de faire évacuer les établissements actuellement occupés par les troupes israéliennes, dès que la situation stratégique le permettra.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères se permet d'exprimer sa conviction qu'aucun autre gouvernement, y compris le gouvernement français, n'eût

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1. הרוזן שארירון הודיע, שממשלת עבר־הירדן הסכימה לפנות את המוסדות הצרפתיים שבשליטת כוחותיה, בתנאי שכוחות ישראל יפנו את המוסדות שבשליטתם. (המזכר בתיק 130.02/2413/11). ראה גם מס׳ 111, 122.

pu, dans de pareilles conditions, agir différemment. Il ose espérer que le Comte Charreyron ne refusera pas de l'admettre.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères prie le Comte Charreyron d'agréer l'expression de ses sentiments les meilleurs.

Moshe Shertok
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

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מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X115. התקבל: 20.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2448/1

New York, 19 July 1948

Arab League reply contains three stipulations truce: 1) Stoppage Jewish immigration. 2) Return Arab refugees. 3) Fixing definite period.[1] As regards 1, we already intimated press we regard fighting personnel sole immigration restriction arising May 29 resolution. Regarding 2, please confirm whether policy outlined June 15[2] unchanged present situation. American delegation seeking clarification our attitude. Regarding 3, we taking no attitude pending receipt your views.[3]

Comay

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1. ראה המזכיר הכללי של הליגה הערבית אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון, 18.7.1948, מסמך או״ם S/908.
2. טעות במקור: הכוונה לדברים שהשמיע אליהו ששון בראיון עיתונאי ב־20 ביוני. (ראה קומיי אל שרתוק, 21.7.1948, 93.03/94/10). ששון ציין ארבעה עיקרים בנוגע למדיניות כלפי הפליטים הערביים: 1) לא תהיה החזרת פליטים אלא כחלק מהסכם שלום; 2) תשלום בעד רכוש ערבי שנתפס יותנה בהסדר פיצויים על נזק לרכוש יהודי; 3) ייערך ניפוי של החוזרים והם יחויבו להכיר בחוקי מדינת ישראל ובסמכותה; 4) הערבים הנותרים בישראל רשאים לעזוב. (ראה ״ניו יורק הראלד טריביון״, 21.6.1948).
3. ראה מס׳ 357.

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נ. גולדמן אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)

N. Goldmann to A. Eban (New York)

מקור: 93.03/127/1

London, 19 July 1948

Dear Aubrey,

I must apologise for not having answered — or even acknowledged — earlier your very interesting letter of June 22nd,[1] for which I thank you very much. I was so busy first in Montreux,[2] and since then in London, that I could not find time to write letters.

The situation here is briefly the following:

The Government has acquiesced in the idea of the existence of Israel, and wants to find a peaceful solution based on that. But at the same time Britain does not want to endanger her position with the Arab world. They feel, therefore, that they must give the Arabs plenty of time to get used to the *fait accompli* of Israel, and secondly that some concessions will have to be made to them, to enable them to "save face". They are afraid that if the Arab Governments are forced to recognise Israel overnight, public opinion will sweep them away, and more extreme Governments will come into power. (Elias Sasson, who, as you will certainly know, is in Paris, shares this view.) Nobody here has yet specified exactly what they mean by "concessions", but certainly they have in mind the larger part of the Negev, and maybe something more. The question of Haifa was not raised in any talks with me. Naturally, they take up the position that all this is Bernadotte's business, and they do not interfere. As for Jerusalem, at the beginning they thought it might be as well for Abdullah to have it, but in the meantime they have come to realise that neither Jews nor Christians would accept this, and so have given up the idea. They even criticise Bernadotte for having made this proposal, and deny having had anything at all to do with it.

They pressed the Arabs very hard to renew the cease-fire. They indicated clearly to them that they could not protect them any more in the Security Council, nor make any further deliveries of arms, if the Arabs defy the Security Council resolution — in which case the U.S. would lift the embargo in favour of the Jews. The readiness of the British to support the American resolution in the Security Council last week is regarded by many here as the turning-point in British policy with regard to Palestine; and indeed, as compared with their opposition of a few weeks ago, when they were dead against such as a resolution, it certainly marks some development. The Arabs here are very angry with the British, and accuse them of having gone over to the Jewish camp.

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1. מס' 218.
2. במושב הקונגרס היהודי העולמי, בסוף חודש יוני.

For all these reasons, the Government here is going very slow on the question of de facto recognition. A few weeks ago McNeil thought that the matter was practically settled, but in the meantime they have decided to hold back, and it seems that the officials of the Near East Department have influenced Bevin. They are ready to let us open an office here as the Office of the Provisional Government, but they are not yet ready to exchange letters in this respect, or to address written communications to us in this style. They are ready to discuss everything with us orally, as representatives of the Provisional Government. They have agreed to resume the postal service, we may issue visas, etc., so there is a certain amount of progress, but, as I told McNeil, it is measurable by inches. I presume that once the cease-fire has settled down again, and the excitement of the fighting abates a little, we may get some written de facto recognition in a few weeks.

The business of the five kidnapped[3] has also thrown its shadow over the work here about recognition; it has caused a great deal of irritation both at the Foreign Office and with many Members of Parliament. (When I saw Oliver Stanley, he was very angry about it.) I have advised Moshe [Shertok] to liquidate the incident by expelling those of the five against whom there is serious suspicion, and I hope they will do this.[4] A public trial may easily become a *cause célèbre* and cause a lot of unnecessary irritation.[5]

The real danger of the present situation is that a very long "truce of attrition" may ensue, which in the British view would exhaust both parties and make them more amenable to concessions — especially if the truce can be dragged out till after the U.N. Assembly and the American elections. If we are able to avert this danger and get the matter settled before or during the U.N. Assembly, it should be all right; but I am not sure whether we shall be able to do that. I presume we cannot ask for admission at the Assembly as we are as yet only a Provisional Government, and have no constituent assembly or permanent authorities; nor do I see how we can do all this before October. How do you and Robinson feel about it?[6]

I am leaving tomorrow for Paris, to meet my wife, and shall then try to get a short vacation in Switzerland during August. But in the meantime I may go to Israel, for the Actions Committee (which has again been postponed) and for talks with Moshe and the others. In the next few weeks you can reach me via the Geneva Office, which will know where I am.

With best regards, and hoping to hear from you soon, I am, Yours

Nahum

P.S. May I ask you to send me copies of any general reports on the Lake Success situation which you may send to Moshe?

3. ראה מס׳ 327 הערה 1.
4. ראה גולדמן אל שרתוק, 21.7.1948, 130.09/2318/4.
5. שרתוק דחה את טענותיו של גולדמן. הוא טען שאין ספק ביחס לאשמתם של אחדים מן העצורים, אבל ספק אם יש די הוכחות לצורך הרשעתם או אף לצורך העמדתם לדין. הוא הורה לגולדמן למעט לעסוק בפרשה. (ראה שרתוק אל גולדמן, 23.7.1948, 130.09/2318/1).
6. המשפט האחרון נוסף בכתב־יד.

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שיחת ל. כהן — ג'. רידמן (בתל אביב, ב־13 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: L. Kohn — J. Reedman (Tel Aviv, 13 July 1948)

דין-וחשבון: 130.02/2424/21

20 ביולי 1948

מר רידמן ביקר אצלי במשרד לפי בקשתו ביחד עם מר René Servoise,מומחה כלכלי של המשלחת. לאחר שיחה קלה אמר, שכעת הוא מתעניין בבעיות כלכליות של ארץ־ישראל.

התחלתי באמרי, שהעיתונות העברית ודעת־הקהל אינם מרוצים מדבריו ופעולותיו של הרוזן. לזה השיב שדעה כזו מוטעית בהחלט, וכי כוונת נסיעתו של הרוזן לאמריקה היא לגנות את הערבים. תוך כדי שיחה הוסיף לדבר על הנושא הזה והדגיש שכוונתו הראשונה של הרוזן, אחרי שנכשל בעניין המשכת ההפוגה, היתה לנסוע לקהיר ולהביא לכל הפחות לידי המשכת ההפוגה בירושלים, אולם לאחר שנתברר לו שקיים קרע ענקי בנידון זה במחנה הערבי, שינה הרוזן את דעתו, ובמקום לנסוע לקהיר המריא ללייק־סאכסס, בכדי להשיג שם את המשכת ההפוגה בארץ כולה. רידמן הוסיף ואמר, שוועדת־הביטחון[1] הנה כמובן גוף שקשה להינבא על התנהגותו, כי הכול מושפע ממידת המתיחות השוררת בין רוסיה ואמריקה, אם כי בעניין ארץ־ישראל קיים שיתוף־פעולה ביניהן. לכן קשה להגיד מה יחליטו במועצת־הביטחון אבל הוא מרגיש כי קרוב לוודאי שתוצאות המשא־ומתן יהיה חידוש ההפוגה בארץ כולה. הליגה הערבית בכלל, ועזאם ביי ונוקראשי פחה[2] בייחוד, נמצאים במבוי סתום, וההפוגה אשר תתקבל לפי צו מועצת־הביטחון תהווה עבורם מוצא של כבוד. הם יוכלו להגיד, שהסכימו לה תחת הלחץ החזק של הגורם הבינלאומי.

הוא אמר גם שאינו מפקפק שמועצת־הביטחון תאיים בסנקציות. שאלתיו: "גם צבאיות?" הוא ענה: "כן, אבל אין צורך בצבא, מספיק אם ישלחו ארבע־חמש אניות נושאות מטוסים ועוד אנית־מלחמה או שתיים." הוא גם בדעה, שצריך לשתף את רוסיה בפעולה זו. בהמשך השיחה על הנושא הזה סיפר רידמן, שהאנגלים באמת השתמשו בלחץ חזק על הערבים בדבר המשכת ההפוגה.

השיחה אחר־כך עברה לעצם העניין. הוא אמר שעלינו למצוא דרך לבוא בדברים עם מישהו מצד הערבים, והרצוי מכולם, למרות חולשתו הידועה, הוא עבדאללה. הוא תיאר את פתרונו של קלייטון[3] (חלוקת החלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל בין המדינות הערביות) כפתרון שאינו מניח את הדעה כלל וכלל, מכיוון שלא יתן סיפוק לאף אחד מהצדדים אלא רק יוסיף על המתיחות הקיימת. כן הוסיף שברור לכל אחד, שהמדינה הערבית בארץ־ישראל המערבית לא תוכל לעמוד על רגליה בלי תמיכה מן החוץ.

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1. מועצת־הביטחון.
2. מחמוד נוקראשי פאשה, ראש ממשלת מצרים.
3. בריגדיר א.נ. קלייטון, ציר בשגרירות הבריטית בקהיר וממונה מטעמה על המגעים עם הליגה הערבית.

להלן נסבה השיחה עם הצעותיו של הרוזן ברנאדוט. מר רידמן הודה, שהוא, רידמן, הנו מחבר ההצעות האלו. הוויכוח התחולל על ההצעה בעניין העלייה. הוא הסביר שהיה צורך להשקיט את דעת הערבים בעניין סכנת פלישה יהודית לארצותיהם. שאלתיו [אם] אין הוא משוכנע שבמצב הנוכחי סכנה כזו אינה קיימת. הוא ענה בחיוב, ואף הטיל ספק אם יש לנו מיליון יהודים שיעלו ארצה. אבל הצרה היא בזה, שהערבים אינם משוכנעים, וקיים אצלם פחד חדש שהרוויזיוניסטים והפורשים ישתלטו על השלטון במדינת ישראל ויארגנו פלישות לארצות ערב. את הפחד הזה קשה מאוד להוציא מלב הערבים. אני מצדי הסברתי לו עד כמה ההנחה הזאת משוללת כל יסוד בהתחשב עם המבנה הסוציאלי והכלכלי של חברתנו. הוא הודה בכך, אבל אמר שהערבים לא מבינים זאת. רידמן מסכים שיש בהצעותיו של הרוזן במידה ידועה משום פגיעה בריבונותנו, אבל הוסיף ושאל, איזה כוח בעולם יוכל לאמיתו של דבר למנוע מאתנו את הכנסת היהודים לארץ. לזה עניתי לו, שהוא לא שכנע אותי, ושאנחנו לא נוכל בשום־פנים להסכים לפגיעה כלשהי בריבונותנו ודווקא בעניין העלייה.

להלן שוחחנו על ירושלים. הוא הודה שהצעתם בעניין ירושלים היתה מזעזעת עבורנו, אבל הוסיף, בחיוך קל, שזעזועים כאלה נחוצים כדי להכשיר את הקרקע לפתרון סופי. אמרתי לו שבין כל הפתרונות שהוצעו לנו במשך השנים עוד לא עלה על דעת אף אחד להציע שימסרו את ירושלים למדינה ערבית. לזה ענה שבשאלת ירושלים נוצר כעת מצב חדש. במשך כל השנים, כשהציעו לנו סידורים מיוחדים בשביל ירושלים (פרוזדורים, משטר בינלאומי וכו׳), היתה הכוונה האמיתית לאפשר לאנגלים דריסת־רגל בארץ־ישראל. כל התכניות היה בהן רק משום אחיזת־עיניים לכוונה זו. כעת, אחרי צאת הבריטים, מוכרחים למצוא פתרון לעצם הבעיה, והוא איננו רואה איך יכולים להתעלם מהעובדה, שירושלים מוקפת ערבים מכל עבריה. אם כפי שאנחנו טוענים, הקשר שלנו עם ירושלים הוא בעיקר רוחני, לשם מה נחוץ לנו שלטון מדיני יהודי בירושלים? מדוע לא יספיק לנו ההסדר שהם מציעים, אשר לפיו כל זכויותינו הרוחניות תהיינה מבוטחות, ונוסף לזה יהיה לנו שלטון מוניציפלי בתוך החלק היהודי של העיר החדשה? הסברתי לו שבמסורת שלנו הרוחניות והגשמיות אינם עולמות נבדלים, שהרוחניות קשורה עם ובנויה על הגשמיות. הוספנו לדבר על הנושא הזה, ובסוף הוא אמר שהבין את עמדתנו. הוא אמר שלפי דעתו לא בא בחשבון שלטון בינלאומי. שלטון כזה הוא דבר מלאכותי מאוד, וכאשר עיבדו בלייק סאכסס את התחוקה למשטר הבינלאומי בירושלים הרגישו בזה. הוא שאל אותי איך אני אביט על הצעה אחרת, דהיינו שירושלים לא תהיה עיר בינלאומית, כי אם בירת האיחוד בין מדינת ישראל והמדינה הערבית, זאת אומרת, ששם יתרכזו כל השלטונות וכל הרשויות המטפלות בעניינים המשותפים של שתי המדינות. חוץ מזה יהיה שם כמובן משטר מוניציפלי חופשי ושמירה על כל הזכויות הרוחניות, המקומות הקדושים וכיוצא באלה. אמרתי לו שלפי דעתי הרעיון הזה מופשט יותר מדי, ושהאיש ברחוב, יהודי כערבי, לא יבין הסדר כזה וירצה לדעת מי בעל־הבית בירושלים, והפתרון המטפיסי לא יוכל לתת סיפוק. שאלתיו מה תהיה דעתו לפתרון אחר: לחלק את העיר בין ערבים ויהודים, עיר עתיקה לערבים והעיר החדשה ליהודים, עם סדרים מיוחדים בסביבות ידועות, כגון הרובע היהודי בעיר העתיקה, ולאפשר לנו קשר בין ירושלים

לבין המדינה היהודית על־ידי כביש שיהיה בידינו ושלידו נבנה מספר ישובים יהודיים חדשים, בכדי שיהיה לנו שטח משען ממשי. הדגשתי שזהו רעיון שלי בלבד ואינני יודע מה תהיה התגובה של דעת־הקהל אליו. יש בינינו כאלה שבאופן עקרוני יתנגדו בכל תוקף לחלוקת ירושלים. רידמן השיב שזאת היא הצעה רצינית, ואם נוכל לבוא לידי הסכם בדבר זה עם הערבים, יהיו הם, אנשי המתווך, בוודאי מרוצים. בסוף הדגיש עוד פעם, שהפתרון לפי הקו של משטר בינלאומי לא יהווה פתרון כלשהו.

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שיחות מ. קומיי — חברי משלחת ארצות־הברית לאו״ם
(בניו יורק, ב־19 וב־20 ביולי 1948)

Meetings: M. Comay — Members of the United States Delegation to the United Nations (New York, 19 and 20 July 1948)

דין־חשבון: 93.03/94/10

20 July 1948

Confidential

CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN DELEGATION

I. TRUCE COMMISSION

This morning I gave Mr. Jack Ross of the American Delegation an advance copy of our draft letter to the President of the Security Council, protesting against the recent telegrams from the Truce Commission in Jerusalem.[1] His "off-the-record" reaction was that we had made out a strong case, but he wanted to know what action we proposed should be taken. I said that we were protesting, not proposing; I was not authorized by our Delegation to suggest any action but, speaking for myself personally, I thought that maybe the State Department might wish to give fresh consideration to the existence of this Commission. The three Consular Representatives were acting in a dual capacity, and their functions in connection with the truce might conflict with their Consular positions. I referred again to the strong public resentment aroused by the messages to the Security Council, and also quoted another example which more directly concerned the American Consul.[2] Under the earlier truce arrangements, he had been made responsible for controlling the food supply for Jerusalem, and had been engaged in a dispute with the Jewish representatives about the amount of food which should be allowed to reach the City. It could hardly be in the interests of the United States Government that their representative should be generally regarded as responsible for restricting

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1. ראה מס׳ 343, והערה 4 שם.
2. ג׳ון מקדונלד, הקונסול הכללי של ארצות־הברית בירושלים.

the food available for the starving population of Jerusalem. While I appreciated that the Commission served a political function, in that it provided a three-country prototype for the composition of Count Bernadotte's corps of observers, this had to be weighed in the balance against the above disadvantages. In any case, it could only lead to friction and confusion if the Truce Commission was able to go on communicating direct to the Security Council after the Mediator's truce machinery was in operation.

Ross was non-committal about the continued existence of the Truce Commission, although he seemed worried about some of the points I had raised, and possible repercussions, as regards public opinion in this country. He agreed, however, that it was essential to coordinate the activities of the Truce Commission and the Mediator's truce organization. He made the off-hand suggestion that maybe the Mediator should be left free to concentrate on his political mission, and that responsibility for truce observance should be vested in the Commission. I immediately pointed out that this was quite impracticable. Regulating the truce terms over wide areas, and controlling their transport, communications, etc., was a quasi military operation, which the Consular representatives were unable to direct effectively; there might be political difficulties if they were responsible for truce observance in Arab countries; and in any case, the kind of frayed nerves which were apparent in the recent messages hardly commended the authors of these messages for the difficult job of adjusting disputes and situations locally, without recourse to the Security Council. Ross appeared to accept these objections and spoke merely about giving them a role in the Jerusalem set-up, subject to Count Bernadotte's over-all responsibility.

I told Ross that Eban intended making personal representations to the French and Belgian Delegations before our letter was actually submitted to the President of the Security Council. I added that we would regret it very much if this matter of the Truce Commission were allowed to impair our good relations with these three delegations at Lake Success, and he assured me that we need have no anxiety on this score, as far as his Delegation was concerned.

II. THE CASE OF THE FIVE BRITONS

Yesterday Ross called me up to know whether I could throw more light on the Irgun kidnapping of the five British employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation. I mentioned to him that Hector McNeil had, in the House of Commons, publicly absolved the Jewish authorities from responsibility for this kidnapping,[3] and that the five men had apparently now been

3. בעקבות שאילתא בפרלמנט, ב־14.7.1948, הטיל מקניל את האחריות לחטיפה על ״ארגון טירוריסטי״. (ראה 453 *H.C. Deb. 5s.* col. 1183).

handed over to the Israeli authorities for public trial. Both these facts were new to him. In my talk with him today, he reverted to this matter, and expressed the fear that it might develop into a major international incident, which might not do us any good. Although he did not say so, I gained the impression that the British Delegation had taken the matter up with him, preparatory to the Security Council discussion on it. While stating that our Delegation had not received the full facts, or instructions, and could not therefore take up any official position, I said that there were certain facts which were relevant — for instance, that there was no civilian authority whatsoever in Jerusalem, apart from that which had been established by the Jews themselves, in the areas under their occupation. Ross said that he had been told that this particular part was not under Jewish occupation, to which I replied that although the power station itself was under a United Nations flag, it was situated within an area which we were holding. When he stressed that the building occupied a special status, I inquired whether the protection which the Truce Commission had extended to the power station could be held to include diplomatic immunity for the employees of the Electric Corporation, in respect of offenses alleged to have been committed by them, unconnected with their duties at the power station. He was unable to suggest any answer to this, but merely expressed the hope that some arrangement could be arrived at whereby a complicated dispute could be avoided. He mentioned that such a dispute would inevitably entail an examination of the exact relations between the Irgun, the Israeli forces, the Jewish authorities in Jerusalem and the Israeli Government.

III. THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

Yesterday Reed,[4] a junior member of the American Delegation Staff, came to see me and said that Dr. Jessup wanted us to clarify, as far as possible, our attitude towards the return of Arab refugees to their homes in Jewish areas. I explained considerations on which the attitude announced by us some weeks ago was based, and said that in any case, we had asked our Government for fresh instructions on this point.[5]

4. הנרי ק. ריד, יועץ במשלחת ארצות־הברית באו"ם.

5. ראה מס' 345, 357.

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מ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X122. התקבל: 21.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 20 July 1948

Long discussion Robinson and Jessup endorsed arguments against International Court,[1] stating he foresees no prospect acceptance Syrian resolution and even Syrian[s] apparently losing interest now. Robinson requested him present case against resolution, but he prefers ourselves argue, they supporting.

Comay

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תזכיר מאת הרוזן ברנאדוט
Memorandum by Count Bernadotte

תזכיר: 130.02/2424/21

Rhodes, 20 July 1948

UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE
TERMS OF THE TRUCE

1. The clear intent of the truce as envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July 1948 is to bring about a cessation of hostilities without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews, and to ensure that no military advantage shall accrue to either side as a result of the application of the truce.

2. The Mediator has carefully explained to each side that it is his earnest intention to apply the truce and the controls required in such manner as to ensure that no military advantage will accrue to either side during the truce or as a result of its application. To this end, certain interpretations of the resolution of 29 May and certain decisions as to its application and that of the resolution of 15 July have been made by the Mediator which have been thoroughly explained to the representatives of both sides and which in summary are set forth in the following paragraphs.

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1. ראה מס' 342 והערה 1 שם.

3. No fighting personnel, which shall include persons identified as belonging to organized military units as well as all persons bearing arms, shall be introduced into any of the Arab States or into any part of Palestine.

4. As regards men of military age, the Mediator shall exercise his discretion during the truce in determining whether men of military age are represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give to one side a military advantage if their entry is permitted, and in such event shall refuse them entry. Should men of military age be introduced in numbers necessarily limited by the application of the foregoing principle, prior to their disembarkation they shall be registered by the local authorities in the presence of United Nations Observers, given identity cards, and their destinations, intended places of abode and occupations carefully recorded. They shall not be diffused throughout the country, but shall be assigned to a particular area or areas which shall be approved by the Observers, who shall periodically check on their whereabouts and activities. They shall not be mobilized in the armed forces or given military or para-military training during the truce.

5. The Mediator shall exercise, to the fullest extent practicable, a check on all immigration at the ports of embarkation and debarkation, and shall place United Nations Observers on ships bearing immigrants, and to this end shall be notified well in advance as to the port of embarkation of any ship bearing immigrants.

6. Movements of troops or war material from one interested country to another, or closer to the borders of Palestine, or to the fighting fronts in Palestine, are prohibited during the truce.

7. All fighting fronts and lines shall remain stabilized during the truce, and there shall be no increase in the fighting strength deployed along the fronts and lines, nor in the war materials on hand. Routine replacement of personnel may be undertaken.

8. War materials shall not be imported into the country or territory of any interested party.

9. Relief to populations of both sides in municipal areas which have suffered severely from the conflicts, as in Jerusalem and Jaffa, shall be supervised by United Nations Observers in such manner as to ensure that reserve stocks of essential supplies shall not be substantially greater or less at the end of the truce than they are at its beginning.

10. All warlike acts, whether on land or sea or in the air, shall be prohibited during the truce.

Count Folke Bernadotte
United Nations Mediator on Palestine

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ג. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 92/80. נשלח: 21.7; התקבל: 22.7
נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ Z4/14834
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 20 July 1948

Had lengthy talk yesterday Beeley at his initiative, and indicated to McNeil and him that if de facto recognition long delayed, I may leave London. Beeley told me they worried about this possibility, pressing me be patient and stay on. They agreed our opening office as representation Provisional Government and announcing it publicly. Question their written communications with us will be settled soon, as Beeley hopes settle satisfactorily. Urge you make clear Sheringham and Marriott that contact with them impossible if they not de facto accredited to us, as they eager maintain contact. New office will be set up two weeks time and will then make formal announcement. Meantime leaving today for Paris, Switzerland, for short vacation with Alice [Goldmann], as no important work for me this moment here. Will return immediately whenever necessary. Am awaiting date Actions Committee to know when coming Tel Aviv.

Nahum

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מ. שרתוק אל ח. וייצמן (מונטרה)
M. Shertok to C. Weizmann (Montreux)

העתק: 130.02/2391/70

Tel Aviv, 20 July/22 August 1948

My dear Dr. Weizmann,

So we are again in the throes of a truce which "broke out" last Sunday evening. The cable which I sent you yesterday[1] proved, in the light of subsequent events, to have been a little premature. Arab forces up and down the country have been trying to play all sorts of tricks as mice do when the cat is away. Their game was, and still is, to take advantage of the few days which must pass before the Mediator's supervision machine comes into operation in order to score points which they previously failed to do. As a result, there have been flare-ups of fighting in Galilee, in the

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1. לא נמצא.

Jordan valley, in Jerusalem and in the South. As it seems, all these incidents are mere spasms of death of the last phase of warfare or birth-pangs of the new truce. They indicate no determination on the part of the Arab League to defy the Security Council. On the contrary, the much publicised Cairo inspired version that Arab consent to the truce will be hemmed in by all sorts of "conditions" has turned out to be false. The communications which the Mediator received from at least four of the Governments concerned — Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan — are in the form of complete and unreserved compliance with the order.[2] Iraq and Saudi Arabia have tried to hedge, but there can be little doubt that they will fall in with the rest and not try their hand at a separate war.

For the time being we have had the best of both worlds — we have behaved like good boys *vis-à-vis* the United Nations and proved that we are good soldiers on the field of battle. The refusal of the Arabs to prolong the truce for ten days, in response to the Mediator's pathetic appeal, has been their undoing. The results of that gamble on their part were truly catastrophic. They have lost vast stretches of territory — vast, of course, in relation to Palestine — and a number of most vital positions. Tel Aviv's hinterland has been greatly extended, and, for the first time since the war started, this city of ours is outside artillery range from inland. The towns of Ramleh and Lydda, the great Lydda airport, the German colony Wilhelma, the source of the Jerusalem water supply at Ras-el-Ain (held by the Iraqis for many months past), the extensive military camps and installations of Beit Nabala, are all in our hands. Ben Shemen, completely isolated for months with only planes to feed it, has been united with Israel. A whole string of important Arab villages from Lydda south-eastwards on the northern side of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, have been taken and are firmly held. Latrun is almost completely surrounded. Another night or two and we would have captured it, but as ill-luck would have it, the truce came just in time to avert the collapse of this remarkably well-fortified Arab stronghold — the last along the road to Jerusalem. The Latrun pumping station is today the only missing link in the chain of the stations of the Jerusalem water supply, all the rest of which are in our hands.

To proceed further inland, the stretch of road between a point east of Qubab and west of Bab-el-Wad is the only gap along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway still in Arab hands. On the other hand, the strip of territory linking up Israel proper with Jerusalem has been widened, and the alternative road running through it, improved. Work is now being done on the laying of a pipe-line from Hulda to Bab-el-Wad to provide an alternative source for the Jerusalem water supply. The hold on Bab-el-Wad has been considerably re-inforced by a successful push southwards, which, *inter alia,* resulted in the regaining of Hartuv and in the capture of the village of Sar'a (Biblical

2. נוסח תשובות של מדינות ערב ראה במזכר של רידמן אל שרתוק, 19.7.1948 (93.03/94/10).

Tsor'a, Samson's birthplace), which at that point commands the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway. Along the stretch of road from Bab-el-Wad to Jerusalem our positions have been strengthened and various indentations straightened out.

In Jerusalem itself we have bulged out from the city westwards, enveloping Ain Karem. A very considerable increase of our artillery in Jerusalem has made all the difference between our position there before and after the truce. Again, had the inter-truce period been a couple of days longer, the Old City might have been ours, but this asset would have also carried serious liabilities.

In Galilee, Kaukji's insolence in striking from the mountainous pocket southwards was severely punished. He concentrated very large forces against Sajera where we lost twenty-five boys at one go, including Shaul [Meirov]'s[3] only son, a 17 year old of exceptional bravery. But he was eventually crushed, and when we went over into the offensive from the west, the tide proved irresistible. We took one after another Shafa-Amr, Eliut, Saffurieh (old Zippori), Reyna, Kafr Kanna and Lubya. Nazareth fell into our laps like a ripe plum, practically without any resistance, some of the Moslems having fled and the Christians meekly submitting. The entire road from Haifa to Tiberias is thus free and the city of Haifa definitely secure.

Very strict orders have been issued in time regarding behaviour and discipline in Nazareth, which I am happy to say are obeyed.

The north of Palestine, however, is not without its sore point. All our efforts to dislodge the Syrians from their bridge-head at Mishmar Hayarden have failed. It is true that we could not detail a large enough force for that particular task, being very heavily engaged elsewhere. The Syrians have also nibbled successfully at one or two of our positions north of Huleh. The Iraqis advancing from Jenin have forced us to evacuate a couple of heights bordering on the Emek from the south. The top of the Gilboa, however, is in our hands, and so is Mount Tabor. On the balance, our losses of territory in northern Palestine are dwarfed into complete insignificance as compared with our gains.

Another source of headache are a couple of villages south of Haifa — Ein Ghazal and Java', between Zikhron and Athlit — where some Iraqi units managed to entrench themselves. We are going to liquidate that sore spot despite the truce on the plea that this is an ordinary proposition of restoring law and order inside the territory and not part of the general campaign against outside aggression.*

* Since this was dictated, the villages have been brought completely under control.[5]

3. שאול מאירוב (אביגור), גיסו של שרתוק.

4. כוח ישראלי השתלט על הכפרים במבצע "שוטר", בסוף חודש יולי.

Most intricate of all is the position in the south. With a few exceptions, fighting here has been concentrated in the north-western part of the Negev, the stretch of territory running parallel to the coast from south of Beertuvia to the Egyptian frontier. My son's settlement,[5] for instance, which is next door to Beersheba on the western side, as well as the two settlements to the east of Beersheba, have been completely unaffected. Asluj has had its losses in men when our force sallied forth from the settlement and in a daring operation took Asluj camp on the main road to Egypt. This was practically on the eve of the first truce. On the resumption of fighting the Egyptians made a strong bid to retake the camp but were beaten off. I mention this to indicate one of the very few exceptions to which I have referred. In the area infested by the Egyptians we have suffered considerable losses in men, as well as in territorial positions. Kfar Darom and Yad Mordechai, completely cut off and surrounded, had to be evacuated. Both the long drawn-out resistance of these settlements and the final break-through retreats were feats of exceptional valour.

The Egyptians have concentrated a considerable force in that whole area — over 10,000 men — who possess excellent equipment: long-range artillery, heavy armour, and aircraft overwhelmingly superior to ours. The way Negba has held out against an unceasing, most ferocious land and air barrage, is nothing short of a miracle and bespeaks unlimited courage and endurance. There is not a single building still standing in the settlement; it has all been razed to the ground and people live in trenches and dugouts. Yet they did not flinch. The losses of the Egyptians in the Negev are between five and ten to one as compared with ours. The outstanding feature of a whole series of engagements has been the capture by us of large quantities of equipment, some of it of the most valuable kind, which was put to use immediately: guns, vehicles, machine-guns, ammunition, wireless carriers, etc. — veritable treasures.

The ammunition expenditure of the Egyptians in the course of the fighting has been so reckless that they would probably not have been able to keep up the intensity of their attacks for very long. The depletion of their ammunition stocks may have been one of the main causes of their final acceptance of the truce. (We know, too, how critical the ammunition problem has become of late with the Arab Legion.) Their persistent air attacks gained them no territory, but subjected the morale of our people to very severe ordeals. It was only in the very last few days of the inter-truce fighting interlude that we received a few really effective aircraft which enabled us to "go to town" — in this case literally so, for we bombed with good effect Cairo, Damascus and a few towns in Palestine, including Tulkarm, and managed in the process to keep sufficiently high not to be shot down.

5. קיבוץ חצרים.

The issue in the Negev remains undecided. We and the Egyptians are interlocked and, for the time being, immobilised by the truce. Our lines of communication and theirs lie accross and athwart each other. The notions of front and rear have become inoperative. My account would become too tedious and involved if I attempted to trace for you the respective lines — it is a hopeless tangle, which only a very decisive blow can cut through. We have lost one important road which leads from west of Negba to east of Nir Am. We have managed to open another leading from east of Negba to Ruhama. This was tried for the first time only last night and the experimental convoy went through unharmed. Egyptian strategy was not to fritter away forces on the capture of single settlements, but to aim at a major objective: to take under control the cross-country road running from Ashkelon on the coast via Majdal, Falluja and Beit Jibrin to Hebron. By holding this line they would have sealed off the entire Negev from any effective contact with the rest of the country. It was because of the controlling position of Negba with regard to a vital part of that road that they concentrated such forces on its attempted capture. And it is by reference to their failure to attain that objective that our success in holding Negba has to be measured. By taking hold of the alternative north-south road to which I have just referred, we have cut the east-west Majdal-Falluja road and inflicted a second defeat on Egyptian strategy. Nevertheless, the sons and slaves of Pharaoh are still here and there and everywhere in that area, licking their wounds, which are worse and more numerous than ours, but by no means exhausted as far as their striking power goes.

I have given you a rather lengthy account of the military situation, but this is such an absorbing subject and the most decisive aspect of the entire problem. Also, it has the advantage of tangibility and definiteness as compared with the political situation. But during the coming weeks the centre of gravity will definitely shift from war to politics, and we shall have to pick our way carefully through the maze of negotiations, probably tentative at the outset and abortive at the end, trying to keep clear of all the pitfalls.

Actually, before the Mediator is ready to advert to his task of squaring the political circle, he will probably have to devote quite a few days to the organisation of the truce. This time he is swooping down on the Middle East with a cohort of several hundred observers, a much larger force than the previous one and more varied in its composition. In addition to the Americans, French and Belgians whom he had before — not necessarily the same people or in the same numbers — we are probably going to have quite a few Scandinavians as well as Dutch, Canadians and even Slavs.* A goodly proportion of this international personnel will be stationed in Palestine, and it will be quite a job to liaison effectively with them and to keep track of all their deeds and misdeeds.

* This "hunch" has not materialised.

With regard to the operation of the truce there is only one major worry, and that is immigration of men of military age. Originally we decided not to make too much heavy weather over the Mediator's ruling that while he would admit men of military age as immigrants, he would do so only within certain numerical or percentual limits.[6] During the first truce those admitted of that category were to be, and actually were, kept in camps under some sort of supervision. At the end of the truce period the Mediator agreed to liquidate the camps and, in the event of the truce being renewed, let those who would come henceforth be free to move about. This course leaves us with two problems unsolved: first, as the new truce is to be of indefinite duration, any numerical limit on immigration is a derogation from our sovereignty. As we do not here clash with the text of the resolution of the Security Council, but merely with the construction put on it by the Mediator, we intend to have it out with him. On the other hand, while we have found the Mediator's interpretation unduly restrictive, the British have judged it to be quite unjustifiably liberal, so in Cyprus, where it depends on them to decide who is and who is not to go to Palestine, they refuse to let out any men of military age, with the result that unless their practice is changed, some 11,000 men and their families are doomed to continued incarceration, maybe for months to come. This issue, too, we intend to fight out — verbally, of course.

With the exception of this problem, the truce as such, from the military aspect, does not worry us much. It does, however, saddle us with a very grave financial burden. This truce is to us a phase of war, not of peace. So long as there is no definitive peace settlement we cannot afford to demobilise. On the contrary, we must go on strengthening and perfecting our war machine — spending lots of money on new purchases and huge amounts on maintenance. The drain of this expenditure on our resources is terrific, and the job of making both ends meet a back-breaking one. How Eliezer [Kaplan] is managing it, even with all the resourcefulness — *izvorotlivost,*[7] I would say — of Dolik Horowitz, who is now his Permanent Under-Secretary,[8] is really beyond me. If there is one man in Israel who insists on this war ending quickly it is our friend Eliezer, and I cannot blame him. Our only consolation is that the enemy is in much the same position. The upkeep by Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan of armies in a foreign country, and in the case of the former so far away from the bases, is a task with which they find themselves increasingly unable to cope. Taking it all in all, it may well be that in this little war, as in many great wars, it is the last pound or dollar that is going to win.

I am sending you a map which shows (a) the boundaries of November

6. ראה מס' 350.
7. תחבלנות (רוסית).
8. דוד הורוביץ, המנהל הכללי של משרד־האוצר.

29th (light blue line), (b) the boundary of territory occupied by us as at the termination of the first truce (red line), (c) ditto as at the commencement of the second truce (dark blue line) and (d) bits of territory lost during the ten days interval (marked red).

22nd August, 1948

Weeks have passed since the above was dictated. I am both distressed and ashamed to think that I could find no time to complete the letter and send it off, but such is the cruel fact. The accumulation of work has been so overwhelming that I have the feeling of battling against the waves and getting into deeper and deeper water with no shore in sight.

Things have not evolved exactly as foreseen. The truce has produced a series of most formidable political problems. We have been sending you regularly all relevant documents via our Paris office, and I trust that they have all arrived and that you are aware, at least in general outline, of the attitude we have taken up on major issues of the return of Arab refugees, the future of Jerusalem and immigration.

With regard to the refugees, we are determined to be adamant while the war lasts. Once the return tide starts, it will be impossible to stem it, and it will prove our undoing. As for the future, we are equally determined — without, for the time being, formally closing the door to any eventuality — to explore all possibilities of getting rid, once and for all, of the huge Arab minority which originally threatened us. What can be achieved in this period of storm and stress will be quite unattainable once conditions get stabilised. A group of people from among our senior officials has already started working on the study of resettlement possibilities in other lands and of the finances necessary. What such permanent resettlement of "Israeli" Arabs in the neighbouring territories will mean in terms of making surplus land available in Israel for the settlement of our own people requires no emphasis. As so often in the past, we are helped in this matter by the Mufti's intransigence: he is dead against the return while the State of Israel stands, and has made out a very strong case in support of his policy.

We are fully aware that our attitude may not so easily go down with the uninitiated public, and we feel worried about the reaction to it in high American circles. We are thinking of sending someone to Washington in order to explain the problem properly to our own people and galvanise them into action *vis-à-vis* the President, the Secretary of State, etc. Rosenman will have to be brought into line, and if you could drop him a few lines asking for his active assistance on this particular subject, it would be very helpful. Leo Kohn will probably be our emissary.

In regard to Jerusalem, again we must beware of falling into a trap. On the face of it the case for demilitarising the Holy City may sound to the general run of enlightened people as quite unanswerable. In actual fact it

may turn out a mere prelude to Arab domination. The geopolitical conditions of Jerusalem as a city surrounded on all sides by Arab territory are such that unless we maintain a firm military grip on it from within and an equally firm link between it and Israel, — or unless, alternatively, the city is taken over by a strong international force, ready to fight, if necessary — its fall into Arab hands in inevitable. But there is no readiness whatsoever for raising an international force, and all people talk about is Jewish and Arab police forces, supervised by a small U.N. staff. This is sheer humbug, and ungrateful as the task may be to argue against such a lofty principle as demilitarisation, we must undertake the effort of making people see the stark facts of the situation through the cloak of plausible formulae.

The most pressing problem of all is that of immigration. We maintain our right, under the Security Council Resolution, to bring in as many men of military age as we like, provided only we do not draft them into the Army. The Mediator insists, theoretically, upon a certain proportion, the exact extent of which he has never disclosed. In practice, he holds that we have already exceeded the limit and should therefore call a halt. This we have refused and the next move is with the Mediator: he can either indict us before the Security Council or make a further attempt to reach a working compromise with us. In the meantime the deadlock on Cyprus is complete — 7,500 men of military age with about 3,500 wives and children are pining there in British captivity with no end to their misery in sight. What is even worse, a similar situation is developing in the American zone of Germany. The European command of the American Army decreed a ban on the exit of men of military age to Israel. They subsequently agreed to refer the matter to the Mediator, who issued quite an impossible ruling that lists of names should be sent to him for prior approval, pending which no one is to move. I received a yelp from our friend Joe Schwartz[9] about this new most distressing complication, but as in the meantime we got into a conflict with the Mediator on the whole question of the admission of men of military age, I am not yet in a position to help.

In a different corner of Europe, in Rumania, which contains the largest reservoir of pioneering elements for Israel, things are also very complicated, though for different reasons. At a certain stage we were faced with a complete ban on Jewish emigration from that country, imposed under the pressure of Jewish Communists of the old Yevsektzia brand. We sent a special emissary[10] to Bucharest, who succeeded in reopening the exit gates and negotiated an arrangement with the Rumanian authorities about the emigration programme of a few thousand per month. Anna Pauker, their Foreign Minister, does not belong to the rabid anti-Zionist type — she is even credited with a father and brother in Palestine. Since that decision was

9. יוסף שווארץ, מנהל ״הג׳וינט״ באירופה.
10. מרדכי נמיר, ראה מס׳ 374.

obtained, however, the Jewish Communists again got to work, and, according to latest reports, have succeeded in reducing the figure and are now trying to capture the whole machinery of the selection of immigrants, as part of their campaign to liquidate the organised Zionist movement.

You can thus see that there is no end to our worries. Yet, it is infinitely preferable to grapple with all these numerous difficulties besetting the path of the Jewish State than to carry on, as we did for so many years, with the hopeless drudgery of the day-to-day struggle with the British Administration, leading from one deadlock to another and opening no avenue for big achievements.

A letter which Arlosoroff wrote you on this theme a few months before his death, and which has only just been published for the first time,[11] is the most incisive formulation of that insoluble problem that I have ever read — a problem which looked eternal and which has now vanished overnight into the limbo of history.

I have said a great deal about our immediate worries. I have not yet begun to discuss the major problems of the future — peace with the Arab world, our future relations with Britain, the internal structure of the State itself, etc. But for fear that if I now start on a new chapter I may again be prevented from continuing by something unexpected and pressing, I would now bring this letter to a close, and in conclusion would only reply briefly to some of the questions which you have raised.

With regard to your journey, which I understand will take place in the second half of September, the arrangements we propose are as follows. You will travel on the *Kedmah*, probably with a group of immigrants, which is an economic necessity, but which, I hope, you will find symbolically most fitting. Two corvettes will go out to sea to meet the *Kedmah* and escort her into Tel Aviv Port. A few planes will also join the escort. The Port will be bedecked for the occasion and, apart from members of the Government and other dignitaries who will be there to greet you, a guard of honour will present arms. As far as safety during the sea voyage is concerned, while the truce lasts there is no humanly foreseeable risk attending it.

Preparations are now on foot for holding elections some time in October, and as soon as they are over and the Constituent Assembly meets, I hope it will be possible for it immediately to vote on the Articles of the Constitution bearing on the republican form of government and the presidency, by taking these major points of principle out of the rest of the context, so that their approval need not wait until the whole Constitution is ready for adoption. The election of the President of the Republic can then proceed in whatever form the Constituent Assembly may have decided. During the weeks preceding the elections, all arrangements concerning the presidential

11. מכתב מיום 30.6.1932; המכתב פורסם לראשונה ב"דבר" ב־30.6.1948. ראה גם ח. ארלוזורוב, יומן ירושלים, עמ' 331־342.

office, as regards both accommodation and personnel, could be worked out.

We are all happy to hear that your operation went off successfully, and are looking forward to greeting you with your eye-sight considerably improved, and otherwise in full health and vigour.

With much love to you and Mrs. Weizmann, Yours ever,

Moshe

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מ. שרתוק אל י. לינטון (לונדון)
M. Shertok to I.J. Linton (London)

מברק MH780
נוסח נכנס: 72.9/687/2

Tel Aviv, 20 July 1948 (16.35)

Evacuation Cyprus again interrupted. Collins stating applied again London for instructions whether even non-military age group can proce[ed] without U.N. supervision. This is reversion to previous scandalous position. Please try prevail they should allow non-military age groups proceed pending decision regarding military age group.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X120. התקבל: 21.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

New York, 20 July 1948

Joseph Satterthwaite, who succeeded Henderson,[1] has been appointed for one year only. A personal friend whom I know for eight years. He is honest and loyal, but does not differ in views and attitude on Palestine from his predecessor. Less biased and aggressive than Henderson, he will probably observe more strictly instructions his superiors. Raymond Hare been appointed his assistant, has good knowledge Palestine problem and cooperated with us many occasions in past. He will follow his chief. Do not expect any significant changes or developments [State] Department as results these appointments only; however, friendly personal relations with both will make Department more accessible and contact easier.

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1. כמנהל המשרד לענייני המזרח הקרוב ואפריקה במחלקת־המדינה.

Long conversation Sarper[2] learned further improvement Turkish attitude towards Israel. Under Sarper's inspiration, Shukry Esmer[3] published favourable article *Ulus.*[4] Such article could not be published without Government's consent, and served for Sarper best evidence Turkish readiness make their views on Israel more public and official. Turks most satisfied lesson we gave Arabs, especially Egypt. Ankara supports our cooperation with Abdullah and desires improvement our relations with British. Turkish Government distrusts Iran, which is disintegrating under corrupt leadership. Sarper hopes advance our cooperation during Paris Assembly, where Turkish Delegation will consist prominent members Government.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
M. Shertok to M. Fischer (Paris)

העתק: 130.02/2382/12

תל אביב, י״ד בתמוז תש״ח
21 ביולי 1948

מוריס היקר,

קיבלתי בתודה וקראתי בעניין רב את מכתבך מ־14 ליולי שנה זו.[1] גרשון הירש מטפל בשאלות המעשיות שאתה מעורר ויכתוב לך עליהן.

אנדרי פיליפ, בביקורו הקצר, ראה הרבה והתרשם מאוד.[2] אקווה שביקורו יהיה לברכה. כיוון שההפוגה עכשיו היא לזמן בלתי־מוגבל, האין סיכוי לחידוש המערכה על הכרה לאלתר? הנני שומע מנחום גולדמן[3] כי ההתנגדות הבריטית להכרתנו נתרופפה במקצת. היש סימנים לכן בפאריס? יש להסביר היטב, כי אי־הכרת צרפת, הגוררת אחריה אי־הכרה מצד מדינות אחרות במערב, ממילא דוחפת את ישראל מזרחה. פועלים כאן חוקי פיסיקה מדינית, אשר שום מתרסים אידיאולוגיים לא יעמדו בפניהם. צרפת מאבדת במו ידיה את עמדתה בישראל ומחלישה את עמדת המערב כולו במדינתנו על־ידי עיכוב ההכרה.

[.....][4]

בברכה לבבית, מ.ש.

2. סלים סארפר, הנציג הקבוע של טורקיה באו״ם.
3. אחמד שוקרי אסמר, עיתונאי טורקי, מנהל לשכת ההסברה של טורקיה בניו יורק.
4. עיתון יומי, בטאונה של מפלגת העם הרפובליקאית בטורקיה.

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1. מס׳ 328.
2. אנדרה פיליפ, מדינאי צרפתי, מראשי הקבוצה הפרו־ציונית באסיפה הלאומית הצרפתית, החזיק בתיקים כלכליים ופיננסיים בממשלות אחדות בתקופה שלאחר מלחמת־העולם השנייה.
3. ראה מס׳ 351.
4. הפיסקה האחרונה לא הודפסה כאן. היא דנה בשיתופו של מ. יארבלום, יושב־ראש הפדרציה הציונית בצרפת, בעבודה המדינית בנציגות ישראל בפאריס.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 557
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 22 July 1948

Robinson, myself, discussed admission United Nations with Jessup, Ross. They indicated American support principle, but advised exploring prospects success before submitting formally. They promised consult Washington and take soundings other delegations. Advised us do likewise, exchange reactions.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל מ. קומיי (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to M. Comay (New York)

מברק MH814
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/20

[Tel Aviv], 22 July 1948

Your 548.[1] Our policy: 1) Arab exodus direct result folly aggression organised by Arab States and sponsored by British. Present distress masses refugees and their future settlement responsibility war-mongers. 2) No question allowing Arabs return while state of war continuing, as would mean introduction fifth column, provision bases for enemies from outside and dislocation law order inside. Exceptions only in favour special deserving cases compassionate grounds, subject security screening. 3) Truce is phase war, not peace. 4) Question Arab return can be decided only as part peace settlement with Arab State[s] and in context its terms, when question confiscation property Jews neighbouring countries and their future will also be raised. 5) Arabs remaining Israel unmolested and receive due care from State as regards services.

Shertok

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1. קומיי אל שרתוק, 21.7.1948, 93.03/94/10. קומיי שלח הבהרות למברקו הקודם, מיום 19.7.1948 (מס' 345, וראה גם הערה 2 שם).

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ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Reedman to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2443/1

Tel Aviv, 22 July 1948

Dear Mr. Shertok,

At the request of the Mediator, I enclose the draft suggestions for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. A copy is being submitted to the Arabs.

The suggestions are not final but are intended to serve as a basis for a detailed discussion of the problem between the parties.

Yours sincerely,

John N. Reedman
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

נספח
APPENDIX

DEMILITARISATION OF JERUSALEM
DRAFT SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MEDIATOR[1]

ARTICLE 1

The Town Planning Area of Jerusalem with surrounding localities, the precise boundaries of which are to be determined, is demilitarised.

ARTICLE 2

The U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem is in charge of the demilitarisation of the area described in Article 1. In the execution of its mission, the U.N. Truce Commission is assisted by U.N. military observers and U.N. forces.

ARTICLE 3

Both parties agree to withdraw their respective forces from the area to be demilitarised according to a plan, which will be established by U.N. military observers in consultation with both parties. To ensure effective control, the withdrawal of forces can be carried out in successive stages.

ARTICLE 4

The demilitarisation shall commence at a time to be fixed by the U.N. Truce Commission in agreement with the two parties.

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1. בשולי ההצעות מצוין מקום ומועד חיבורן: "רודוס, 13.7.1948."

ARTICLE 5

Both parties agree to grant free passage through the areas under their control to U.N. forces and other personnel, as well as to supplies, military and civilian, required for their maintenance.

ARTICLE 6

Both parties agree to grant all facilities required by the U.N. forces and other personnel for the fulfilment of their duties.

ARTICLE 7

Once one or both parties have withdrawn their forces from part or the whole of the area to be demilitarised, the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem and its organs are responsible for the observation of the terms of this agreement.

ARTICLE 8

Police forces organised by local communities are authorised to operate under the control of and with the armaments authorised by the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem.

ARTICLE 9

Military operations on land or from the air inside the demilitarised area are prohibited.

ARTICLE 10

Military operations from the territory or from the air outside of the demilitarised area against the demilitarised area are prohibited.

ARTICLE 11

The maintenance of fighting and auxiliary personnel with the exception of U.N. forces, of wounded and of sanitary personnel, in the demilitarised area is prohibited.

ARTICLE 12

The passage of fighting and auxiliary personnel, with the exception of U.N. forces, of wounded and of sanitary personnel, through the demilitarised area is prohibited.

ARTICLE 13

Men of military age not normally residing in the demilitarised area can only be admitted to this area with the special permission of the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem.

Article 14

Men of military age normally residing in the demilitarised area, but who at any time have been enrolled in the military (or defence) forces of either party, can only be admitted to this area with the special permission of the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem.

Article 15

Men of non-military age, women and children normally residing in the demilitarised area, are freely admitted into this area.

Article 16

Men of non-military age, women and children not normally residing in the demilitarised area, can be admitted only with the special permission of the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem.

Article 17

The import to, the export from or the storage in the demilitarised area of arms, ammunition or other military supplies, except for U.N. forces, are prohibited.

Article 18

The import to and storage in the demilitarised area of food and other civilian supplies, including water and fuel, are permitted.

Article 19

The free flow of water from the sources at Ras-el-Ain through the pipeline to Jerusalem, as well as the maintenance and repair of pumping stations and other necessary installations, shall be permitted.

Article 20

As a rule, the export from the demilitarised area of food and other civilian supplies is prohibited. In exceptional cases export licences may be granted by the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem.

Article 21

The import to and storage in the demilitarised area of food and other civilian supplies has to be effected under the control of the Truce Commission.

Both parties agree to grant free passage through the area under their control of such supplies.

ARTICLE 22

Free access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites is guaranteed according to existing rights and with the limitations resulting either from the terms of this Agreement or from decisions taken by the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem for reasons of security, public order or public health.[2]

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ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק
L. Kohn to M. Shertok

תזכיר: 130.02/2424/21

[Tel Aviv], 22 July 1948

1. It seems to me that we ought to begin to prepare our position for the forthcoming encounter with Bernadotte and his staff. I am inclined to think that Bernadotte will start, not by continuing the discussion on his Rhodes "Suggestions",[1] but by fixing the details of the truce conditions and working in the direction of a permanent armistice, thus creating a kind of interim regime, which, as Jon Kimche has just pointed out, may, in accordance with precedent, become the basis of the final settlement. As a part of this interim regime, Bernadotte is also likely to take up the question of the demilitarization of Jerusalem.[2] I think we must plan our strategy for all this.

2. If these assumptions are correct, I think we ought first of all to clear the deck by sending off our reply to Bernadotte to his "Suggestions". Otherwise we may find ourselves entangled in new discussions on new issues without having had an opportunity of having our say on his "Suggestions". The letter[3] was drafted at the beginning of the fighting week, and it may require to be strengthened in one or two details, in the light of the outcome of the fighting. I have re-drafted the paragraph on Jerusalem in this light. I am inclined to think that Bernadotte will not reply, except formally, and postpone the discussion on the terms of the final settlement to a later season, hoping perhaps in the meantime to create *faits accomplis.*

2. שרתוק הבריק בו ביום את עיקרי ההצעות אל אבן וציין כי לדעתו הן אינן יכולות לשמש בסיס למשא־ומתן, בעיקר לאור סעיפים 13, 14 ו־16 והענקת סמכויות מרחיקות־לכת לוועדת ההפוגה הקונסולרית. הוא הוסיף שכל העניין נראה עתה באור שונה לנוכח ההפוגה. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 22.7.1948, 130.09/2329/1). הממשלה דנה בהצעות ב־25 ביולי; הוחלט לדחותן מכול וכול, להחיל את סמכות מדינת ישראל וחוקיה בירושלים ולמנות מושל צבאי לעיר. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 25.7.1948).

1. ראה מס' 359.
2. ראה מס' 358.
3. מס' 378.

3. The truce situation is this time different from that in the previous case in that formerly the Arabs accepted unconditionally, and this time they appear to have put up certain stipulations. It may very well be that this is no more than a face-saving device on their part, but it is not inconceivable that he may have given them a promise that he would try his best to secure at least some of their demands, and we may expect that he will approach us on this. Their stipulations as far as published in the press are:

a) complete stoppage of Jewish immigration;

b) the return of the Arab refugees;

c) the fixing of a definite term for the new truce.

I feel certain that Bernadotte will not even dare to suggest to us the stoppage of all Jewish immigration. He may, however, insist on the continuation of the immigration limitations which were enforced during the first truce. I doubt whether we can accept this if the truce is going to be prolonged; but this is a matter on which the competent immigration and man-power authorities ought to be consulted. Nor do I think that Bernadotte will take up the Arabs' demand for a time limit to be fixed for the new truce, for the obvious reason that this runs counter to his own line, which is to make the truce permanent.

3.[4] It follows that the only one of the Arab stipulations which he may take up with us is the return of the refugees, more especially as he himself may feel strongly about this, and he may regard it as helpful towards the establishment of a better atmosphere for an agreed truce. As far as I know, our attitude on this question has hardened in recent months. On the other hand, this is just one of those points where it will be easy to join all our enemies against us, who will like nothing better than to hide their hatred of us under the cloak of humanitarian concern for the poor exiled Arabs. I therefore suggest that the military, district and the economic authorities concerned should be made to study this problem and prepare a joint proposal as to what we can concede and what we cannot, and why.

4. The question of the demilitarization of Jerusalem is a new stunt thrown into the debate, which Bernadotte is likely to pursue in earnest. It is not quite clear why he raises this issue at a time when he is obviously concerned to maintain the truce indefinitely. Perhaps the idea is thereby to take out the sting of his proposal for handing over Jerusalem to the Arabs, because if Abdullah is not allowed to maintain any army in Jerusalem, his political domination of the city may not amount to anything real. Or it may be part of the new suggestion which Reedman made to me last week that Jerusalem be neither Jewish nor Arab but be the headquarters of the Union of Palestine and Transjordan and a seat of the administration of the common services.[5] For the realisation of this idea, too, it might be useful to demilitarize the city.

4. הטעות במספור הסעיפים (פעמיים סעיף 3) — במקור.

5. ראה מס' 347.

5. Actually, Bernadotte himself has put up a strong case against the demilitarization of Jerusalem by basing his proposal for the handing over of Jerusalem to Arab rule on the ground that Jerusalem is surrounded on all sides by Arab territory. It is evident that this gives the Arabs a tremendous initial advantage in any scheme to conquer the city militarily. Our military experts will probably have a lot to say on this and other aspects of the demilitarization idea, and I suggest that they should be immediately put to work on it. It is obvious that an international police force of a few thousand men can in itself not provide any effective defence of an overwhelmingly Jewish city against the danger of an Arab coup.

6. It is clear that our reaction to whatever proposal may be made by Bernadotte on the demilitarization question will in the ultimate resort depend on our policy towards the Jerusalem problem in general. There is, in my view, tremendous force in Kimche's argument based on the analysis of Sir Frederick Maurice[6] that it is the armistice conditions which in the end determine the peace conditions. Our position on the Jerusalem question is at the present moment very unclear. We accepted last November the international city proposal of the UNSCOP majority report as endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly as a *pis aller*. It was put to us as part of the general scheme, and our rejection of their Jerusalem proposal might have resulted in the whole partition scheme falling through. Since then, however, a lot of things have happened. Bernadotte clearly does not regard the decision of the 29th November as binding on him, and in his last letter to you there is such a phrase as "whatever may be the legal character of the Resolution of the 29th November".[7] We may have to fight him on that issue, and I think we should, but it is doubtful whether we shall win in that dispute in view of the fact that the Russian effort at last week's meeting of the Security Council to secure reaffirmation of the 29th November resolution *vis-à-vis* Bernadotte did not produce any results.[8] I think, however, that we may succeed in making him stick to the basic conceptions of the Resolution subject to territorial adjustments in detail. He may, however, insist on a change of the Jerusalem decision, because I gather from Reedman that he and his advisers regard the international regime scheme as quite unreal and the recent discussions at Lake Success on the Statute as merely perfunctory. Reedman's recent talk with me was obviously an attempt to throw out a new plan for us to think about, and I must say that the few people I have spoken to seem not averse to our considering a

6. סר פרדריק מוריס, היסטוריון צבאי בריטי.
7. ראה מס׳ 282, סעיף 6.
8. בדיונים על הצעת ההחלטה האמריקאית במועצת־הביטחון (ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 326) טען נציג ברית־המועצות, שנוסחם של שניים מסעיפי ההצעה אינו תואם את החלטת ה־29 בנובמבר ואף פותח פתח להחלפתה בהחלטה אחרת. לאחר שהצעת תיקון סובייטית לאחד הסעיפים נדחתה, נמנע נציג ברית־המועצות בהצבעה על סעיפים אחדים ועל ההצעה בכללותה. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 336th Meeting, 14.7.1948, pp. 26-34; 338th Meeting, 15.7.1948).

solution on these lines. It is of course infinitely better than the "Suggestion" for handing over Jerusalem to Arab rule, which I think Bernadotte can hardly press in the light of our actual military position.

7. It seems to me, however, that we ought not to confine ourselves to reacting to Reedman's new scheme. Nor do I think we should continue to make ourselves the advocates — in fact practically the sole advocates — of the international city idea. It was not our suggestion: it was forced upon us, and many of us disliked it intensely. I am convinced that it will for all time exclude Jerusalem from the Jewish State. I think Jerusalem under such a regime will [be] governed by a combination of anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist forces: the Anglican Bishop, the Papal Nuncio, Rabbi Dushinsky[9] and Dr. Magnes. It will result in Jerusalem being consciously or sub-consciously abandoned by many Jews in the Jewish State, while on the other hand, it may well lead to the creation within Israel of a powerful irredentist movement for the re-conquest of Jerusalem, which may poison the internal political life of our new State. Economically the regime will be untenable. The best of our people will not want to live under such a Vatican City regime, and the city administration will come with very large demands to the Jewish State for financial aid, as they are entitled to do under the Resolution of the 29th November.

8. On hammering out all these considerations, I strongly urge that we should consider taking the initiative in this matter and working out a new scheme for the partition of Jerusalem in the light of the circumstances now created. This should be our counter-proposal to Bernadotte's "Suggestion" and to Reedman's latest scheme. I propose that we renew the suggestion which we made to the Woodhead Commission in 1938[10] that the New City of Jerusalem be included in the Jewish State and connected with it by a tenable and defensible corridor. The Old City plus some Arab Quarters outside the Walls, but minus the Jewish Quarter in the Old City, should go to the Arab State. The corridor should be based on the new road to Tel Aviv but should provide space for the establishment of a dozen new Jewish agricultural settlements to fill the gap between Kiriat Anavim and Hulda and beyond that. If we can achieve this, Jewish Jerusalem may become the capital of the Jewish State, and the State of Israel secure that historical background which it badly needs both for itself and to impress the whole Jewish people and the world at large, as historical successor of the ancient Jewish State. This may also be the economic saving of Jerusalem, for I find it difficult to believe that we can maintain the Jewish population of Jerusalem at its pre-war level if the seat of Government of the Jewish State

9. יוסף צבי דושינסקי, רב העדה החרדית בירושלים.
10. ראה מס' 64, הערה 2.

is located elsewhere. The movement of men of the professional classes from Jerusalem in recent weeks, under the most adverse conditions now prevailing, has assumed alarming proportions. If freedom of travel is restored, it may in a very short time result in the devastating depletion of the New City.

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הרוזן ברנאדוט אל מ. שרתוק
Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2424/21

22 July 1948

Following my message to you of sixteen July,[1] I may now inform you that U.N. Observers are at my disposal and will be rapidly deployed to their respective observation posts in Palestine and the Arab States for purposes of supervising the application of the truce beginning on Wednesday, 21 July.

I trust that these observers and their staffs will be accorded every appropriate facility and assistance in the discharge of their responsibilities.

It is my intention to resume at an early date my consultation with the respective parties on the demilitarization of Jerusalem and the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine in pursuance [of] the instructions laid down in the Security Council's resolution of 15 July.[2]

Folke Bernadotte

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1. הודעה על תחילת הפסקת־האש (130.02/2424/21).
2. הערות אנשי משרד־החוץ:

״האם מברק זה מחייב תשובה? ואם כן — מה עלי לומר לפיסקה האחרונה? לא הייתי רוצה להביע נכונות למו״מ, או אפילו תקווה לראותו בקרוב, כי הנסיון הוכיח שהוא מנצל דברי נימוס כאלה למטרות מדיניות; משום זה מוטב לא לענות כלל, אם הדבר לא ייראה כחוסר נימוס. תנו־נא דעתכם. מ[שה] ש[רתוק], 22.VII.״

ליאו כהן אל מ. שרתוק: ״סבורני שהנימוס מחייב שתענה למברק זה. מאידך גיסא נראה לי, מהסיבות שציינת, שתשובתך אסור לה להגיב על הפיסקה האחרונה, לכן אני מציע שהתשובה תהיה מנוסחת כדלהלן: מתכבד לאשר את מברקך 22 ביולי. למשקיפים ולצוותם ינתן כל הסיוע והעזרה במילוי תפקידם.״

״אני מסכים לנוסח הזה. ו[לטר] א[יתן].״

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 94/130, 95/127, 96/192.
נשלח: 24.7/23.7;
התקבל: 25.7/24.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 22 July 1948

Following considerations from this end may be relevant your current negotiations and preparation for Paris session General Assembly:

1) Whatever weakness present United States Administration has exhibited, nevertheless probable that forthcoming three months represent best remaining opportunity for accomplishment here, both from viewpoint of electioneering nature of Truman and make-up of entourage. Dewey victory highly probable and Dewey reportedly less influenced by personal attitudes than by Departmental recommendations. Dulles, who seems most likely successor Marshall, has never been particularly friendly nor intimately concerned Palestine problem. Thus seems likely that Dewey will be more decisively controlled by Dulles than Truman by Marshall, particularly when election factor ended. Although platform both parties exceedingly friendly, nevertheless probably wise discount their importance, and for period after November assume continued dominance pro-Arab elements State Department.

2) Regarded highly unlikely here that more conciliatory British attitude permanent or sincerely motivated. British undoubtedly concerned first by need for supplementary United States loan, second — avoidance threat and cost of Middle East fighting, and third — danger of weakening and perhaps overthrowing present regimes and pro-British leadership some Arab states if our military successes continued.

3) As result Berlin crisis and increased tension Soviet-American relationships, State Department anxious avoid continued difficulties Middle East. But danger also exists that to facilitate joint British-American action Germany, Bevin may seek concessions at expense Israel. [.....][1] Israeli strength apparently dominant factor here, but diplomatic maneuvering hostile elements evidently continuing, as evidenced by delays de jure recognition, grant of loan etc.

4) Truce without terminal date strengthens hands of those who have persistently sought establish so-called bi-partisan Palestine policy in Uni-

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1. משפט אחד לא הודפס כאן.

ted States and who have fought to postpone final settlement until after election. Moreover, under present truce terms issues may be reopened United Nations General Assembly Paris.

5) In view foregoing, stress great desirability direct independent negotiations with Arabs and settlement without Bernadotte. Fully appreciate difficulties, but worried regarding possible loss strength in United States after November elections and dangers wide-open agenda Paris session. Some evidence now available here that possibilities exist to approach Egypt. Close friend advised by Hafez Afifi Pasha,[2] presently in United States America, that Egypt has no territorial ambitions Negev, but dominantly concerned extinguishing British influence Middle East, both as exercised directly and through Abdullah. Recognize that common Israeli-Egypt policy cannot be based this negative approach, but belive basic Egyptian attitudes worth reappraising. Settlement with Egypt before Paris session would obviously represent tremendous diplomatic victory for Israel and probably end danger adverse action Paris.

6) Above all, urgently stress need consideration programme for Paris, including approaches friendly governments regarding establishment common policy. Informing Eban.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (וואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 28/42
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 22 July 1948

View impending arrival U.S. Representative, please convey Soviet Embassy earliest arrival their Minister most desirable. Take opportunity explain we deeply regret delay establishment Israeli Legation Moscow owing Golda's accident.[1] Expect her here next week, hope she able leave after brief stay.

Shertok

2. חאפז עפיפי פאשה, מדינאי וכלכלן מצרי. יושב־ראש חבר המנהלים של "בנק מיסר". מילא תפקידים דיפלומטיים במשלחת המצרית באו"ם (1946).

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1. גולדה מאירסון נפצעה בתאונת דרכים בארצות־הברית.

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 24/31

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 22 July 1948

Bidault returned from The Hague,[1] says: "Bevin position re Palestine big change towards acceptance de facto situation. Bevin said expecting France and small Western states recognise before Britain".

Fischer

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X126. התקבל: 24.7

נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 23 July 1948

First long conversation Malik[1] today, extremely cordial. Evinced appreciation our military successes, discussed effect set-backs on Arab /regimes/. Approved our application membership but advises careful preparation, believes all depends degree American support. Hoped early beginning Golda [Meyerson]'s mission.[2]

Eban

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1. מפגישת שרי־החוץ של ה"איחוד המערבי" — בריטניה, צרפת ומדינות בנלוכס.

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1. יעקב מאליק, הנציג הקבוע של ברית־המועצות באו"ם.
2. ראה מס' 362 והערה 1 שם.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 565
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/126/1

[New York], 23 July 1948

Keenly felt difficulty influence highly unsatisfactory Belgian attitude without assistance any representative Brussels, maintaining closest contacts with ourselves and keeping touch Government. Ferdman[1] useful contact, but not capable daily political work. Contrast recent attitudes France, Belgium, at Lake Success illustrates vital importance dealing with matter either by dispatching envoy or nominating influential local friend. Representative here[2] not unfriendly but in absence constant Brussels communications, consistently follows British line.

Eban

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שיחת א. לוריא — ג׳יימס מקדונלד (בניו יורק, ב־23 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: A. Lourie — James McDonald (New York, 23 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/70/18

[New York, 23 (?) July 1948]

Secret

I saw Mr. McDonald immediately prior to his departure for Israel. He told me that he wanted our people to know that he had delayed his departure not as Mr. Knox[1] had suggested, because of the impending birth of a grandchild (which had still not arrived), but in order to arrange a number of further interviews with key people in Washington so that he should arrive with a better background of support and understanding. He expected when in London to see Mr. Bevin, and also possibly Mr. Churchill. He planned further to pay another visit to the Pope *en route*. He expected to be in Israel about two weeks hence.

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1. דוד פרדמן, איש עסקים, פעיל בציבור הציוני והיהודי בבלגיה.
2. פרנאנד ואן לאנגנהווה, נציג בלגיה באו״ם.

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1. צ׳ארלס נוקס, המיועד לתפקיד יועץ בנציגות ארצות־הברית בישראל.

On July 21, two days before sailing, Mr. McDonald was in Washington to take leave of the President and the State Department. In the course of the day he saw, in addition to President Truman, Secretary Marshall, Mr. Lovett, General Bradley,[2] Secretary for Air Symington, Mr. Forrestal and a representative of the Navy. In the case of the armed services, his purpose was to assure that the respective attachés to be sent out to Israel would be competent men in whom he could have confidence.

Mr. McDonald received a letter signed by the President (apparently drafted by J[ames] M[cDonald] himself), in which the President in greeting him in connection with his mission, asked that Mr. McDonald advise him with regard to the embargo, the appropriate time for taking action with respect to "full recognition", and matters pertaining to assistance for which this country might be asked and which it might properly give to Israel.[3]

Mr. McDonald told me that this letter had been read with interest by the State Department people, who were apparently impressed by its terms. He added that he intended to write a personal note to Marshall from the boat, thanking him for his interview, and would take the opportunity to enclose a copy of the President's letter.

In comparing the attitude of the President and the State Department on the subject of recognition, Mr. McDonald said that the President was looking for an excuse to accord de jure recognition, and apparently was planning to accord such recognition if possible during September. The attitude of the State Department was that they would grant recognition as soon as there was any substantial change in the situation on the basis of which they could justify their changed attitude. An example of such a change would be the calling of the Constituent Assembly, but favourable action might also be prevised on some other development.

Mr. McDonald had a long talk with Mr. Marshall and felt that good personal relations had been established between himself and the Secretary of State as a result. He was the more pleased about this, in view of the fact that at the beginning of their talk Mr. Marshall made it clear that he had opposed Mr. McDonald's appointment. Mr. McDonald, for his part, had told the Secretary of State in detail of his interest in and past association with the Zionist movement, and stated that he was entering upon his task with established convictions. Mr. McDonald explained his views at some length and apparently received a sympathetic hearing.

Concerning his interview with Mr. Lovett, whom he had met some time previously, Mr. McDonald said that in arranging the present series of meetings he had consulted with Mr. Satterthwaite, the successor to Mr. Loy Henderson, who seemed rather reluctant to have Mr. McDonald meet Mr.

2. עומר בראדלי, ראש המטה של כוחות היבשה של ארצות־הברית.
3. המכתב פורסם בספר James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, pp. 16-17.

Lovett again. Accordingly, Mr. McDonald arranged the interview himself. He described Mr. Lovett as not basically anti-Semitic or hostile, but as conservative, pro-British and still troubled by ideas of Red infiltration into Israel. On the subject of Red infiltration, Mr. McDonald said that the Secretary of State had taken a much more reasonable view, and apparently was not prepared to accept the argument of those who saw in the establishment of the Jewish State an outpost for Russian influence in the Middle East. Mr. Lovett was also troubled about the Irgun Zvai Le'umi and the Sternists' reports that the Israeli Government might eventually be faced with a civil war. At the same time he had been clearly impressed by the manner in which the *Altalena* incident was handled. He relied a good deal on his subordinate officials and also had much faith in the views of Ambassador Douglas. Although his conversation with Mr. Lovett was not on the same frank level as that with Mr. Marshall, Mr. McDonald felt that it had been of value in establishing a satisfactory working relationship. At the same time Mr. McDonald emphasized to me the importance of arranging for the appointment in the State Department of a special adviser on Israeli affairs. General Hilldring would have been the right man, and it was most unfortunate that he had withdrawn after actually having been appointed.[4] Reports that the Secretary of State had indicated to Hilldring that he would prefer him not to act were entirely unfounded, and Mr. Marshall was much put out by the General's letter of resignation. Efforts had been made to have the State Department take the matter up again since Hilldring might now be prepared to accept the appointment, but there was an understandable reluctance on their part to re-open the matter.

Mr. McDonald urged that we should do what we can to press forward with the idea of such an appointment, and in particular it was important to have available the names of suitable candidates.

In addition to discussing with the President and obtaining his approval of the letter of instructions already referred to, Mr. McDonald asked him to obtain the release from the Department of Commerce of Mr. [Cummings][5] whom Mr. McDonald was anxious to have as a specially trusted member of his staff. He had previously tried to secure Mr. [Cummings'] release through David Niles, but the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Sawyer, had not been willing to accede to this request. The President telephoned to Mr. Sawyer, and after some little discussion the latter gave way. Mr. McDonald told me that the standing of Mr. Shertok and Mr. Ben-Gurion was high with those with whom he had spoken, also that Mr. Epstein was regarded as doing an excellent job. He said further that he had been advised that probably he would be exceptional amongst the Ministers abroad in being continued under the Dewey Administration — adding, however, that the

4. ראה מס' 192 והערה 1 שם.
5. הרברט קאמינגס, פקיד במשרד־המסחר של ארצות־הברית. השם כאן ולהלן חסר במקור.

reason probably was that Mr. Dewey would thereby be saving himself a potential headache.

Mr. McDonald mentioned to me, in the course of our talk, that the British had told the Arabs that they had lost the war and must accommodate themselves to that fact.

A.L.

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א. אבן אל נ. גולדמן (ז'נבה)
A. Eban to N. Goldmann (Geneva)

העתק: 93.03/127/1

[New York], 23 July 1948

Dear Nahum,

Many thanks for your letter of July 19.[1] Our impressions here bear out your analysis in its entirety.

Since the question of de facto recognition is at least recognized to be imminent, it seems rather absurd to notice how persistently the United Kingdom Delegation fights against our proper designation here. The latest example was an attempt to specify the Arab States by name and refer to us as "the other party". We were able to defeat this by sheer ridicule, and a vote of 8 to 3.[2] But each such instance involves me in a duel with Cadogan, which public opinion here appreciates enormously, but which both of us feel we could do without. Owing to our relative proximity at the table, I am able to form a clear impression that most of his more startling utterances come directly from London — for example, the remarkable pronouncement that the Security Council had been biased against the Arabs and did not give proper consideration to their views.

With regard to the outstanding Anglo-Israel issues, our own experience here confirms the grave damage which will be caused unless the five men are speedily released. The American Delegation is especially insistent in order to avoid a showdown in the Security Council, although they do admit that we should conduct such proper investigation before releasing them as we deem fit.

The other matter at issue is that of Cyprus. We have now got the Mediator publicly to announce that the detention of those 11,000 men is not justifiable within the terms of the truce, and constitutes a unilateral

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1. מס' 346.
2. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 326.

act.[3] Nevertheless, this does not raise an echo with His Majesty's Government. In a talk with Parodi today, he expressed his indignation at the British attitude, which was a clear violation of the immigration clause as adopted in the form of the French amendment on May 29. I wonder whether some preliminary attention to this matter would not help; I find it difficult to imagine how the Minister could formulate his defence on this matter.

With regard to our admission, the provisional nature of the government is no handicap. In fact, we fulfil all the conditions and criteria; we have no lack of arguments; we merely have a lack of votes. The government of Israel is infinitely more stable than about half the governments represented in the United Nations. As you know, the United States has committed itself several times to the support of our application. But there is a difference between perfunctory support and the kind of support that secures the South American and Canadian votes. We have decided on no account to submit a formal application in advance of a tolerable certainty that we shall be accepted, and we are spending these few weeks in intensive propaganda and exploration.

Parodi, whose attitude has become increasingly cordial and enthusiastic since our military successes, is now putting this question up to Paris.[4] It should be made clear that there is no connection whatever between individual recognition and admission to the United Nations. Transjordan received ten votes in the Security Council for admission, although only two members of the Council recognized him [*sic*]. Yemen, Liberia and Pakistan put together have fewer recognitions than we have. Yet this was no bar to their admission. The United Nations has a tendency to universality, and normally has a liberal practice in this regard, and the only question remaining is whether Great Britain will or will not put up swift opposition to our admission.

I should be most grateful if you can get some preliminary soundings on this matter. Some of our American friends in the Delegation anticipate that the British attitude will be not to oppose our admission but to link it inseparably with the admission of Transjordan, on which they are keener than ever in the light of their difficulties with other Arab governments. The trouble is, of course, that even if we felt like this bargain, we are in no position to deliver Transjordan's admission. In a talk with Malik this morning, I found their attitude to Transjordan unchanged. It is, however, not inconceivable that they might do the deal if to refuse it would mean the denial of our entry. For the time being, I should think it advisable to discuss

3. המתווך אמר זאת במהלך הדיון על הדין־וחשבון שלו במועצת־הביטחון בתשובה לשאלה של אבן. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 333rd Meeting, 13.7.1948, pp. 13-14).
4. ראה מס' 372.

our admission on its merits, not raising the Transjordan issue unless it is raised by Great Britain, as I am fairly sure that it will.

We had a most interesting and important cable from Fischer yesterday,[5] and will be glad to have more details. That there is a general directive to be friendly to us is very clear from the delegation's attitude here.

I am in a sort of dull despair about Belgium. They seem unable to help us, even on the most trivial matters, and are showing a completely pro-Arab leaning. I am sure that it has nothing whatever to do with van Langenhove, who is a thoroughly decent person, but a certain amount of malice appears to have got into Spaak. I know how hard you have tried on these matters before, but do you think that some new effort could not be made?[6]

Every time we look at the situation, we find that London is the key to any prospect of swift stabilization. It is not true that the United States and the Soviet Union together can do what they like at the United Nations. Britain definitely holds the balance of power and influence. It seems to me therefore that even progress by inches toward a de facto recognition in London is of inestimable value.

On the American scene, we face no real dangers in the coming few months. Their Delegation keeps the closest contact with us and takes no major steps without consultation. It seems clear that they cannot allow themselves, for political reasons, to diverge from us too widely. Even in the State Department, I doubt if there is any real desire for any sharp reversal, especially now that Henderson has gone and Forrestal is no longer mobilizing the Defence Department against us.

Both in Washington and at Lake Success, the dominant factor is our military success. I remember giving everybody a low estimate of Arab military capacity with a consciousness that I was exaggerating matters. We are now in a position where our lies have come true. By revealing the fact that the Arab League is not the vast factor in strategic calculations which it was portrayed to be, we are regarded in many circles as having rendered a service to the overall strategic picture.

If you do go to Tel Aviv, please give my regards to everybody. I still hope that between August 20 and whenever the Council starts meeting in Paris, I may have a chance of going to Israel for a few days via London.

Yours sincerely,

Aubrey S. Eban

5. פישר אל אבן, 22.7.1948, 93.01/2180/21 — זהה למס' 363.
6. ראה מס' 365.

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א. אבן אל י. לינטון (לונדון)
A. Eban to I.J. Linton (London)

מברק

נוסח נכנס: אצ"מ Z4/14834

New York, 23 July 1948

Your 73/22.[1] Will suspend action here pending your receipt Foreign Office reply, unless instructed otherwise Moshe [Shertok]. French Delegation informed me today wholesale detention Cyprus out of accord immigration clause truce resolution, which they drafted.[2] This not for publication but usable private conversations. Obviously preferable settle London rather than raise debate Council, but Cypriots continually sending pathetic messages.

Eban

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

ב־23.7.1948 מסר משרד־החוץ את ההודעה הבאה לעתונות:

On 23 July the Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the following communiqué to the press

The Provisional Government of Israel has for some time had under consideration the situation created by the closing of the Haifa Oil Refineries.

Work at the Refineries was stopped by the Management on April 26, 1948. Since then considerable quantities of crude oil from Iraq were pumped into the Haifa terminal and taken away by tanker. In the last three weeks alone before the British evacuation of Haifa, 115,000 tons were so removed, most of it to be refined at Tripoli; of the oil so refined quantities were placed at the disposal of the Arab States. Oil refined at Kirkuk was also supplied to the Transjordan Government for the needs of the Arab Legion. A stock of about 40,000 tons of crude oil was left in the tanks of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Haifa.

In view of the limited volume of the stocks of oil in Israel, and in particular of the shortage of fuel oil on which the normal functioning of a number of vital plants depends, the Provisional Government found it necessary to take steps to secure the refining of the crude oil left at Haifa.

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1. לינטון אל אבן, 23.7.1948, 93.01/2180/22. לינטון הודיע שעורר את שאלת עצורי קפריסין במשרד־החוץ הבריטי. הוא שאל אם שרתוק יסכים לשחרורם תחת פיקוחו של המתווך. (סוף המברק משובש ואינו ברור).
2. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 92.

Accordingly, on July 9, 1948, it decided to take action under the emergency powers assumed by the Mandatory Government, which, in accordance with the decision of the Provisional State Council of May 14, 1948, are still in force. By virtue of these powers, on July 14, 1948, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Supply, issued an order calling upon the Iraq Petroleum Company to supply the crude oil held by them to the Consolidated Refineries, Ltd., and upon the latter to refine it. The local Committee of Management of the Consolidated Refineries Ltd. complied, and one of the three units was put into commission. The first of the refined oil came out of the Refineries yesterday, and the refining of the whole quantity is expected to be completed within the next few days. The question of importing crude oil for refining at Haifa — following the previous practice of the Consolidated Refineries Ltd. — is now under consideration.

The Refineries have in no sense been requisitioned. All that has been done was to order its management to carry on their usual operations. Nor has the crude oil in question been expropriated. As it is refined by the Consolidated Refineries Ltd. it will, according to the established practice, pass into the hands of the Shell and Socony Vacuum companies from which it will be purchased by the consumers.

The contention of the British authorities was that the technical operation and, therefore, the re-opening of the Refineries was impossible without:

a) the return of the British technical staff, all of whom had left Israel;

b) the return of Arab workmen who formed more than half of the total staff employed;

c) the resumption of the flow of crude oil from Iraq, now withheld for political reasons.

The validity of this contention is now to be judged in the light of the fact that oil is being refined at Haifa, entirely by Israeli personnel, and of the prospect of further refining of oil to be imported.

The Provisional Government feels satisfied that the re-opening of the Refineries, amply justified by the emergency situation as regards the supply of oil in Israel, is also fully in keeping with the urgent world need for an increased supply of refined oil to which the closing of the Haifa Refineries was so obviously detrimental.

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מ. שרתוק אל נ. גולדמן (לונדון)
M. Shertok to N. Goldmann (London)

מברק מוצפן 71/121
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/24

Tel Aviv, 23 July 1948

Supplementary to press release regarding reopening Refineries:[1] 1) Supply fuel-oil Palestine Electric [?Corporation and] industry has been precarious. Even with 9000 tons imported recently, stock sufficient only two months. 2) Apart economic need, our purpose was political demonstration ability run Refineries with Jewish personnel and emphasise connection Marshall Plan. 3) Members British management now Cyprus visited Refineries yesterday, expressed complete satisfaction technical side work, gave strong impression pleased with reopening and happy to have been forced into course of action which they were anxious to follow. Head company London was told by Foreign Office [that] soon as British leave Haifa Jews be thrown into sea. Impression is they do not mind real row with Foreign Office.

If you find necessary, explain Foreign Office reasons reopening on lines our release and (1) above.

Shertok

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א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין
O. Gass to P. Bernstein

מברק 196. התקבל: 25.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.08/365/24
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2420/1

Washington, 23 July 1948

Am handling your instructions regarding crude petroleum as matter of first urgency.[1] After consultation colleagues suggest following program: First, attempt to enlist the support of the State Department Petroleum Division, the American oil companies, and especially the European Recov-

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 392־393.

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1. ברנשטיין הורה לגאס להתקשר עם מקורות לאספקת נפט גולמי. (ראה מברק מיום 23.7.1948, 93.03/129/11).

ery Administration, recognizing that our activities can in any case not be kept secret and should not be. Second, explain to all that Israel is not in any way confiscating Haifa Refinery, but merely issuing emergency production directive and assuring emergency production, exactly as was done in the United States during war. Third, ask Socony [Vacuum] and Standard [Oil Company] supply crude from Persian Gulf for refining at Haifa. Fourth, would welcome British collaboration in restarting flow through Iraq pipeline. Fifth, offer refining at Haifa for European Recovery Program as well as for Israeli needs. Sixth, agree distribution petroleum products all Middle East countries according past pattern, as soon as full operation restored. Seventh, emphasize that Israel would approach other sources of crude only after Americans given first opportunity. Eight, give major American companies four or five days time-limit before turning elsewhere. Request you consult Shertok, others, most urgently and cable concurrence or difference with each of the eight points indicated above.[2] Regards.

Gass

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 26/43. התקבל: 24.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 23 July 1948

1) Instructions sent today Parodi approving former general attitude and directing negative vote re International Court.[1] 2) Administrative section Quai [d'Orsay] no more opposed to recognition. [.....][2]

Fischer

2. תשובת ברנשטיין: "1)מסכים, אנא הדגש האופי הזמני של תכניתנו העכשווית המוגבלת. 2) נעשה. 3) עושים זאת, אנא פנה אליהם גם אתה. 4) גם אנו מנסים בכיוון זה, הסיכויים אינם רעים. 5) מסכים, הברק למי יש להציע. 6) מסכים. 7) לאחר התייעצות עם שרתוק, הוריתי לפנות למקורות מזרחיים [...] מסכים לא להחליט לפני שתתקבל תשובת החברות האמריקאיות." (ברנשטיין אל גאס, [נתקבל] 27.7.1948, 93.03/129/11).

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1. ראה מס' 342. מברק דומה נשלח אל אבן (23.7.1948, 93.01/2180/22).
2. משפט אחד לא הודפס כאן.

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א. אבן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
A. Eban to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק. התקבל: 24.7
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/172/9

New York, 23 July 1948

In conversation with Parodi today he expressed strong conviction stability and military success Israel, confessed previous scepticism refuted by events, declared French recognition inevitable though still non-committal on timing. He expressed firm opposition Syrian proposal International Court.[1] Promised refer question our admission Paris. Warned against premature formal application in advance assurance success. We suggest active work Paris this respect, pointing out especially clear distinction between recognition and admission, since many member states unrecognized by French and many possess fewer recognitions than ourselves; also vote for November Resolution includes moral commitment favouring admission. Parodi expressed keen French interest in early resumption oil production Haifa Refineries, which closely affect French oil position. He would welcome full information this subject. He urged utilization truce for improving relations French consular, religious, authorities with respect occupation buildings Jerusalem. General tone conversation, which Robinson participated, very encouraging. Same cable going Shertok.[2]

Eban

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מ. קומיי אל ג'. איגנאטייב[1] (ניו יורק)
M. Comay to G. Ignatieff (New York)

העתק: 93.03/69/16

[New York], 23 July 1948

Dear Mr. Ignatieff,

You will recall that after my recent visit to Ottawa, I submitted to the Minister for External Affairs an *aide-mémoire* on "Canadian Recognition of Israel".[2] It may be useful if I supplement that document with certain further observations, in the light of events since it was written. In particu-

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1. ראה מס' 342 והערה 1 שם.
2. אבן אל שרתוק, 23.7.1948, 93.03/72/16.

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1. ג'ורג' איגנאטייב, חבר משלחת קנדה לאו"ם.
2. ראה מס' 247 והערה 3 שם.

lar, I wish to deal with any lingering doubts about the effect of recognition on the fresh truce and on mediation.

1. The Canadian Government apparently felt some reluctance to recognize Israel at a time when a short truce had been voluntarily accepted by both sides, and when the question of its prolongation after the initial four weeks was still unsettled. However, the Arab states subsequently refused to prolong the truce, and resumed their war of aggression against Israel despite the fact that the Mediator's request was supported by an urgent appeal from the Security Council. A truce was only brought about by the joint impact of two factors — Arab military defeats in Palestine and the threat of sanctions by the Security Council. The Arab replies accepting the truce made clear that such acceptance was unwilling, and was a mere yielding to force of circumstances. Furthermore, no question now arises of obtaining their consent to further renewals, as the truce has this time been imposed for an indefinite period. Under these conditions, it cannot be argued that further recognition of Israel would prejudice the truce. On the contrary, since the threat to the peace comes only from the Arab side, and has as its declared motive the destruction of the new State, the most useful deterrent to further aggression would be the prompt and general recognition of that State, and its early admission to the United Nations.

2. No fear need be entertained that recognition may impede the task of mediation. The conduct and statements of the Mediator himself dispose of any such suggestion. From the beginning Count Bernadotte "recognized" the State of Israel by entering into official relations with its Government, and reflecting this fact in all his communications to the Security Council. Two basic principles emerge from the Mediator's discussions with the Governments on the spot, and his Report to the Security Council of 12 July (S/888)[3] — firstly, that the existence of Israel must be accepted as an established fact; and secondly, that any proposals for a final peaceful adjustment are subject to the voluntary approval of its Government. One relevant passage in his Report is contained in paragraph 34 thereof, and reads as follows:

> The de facto situation in Palestine today is that a Jewish Provisional Government, recognized by an increasing number of states, exists in an area of Palestine, and is exercising, without restrictions of any kind on its authority or power, all the attributes of full sovereignty, including the waging of war. This provisional government and the state is represents, were established under the cloak of authority given by the 29 November resolution of the General Assembly. Since that resolution, much has happened in Palestine, and it is not easy to undo what history has recorded. It is this de facto situation which the

3. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 326.

Arab states are fighting to eliminate, but the plain fact remains that it is there.

In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Israel, 6 July 1948,[4] the Mediator stated:

I may also assure you that in working up my Suggestions I took fully into account the facts of the actual existence of the Jewish State in a defined area.

3. Israel's claim to recognition is unique, in that the State was set up in accordance with an international decision, to which Canada was a party. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even had the General Assembly Resolution of November 29 never been adopted, Israel would still fulfil the accepted criteria for recognition. The[s]e are defined as "the existence of an independent Government exercising effective authority within a defined area." (Lauterpacht: *Recognition in International Law,* Cambridge University Press, p. 26).

The independence of the Provisional Government of Israel — i.e., that it is "actually independent of that of any other state" (*ibid*) — is not in question. The effectiveness of its authority is not only unchallenged, but is accepted by the Security Council concerning the gravest issues of war and peace.

The area of Israel is defined by the Resolution of November 29, 1947. While the possibility cannot be excluded that these frontiers may eventually be revised, such revision can only be effected with the voluntary agreement of the State of Israel. That the Mediator for his part accepts this, is made plain in the above mentioned letter dated July 6, in which he says:

All the arrangements proposed could have practical meaning only in the sense of voluntary agreement on the part of the parties concerned. It was specifically emphasized in paragraph 8 of my introductory statement[5] that there could be no question of imposition.

Even assuming that the area of the State has not been finally defined, it may be pointed out that "it has been held that the fact that the frontiers of the new State have not yet been definitely decided does not constitute an impediment in the way of its statehood" (*ibid*, p. 30).

It would be appreciated if these observations were conveyed to your Government for consideration together with the original *aide-mémoire*.

Sincerely yours,

Michael S. Comay

4. מס' 282.

5. ראה הצעות המתווך מיום 27.6.1948 — מס' 239.

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שיחת מ. נמיר — אנה פאוקר (בבוקארשט, ב־23 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: M. Namir — Ana Pauker (Bucharest, 23 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2457/19

בוקארסט, בית מיניסטריון החוץ.

לאחר שהגשתי למרת פאוקר בראיון הראשון,[1] ביום 13.7.48, את בקשת ממשלת ישראל להרשות מחדש עליית יהודים מרומניה למדינת ישראל, ולפחות — כמשימה מיוחדת — אנשים בגיל 17-36 (גברים ונשים), כ־5000 בכל חודש, לצרכי צבא ההגנה והעבודות המרובות הכרוכות במצב המלחמה, בהרחקת השלטון הבריטי מארצנו ובבניית המדינה הצעירה — אמרה מרת פאוקר, כי הבקשה תובא בפני ממשלת רומניה, וכי עלי לחכות ימים מספר לתשובתה.

היום הוזמנתי למרת פאוקר, והיא הודיעה לי כי תשובת הממשלה היא חיובית. לאחר בירור הצדדים השונים של העניין סוכמו הדברים הבאים:

1. תורשה יציאתם של 5000 (בערך) יהודים בכל חודש.
2. העולים ייחשבו כרפטריאנטים החוזרים למולדתם ויקבלו תעודות מתאימות מאת מדינת ישראל.
3. 70% יהיו בגיל 17 — 36, גברים ונשים, 30% בני גילים אחרים, בעיקר בני משפחה של הסוג הראשון.
4. ממשלת ישראל תהיה אחראית לסידור טרנספורטים, לכלי־הובלה, לאספקה ולכל שאר העניינים הכרוכים בסידורי העלייה, ותישא בהוצאותיה.
5. מר אברהם יאמפולסקי, מנהל המשרד הארץ־ישראלי בבוקארסט, ישמש באופן זמני, עד לבוא הצירות הישראלית לרומניה, בתפקיד של קונסול כבוד של מדינת ישראל לשם מתן ויזות־כניסה לישראל. הוא שיצייד את הרפטריאנטים גם בתעודות הנזכרות לעיל בסעיף 2.
6. על יסוד ויזת־הכניסה לישראל והתעודה הנזכרת בסעיף 2 לעיל, יתן מיניסטריון הפנים הרומני את ויזות־היציאה הדרושות לפי החוק.
7. מר ג׳יאנו, סגן למיניסטר הפנים, יתמנה לטיפול בענייני העלייה מטעם ממשלת רומניה.
8. מר משה אורבוך, שטיפל בעבר בענייני עלייה מרומניה (מרת פאוקר העירה כי שמו ידוע לה) ומשמש עכשיו כקצין בצבא ההגנה לישראל — יתמנה מטעם ממשלת ישראל לשם טיפול בכל ענייני הרפטריאציה, לסידור הטרנספורטים, לאספקת הספינות הדרושות וכל סוגי אספקה אחרת וכו׳, ויהיה אחראי לכך, כמבואר לעיל בסעיף 4.

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1. לא נמצא רישום מהראיון הראשון. מרדכי נמיר נשלח לרומניה בשליחות מיוחדת לרכישת דלק וכדי לפעול למען חידוש העלייה לארץ; לאחר הפלגת ה״פאנים״ בדצמבר 1947 (ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך בעמ׳ 19; מס׳ 58 שם) לא יצאו עולים את רומניה בדרך חוקית.

ויזת־הכניסה למר אורבוך תישלח לצירות הרומנית בפראג אחרי שאני אודיע למרת פאוקר כי הוא שוחרר מהצבא. עד לבואו של מר אורבוך ימלא את מקומו מר ריקו מנדלסון[2] מבוקארסט.

9. במידת האפשרות יועברו הרפטריאנטים לא מנמל רומני.

10. הנוגעים בדבר יימנעו ככל האפשר מלעורר רעש חיצוני ופירסום רעשני מסביב להסדר זה.

לאחר סידור ענייני העלייה, ביקשתי את מרת פאוקר למנוע את סגירת קיבוצי־ההכשרה של "החלוץ" ולפתוח את הקיבוצים שנסגרו. מרת פאוקר השיבה בחיוב והודיעה כי מיניסטריון הפנים כבר נתן הוראות מתאימות.

מסרתי למרת פאוקר סקירה קצרה על כמויות הדלק שקנינו ברומניה, ולבסוף הבעתי לה ולממשלת רומניה רגשי תודה והערכה לעזרה הרבה שהיא הגישה לי בשליחותי, ובמיוחד לגבי עניין העלייה החיוני. כן הודעתי כי אבקש מיד מאת מוסדותינו המתאימים שיתחילו בהכנת אמצעי הובלה לטרנספורט הראשון. מרת פאוקר ביקשה למסור ברכתה לשר־החוץ מר שרתוק ואיחולי ניצחון לצבאותינו.

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מ. קומיי אל פ. ג'סאפ (ניו יורק)
M. Comay to P. Jessup (New York)

העתק: 93.08/377/8

[New York], 24 July 1948

Dear Mr. Jessup,

A few days ago, Mr. Reed of your delegation discussed with me the question of Arab refugees.[1] In the light of further information which has now come to hand from the Provisional Government of Israel, its general attitude can be noted as follows:

a) The Government of Israel must disclaim any responsibility for the creation of this problem. The charge that these Arabs were forcibly driven out by Israeli authorities is wholly false; on the contrary, everything possible was done to prevent an exodus which was a direct result of the folly of the Arab states in organizing and launching a war of aggression against Israel. The impulse of the Arab civilian population to migrate from war areas, in order to avoid being involved in the hostilities, was deliberately fostered by Arab leaders for political motives. They did not wish the Arab population to continue to lead a peaceful existence in Jewish areas, and they wished

2. אריה (ריקו) לופסקו (לופי), שליח המוסד לעלייה ברומניה; היה ידוע בשמו המושאל — מנדלסון.

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1. ראה מס' 348, 357.

to exploit the exodus as a propaganda weapon in surrounding Arab countries and in the outside world. This inhuman policy has now faced the Governments concerned with practical problems for which they must assume full responsibility.

b) The question of the return of Arab refugees cannot be divorced from its military context. While a state of war continues to exist between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, it would gravely prejudice the security and defence of Israel if its borders were flung open to an unrestricted influx of Arabs from those states, who would be a disruptive element in the maintenance of internal law and order, and a formidable fifth column for external enemies. It must be appreciated that a truce is not peace, but merely an interruption of active warfare, and that the governments which are now pressing for the return of these refugees, in order to relieve themselves of a problem they have created, are in the same breath making it clear that they have not relinquished their bellicose intentions.

c) While permission to return is at present being granted in individual cases on special compassionate grounds, and subject to security screening, the general question can only be considered as part of a permanent peace settlement with the Arab states.

d) Such future consideration will take into account the position and treatment of Jewish minorities in the Arab countries.

e) The Arabs remaining in Israel are assured of equal status, full protection, and due care by the State as regards their social services.

Sincerely yours,

Michael S. Comay

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH834
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/126/2

Tel Aviv, 25 July 1948 (11.40)

Your 562 considering advisable suspend action.[1] On contrary — we should keep them under pressure if only as counterblast their protest, but primarily on merits case which been crying shame such long time.

Shertok

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1. כנראה מס' 368

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)

M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 31/57
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 25 July 1948

Your 184.[1] Suggest you raise both interviews:[2] 1) Support our admission U.N. 2) Friendly advice other governments act likewise. 3) Loan, /instancing/ immigration first two months. 4) /Planes/ for future. Last point perhaps only with Secretary. Even if no prospects of advance this regard during truce, important for us go on record having asked them for this assistance.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט

M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte

העתק: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 25 July 1948

Sir,

The Provisional Government of Israel has given careful consideration to your letter of July 6th,[1] and begs to communicate to you the following observations.

2. In my letter of July 5th,[2] I expressed the view that your Suggestions appeared to ignore the Resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947. In reply you say that while you cannot accept this statement, it is true that you did not consider yourself bound by the provisions of the Resolution, since had you done so, there would have been no meaning to your mediation. You further point out that the failure to implement the Resolution on the one hand, and the Arab hostilities on the other, had led to the convoking of a Special Session of the General Assembly which,

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1. לא נמצא.
2. ראיונות עם שר־החוץ והנשיא — ראה מס' 383, 399.

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1. מס' 282. שרתוק השהה במתכוון את תשובתו למכתב זה כדי "להימנע ממתן סם־חיים לשליחותו." (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 26.7.1948, 130.09/2329/1).
2. מס' 266.

taking into account the new situation, adopted the Resolution of May 14th[3] providing for a Mediator.

The Provisional Government must disagree with this interpretation of the Resolution of May 14th. It is well known that various efforts were made at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly to change the Resolution of November 29th. These efforts failed, and accordingly, in our view, the Resolution of November 29th retains its full validity. The authority of the Mediator derives from this same session of the General Assembly at which the attempts to secure a revision of the November 29th Resolution were rejected. It follows that the Assembly could not have intended, by the appointment of a Mediator, to bring about indirectly a result which it had refused to accept directly. Had the purpose of the appointment of the Mediator been to set aside the Resolution of November 29th, it would have been reasonable to expect this to be expressly stated and not left to be merely inferred. It is equally evident that had such understanding of the position been clearly formulated at the time when the motion to appoint a Mediator was put to the vote, it would have met with considerable opposition, and the motion would almost certainly not have secured the requisite majority. In the light of these facts, the only interpretation which, in the view of the Provisional Government, can properly be placed on the Resolution of May 14th, is that the Resolution of November 29th stands, whilst the Mediator is commissioned to undertake such efforts of persuasion and explore such modes of adjustment as might help to bring about a cessation of armed conflict. It clearly could not have implied that the starting point of the Mediator's mission should be that he was not to "consider himself bound by the provisions of the November 29th Resolution."

3. In paragraph 4 of your letter you state that it would not impress you as an argument of very great merit that the boundaries of a Jewish State which had been acceptable to the Jewish community would require revision in the Jewish favour solely because the Arab part of Palestine might decide to enter into closer relationship or merge with a neighbouring Arab State. In thus summing up our submission you ignore its principal point, which was that the perils revealed by Arab aggression for the safety and territorial integrity of Israel indicate the imperative need for an improvement of its boundaries. It is evident that these perils would be considerably increased if, in the event of an armed conflict, Israel were not merely faced with the eventuality of Transjordan sending troops into Western Palestine to wage the war against her, but with the threat of an imminent attack by Transjordan as her immediate neighbour — enlarged and strengthened as that country would then be.

3. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך בעמ' 786־787.

Moreover, in the partition of Western Palestine between the Arab and the Jewish State, the question of territorial proportion played a decisive part. In fact, the original division of territory proposed by UNSCOP, which set the ratio of 61 to 39 as between the Jewish and the Arab States, was altered by the Assembly to one of 54 to 46, precisely because some delegations considered that the area allotted to the Arabs might not be large enough for a separate State and that, therefore, a closer approximation to equality was essential. The joining of the Arab portion of Western Palestine to Transjordan obviously effects a fundamental change in the whole proposition. If your approach to the problem in treating Palestine and Transjordan as one unit is the correct one, then surely the much enlarged Arab State can afford to rest content with a smaller portion of Western Palestine, while the Jewish State deserves a larger one than those [*sic*] provided for in the Assembly's Resolution. Finally, I would recall that in insisting on an increase of the territory of the Arab State and in resisting Jewish claims to a larger area, certain delegations at Lake Success laid great stress on the need of the Arab State for a land reserve for purposes of agricultural development. It was largely on these grounds that the bulk of the area of Galilee was assigned to the Arab State. In this respect again, fusion with Transjordan completely alters the picture. The acquisition by the Palestine Arabs of access to the vast land reserves of Transjordan adds great weight to the Jewish claim to the whole of Galilee, not in exchange for, but in addition to, the other parts of Israel.

4. As regards the observations in paragraph 5 of your letter, I am afraid that these are due to a misunderstanding of the relevant paragraph 3 of my letter of [July] 5th. I did not suggest that you desired to "impose" upon us the arrangements outlined in your Suggestions. What I intended to convey was that the scope of the Union envisaged by you, which goes far beyond the Economic Union proposed in the Assembly's Resolution, would entail an even greater limitation upon the independence of Israel. Co-ordination of foreign policy and of measures for common defence clearly involves a degree of mutual dependence which, in view of the fact that the Arab partner of the Union would invariably have the backing of the neighbouring Arab States, would be bound in practice to work out as a permanent and far-reaching encroachment upon Jewish freedom and sovereignty.

5. You state in paragraph 6 that you infer from paragraph 4 of my letter that our Government "no longer considers itself bound by the provisions for Economic Union set forth in the November 29th Resolution for the reason that the Arab State envisaged by that Resolution has not been established." You note, on the other hand, that in the earlier paragraphs of my letter we take that Resolution as our basic position, and you comment that neither party is entitled to regard those parts of the Resolution which are favourable to it as effective and the unfavourable parts as ineffective. In reply I must point out that my letter contained no suggestion that we

considered ourselves no longer bound by the provisions for Economic Union as set forth in the November 29th Resolution. What I did emphasise was that the scheme was binding only if all its main elements were to materialise. On the other hand, I pointed out that if your Suggestions were to be adopted, the size and political character of the Arab partner State would be very different from those envisaged in the Resolution, and Jewish consent to an economic union with the latter could not be held to imply or enjoin readiness to such a union with the former. The Economic Union originally proposed, as was fully realised at the time, involved considerable sacrifices for the Jewish State. There was much opposition among the Jews to the acceptance of the whole scheme, largely on account of the extensive economic liabilities which it imposed upon us. These liabilities might be greatly increased if the Union were to embrace, in addition to the Arab portion of Western Palestine, the economically backward and financially bankrupt State of Transjordan. The point is so clear that I find myself at a loss to understand your strictures under this head.

6. We find it even more difficult to follow your observations on paragraph 5 of my letter, relating to immigration. I insisted on our complete and unqualified freedom to determine the size and composition of Jewish immigration, and advanced the view that the recognition of that freedom as a vital part of our sovereignty was the very basis of the acceptance of our claim to statehood by the world at large. In reply you argue that even within the limits of full sovereignty the question of immigration is related to the absorptive capacity of the country; that from this point of view Palestine has become the subject of international concern; that it would therefore seem justifiable that the Economic and Social Council be given an eventual say in the matter; and that such an arrangement might help in ensuring international interest in and assistance for the settlement of Jewish immigrants in Palestine. It cannot be ignored, you state in conclusion, that immigration affects not only the Jewish State and the Jewish people, but also the surrounding Arab world.

To start from the last point, you are certainly aware that the conflict between the claim of the Arabs of Palestine to decide the fate of Jewish immigration, namely to prohibit it, on the one hand, and the claim of the Jewish people to be the sole arbiter of its immigration into Palestine, on the other hand, has been the crux of the whole problem. The only practicable way out of the impasse was found in the partition of Palestine and the setting up of a Jewish State which, in a definite area, would exercise unrestricted control over immigration. At the price of territorial limitation the Jews were offered freedom of immigration, untrammelled by any interference on the part of the Palestine Arabs. Having accepted this scheme, they are now confronted with the claim of the Arab world for similar interference. Clearly, such a course leads back to the impasse. Many a country in the world is affected in one way or another by the immigration

which is proceeding into adjacent territory. yet we are not aware of any such country having claimed a say in regard to the immigration policy of its neighbour, certainly not of any such claim having ever been accepted.

As to the question of international control, it is a mere truism to say that even within the limits of full sovereignty the question of immigration is related to the absorptive capacity of the country. The statement of this obvious principle is quite beside the point. the question is who is to assess the absorptive capacity of the country at any given time. To us, this is essentially a right of sovereignty. Under the Mandatory regime there was an unceasing controversy between the Jewish Agency and the Administration as to the assessment of the absorptive capacity of Palestine for Jewish immigration. Your suggestion under this head would imply a continuation of this perennial and acrimonious debate, henceforth to be conducted with the Economic and Social Council, instead of with the Mandatory Government — a debate in which, as before, we would be free to argue while the outside body would be free to decide. It is clear that such interference would be utterly incompatible with the sovereignty of the State of Israel, from which, as you state in paragraph 3 of your letter, you have no desire to derogate. It may be true that, as you suggest, the immigration question of Palestine has become an object of international concern, though such concern would appear to be confined to the neighbouring Arab States who are opposed to Jewish immigration, in whatever form and size, on purely political grounds. Whatever its roots, such international concern cannot justify the proposed encroachment upon the sovereignty of Israel. There are countries, again, whose immigration policies are objects of infinitely greater international concern than those of Palestine, affecting as they do the lives of millions of people who aspire to settle there. Yet it would not occur to anyone to suggest that the Economic and Social Council should be set up as an arbiter in these immigration disputes, whether they be mute or articulate. If national sovereignty in this respect is to be curtailed, it is our view that the experiment should not be begun with those who have only just attained the national independence so long denied to them.

7. I have little to add to what I said in my letter of July 5th on the subject of Jerusalem. The difficulty of isolating Jerusalem from the surrounding territory, which you consider to be enormous, is to our mind rather slight as compared with the enormity of the proposal that the Holy City, with its hundred thousand Jews and its imperishable Jewish associations, should be placed under Arab rule — that the free life of its institutions, public bodies, social and political organisations, and the future of Jewish culture and civilisation so vitally linked up with that city's fate, should be sacrificed to Arab interests. Neither the UNSCOP nor the Assembly, which between them spent eight months in the study of the Palestine problem, could be unaware of the difficulties of "isolation"; yet they decided that Jerusalem be internationalised. Since then significant events have taken place. An

Arab army, equipped and financed by Great Britian and commanded by British Officers made a determined attempt to regain Jerusalem for Islam. The Christian world abandoned the Holy City to its fate, and lifted not a finger in its defence. The Jews alone stood in the breach; they are now in control of practically the whole of Jerusalem, with the exception of the walled city, and of a firm land bridge between it and Israel. Henceforth, no constructive examination of the future of Jerusalem can be undertaken in disregard of these cardinal facts. There can in any case be no question of the Jews ever agreeing that Jerusalem should come under Arab domination. The State of Israel has come into being to uphold and defend the most vital interests of the Jewish people in Palestine. Among these, the fate of Jerusalem is second to none.

8. In conclusion I should like to refer to the exception you have taken to our failure to avail ourselves of your invitation to offer counter-suggestions. Technically this is correct, but the inference that this attitude is due to any lack of readiness for conciliation and compromise on our part is unjust and misleading. The partition of Palestine and the setting up of a Jewish State in only a part of Palestine are, from our standpoint, a most far-reaching compromise. The Provisional Government of Israel was ready from the outset, and is ready today, for peace negotiations between the parties directly concerned, recognized by one another as sovereign states. To be fruitful, the negotiations must fully take into account the basic provisions of the Assembly's Resolution of November 29th, as well as the subsequent course of events. A determined effort to bring about such negotiations would be a distinct contribution to the cause of peace.

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן
M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 25 juillet 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

[.....][1]

5. J'ai été reçu ce matin par M. Chauvel.[2] L'accueil a été d'une courtoisie et d'une cordialité qui marquent un changement profond dans l'attitude de ce fonctionnaire à notre égard.

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1. החלק הראשון והחלק האחרון של המכתב וכמו כן תוספת מיום 26.7.1948 לא הודפסו כאן.
2. ז'אן שוול, המזכיר הכללי של משרד־החוץ הצרפתי.

J'ai extrait, du projet de constitution que vous m'avez envoyé, quelques passages dont je vous remets ci-joint une copie.[3] Ce papier se trouvait sur la table de M. Chauvel, et il m'a immédiatement exprimé sa satisfaction de voir que nos projets allaient dans un sens absolument conforme aux desiderata français et l'espoir que notre constitution définitive adopterait ces principes.

M. Chauvel m'a affirmé que si la France tardait un peu à reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël, il ne fallait pas voir là une prise de position négative à l'égard de l'Etat d'Israël mais une mesure de prudence n'ayant rapport qu'à la situation très tendue au Maroc.[4] Je lui ai dit que nous désirions néanmoins voir la France s'engager, d'une façon non équivoque, dans la voie de la reconnaissance et que j'estimais que l'envoi, en Palestine, d'un délégué spécial français, d'un rang élevé, préparerait utilement le terrain. Là-dessus M. Chauvel m'a répondu que cette idée lui agréait et qu'il se mettrait immédiatement en rapport avec le nouveau ministre[5] afin de la réaliser. Je serai tenu au courant des décisions qui seront prises à cet égard.

[.....][6]

Nous avons ensuite parlé de l'affaire de l'*Altalena.* M. Chauvel a dit qu'il s'agissait là d'une "ânerie sans précédent" qui avait été commise par certaines personnalités françaises dont il n'était résulté, pour la France, que des reproches et des ennuis des deux côtés. Il m'a assuré que toutes mesures seraient prises afin que de pareils agissements ne se reproduisent pas et qu'il mettrait en garde les membres du Cabinet du nouveau ministre contre les tentatives qui pourraient être faites par des représentants de l'Etsel, dans le but de s'introduire auprès d'eux.

6. En réponse au télégramme de Shertok du 25,[7] se référant à mon télégramme 26/43, cela signifie bien que c'est la section administrative du Quai qui dicte une ligne politique, mais cela ne signifie pas que cette ligne politique soit nécessairement suivie par le Gouvernement ou même par le ministre des Affaires étrangères. La décision appartient uniquement au Conseil des ministres. Nous verrons ce que décidera le nouveau ministère.

[.....]

Maurice Fischer

3. מוסב, ככל הנראה, על הצעת החוקה שחיבר ליאו כהן. הלוט לא נמצא.
4. ראה מס׳ 328.
5. צרפת היתה שרויה באותה עת במשבר ממשלתי; ב־26 ביולי מונה רוברט שומאן לתפקיד שר־החוץ במקום ז׳ורז׳ בידו.
6. פיסקה אחת לא הודפסה כאן.
7. לא נמצא.
8. מס׳ 371.

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שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט וצוות עוזריו (בתל אביב, ב־26 ביולי 1948)
Meeting: M. Shertok — Count Bernadotte and Assistants (Tel Aviv, 26 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 26 July 1948

Count Bernadotte opened by asking Mr. Shertok whether he could throw any light on two recent statements — one by Mr. Eban in New York, to the effect that the Government of Israel had never expressed its confidence in the Mediator,[1] and the other by the Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion, who had declared in a recent speech that the time had perhaps come for a solution of the Palestine problem by direct negotiation, and not through the good offices of a Mediator.[2]

Mr. Shertok replied that the Israeli Government accepted Count Bernadotte as an emissary of the United Nations and honoured him in that capacity, but it had not appointed him Mediator nor had it requested his appointment. The question of confidence therefore did not arise. A press statement emanating from the Mediator had declared that the Israeli Government had expressed its confidence in him, and what had happened was that Mr. Eban had been asked to explain that the Government had never made any such statement. This did not mean that the Israeli Government had no confidence in him; but clearly, if the Government expressed confidence, as had been suggested in the Mediator's press statement, this might be held to commit the Government in advance to acceptance of, or agreement with, the Mediator's proposals. In the Israeli Government's understanding, the Mediator was not acting on behalf of either Arabs or Jews, but in the name of the United Nations. There was, Mr. Shertok continued, nothing in the Prime Minister's statement to suggest that we would have nothing to do with the Mediator. It was a wholly positive statement, which stressed that Israel was ready to enter into direct peace negotiations with the Arabs. It was not a negative statement directed against the Mediator. The Israeli Government's readiness to enter into direct negotiations with the Arabs was stressed again, Mr. Shertok explained, in the letter which he was about to hand to Count Bernadotte in reply to the latter's proposals submitted earlier in the month.[3] This reply of the Israeli Government suggested that the Mediator might help in bringing

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1. ראה מס' 324 והערה 3 שם.
2. הדברים נאמרו בסקירת ראש־הממשלה במועצת המדינה הזמנית. (ראה מועצת המדינה הזמנית, ישיבה אחת־עשרה, 22.7.1948, עמ' 9־10).
3. מס' 378.

such direct negotiations about, and if he was successful in this, he would have earned the Government's gratitude. It was essential that any negotiations with the Arab States should be on a basis of absolute equality as between States which recognised one another's sovereignty and independence.

Count Bernadotte thanked Mr. Shertok for his explanations and said that he had a number of points he wanted to raise. The first was the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, which he had last discussed with Mr. Shertok at their meeting on July 7th.[4] The Israeli Government had stated at the time that it would think the matter over and announce its decision shortly. In the meantime a set of detailed suggestions had been drafted for the implementation of this project, and had been handed over to the Israeli Government by Mr. Reedman.[5] He would like to know whether the Government was now in a position to give him a definite reply.

Mr. Shertok replied that the Government had given its full consideration to the details of the project as submitted by Mr. Reedman, and its reaction was definitely negative. The suggestions, though they were tentative, nevertheless indicated certain general trends, and these the Government found wholly unacceptable. The Government's outlook on the project of demilitarisation in principle had been coloured by the specific proposals made for its implementation. The arrangement that must result from proposals such as these went far beyond the idea of demilitarisation itself. When the Israeli Government had said that it was willing to discuss demilitarisation, it had never contemplated that implementation of the project would so far-reachingly affect the city's ordinary life. If Count Bernadotte's suggestions, or anything like them, were ever to be carried into effect, everything in Jerusalem would be subordinated to the city's demilitarisation. The Truce Commission would in many respects become the supreme arbiter of the daily lives of the people. (Mr. Shertok at this point explained that he was saying this without reference to the present composition of the Truce Commission, though he felt that this was far from ideal. Consuls who had been appointed to perform purely consular functions were not necessarily the fittest persons to discharge an international responsibility of such delicacy as now fell to the members of the Truce Commission in Jerusalem. He thought that the judgment which the members of this Commission had on certain occasions shown had not been as mature as it should have been in persons entrusted with so grave and complex a responsibility.)

But whatever the authority in Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok went on, it would, under Count Bernadotte's plan, be set up as the supreme arbiter of the city's life. The writ of the Government of Israel now ran in Jerusalem, and it was planned to put it on a legal basis in the near future. There was no

4. ראה מס' 289.
5. מס' 358.

thought of annexation, but it was essential for the orderly life of the city that it be controlled by a legal Jewish authority, and subject to the laws of Israel. There were a number of Jewish local authorities in Jerusalem, and these must be free to run the city in accordance with the city's interests, not subject to an international authority which would have power to interfere at every turn.

In reply to a question by Dr. Bunche, whether the Provisional Government accepted responsibility for what happened in Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok replied that formally this was not yet the case, but that the Government wanted to be in such a position and was planning to take steps accordingly.

Count Bernadotte asked what was the reply of the Israeli Government on the principle of demilitarisation.

Mr. Shertok: In principle, I cannot say that we want it.

Count Bernadotte: Does that mean that you do not want it?

After this stichomythic interlude, Mr. Shertok explained to Count Bernadotte that in the view of the Israeli Government the question of saving Jerusalem from physical destruction was no longer as urgent as it had been, seeing that a truce of indefinite duration was in force. Furthermore, the Israeli Government was convinced that any scheme of demilitarisation would affect the future political status of Jerusalem, since it implied the establishment even now of an international authority which was to govern the city's life. The future of Jerusalem was an open question. (Count Bernadotte nodded agreement.) There was strong and increasing public feeling here that Jerusalem should be included in the State of Israel, and the Government was determined to keep all possible avenues open. The Government hoped that it might yet persuade the international world to accept its point of view regarding Jerusalem's future. The demilitarisation project was liable to prejudge the issue. The transition from a demilitarised Jerusalem to an Israeli Jerusalem would be much more difficult than that from a Jerusalem as constituted at present. The Israeli Government had no desire to make the transition more difficult than it need be.

Dealing with specific points in the Mediator's project for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok insisted upon the right of every Jew to live in Jerusalem freely, and to come in and go out as he pleased. The Mediator's suggestions on this score were fantastic. They meant making life in Jerusalem impossible.

Count Bernadotte asked whether he was to report to the Security Council that the Government of Israel was not interested in getting Jerusalem demilitarised.

Mr. Shertok replied that he was not in a position to commit himself to the principle of demilitarisation affirmatively. Having seen what might be its implications in practice, the Government was now much more reserved on the point of principle than it had been. He went on to say that he understood that the Arab world was now more amenable than it had been to the

idea of the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. This was only natural, as demilitarisation today would mean the removal from Jerusalem of more Jews than Arabs and the immobilisation of more Jewish arms than Arab. He doubted whether it would be possible to trust an international force to guarantee the predominantly non-Arab character of the city.

After a lengthy discussion, prompted by a question from Mr. Reedman about the position of the I.Z.L. in Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte inquired whether, if the truce should end, the Israeli Government was anxious to keep Jerusalem out of the ensuing war. With regard to doubts which had been expressed about the efficacy of an international force, Count Bernadotte said that if the Arabs attacked this force, it would put them at a tremendous political disadvantage. He again pressed Mr. Shertok to say whether the Government of Israel was for or against the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. All he wanted at this stage, he said, was a reply to this question in principle. He urgently required this answer as he would have to report to the Security Council soon.

Mr. Shertok said that he would let Count Bernadotte have his answer in writing, through Mr. Reedman, after the Government's meeting on Wednesday (July 28th).[6]

Count Bernadotte at this point observed slyly that what Mr. Shertok had told him of a possible revision of the Israeli Government's views on the future status of Jerusalem, encouraged him to think that the Government was perhaps no longer sticking so closely to all the terms of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29th.

Count Bernadotte now raised the question of the Arab refugees, said to number 300,000 or more. He explained that he wanted to do "something" for them, i.e., to secure their return to their homes. Would the Israeli Government allow the refugees to come back? In asking for a statement of the Government's views on this subject, he drew attention to the comparable fate of the Jewish refugees in Europe.

Mr. Shertok replied that there could be no question of the return of these refugees while the war lasted. Any question of their return ultimately would have to be raised in the context of a general peace settlement. The refugees were no longer a local issue — they had become a major feature of the war situation. On the humanitarian aspect, he agreed with Count Bernadotte entirely and fully realised that the refugees required relief. But their return was a political question of the first magnitude. If they were allowed back, they would have the opportunity of organising a fifth column on a vast scale. There was also the economic aspect, which would greatly complicate the return of the refugees even under normal (i.e. peace-time) conditions. When the time came for a final peace settlement, and the question of Arabs wishing to return to Israeli territory was discussed, the Israeli Government

.6 ראה מס' 389.

would bring up other matters, such as the treatment of Jews in Arab countries, the internments which had taken place there, and the large-scale confiscations of Jewish property.

Count Bernadotte said that he could not quite agree with Mr. Shertok. Whatever anybody might say, home was home, and he regarded the plight of these refugees as a humanitarian problem calling for immediate relief.

Count Bernadotte went on to say that he did not think that the fighting would be resumed. He was anxious to know whether the Israeli Government was interested in developing the truce into an armistice. He was thinking of a scheme for an armistice, under which forces on both sides would be withdrawn some distance, thus increasing the no-man's land between them and reducing the chance of untoward incidents.

Mr. Shertok said that at this stage he could give Count Bernadotte only an off-hand reply, as the Government had not yet discussed any such proposition. In his understanding, the truce was a phase of war, while an armistice was a phase of peace. An armistice implied some preliminary agreement to negotiate the peace. It presupposed agreement by the Arabs to sit with the State of Israel and discuss terms for a settlement. An armistice which merely entailed the evacuation of certain areas, placing the neutral zones (no-man's land) under international control, might well lead to a reduction of Israel's bargaining power before an agreement had been obtained from the Arabs to negotiate a peace settlement.

Count Bernadotte now raised a number of minor points. He had heard that the main Haifa-Tel Aviv road was closed for some miles south of Haifa, and that ordinary traffic was proceeding by another route. He hoped that his Observers would be allowed to proceed along the main road in the execution of their duties. (He was assured that the main road would be reopened that afternoon.)[7] He complained that the blackout in Haifa was interfering with the work of his staff at the Zion Hotel in Haifa. (He was told that the blackout would probably be lifted shortly.) Referring to a telegram in which he had requested facilities for vessels operating under his control to enter Haifa harbour freely,[8] he complained that torpedo nets were interfering with free entrance into the port, and that it was taking ships as much as two and a half hours to get into the harbour. (He was told that this would be looked into and remedied.)

Mr. Shertok now raised a number of points. He said, first of all, that since the truce was now of indefinite duration, the Israeli Government must interpret the Security Council's resolution to mean that there was to be no numerical limitation on the entry into Israel of men of military age. If Count Bernadotte's interpretation of this resolution were to stand, it would mean in the case of Cyprus, for example, the indefinite incarceration of

7. ראה מס' 352 והערה 5 שם.
8. לא נמצא.

9,000 men. Mr. Shertok added that he had reason to believe that many members of the Security Council endorsed the interpretation which the Israeli Government placed upon the Council's resolution.

Count Bernadotte replied that the majority of the Security Council had, as he understood it, approved his interpretation of the resolution. The Israeli Government was at liberty to take the matter up again with the Council, through Mr. Eban, and attempt to secure a clear ruling, but he himself could not alter his own interpretation.

Mr. Shertok asked whether Count Bernadotte would let him have, confidentially, a list giving the disposition of his Observers in the various parts of the Middle East. There was a feeling in the public mind that an unduly large number of these Observers was concentrated on Israeli territory, and that the implementation of the truce was perhaps not being watched as closely in the Arab countries. The Government would not necessarily wish to publish such a list, but would like to be able to announce that full information on the subject was in its possession. Count Bernadotte agreed, on condition that the document was treated as confidential.

Mr. Shertok complained that he had seen cars used by United Nations Observers flying the U.S.A. flag. Count Bernadotte said that this was against all the rules, and that the only flag they were authorised to fly was that of the United Nations. The matter would be put right.

Count Bernadotte handed to Mr. Shertok a copy of the general instructions which he had issued to his Observers to direct them in the performance of their duties. He said that it was his intention from now on to concentrate on three main projects: (a) the demilitarisation of Jerusalem; (b) observance of the truce; and (c) relief for the Arab refugees. He was planning to go to Sweden on August 9th to attend the International Red Cross Conference, and expected to be back in the Middle East not later than the beginning of September. He said that he had appointed General [Lundström][9] as his Chief of Staff, to be in command of all the United Nations Observers in the Middle East, and that Dr. Mohn would remain with the General as his political adviser. After his return to the Middle East early in September, he (Count Bernadotte) would concentrate on preparing a full report for the General Assembly. He said in conclusion that he very much hoped that we would succeed in establishing direct contact with the Arabs — the only cause he had at heart was that of peace, and he was not out to secure for himself any personal prestige.

9. במקור כתוב בטעות: Douglas.

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ל. כהן: הערות לתזכיר של ו. איתן[1]

L. Kohn: Note on W. Eytan's Memorandum

130.02/2424/21 :מזכר

[Tel Aviv], 27 July 1948

I agree that Bernadotte's mission is practically at an end and that no significant contribution towards an ultimate settlement is to be expected from whatever he may still do before or after his journey to Sweden. [. . .][2]

I also agree that the time has come for us to take the initiative in solving the present impasse in the light of the new situation created by our military successes, by the flight of the Arabs and by the progressive stabilization of our regime and its growing recognition. I further agree that the initiative ought to lie in the Arab field. I do not, however, agree that it is towards the Arab world at large that our efforts should, at least at this stage, be primarily directed. I think we have little to expect from those quarters as things now stand. To Azzam Pasha, to King Farouk, to the Syrian and Iraqian ruling castes, this is a war of prestige, of power politics, an outbreak of the Arab inferiority complex towards a western group settled in their midst which they hoped to be able to destroy by sheer numerical superiority. They failed, and the Arab inferiority complex is likely to grow further as a result of that ill-advised adventure. This clique cannot admit failure without ruining its dominating position in the Arab countries. To sit with us at a table at the present stage means for them admission of failure. Moreover, they may hope that the continuation of the present state of affairs will work in their favour. They are sufficiently versed in matters of government to know that the prolonged maintenance of an army in fighting condition imposes upon us a very heavy financial burden. They also know that as long as the U.N. insists on the maintenance of the truce we have no way of breaking the impasse by force of arms. To them the continuation of the present state of affairs does not involve unbearable sacrifices. The greatest inconvenience to them is presented by the Palestine Arab refugees, who are indeed at the present moment our most valuable bargaining asset. They may well feel that as long as they do not give in, their prestige remains unimpaired internally, and that the increasing suffering of the Arab refugees may be a good card to exploit against us in the councils of U.N. and among world opinion generally.

For all these reasons I am inclined to think that we should concentrate our Arab policy at this moment not on the Arab League and the Arab

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1. מס' 388. תאריך הנוסח שבתיק הוא: 28.7.1948.
2. החלק האחרון של הפיסקה לא הודפס כאן.

world, but on the Palestinian Arabs and on Abdullah. The Ramallah radio station has lately become the mouthpiece of Palestine Arab dissatisfaction with the Arab League. Among the objects of resentment now being included are also the Arab Legion and King Abdullah. The station complains bitterly about the poor hospitality extended in Arab countries to the refugees, etc., etc. The radio station is apparently now controlled by the Mufti's followers, who are lately starting an independent line, but inasmuch as it is obviously trying to win favour with the Palestinian Arabs, its broadcasts clearly indicate what is uppermost in their minds.

It seems to me that we ought to start this effort by integrating the Arabs who have remained with us into our economic and political system. Their number is not large and most of them may by now have realised that the Jewish State is going to last, and that the best course for them is to accept it loyally and establish their own place within it. It may well be, Arab mentality being what it is, that they may become a powerful vested interest working against the re-admission of too many Arabs, especially against those whom they suspect of being disloyal to Israel and hence likely to embarrass their own position. They might become the nucleus of an effective propaganda in our favour among Arabs in the non-conquered parts of Western Palestine. We ought to consider in which way we could help build up the Arab State visualised by the decision of November 29th, which in present circumstances would become a satellite of Israel. If we had made progress on these lines, we could then face Abdullah with the alternative of playing with us and getting the Arab part of Western Palestine attached to Transjordan, or being relegated to the backwoods and remaining for all time a British satrap with all the danger that this involves for him. In general I should think that we ought to make all efforts to resume contact with Abdullah, either through the old intermediaries or through new ones. He may continue the old line and not act without British consent, in which case matters will essentially depend on whatever progress Nahum Goldmann is making. It is, however, conceivable that he may seek independence from the British yoke and that, knowing the unreliability and hostility of his Arab allies, he may now be ready to come round and seek agreement with us.

For all these activities I think Elias [Sasson] should be brought back from Paris. If the above analysis of the situation in the Arab States is correct, he can in any case do little constructive work from Paris at this moment.

L.K.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH862

נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/20

Tel Aviv, 27 July 1948 (11.30)

Your 94 etc.[1] Appreciate incisive analysis. You may be slightly exaggerating both immediate chances and later dangers, but this doesn't affect conclusions. Fear suggestions outlined fifth paragraph, though must be pursued all vigour, hardly likely materialise, and only practicable constructive course is creation further *faits accomplis.* Among these, admission most important and in light Eban's 564[2] easier than certain recognitions. Anyhow this must be first point your suggestion paragraph six and most effective move forestall last sentence paragraph four. It calls for concentration all efforts. Consult Eban.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 97/206. התקבל: 28.7

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 27 July 1948

Had today most cordial conversation Marshall. View this conversation, my first since appointment, at which Chief Protocol was also present, did not consider proper go beyond general explanation our policies and problems.

Expressed desire Israel develop close friendly relations U.S.A.

Emphasized Israel creation United Nations as well as our own efforts, and our foreign policy consequently imbued principles international peace, cooperation.

Stressed our political success U.N. primarily due U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Consequently friendly relations U.S.S.R. one principal object our foreign policy.

Stressed friendly relations Soviet Bloc no indication political orientation towards U.S.S.R. social principles and ideology. These respects consider ourselves part western democracy.

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1. מס' 361.
2. אבן אל שרתוק, 23.7.1948, 93.03/72/16 — זהה למס' 372.

Stressed also desire peace Arabs basis equality. Indicated desire restore good relations Britain if Bevin's policy abandoned.

Concluded emphasizing our future dependent partly U.S.A. support Israel as progressive democratic factor Middle East.

Marshall inquired about you personally and praised your honesty, moderation. Asked convey his regards.

Marshall professed follow developments Israel closely and impressed especially handling Irgun.

Marshall congratulated me frank friendly presentation our problems, including relations U.S.S.R. Was obviously touched by narrative relating heroism, self-sacrifice, our soldiers. Marshall concluded cordially, wishing Israel progress and prosperity.

Epstein

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א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין
O. Gass to P. Bernstein

מברק 182
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/129/11

Washington, 27 July 1948

Thanks your instructions July 27th.[1] Have discussed need crude Haifa with Chief Petroleum Division State Department,[2] Chief Near East Division State Department,[3] Socony Vacuum, and Standard [Oil Company, New] Jersey. Encountered not one word criticism Memisrael for action reopening Refinery. They promised urgent consideration our needs crude, obviously in consultation British, French, affiliates. Presented memorandum[4] embodying approach you approved and emphasizing need affirmative decision in days, not weeks. Will take care of European Recovery Plan angle from here. Consulting Socony [and] Jersey further tomorrow and will cable.[5] Airmailing you all submissions.

Gass

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1. ראה מס' 370, הערה 2.
2. רוברט איקנס.
3. גורדון ה. מאטיסון.
4. מס' 385.
5. בשיחותיו עם ההנהלות של חברות הנפט התברר, שהן רוצות לחדש את הזרמת הנפט לחיפה באמצעות הצינור, אך תהינה מוכנות להעביר נפט גם במיכליות; הן הדגישו את הצורך בהסכמה דה פאקטו של הנהלת בתי־הזיקוק להפעלת המתקנים ובשיתוף־פעולה של חברות נפט בריטיות. (ראה גאס אל ברנשטיין, 28.7.1948, 93.03/129/11).

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א. גאס אל ר. איקנס (וואשינגטון)

O. Gass to R. Eakens (Washington)

העתק: 93.03/129/11

Washington, 27 July 1948

Dear Mr. Eakens,

I enclose a memorandum which is very largely a summary of my conversation with you and Mr. Moline on Friday, July 23rd. I subsequently had an opportunity to review the same matter with Mr. Mattison and Mr. Wilkins of the Near East Division.

I have also discussed the problem of the supply of crude to Haifa with both Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum over the telephone. I am going up to New York tomorrow to complete the explanation of our position, in face-to-face conversations, and to ask them for most urgent action. We must have immediate action on supply of crude to Haifa by tanker (point 9 of the enclosed memorandum dated July 27).

Since speaking to you, I have received renewed assurance from the Provisional Government of Israel that they are looking, first, to the American companies (and their British and French affiliates) for a solution of the problem of Haifa's crude requirements. We are most anxious that no further complicating factors be injected into an already difficult Middle Eastern situation. But the Provisional Government has also emphasized to me the significance of the fact that, through no fault of Israel, the refinery has already been closed more than three months. They have informed me that the problem of the supply of crude must be solved in a matter of days rather than weeks.

We would greatly appreciate anything you can do to expedite a constructive solution of this problem.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Gass
Economic Adviser to the
Provisional Government of Israel

נספח

APPENDIX

Memorandum

The Supply of Crude for the Operation of the Haifa Refinery

1. On April 17, 1948, pumping of crude from Kirkuk was stopped and the Haifa refinery was shut down. In the absence of an operating refinery, tankers ceased to bring crude from the Persian Gulf to Haifa by sea.

2. Since May 14, when the Provisional Government of Israel was proclaimed and recognized by the Government of the United States, the Provisional Government has attempted to offer every reasonable facility for the reopening of the refinery and the related resumption of the flow of crude. Israel has emphasized the mutual advantage of resumption of operations at Haifa to its own economy, to the Arab States, to the oil companies, to the European Recovery Program, and to the objectives of a sustained peace in the Middle East.

3. The Provisional Government has appreciated that reasonable guarantees of the distribution of the refined output would facilitate the resumption of operations at Haifa. The Provisional Government has accordingly offered such guarantees — to the U.N. Mediator, to the Government of the United States, and to all other interested parties.

4. The issues of mutuality of interest and the guarantees offered by Israel are adequately covered in the Memorandum of June 16, 1948,[1] which was transmitted to the U.S. Department of State and to other interested parties. (A copy of that Memorandum is attached, for convenience in reference.) This Memorandum still reflects the basic policy of Israel.

5. When prolonged negotiations brought no result — even after the achievement of a permanent truce, by order of the U.N. Security Council — Israel took steps, on July 22, 1948, to assure such emergency production of refined petroleum as lay within its powers. An emergency production directive was issued to utilize such crude stocks as remained at the refinery, and emergency steps were taken to assure refinery operation.

6. Nothing which Israel has done at Haifa in any way affects any permanent property right, title, or interest in the refinery or the related flow of crude.

7. The Provisional Government would like to restore all petroleum operations at Haifa immediately to the normal basis on which they were conducted before April 17.

8. Israel would welcome, and, indeed, invites the collaboration of the American, British, French and other parties interested in Haifa petroleum operations in securing the resumption of the flow of crude through the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline.

9. In the interim — and also as a precipitant to the resumption of a flow of crude through the pipeline — Israel requests the interested petroleum companies (and through the present intermediary particularly the interested American companies, Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey) to resume immediately the supply of crude from the Persian Gulf by tanker for refining at Haifa. This is the most urgent question, requiring immediate policy decision.

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1. מס' 195.

10. Israel suggests that the refinery at Haifa should be used immediately, as it normally would be, to supply refined products needed for the European Recovery Program as well as to meet the needs of Israel and the Arab States.

11. The Provisional Government of Israel is turning first to the American oil companies who have hitherto been interested in Haifa (and their associated British and other affiliates) to meet the need for crude to resume Haifa operations. No arrangement will be made with any other party if a satisfactory one can be worked out in this way.

12. The great urgency of this matter must be underlined. Israel requires that satisfactory arrangements with respect to the supply of crude to Haifa be made in a matter of days. The Provisional Government's responsibilities for the functioning of the Israeli economy and for the public security of Israel permit no delays.

Oscar Gass
Economic Adviser to the
Provisional Government of Israel

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 604
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/128/8

[New York], 28 July 1948

Your 863.[1] Unanimous estimate Delegation no prospect procure Council ruling revising immigration practice our favour owing to composition Council, general desire placate Arabs after their recent military, political, defeats. General sentiment ourselves substantially succeeding all fronts, therefore necessary redress balance. We gravely apprehensive results prolonged discussion immigration in Council, possibly culminating in formal approval in principle of *Aliya* restrictions, which at moment rest on slender basis Mediator's temporary discretion. At present no decision any United Nations organ adversely affecting *Aliya* principle exists, must strive keep principle intact that *Aliya* is not international concern. Must emphasize our general conclusion that in Council we can hope block hostile action, not initiate positive action our favour, except on such occasions when cease-fire or truce resolutions incidentally favour us. We advocate fighting

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1. המברק מוסב על דברי ברנאדוט בשיחה עם שרתוק (ראה מס' 380, עמ' 414)שממשלת ישראל חופשית לערער בפני מועצת־הביטחון על קביעתו, שהחלטת המועצה מחייבת הגבלת מספר העולים בגיל צבא בתקופת ההפוגה. (ראה מברק מיום 27.7.1948 בתיק 130.09/2329/1).

specific issue Cyprus and your approaching Mediator, informing him we will not raise issue formally at Council on understanding his discretion be liberally interpreted and not applied, save in exceptional circumstances in consultation ourselves.

Eban

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

פרשת מעצרם של חמשת הבריטים, עובדי חברת החשמל בירושלים (**ראה מס' 327 והערה 1 שם**) נדונה ביזמת בריטניה בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון ב־27 ביולי. הנציג הבריטי הגיש הצעת־החלטה המביעה תמיכה בדרישתה של ועדת ההפוגה, שהעצירים ישוחררו ויועברו לרשותה. הדיון בעניין נדחה ללא החלטה. (*SCOR, Third Year,* 340th Meeting ,27.7.1948, pp. 34-50).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X135. התקבל: 29.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 28 July 1948

Cadogan approached me for first time before meeting, expressing urgent hope rapid release detainees, saying this worst time for Anglo-Israeli quarrel view "new conditions". We all feel victory Israeli international prestige available with sympathy western powers by prompt liberal treatment culminating deportation or release. Believe international issue here involved predominating over internal considerations.[1]

Eban

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1. חמשת העצורים הובאו בפני שופט־שלום בתל אביב ב־27.7.1948. זה פסק שהראיות המובאות נגדם אינן מספיקות, אך הורה להחזיקם במעצר חמישה־עשר יום עד להמצאת ראיות נוספות. לאחר הדיון במועצת־הביטחון שוב פנתה המשלחת הבריטית אל אבן וביקשה באורח בלתי־רשמי להחיש את ההליכים המשפטיים. (ראה חילופי מברקים אבן — שרתוק, 28 — 30 ביולי, 93.03/72/30 ; מס' 395).

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ו. איתן אל מ. שרתוק
W. Eytan to M. Shertok

תזכיר: 130.02/2424/21

תל אביב, כ״א בתמוז תש״ח
28 ביולי 1948

אם גם שליחותו של הרוזן לא נכשלה עדיין כליל, הרי לעת עתה נדחתה, ונראה שבחודשיים הקרובים לפחות לא יוכל תיווכו להביא לידי תוצאות מכריעות או אפילו תוצאות ראשונות. אחרי־כן עלול תיווך זה להיפסק לגמרי או שיושם במקרר לחודשיים נוספים בגלל מושב עצרת האומות המאוחדות, שיתכנס אז.

עובדה זאת פותחת בפנינו את האפשרות לעשות משהו פעיל בשדה הדיפלומטיה על דעת עצמנו.

צעד כזה מצדנו הוא דחוף מכמה וכמה טעמים, אך כאן אמנה רק אחדים מהם:

א. אין ביכולתנו הכלכלית להחזיק צבא גדול על בסיס מלחמתי מבלי לעשות דבר, ואולי גם לא נוכל לכלכל זאת מבחינה פסיכולוגית.

ב. בפעולה נועזת היינו נוטלים לידינו — זו הפעם הראשונה, אם איני טועה — את היזמה הדיפלומטית בשאלת המזרח־התיכון, ויש לצפות שיזמה כזאת תישא את הפרי המתאים.

ג. הלא אנחנו מעוניינים בהסדר עם מדינות ערב, ואם לא עכשיו אימתי? שאם לא כן עתידה בעיה זו להיגרר לאורך ימים.

אני מציע, איפוא, שנפתח בחזית המזרח־התיכון באופנסיבה דיפלומטית רבתי, בלווית כל התותחים הכבדים של פרסומת ותעמולה, וזאת בעתיד הקרוב ביותר, דהיינו בשבועיים הבאים, לפני שיוכל מישהו אחר לחטוף מידינו את היזמה הדיפלומטית.

עלינו לכוון את מאמצינו לשטחים רבים ככל האפשר על מנת לתת למסע זה את כל הסיכויים להצלחה. לדעתי השטחים הללו הם בעיקר:

א. החבר הערבי בכללותו;

ב. מדינות ערב אחת לאחת;

ג. דעת־הקהל במדינות ערב, להבדיל מן הממשלות השונות;

ד. דעתן של ארצות־הברית, במיוחד של ממשלת ארצות־הברית, אשר בוודאי תקדם בברכה הצעה קונסטרוקטיבית כדי להיחלץ מן המיצר.

קיימים כמובן גם שטחים אחרים, כמו בריטניה, רוסיה, המיעוטים בעולם הערבי וכיוצא באלה.

בתזכיר מוקדם זה אין בדעתי להיכנס לפרטי פעולה כזאת, היות וראשית־כול יש להשיג את הסכמתה העקרונית של הממשלה למערכה דיפלומטית מעין זאת המוצעת כאן. אך ישנם אי־אלו דברים שאפשר לאמרם מראש, ועל כן ייאמרו כאן.

1. דבר זה פירושו מהפכה במדיניותנו. עד כה נחבאנו תחת כנפי האו״ם והרגשנו עצמנו בטוחים כל עוד לא הסתכסכנו עם המוסד הזה. עובדה זו מנעה בעדנו מלגלות

יזמה דיפלומטית ומדיניות בלתי־תלויה, וגרמה לנו כי נהיה תמיד יותר מטרה למדיניות המזרח־התיכון מאשר מניעים למדיניות זאת. אמנם דרך זו הובילתנו בשלום עד כאן, אך בחודשים האחרונים אין לראות שהתקרבנו למטרה הסופית של הסדר איזורי. הסיכויים להסדר הנוח לנו יגדלו בהרבה אם היזמה תבוא מצדנו, בפרט כשהיא נתמכת על־ידי הזכר הטרי של הצלחתנו הצבאית.

2. נטילת היזמה הדיפלומטית מחייבת ניסוח מדויק או של מטרות המלחמה שלנו או של הצעותינו להסדר בעתיד (וגבולות בכלל זה), או של שני הדברים כאחד. עד כה נרתענו מפני כל הגדרה מחייבת של אחד משני אלה, והסתפקנו בהודעות סתמיות. מעתה שוב לא צריך להיות קושי רב בנקיטת מדיניות ערבית פעילה יותר בקנה־מידה הרבה יותר רחב מאשר עד עתה, אך ברור שלשם כך דרושים ריכוז־המחשבה ואומץ־הרוח לקבל החלטות מרחיקות־לכת.

3. אין כל סיבה שבגללה לא נוכל לקיים בבת־אחת שני מפעלים, אחד בגלוי ואחד בחשאי. התכנון המדויק והביצוע הקפדני שיידרשו לכך אינם נבצרים מיכולתנו, לא העיונית ולא המעשית.

הנאום שנשא לא מכבר ראש הממשלה[1] יש בו לשמש כפתח מתאים לאופנסיבה דיפלומטית כזאת. יהא זה חבל מאוד אם דבריו של מר בן־גוריון ישארו קול קורא במדבר, מבלי שתבוא בעקבותיהם פעולה מכרעת.

העליתי כאן רק כמה רעיונות־יסוד, ובסיכום ברצוני לחזור ולהדגיש, שאם תכנית כזאת עלולה להתקבל על־ידי ממשלתנו, יש לבצע אותה ללא דיחוי, פן יבואו אחרים ויקדימונו.

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מ. שרתוק אל ג'. רידמן (תל אביב)

M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק משוכפל: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 28 July 1948

Confidential

Dear Mr. Reedman,

At our meeting on Monday, 26th July,[1] I promised Count Bernadotte to let you know on Wednesday, for transmission to him, the decision of the Provisional Government in regard to the proposal of demilitarising Jerusalem. I am now in a position to do so.

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1. ראה מס' 380 והערה 2 שם.

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1. ראה מס' 380.

The Cabinet gave full consideration to the point of principle involved at its regular half-weekly meeting today. Its conclusions are as follows:

1. The Provisional Government re-affirms its rejection of the Mediator's plan of demilitarisation which you communicated to us on July 22nd.[2] The Provisional Government assumes that this particular scheme no longer stands.

2. The attitude of the Provisional Government to any plan of demilitarisation emanating from the Mediator cannot but be influenced by the fact that the Mediator has proposed to place Jerusalem ultimately under Arab rule and that he has not withdrawn that proposal.

3. The Provisional Government is ready, as before, to examine any scheme which, without prejudging the ultimate settlement of the problem of Jerusalem or prejudicing the vital interests of the Jewish people in the Holy City, would protect it from further destruction in the event of hostilities being resumed in other parts of Palestine.

I shall be grateful if you will transmit this reply to the Mediator.

Yours sincerely,

M. Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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ג'. רידמן אל מ. שרתוק
J. Reedman to M. Shertok

העתק משוכפל: 93.03/94/10

Tel Aviv, 28 July 1948

Dear Mr. Shertok,

The enclosed note from the Mediator on the question of Arab refugees has been sent to me for submission for the urgent consideration of the Provisional Government of Israel. The Mediator requests that a reply to the proposals contained in the note be given to him at the earliest possible date, and in any case not later than the end of this week.

I should like, if possible, to have an opportunity to discuss with you informally the subject of this note, and I am available for this purpose at any time that suits your convenience.

Yours sincerely,

John N. Reedman
Special Representative
of the Secretary General

2. מס' 358.

נספח
APPENDIX

NOTE FROM THE MEDIATOR TO BE SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB REFUGEES

The resolution of the Security Council of 15 July[1] urges the parties to continue their conversation with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation, in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully. As indicated in my conversation with Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv on 26 July,[2] one of the points under dispute is the return to their homes in the Jewish-controlled area of Palestine of Arab refugees who fled because of war conditions.

I am deeply concerned with the plight of some three hundred thousand Arab refugees scattered in Arab countries and Arab-controlled areas of Palestine. Their suffering will be intensified when winter comes. Most of them left practically all of their possessions behind and have no means at their disposal.

I recognize the basis for the misgivings which the Provisional Government might have with regard to the return of large numbers of these refugees during the war. These misgivings derive from security as well as economic and political considerations. But I must point out that the existing truce in Palestine is of indefinite duration, and that the Security Council Resolution has ordered the Governments and Authorities concerned to desist from further military action.

For humanitarian reasons and taking into consideration both the claims of Jewish security and the ultimate right of all Arab refugees who so desire to return to their former places of residence, I request that the principle be accepted that from among those who may desire to do so a limited number, to be determined in consultation with the Mediator, and especially those formerly living in Jaffa and Haifa, be permitted to return to their homes as from 15 August.

In recognition of security considerations, a differentiation may be made from amongst those who wish to return between men of military age and all others.

The Mediator will undertake to enlist the aid of appropriate international organizations and agencies in the resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the returning refugees.

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1. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־671.
2. ראה מס' 380.

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א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (לייק סאכסס)

A. Eban to the President of the Security Council (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/94/6

[New York], 29 July 1948

Sir,

At the 340th meeting of the Security Council held on Tuesday, 27 July, I undertook to clarify certain matters arising from the statement of the United Kingdom representative with respect to the arrest and trial of five employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation. I am now in a position to make a preliminary comment on one of the central points in that discussion.

2. In the course of his statement on 27 July, the representative of the United Kingdom said:

> The Truce Commission has previously informed us that the building from which the five men were abducted was... protected by the flags of the three Powers represented on the Commission. The abduction was consequently an affront to the prestige of the Truce Commission (S/P.V. 340, p.46).[1]

In the subsequent discussion, the representatives of the United States, Belgium and France emphasized that respect for United Nations premises was a paramount motive of the Security Council's concern with this incident.

3. The Security Council may therefore be glad to hear that no issue of disrespect to the flags of the Truce Commission is involved. Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement that the Truce Commission had "previously informed" the Council that "the building from which the five men were abducted was protected by the flags of the three Powers represented on the Commission" must be based on a misunderstanding. No such information relating to the place of these arrests is conveyed by the Truce Commission in any of its published messages on this question (S/898; S/905; S/915; S/920).

4. I have now received information from the Provisional Government of Israel that the five men were taken, not from the Power Station itself, but from their private dwelling near by, over which no flag of the United Nations or of any Power was hoisted. It is clear, therefore, that no issue affecting the status of the Truce Commission or of United Nations premises arises at all.

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1. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 340th Meeting, 27.7.1948, p. 35 ; כאן מראה־מקום לפרוטוקול הזמני.

5. I am awaiting the comment of the Provisional Government of Israel on other matters which arose during the 340th meeting, and will communicate with the President of the Security Council at the first opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban

Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel

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א. אבן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
A. Eban to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק 618

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/10

נוסח נכנס: 93.02/172/9

[New York], 29 July 1948

Parodi invited me discuss two points: 1) Continuation of complaints by Consul-General against intrusions Jewish forces French religious institutes Jerusalem,[1] Abu Gosh.[2] Without discussing incidents, he emphasized disturbing effect our relations Paris, which also bombarded these messages, underlined urgency prevent either by improving relations Consul or by circumspect attitude our forces. Expressed opinion political damage Franco-Israel relations not possibly outweighed by tactical military advantages even if justified. 2) Officially expressed anxiety French Government withholding oil from Haifa, French deeply interested early renewal since French economy and European Recovery Programme plans suffering. I explained initiative and responsibility withholding oil with Iraqi Government, ourselves producing oil to maximal possible extent existing circumstances, would welcome measures leading to resumption flow and undertake restore work refineries previous standard. He asked memorandum, which supplying through Gass,[3] expressed interest possibility negotiations French as well as American companies, ended repeating this was official approach.

Eban

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1. המדובר בתפיסת מנזר הקפוצ׳ינים בטלביה על־ידי הצבא כדי שישמש כבית־החלמה לחיילים. הקונסול הצרפתי התלונן שהמנזר נתפס לפני שהתקבלה הסכמה ממשרד־החוץ בצרפת, שבדיעבד התנגד לתפיסה. שרתוק השיב שהקונסול עצמו אישר את התפיסה. (ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 28.7.1948, 130.09/2329/23; שרתוק אל פישר, 5.8.1948, 130.02/2413/11).
2. המדובר במנזר וכנסיה של אחיות יוסף הקדוש באבו גוש. משרד־החוץ השתדל למען פינוי הבניין או הגבלת השימוש בו. (ראה שרתוק אל ממ״ז ירושלים, 30.6.1948, 130.02/2413/11).
3. אולי מס׳ 385.

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מ. שרתוק אל ד. בן־גוריון
M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion

העתק: 130.02/2426/8

תל אביב, כ״ב בתמוז תש״ח
29 ביולי 1948

כפי שמסרתי בישיבת הממשלה אתמול, הצהרתי לפני המתווך בשיחתי האחרונה אתו,[1] כי אנחנו מקבלים עלינו את שתי ההגבלות שהוטלו על העלייה בהחלטת מועצת־הביטחון מ־29 במאי,[2] והן:

א. אי־העלאת "אנשים לוחמים";

ב. אי־גיוסם ואי־אימונם לצרכי צבא של עולים (גברים) בגיל צבא תוך תקופת ההפוגה.

הנני סבור כי דווקא משום שאנו עלולים להתנגש עם המתווך בשאלת ההגבלה המספרית של העולים בגיל צבא — דבר שמנוי וגמור עמנו להתנגד לו לחלוטין — ולהתדיין אתו בשאלה זו לפני מועצת־הביטחון, מצווה עלינו להקפיד במיוחד על שמירת שני התנאים שקיבלנו עלינו את דינם.

כידוע לך, השגנו מהמתווך ויתור על הסדר הקודם שנקבע לגבי עולים בגיל צבא, והוא כליאתם במחנות למשך הפוגה. לעומת זה הצענו סדרים שיאפשרו מידה מסוימת של פיקוח מטעם או״ם על מילוי התנאים האלה מצדנו, ואלה הם:

א. כל העולים בגיל צבא העוברים תחת בקרת או״ם, יקבלו מאתנו כרטיסים מיוחדים המעידים על שחרורם מחובת גיוס בתקופת ההפוגה;

ב. תונהג אצלנו כרטיסיה שתאפשר בכל עת בדיקה לנסיון, שמטרתה תהיה להוכיח כי אין העולה מגויס או מתאמן.

בשעתו כתבתי למטכ״ל/אכ״א על הצורך להנהיג את הסדרים האלה ולהקפיד עליהם. אבקשך לחזק את דרישתי על־ידי הוראה ישירה מצדך.

מ.ש.

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1. ראה מס' 380.
2. נספח ה, עמ' 666־667.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: 101/36. התקבל: 30.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 29 July 1948

Received today following reply by Martin to our application for loan:[1] "Reports reaching me do not appear to warrant at this time active consideration by Export and Import Bank of your credit application." Reason[s], as stated, are undoubtedly political. Will take up the matter interview Truman.[2]

Epstein

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א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (לייק סאכסס)
A. Eban to the President of the Security Council (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/72/30

[New York], 30 July 1948

Sir,

I have communicated to the Provisional Government of Israel the views expressed at the 340th meeting of the Security Council of 27 July on the question raised by the United Kingdom representative with respect to the trial in Tel Aviv of five employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation.[1] In my letter of 29 July,[2] I conveyed information received from the Provisional Government of Israel showing that this incident had no bearing on the status and immunity of United Nations premises. On the legal aspect of this question, I now have the honour to submit the following facts, based on information received directly from the Foreign Minister of Israel:

The laws in force throughout the territory of Israel and territory occupied by Israeli forces are those enacted by the British Mandatory Power during its tenure of the Mandate, except with respect to such legislation as has been enacted or repealed by the State Council of Israel since May 15, 1948. In the Official Gazette, No.1, p.3, published by the Provisional Government of Israel, the following announcement occurs, from which I quote in part:

a. The Provisional Council of State is the legislative authority. . .

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1. ראה מס' 193.
2. ראה מס' 399.

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1. ראה מס' 387.
2. מס' 391.

b. Legislation based upon the White Paper of 1939 is hereby repealed and becomes void. (There follow specific references to legislation on land purchase and immigration.)

c. So long as other laws are not enacted by or on behalf of the Council of State, laws valid in Palestine on 14 May 1948 remain in force in the State of Israel.

It follows that the law governing the trial of these five men is that in force during the British Mandate, since no new enactments have been made relevant to this branch of legislation. The following measures which the courts of Israel are now applying are therefore based entirely on British Mandatory laws and procedures:

1. The question of the jurisdiction of the courts of Israel over these men, will be considered and decided by the appropriate court at the trial, should a trial take place.

2. Should a trial be authorized, it will take place before a regular criminal court composed as during the Mandate, in accordance with the law and procedure hitherto in force.

3. In accordance with British Mandatory law now valid as the law of Israel, the accused are under remand by order of a civil magistrate.

4. Charges were laid on the 27 July under the Official Secrets Act and the Emergency Defence Regulations. The magistrate held that the prosecution had not yet produced evidence adequate for trial, and adjourned the hearing for fifteen days. The prosecution is being conducted under the personal supervision of the Attorney General.

5. Mr. J. Sheringham, representing the British consular authorities, has been given copies of the charges and has been able to interview the accused in private. The Provisional Government of Israel has also promised visa and entry facilities for British counsel should their services be required by the accused.

6. The Attorney General is now making an effort, before the lapse of fifteen days, to accelerate the resumption of preliminary investigation before the magistrate, whereupon the magistrate will decide whether or not the accused will be brought for trial.

The Provisional Government of Israel regards this case as being *sub judice,* and accordingly considers that it would be contrary to legal principle to comment on the merits of the case itself.[3]

Sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban
Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel

3. בסופו של דבר נמצאו ראיות רק נגד שניים מן העצורים, שהובאו לדין בפני בית־המשפט המחוזי בירושלים. בית־המשפט הרשיע אחד מן הנאשמים (סילבסטר) וגזר עליו שבע שנות מאסר, אך פסק־הדין בוטל על־ידי בית־המשפט העליון.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק AE25
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/10

[New York], 30 July 1948

Presume am authorized raise Cyprus issue next meeting Council, approaching American, Russian, French, beforehand. This may embarrass British manoeuvre raise whole refugee problem.[1] They already encountering resistance other delegations on grounds irrelevant, but instruction emanates Bevin personally.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק AE26
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/10

[New York], 30 July 1948

Ross informed me American attitude demilitarization Jerusalem, if agreed, is establishment Jewish, Arab, police in respective areas, with small United Nations supervising staff, not international force. My impression all three Governments[1] alarmed Mediator's heavy demand man-power, this borne out my conversation Belgium, which cabling later.[2]

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 405.

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1. ממשלות ארצות־הברית, צרפת ובלגיה, שאנשי צבא שלהן שרתו בצוות משקיפי האו"ם.
2. ראה מס' 426.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X 142. התקבל: 31.7
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 30 July 1948

Ross showed me telegram containing State Department directive to delegation on our admission. 1) American Government favours early admission Israel United Nations. 2) Regards Israel as peace-loving state, able [and] willing comply obligations Charter. 3) Interprets paragraph I,F November Resolution[1] as meaning that admission Israel not dependent admission neighbouring state. 4) /Assumes/ Memisrael will make declaration under rule 58 Security Council rules procedure.[2] Delegation is instructed react thus to any inquiry from other Governments. Ourselves will now stimulate such inquiries. Toff interviewing Latin Branch State Department before proceeding journey.[3]

Eban

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 102/184. התקבל: 31.7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 30 July 1948

In conversation Truman[1] I emphasised importance not leave Arab[s] think U.N. decision Palestine still open for reversal and modification, indicating that only firm policy U.S.A. will bring peace and stability in Israel-Arabs relation. Stressed urgency U.S.A. further leadership in sup-

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1. הסעיף מופיע כלשונו במס׳ 403.
2. התקנה הקובעת את הנוהל לקבלת מדינות חדשות לאו״ם: מדינה המבקשת להתקבל חייבת להגיש בקשה למזכיר הכללי בצירוף הצהרה על נכונותה לקבל עליה את ההתחייבויות הכלולות במגילת האו״ם.
3. ראה מס׳ 427.

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1. אפשטיין התקבל על־ידי הנשיא ב־29.7.1948 לרגל היכנסו לתפקידו כנציג מיוחד של ישראל בוואשינגטון. הפגישה נערכה לפי בקשתו המיוחדת של הנשיא ולא על־פי כללי הטקס המקובלים. (ראה א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק, 2.7.1948, 130.09/2308/6).

porting Israel, and elaborated on priority loan and our admission U.N. Truman did not reply specifically, but said: "I desire conclude my job on elaboration (?)." He apparently did not know of Martin rejection our application for loan,[2] but did not make any observations or promises. He responded favourably my description role Israel can play social economic progress Middle East, and said he fully aware our past contribution this field. Truman praised wisdom and statesmanship Weizmann, said he followed "with continued interest" situation in Israel, adding he wished us further achievement and progress.

Conversation Marshall[3] was on higher level and more constructive, though I then avoided discussion specific items (?). While Marshall needs enlight[en]ment on Israel problem, success Truman operations in our favour depends primarily on our close contact with his personal and party advisers. This will be my main preoccupation coming week.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
M. Shertok to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/175/10

Tel Aviv, 30 July 1948

Our present attitude regarding Jerusalem as follows:[1]

1. Part Resolution 29 November regarding international regime Jerusalem unimplemented for no fault of ours. We pressed Trusteeship Council approve Statute, submit it Assembly for ratification, but Council refused.
2. Entire Christian world defaulted in its responsibility for Jerusalem by not lifting finger its defence when city was continually shelled by Arab Legion under British command and its fall seemed imminent.
3. Jewish arms alone and stoicism Jerusalem Jews saved Jerusalem from relapse to rule Islam, and placed entire area New Jerusalem and corridor from it to Israel firmly in our hands.

2. ראה מס' 394.
3. ראה מס' 383.

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1. נשלח בעקבות מברק של פישר, שציין שדעת־הקהל בצרפת מוטרדת ממה שמצטייר כתביעה ישראלית לסיפוח ירושלים; הוא עצמו הפריך טענה זו, מתוך הנחה שהמדיניות שהיתה מקובלת על ממשלת ישראל (תמיכה בבינאום ירושלים) לא השתנתה; הוא ביקש אישור ממשרד־החוץ לעמדתו זו. (ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 28.7.1948, 130.09/2329/23).

4. In flagrant contradiction to international verdict, and despite patent dangers involved for Jewish community, Mediator acting behalf U.N. Assembly proposed transfer Jerusalem to Arab rule.

5. This astounding proposal evoked no protest on part any Christian power concerned, and passed over in silence by Truce Commission.

6. This week Trusteeship Council again refused move regarding International Statute, its majority having voted for indefinite postponement, only Soviet Union voting against, Australia and Costa Rica abstaining.[2]

7. In all these circumstances, we no longer consider ourselves morally bound by our acquiescence in Assembly's decision internationalise Jerusalem, which U.N. itself consistently refused implement and U.N. Mediator openly repudiated.

8. Our responsibility for protection lives, property, Jewish community Jerusalem, Jewish institutions of world wide importance which city contains, and supreme spiritual, cultural, association Jewish people with Holy City impells us refrain anything which might prejudice possibility our renewing claim for inclusion Jewish Jerusalem in Israel at proper stage, if we see no other way safeguard our vital interests.

9. Proclamation extending authority Provisional Government and application laws Israel to parts Jerusalem under our control[3] intended regularise position, enable us place various vital financial transactions and administrative arrangements on proper legal basis and turn our virtual responsibility for maintenance law [and] order and enforcement internal discipline into formal one.

10. This does not in itself prejudge future Jerusalem or our ultimate attitude to question international regime. Otherhand, our approach to question demilitarisation mooted by Mediator is far-reachingly influenced by above considerations, which lead us reject anything liable prejudge issue conversely.[4]

Shertok

2. ראה מס' 200 והערה 3 שם.
3. ראה מס' 358 והערה 2 שם.
4. תוכן מברק זה הועבר למשרד־החוץ הצרפתי — ראה מס' 454.

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א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין
O. Gass to P. Bernstein

מברק 210
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/129/11

[Washington], 30 July 1948

State Department Petroleum Division today assured me they are making maximum effort through U.N. Mediator to secure reopening refinery on normal basis with delivery crude both through pipe-line and by tanker. State [Department] not considering any extraordinary measures until they are convinced that there is no hope of re-establishing Refinery operations on normal basis. Please inform me status negotiations your end.[1]

Gass

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן
M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.10/2516/9

Paris, le 30 juillet 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

Reconnaissance. — A la première séance du Conseil du nouveau ministère, il n'a été question de la Palestine qu'en ce qui concerne la participation de la France aux organismes de contrôle pour la trêve. Les dispositions déjà prises par le gouvernement précédent ont été confirmées.

Nos amis dans le nouveau gouvernement ne croient pas à la possibilité d'une reconnaissance rapide. Naturellement, nous faisons un effort maximum car nous réalisons l'importance d'obtenir la reconnaissance avant la session de l'O.N.U.

La présence de Léon Blum dans le nouveau gouvernement[1] exige de lui plus de réserve qu'auparavant, mais ceci est compensé par le fait qu'il a plus d'influence sur M. Schuman qu'il n'en avait sur M. Bidault. Léon Blum ne

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1. ברנשטיין הבריק בתשובה, שהפעלת בתי־הזיקוק בדרך הרגילה ובפיקוח המתווך עלולה להידחות בחודשים; הוא ביקש מגאס להתעניין באספקת נפט גולמי מארצות־הברית והוסיף שהוא לא יוכל לדחות לזמן רב משא־ומתן עם מקורות מזרח־אירופאיים, מאחר שמלאי הנפט הגולמי בחיפה יאזל בקרוב. ראה גם מס׳ 404. (ראה מברק מיום 3.8.1948, 93.01/2207/1).

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1. ליאון בלום מונה לסגן ראש־הממשלה בקבינט של מארי.

s'est pas encore installé dans ses nouvelles fonctions et je le verrai la semaine prochaine. Le nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères a accepté de m'accorder une audience la semaine prochaine, pour que je lui fasse une visite de courtoisie à l'occasion de son entrée en fonction.

Le Comité pour la Reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël continue à obtenir des adhésions dans les milieux parlementaires.

La presse française a été très négligée pendant mon absence du fait que M. Najar devait me remplacer et ensuite du fait qu'il a dû se rendre à Genève. Je lui ai demandé de concentrer ses efforts sur ce domaine d'activité car il est important que nos relations avec la presse soient bien établies au moment où l'O.N.U. va siéger à Paris.

[.....][2]

Maurice Fischer

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מ. קומיי אל א. מקנוטון[1] (ניו יורק)
M. Comay to A. McNaughton (New York)

העתק: 93.03/126/2

[New York], 30 July 1948

Dear General McNaughton,

1. I am grateful to you for undertaking to transmit to your Government the observations contained herein, regarding the admission of Israel to the United Nations. For reasons I need not labour, the Provisional Government of Israel is reluctant to submit a formal application for admission, until it feels assured that such an application will receive the necessary support. The Provisional Government of Israel is therefore seeking an advance indication of their attitude in this matter from various governments which are represented on the Security Council.

2. Israel's application for admission is unique in one respect, in that it has a pre-natal relationship with the United Nations. It came into existence by virtue of the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. By this Resolution, a Plan was adopted which contemplated admission to the United Nations as its final phase. Part I, F of the Plan reads:

> When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this Plan has become effective and the Declaration and Undertaking, as envisaged in this Plan, has been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application to

2. המשך המכתב לא הודפס כאן.

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1. אנדרו מקנוטון, הנציג הקבוע של קנדה באו"ם.

membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The effectiveness of the independence of Israel cannot any longer be doubted, particularly after it has been subjected to "ordeal by battle", and has successfully weathered the war of aggression launched against it in its infancy by neighbouring states. In his recent Report to the Security Council, the United Nations Mediator testified to the factual situation in the following words:

> The 'de facto' situation in Palestine today is that the Jewish Provisional Government, recognized by an increasing number of states, exists in an area of Palestine, and is exercising without restrictions of any kind on its authority or power, all the attributes of its full sovereignty, including the waging of war. This Provisional Government and the State it represents, were established under the cloak of authority given by the 29 November Resolution of the General Assembly. Since that Resolution, much has happened in Palestine and it is not easy to undo what history has recorded. It is this 'de facto' situation which the Arab States are fighting to eliminate, and the plain fact is that it is there. (Doc. S/888, dated 17 July 1948, Para. 34).

(Note: Recognition has already been accorded by fifteen different countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union.)

The Declaration and Undertaking referred to above were accepted at the time when the State was proclaimed.

A query may be raised about the date for independence laid down by the General Assembly's Resolution. The date originally contemplated was "two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the Mandatory Power has been completed..." Since the evacuation was completed on June 29, the independence date would have been August 29. But on May 14, the General Assembly suspended the Palestine Commission, which was to have acted as the transitional authority between the termination of the Mandate and final independence, and therefore made it necessary for the new State to assume full authority immediately, which it did on May 15. This step followed logically on the elimination of the transition period, and was in accordance with the clause of the November Resolution which "calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this Plan into effect." It cannot therefore be said that the independence of Israel was prematurely proclaimed in terms of the United Nations Plan, as subsequently amended.

3. It is submitted that Israel fully complies with the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter.[2] The record of Israel since it came into existence on

2. סעיף 4 של מגילת האו״ם עניינו קבלת חברות חדשות לארגון. הוא קובע שהחברות באו״ם פתוחה לכל מדינה שוחרת שלום, המקבלת עליה את ההתחייבויות הכלולות במגילה, ושעל־פי דעת ארגון האו״ם יכולה ורוצה לקיים את ההתחייבויות האלה.

May 15 has deeply established that it is a peace-loving State able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. It has loyally cooperated with the Security Council in the effort to restore peace in Palestine, and has promptly responded to each one of the numerous appeals and orders made by the Council under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.

4. The early admission of Israel to the United Nations is most desirable for the purpose of stabilizing the situation on the spot. Since the existence of Israel as an independent state is now an immutable fact, it is a basic requirement for peaceful adjustment that the Arab states should at least acquiesce in that fact, and should cease the attempt to eliminate it by force. That this is also the view of the Mediator emerges clearly from the paragraph of his Report which has been quoted above. If the admission of Israel were to be deferred for at least another year, this could only have an unhealthy effect, as it would perpetuate uncertainty and instability and give indirect encouragement to Arab aggressive intentions, which have clearly not been finally renounced. It is only when the status of Israel has been placed beyond dispute that the prospect will open up of settling any outstanding questions between it and its neighbours, either by direct negotiation or through the good offices of the Mediator.

5. There is a general belief that membership of the United Nations should be as universal as possible, and should not be denied to any state unless there are very special reasons to the contrary. In the case of Israel, this broad principle is reinforced by the fact that the authority and prestige of the United Nations itself is involved in the admission of the only State which it has sponsored in advance. This consideration should commend itself more particularly to those individual member-states, like Canada, which participated in the initial sponsorship by their affirmative votes and which thereby assumed the moral obligation of ensuring that the new State should be welcomed into the family of nations.[3]

Sincerely yours,

Michael S. Comay

3. ראה גם התזכיר "The admission of The State of Israel to the United Nations", 2.8.1948 ‏93.03/72/16.

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פ. ברנשטיין אל א. גאס (וואשינגטון)
P. Bernstein to O. Gass (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 34/172
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 31 July 1948

Your 183.[1] Thanks endeavours and information. 1) Refineries reopened under formal protest management. 2) Work proceeding most satisfactorily under temporary Jewish managers, appointed by British directors of refineries. 3) Interpretation of de facto consent by British management seems indicated. 4) No active cooperation British management required if tankers with crude arrive. 5) Supply crude by tankers most promising way of Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline being reopened soon. 6) Cooperation British oil companies in securing crude by tankers doubtful, but will ascertain. 7) Eastern sources in principle inclined supply crude, but /definite offers, quantity,/ price, not yet received, probably forthcoming next week. 8) Stocks /now/ sufficient until end October, except aviation spirit, which cannot be produced in Haifa. 9) Crude required chiefly for continuing production and resuming export refined products to Europe. 10) If crude provided, sale refined products by usual channels most probable. 11) Our /agreement/ not to take decision until your end has replied can stand only until end next week.

Bernstein

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 1 August 1948

Your MH908.[1] Whitehall has instructed delegation here raise at Security Council questions Jewish refugees pressure on Palestine and Arab refugee position as disturbing peace Middle East. They will try secure resolution

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1. ראה מס' 384 והערה 5 שם.

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1. שרתוק אל אבן, 1.8.1948, 93.03/94/11. שרתוק ביקש פרטים על כוונת הבריטים להביא את שאלת הפליטים לדיון במועצת־הביטחון. (ראה מס' 396).

drawing attention Economic [and] Social Council and International Refugee Organization these problems. American attitude to any such Council action believed negative according Eliahu [Epstein]'s sources. Believe vigorous presentation Cyprus case will help discredit this manoeuvre. Acting accordingly.

Eban

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט (תל אביב)

M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 1 August 1948[1]

Sir,

The Provisional Government has duly considered your note on the question of the return of Arab refugees[2] and has authorised me to convey to you the following reply.

2. As I mentioned in the course of our interview on Monday, July 26th,[3] we are not unmindful of the plight of the Arabs who, as a result of the present war, find themselves uprooted from their homes and cast adrift. Our own people has suffered too much from similar tribulations for us to be indifferent to their hardships. If, nevertheless, we find ourselves unable to agree on their readmission to the Israel-controlled areas, it is because of overriding considerations bearing on our immediate security, the outcome of the present war and the stability of the future peace settlement. We feel convinced that any measure of repatriation undertaken solely on humanitarian grounds, in disregard of the military, political and economic aspects of the problem, would prove to have been falsely conceived; it would defeat its purpose and result in graver complications than those which already exist.

3. The Resolution of the Security Council of May 29th, the terms of which were renewed by the Resolution of July 15th, specifically provided that the truce should not prejudice the rights, claims and position of either party. You interpreted this principle as meaning that no advantage should accrue to either side, at the expense of or as compared with the other. There can be no doubt that the return during the truce of thousands of displaced Arabs to the State of Israel — which is still beset by enemy armies, forms the target of violent political attack and may yet again become the object of

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1. המכתב פורסם כמסמך או"ם S/949. תאריכו שם: 30.7.1948.
2. ראה מס' 390.
3. ראה מס' 380.

a renewed military onslaught — would, in fact, gravely prejudice our rights and position. It would relieve the aggressor-States of a large part of the pressure exerted on them by the refugee problem, while, on the other hand, it would most seriously handicap the war effort and war-readiness of Israel by bringing into its territory a politically explosive and economically destitute element, and by saddling its Government with responsibility for all the ensuing complications.

4. Against this background, your reference to the return of Arab refugees as being one of the questions under dispute which it is the duty of both parties to try and settle peacefully, appears to us to miss the main point at issue. The root cause of the present conflict — of which the mass flight of Arabs and their consequent suffering are mere corollaries — is the refusal of the Arab League to accept the State of Israel either as a matter of right or as an accomplished fact. As long as this intransigence persists, any attempt to tear the problem of Arab refugees out of its context and treat it in isolation can only, as already stated, aggravate the issue: it will render rightful defence more difficult and lend further encouragement to wanton aggression.

5. Nor do we feel that the issue is met by your argument that the present truce is of indefinite duration and that, therefore, the security aspect of Arab repatriation should not present a special problem. To begin with, once a large-scale return is authorised, it may be found difficult, if not impossible, to keep it within bounds. Even if formally men of military age are excluded, the practical result may well be the increase of irregulars inspired by the Mufti, who know no truce. Moreover, the Arab States themselves, in their joint communication to the Security Council, have hedged their acceptance of the present truce with several conditions.[4] They have thus reserved to themselves the right to terminate the truce whenever it suits them to resume the fighting. They continue to maintain an attitude of obstinate intransigence and defiance of the Security Council and the Mediator in regard to such basic provisions of the truce as the Jerusalem water supply and the opening of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. Not a day passes without some prominent Arab spokesman threatening the resumption of hostilities. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the Security Council has ordered the truce to be of unlimited duration is not a firm enough foundation on which the Provisional Government could build so far-reaching a measure as the readmission *en masse* of Arab refugees.

6. The difficulty is not minimised if the return is limited to the former residents of Jaffa and Haifa, for whom you enter a special plea. Both these cities constitute vulnerable points, on the peace and stability of which the well-being of Israel in the present delicate stage very largely depends. Both were centres of grave menace to Jewish security, and the re-creation of a

4. ראה מס' 345.

situation pregnant with potential trouble in areas such as these is the last thing that any state still engaged in a struggle for its existence could contemplate. Incidentally, we fail to appreciate why on purely humanitarian grounds the former residents of Jaffa and Haifa have been singled out for special treatment and found, as a class, to be more deserving than those of any other town or village.

7. On the economic side, the reintegration of the returning Arabs into normal life, and even their mere maintenance, would present an insoluble problem. The difficulties of accommodation, employment and ordinary livelihood would be insuperable. You will, we feel sure, readily admit that the international assistance which you envisage is for the time being purely hypothetical. On the other hand, the Provisional Government would resist as utterly unjust an attempt to impose on its limited and heavily strained resources any part of the financial liability for the relief and resettlement of returning Arabs. Far from being ready to shoulder responsibilities on behalf of Arabs whom the Jews never intended to harm — with whom they were, indeed, anxious to live at peace — the Provisional Government considers itself entitled and is indeed determined to claim compensation from the Arab States for all the havoc and destruction, the loss of life, property and livelihood, which the criminal folly of their armed intervention in Palestine has wrought.

8. Arab mass flight from within Israel and Israel-occupied areas is a direct effect of Arab aggression from outside. In justifying their invasion, the Arab Governments claimed that they had responded to the call for rescue addressed to them by the Arabs of Palestine. The plain fact is, however, that but for the intervention of the Arab States there would have been an overwhelming measure of local Arab acquiescence in the establishment of the State of Israel, and by now peace and reasonable prosperity would have reigned throughout its territory, to the enjoyment of Jews and Arabs alike. If the war has brought in its wake a mass exodus, mostly spontaneous, and the exodus has resulted in great suffering, the responsibility for it rests on those who fomented and have carried on the war, as well as on those who aided and abetted them. The Arab Governments and the Great Power which espoused their cause cannot have it both ways: do everything they can to undermine and destroy the State of Israel, and then, having failed, require the State of Israel to take over the liability for the results of their own reckless action.

9. For the political, economic and security reasons stated, the Provisional Government is not in a position, as long as a state of war exists, to readmit the Arabs who fled from their homes on any substantial scale. The Palestinian Arab exodus of 1948 is one of those cataclysmic phenomena which, according to the experience of other countries, changed the course of history. It is too early to say exactly how and in what measure the exodus will affect the future of Israel and of the neighbouring territories. When the

Arab States are ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, this question will come up for constructive solution as part of the general settlement and with due regard to our counter-claim in respect of the destruction of Jewish life and property. The long-term interests of the Jewish and Arab populations; the stability of the State of Israel and the durability of the basis of peace between it and its neighbours; the actual position and fate of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries; the responsibility of the Arab Governments for their war of aggression and their liability for reparations, will all be relevant to the question of whether, to what extent and under what conditions the former Arab residents of the territory of Israel should be allowed to return. For such a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement the Provisional Government is ever ready, but it holds that it cannot in fairness be required to carry through unilateral and piecemeal measures of peace while the other side is bent on war.

I am, yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 105/32. נשלח: 3.8; התקבל: 4.8
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 1 August 1948

Reliably informed after my interview,[1] Truman discussed question our admission U.N. with Lovett and asked from Martin information on loan situation. /Reportedly/ he supported my requests on both issues.

Epstein

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1. ראה מס' 399.

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מ. שרתוק אל ה. גרץ[1] (פאריס)
M. Shertok to H. Graetz (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 22/66
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/23
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/170/12

Tel Aviv, 1 August 1948

Your 25/37.[2] Don't ask Tardini direct questions, but attempt in course general conversation elicit information: 1) What does Vatican consider its interests within boundaries State Israel and what does it expect from us regarding them? 2) What is source of Catholic anti-Israel news and propaganda emanating from Palestine? 3) Would Vatican oppose handing over Jerusalem to Arab rule as much as to Jewish? On no account state or even hint you been in contact with me.

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בישיבת מועצת־הביטחון, ב־2 באוגוסט, עורר נציג בריטניה את בעיית העקורים היהודיים באירופה ואת בעיית הפליטים הערבים. הוא הציע להפנות את תשומת־לבו של המתווך לבעיית הפליטים הערבים ולשגר משלחת של הצלב האדום כדי לבדוק את היקף הבעיה ואת הדרכים לסיוע. נציג ישראל השיב, שעניין הפליטים הערבים נדון במגעים בין ממשלת ישראל והמתווך, והודיע על כוונתו לעלות בקרוב במועצת־הביטחון את מצב העצורים היהודיים בקפריסין. נשיא מועצת־הביטחון סיכם את הדיון בקריאה לצדדים למסור מידע בנושאים שנדונו. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year,* 343rd Meeting, 2.8. 1948).

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1. היינץ גרץ, איש ספנות מישראל; באותה עת ניהל משא־ומתן מסחרי בצרפת מטעמה של ממשלת ישראל.
2. גרץ דיווח על שיחות שניהל בוואתיקן, שם מצא תמימות־דעים בדבר הצורך להעניק מעמד בינלאומי לירושלים. הוא ביקש הוראות לקראת שיחה נוספת עם דומניקו טארדיני, מזכיר־המדינה בפועל של הוואתיקן. (ראה מברקו אל שרתוק, 23.7.1948, 130.09/2329/23).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 625
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 2 August 1948

President was determined avoid discussion and Cadogan's manoeuvre refugees petered out.[1] President insist[ed] prior formal notice raise specific questions, and we have given notice asking special early meeting Cyprus question. Cadogan did not ask return Arab refugees but international assistance their relief wherever they are. Cadogan, despite Soviet challenge, refused vote his resolution five captives.[2] Clearly he had no majority either this or any refugee resolution. General conclusion British failure rally Council either issue.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 3 August 1948

Formally requested special meeting Cyprus today, President assented, will probably fix Friday. We feel should raise flagrant Arab violation truce with respect Jerusalem water,[1] which reported by Truce Commission to Council yesterday.[2] Mediator has already protested twice and Council ruled upholding him on our initiative. Believe can certainly obtain strong Council reaction which, if not heeded by Arabs, would at least create good opening direct action. Please cable.[3]

Eban

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1. ראה הערת־עורך לעיל וראה גם מס׳ 405.
2. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 422.

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1. ראה מס׳ 287. גם במשך ההפוגה השנייה לא חודשה אספקת המים לירושלים בצינור הישן, בגלל שיתוקה של תחנת־השאיבה בשטח ההפקר של לטרון.
2. ראה מס׳ 422 (סעיף g).
3. לא נמצאה תשובה של שרתוק, אך ראה מס׳ 422.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק

E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 106/55

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 3 August 1948

From a reliable source we learnt that Lovett, Dulles, Vandenberg, agreed that United States foreign policy, including Palestine, not be subject election controversy. Republican leaders also agreed to State Department action Palestine in consultation with British. Could not find out whether this done with Truman knowledge.

Effective joint policy both parties will make more difficult organize public pressure in support of our demand.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל ר. לווט (ואשינגטון)

E. Epstein to R. Lovett (Washington)

העתק: 130.20/2483/9

Washington, 3 August 1948

My dear Mr. Lovett,

My Government has instructed me to ascertain the precise status of its application for a credit of one hundred million dollars from the United States Export-Import Bank, in view of the somewhat conflicting information which I have found it necessary to transmit to Israel recently on this question.[1]

As you are aware, Israel's application for this loan was discussed first by Dr. Chaim Weizmann with President Truman on May 25th, 1948. President Truman at that time graciously assured Dr. Weizmann that there would be no difficulty in Israel's being granted a substantial loan by the United States Government, for constructive purposes.[2]

Subsequently, and pursuant to this general assurance, I and my Economic Adviser, Mr. Oscar Gass, had a series of discussions with the responsible economic officers of the Export-Import Bank and the Department of State. These discussions dealt with matters with which the appro-

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1. ראה מס' 394, 399.
2. ראה מס' 82.

priate officials of the United States Government were already largely familiar because they covered ground which had been dealt with during the preceding five months on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. All of the technical questions advanced by the staff of the Export-Import Bank had already received replies in the approximately twenty-five submissions made in response to Export-Import Bank inquiries. These submissions were brought up to date in a memorandum of June 2nd, 1948, which was communicated — like the previous submissions — both to the Export-Import Bank and to the Department of State.[3] We appreciate that there may be some technical questions outstanding such as can be settled in final negotiations; on the other hand, it is clear that the economic officers of the United States Government have received a relatively full picture of the way in which this credit application is designed to service Israel's general programme of resettlement and development.

On June 28th, 1948, you requested me to "...inform Mr. Shertok that the loan application of your Government has been received by the Export-Import Bank and that it is under active consideration by the Bank and by the Department." I conveyed this information to my Government.[4]

I was accordingly somewhat surprised to receive a letter from the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank dated July 26th, 1948, stating that "...reports reaching me do not appear to warrant at this time active consideration by the Export-Import Bank of the credit application filed with Bank...".[5] As our discussions have made clear, the concern of the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank related not to purely financial and economic considerations but rather to such general political and military reports as bear on peace and stability in Israel. However, during the month which intervened between your letter and that of the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, the chief military and political developments which occurred in Palestine were the further strengthening of the security of Israel and substantial progress toward the achievement of a permanent peace under the sanction of the United Nations. My Government is much concerned that this progress in the achievement of peace and stability in Palestine should be accompanied by a shift in the status of our loan application from one commanding active consideration to one not warranting active consideration.

The Provisional Government of Israel was strengthened in its expectation that the Government of the United States would be in a position very shortly to conclude a loan agreement with Israel by the encouragement which I received in the interview with which President Truman honoured me on July 29th, 1948. The President expressed his great interest in the resettlement of displaced persons in Israel and in the related economic development.

3. לא נמצא.

4. ההתכתבות הזאת לא נמצאה.

5. ראה מס' 394.

As you will appreciate, a loan of one hundred million dollars from the United States to Israel at this time could be most helpful in facilitating the next stage of our work of bringing displaced persons into Israel and affording them constructive, self-sustaining employment. The Provisional Government has been much heartened by recent evidence that both the Government of the United States and all sections of the American people are sympathetic with [the] accomplishment of these objectives. My Government is accordingly most interested in concluding these negotiations. Israel would be prepared to send its Minister of Finance to Washington to complete negotiations for a loan agreement as soon as the United States Government considers it advisable.

I would appreciate having your views on the status of this matter so that I can respond to the inquiry of my Government.[6]

Sincerely yours,

Eliahu Epstein
Special Representative

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מקור[1]: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 3 août 1948

J'ai été hier, en fin d'après-midi, au Quai d'Orsay, et l'information hautement confidentielle suivante m'a été donnée:

La ligne adoptée par le Quai d'Orsay est que la France doit s'acheminer, par étapes progressives, vers la reconnaissance de facto. Il est d'ores et déjà décidé que Vanthier[2] partira dans 3 ou 4 semaines pour Israël en mission extraordinaire. Il a été question de lui donner pour l'occasion le titre de Consul, mais je vais insister pour qu'une dénomination soit adoptée indiquant plus clairement sa qualité de Représentant diplomatique auprès du Gouvernement Provisoire d'Israël. Le but est de réaliser une équivalence avec la position que j'occupe de facto à Paris. Il est absolument nécessaire de tenir ceci très secret et surtout que les consuls et vice-consuls en Palestine ne connaissent rien de ces intentions.

[.....][3]

M.F.

6. ממחלקת־המדינה לא ענו על המכתב ואף לא אישרו את קבלתו — ראה מס' 482.

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1. תוספת למכתב מיום 2.8.1948 (לא הודפס כאן).
2. אלברט ואנטייה, הממונה על ענייני ארץ־ישראל במשרד־החוץ הצרפתי. החל מנובמבר 1948 — קונסול צרפת בתל אביב.
3. הפיסקה האחרונה לא הודפסה כאן.

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מ. שרתוק אל ו. אוריול (פאריס)

M. Shertok to V. Auriol (Paris)

העתק: 130.02/2382/12

Tel Aviv, le 3 août 1948

Monsieur le Président,

Je suis heureux de pouvoir profiter de l'amabilité de Madame René Mayer, qui va rentrer en France,[1] pour vous transmettre, d'une façon tout à fait privée, les sentiments les plus cordiaux de mon gouvernement et de moi-même.

Madame Mayer vous dira — [en] ayant été témoin — à quel degré de stabilisation intérieure et d'ordre administratif l'Etat d'Israël est parvenu, dans la courte période de son existence, et cela en dépit des difficultés qu'il avait à surmonter. Elle pourra aussi vous donner les impressions de première main en ce qui concerne le moral et le courage de nos troupes.

J'ai demandé à Madame Mayer d'une façon toute particulière de vous transmettre les sentiments de vif regret, répandus dans tous les cercles de notre société, du fait que l'Etat d'Israël n'a pas été jusqu'à maintenant reconnu par la France. Ce désappointement, je suis heureux de le dire, n'a pas porté atteinte à l'amitié et à l'admiration que les Juifs de Palestine ont toujours ressenties envers la France, sentiments qui ont été rehaussés par la dette de gratitude qu'ils doivent au gouvernement français pour l'aide qu'il leur a montrée récemment. C'est justement parce que nos sentiments pour la France sont si profonds et que votre pays tient dans notre estime une place si importante, aussi bien en politique contemporaine que dans l'histoire, que nous ressentons si vivement son absence parmi les Etats qui ont reconnu Israël et qui sont en train d'établir avec nous des relations diplomatiques normales.

En effet, ce n'est pas simplement à votre sens de justice que nous faisons actuellement appel, mais c'est plutôt à votre sens des réalités. Nous comprenons qu'en accordant sa reconnaissance à Israël la France a à prendre en considération certaines susceptibilités. Cependant, nous ne pouvons concevoir que ces susceptibilités triomphent sur la reconnaissance de ce qui est un fait accompli. Cela ne doit pas dépasser les talents de la diplomatie française que de mettre la question de la reconnaissance sur une base purement pratique, éliminant, comme cela paraîtrait, toute préférence sentimentale.

Etant donné les circonstances actuelles, la France ne montrerait pas une

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1. רעיתו של שר־ההגנה הצרפתי, רנה מאייר, ביקרה בישראל בחודש יולי.

sympathie particulière au peuple juif quand elle reconnaîtra Israël. Elle enregistrerait simplement un changement qui s'est produit dans la structure politique du Moyen-Orient, auquel, en tant que Grande Puissance avec des intérêts traditionnels dans cette partie du monde, elle ne peut rester indifférente. On pourrait aussi souligner que le vacuum politique résultant de la non-reconnaissance de la France, suivi d'une attitude de passivité de la part d'autres Puissances de l'Europe occidentale qui en général voient dans la France leur guide, n'est en aucun cas dans les intérêts du monde occidental.

Rattachée à la question de la reconnaissance, mais ne dépendant nullement d'elle, la question de l'appui de la France pour notre admission à l'O.N.U. se pose. Cette aide ne serait que la conclusion logique de l'attitude antérieure de la France sur la question de la Palestine, exprimée par le vote de la Délégation Française à Lake Success, en novembre dernier, en faveur du plan de partage. Ce plan, comme vous le savez sans doute, stipule expressément l'admission de l'Etat Juif comme membre de l'O.N.U., admission qui n'est pas contingente à l'établissement de l'Etat Arabe.

En ce qui concerne notre avenir, notre principale préoccupation est la paix avec le monde arabe. Objectivement, les éléments d'une paix durable, quoique obscurcis pour le moment par l'état persistant de guerre, sont inhérents à la situation présente. Je m'en réfère à l'égalité du statut qui a été créé entre nous et nos voisins. Plus vite ils reconnaîtront ce fait fondamental, plus facilement et plus rapidement une paix stable s'établira. Chaque étape additionnelle de la procédure de notre intégration dans la famille des nations nous rapproche de ce but, et je suis convaincu que par la reconnaissance d'Israël et son admission à l'O.N.U. la France apportera une contribution très importante à la paix en Terre Sainte.

N'ayant pas le privilège de vous connaître personnellement, j'ai été cependant encouragé par votre sympathie bien connue pour notre cause à vous présenter ce bref exposé du problème de nos relations avec la France dans la conjoncture présente. Nous sommes un peuple ancien, bien habitué à attendre. Mais il y a des moments dans l'histoire quand les événements se déroulent rapidement, et je crois que dans l'intérêt de toutes les parties concernées la reconnaissance par la France ne devrait pas trop tarder.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération et de mes sentiments entièrement dévoués.

Moshé Shertok

Ministre des Affaires étrangères

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שיחת מ. פישר — פ. קארוני (בפאריס, ב־3 באוגוסט 1948)
Meeting: M. Fischer — P. Quaroni (Paris, 3 August 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.10/2316/9

Le 3 août 1948[1]

J'ai fait une visite de courtoisie à l'ambassade d'Italie et, parmi les questions qui ont été soulevées au cours d'un très long et cordial entretien, je relève les points intéressants suivants:

1. Les gouvernements français et italien se sont mis d'accord pour que la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël soit faite simultanément.

2. La France a donné à l'Italie des assurances formelles qu'elle la soutiendrait jusqu'au bout dans ses revendications concernant la Libye. Toutefois les Italiens ne croient pas que la France aura le courage d'aller seule jusqu'à la fin contre les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre et avec l'U.R.S.S.[2] C'est pourquoi les Italiens attachent la plus haute importance à l'attitude que prendra Washington, mais ils sont persuadés que le State Department reste, dans sa grande majorité, pro-arabe.

L'ambassadeur m'a dit qu'il espérait que nous pourrions user de notre influence aux Etats-Unis dans cette question. Le gouvernement italien préférerait, s'il y a des doutes qu'à la session prochaine de l'O.N.U. la question soit résolue dans un sens favorable, qu'elle soit remise à l'année prochaine.

3. Le gouvernement italien a décidé d'envoyer un représentant en Israël. D'après l'ambassadeur, si l'Italie ne reconnaît pas l'Etat d'Israël, c'est uniquement par manque de courage d'aller à l'encontre des Anglo-Saxons. Il suffirait d'une légère indication de Washington à l'Italie pour que celle-ci nous reconnaisse.

4. J'ai appris de l'ambassadeur qu'il était indispensable que nous ayons deux représentants à Rome. En effet, le Vatican a pour principe de ne pas admettre que la même personne soit désignée pour les relations avec le gouvernement italien et avec le Vatican.

L'ambassadeur conseille que notre représentant auprès du gouvernement italien soit un Israélien (d'origine italienne, par exemple) mais il trouve qu'il serait parfaitement convenable que notre représentant auprès du Vatican soit un Juif italien, résidant à Rome.

5. L'ambassadeur a attiré mon attention sur le fait que le gouvernement

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1. מצורף למכתב פישר אל הירש מיום 4.8.1948.
2. גורלן של המושבות האיטלקיות לשעבר באפריקה נדון על־ידי המעצמות בשנים 1947־1948. עמדתה של ברית־המועצות היתה הנוחה ביותר לאיטלקים: היא דרשה להעמיד את המושבות תחת נאמנות האו״ם ולמנות את איטליה כנאמן. ב־1949 הועבר העניין להכרעת האו״ם.

italien était aujourd'hui très influencé par les prises de position politiques du Vatican.

6. Enfin l'ambassadeur m'a dit qu'il avait déjà recommandé à son gouvernement la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël et qu'il le ferait de nouveau en rendant compte de ma visite.

M. Quaroni connaît très bien l'Afghanistan et l'Iran et se considère — à raison je crois — comme très versé dans les questions musulmanes.

Quand j'ai remercié l'ambassadeur pour l'initiative qu'il avait prise en mon absence de délivrer des visas à des Palestiniens, sur lettre de recommandation de M. Najar, il m'a assuré que son geste avait été immédiatement approuvé par le gouvernement.

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

בתחילת יולי 1948 יצא אליהו ששון, מנהל מחלקת המזרח התיכון במשרד־החוץ, לפאריס כדי ליצור קשר ישיר עם נציגים רשמיים ולא־רשמיים של המדינות הערביות, במטרה להגיע לידי ישוב הסכסוך הישראלי־ערבי. עם חבר העוזרים שנתלווה אל ששון נמנו זלמן (זיאמה) זליקסון (שמואל דיבון) וטוביה ארזי. (ראה ששון אל שמעוני, 30.6.1948, 130.15/3749/1).

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א. ששון אל י. שמעוני
E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni

מברק מוצפן 2/85, 3/9. התקבל: 4.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 3 August 1948

First discussion with Transjordan minister in London, Abdul Majid, lasted 4 hours.[1] Full report sent you.[2] Second discussion fixed for Wednesday. Matter seems to be serious. British probably know about talk. Majid requests among other things, answer: 1) our final aim, 2) our attitude Bernadotte, 3) attitude Arab refugees, 4) attitude towards annexation Arab Palestine. Majid will send typewritten but unsigned reply to king. I can give noncommittal answer. Awaiting urgently reaction and instruction Shertok.[3]

Sasson

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1. לדברי ששון, הגיע השגריר עבד אל־מג׳יד היידר לפאריס בשליחותו של המלך עבדאללה כדי ״להחליף דעות אתי ולבדוק את האפשרויות להבנה.״ (ראה מברק קודם של ששון אל שמעוני, 3.8.1948, 130.09/2329/23).
2. לא נמצא.
3. ראה מס׳ 428.

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א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (לייק סאכסס)

A. Eban to the President of the Security Council (Lake Success)

העתק משוכפל: 93.08/377/8

New York, 4 August 1948

Sir,

At its 320th meeting, on 15 June 1948, the Security Council accepted the ruling (S/P.V. 320, pp. 17-20) that questions relating to the interpretation of the truce resolution could, if not otherwise settled, be referred by either of the parties to the Security Council.[1]

I accordingly have the honour to request, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, that the Security Council discuss the detention by the United Kingdom Government on the island of Cyprus of 11,000 Jews for whom the Provisional Government of Israel has granted permission to immigrate to Israel. It is clear from British Parliamentary reports (*House of Commons,* July 28, p. 1323) that the Government of the United Kingdom invokes the Security Council's truce resolution and the Mediator's authority in an attempt to justify these detentions.

The facts, however, are:

1. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on May 29 contains no injunction or appeal to prevent the immigration of men into the countries of the Near East on the grounds that they are of military age. Indeed, the only reference in that resolution to men of military age refers to their entry, not to their exclusion, still less to their forceful detention in Cyprus.

2. The fact that the relevant paragraph of the Security Council's resolution does not require the exclusion of men of military age was categorically stated by the representative who drafted that paragraph in the form of an amendment which was subsequently adopted (see Annex to this letter, para. 2, 3).[2]

3. It is true that during the first truce which terminated on July 9, an agreement operated according to which the Mediator could use his discretion if the number of immigrants of military age appeared to him to assume unduly large proportions. This agreement, however, has no relevance to the United Kingdom's action, since the Mediator has declared that he has never applied his discretion in this case. He has further confirmed that "the wholesale detention of these men in Cyprus has never been recommended or requested by the Mediator as essential for the observance of the truce."

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1. ראה SCOR, Third Year, 320th Meeting, 15.6.1948, pp. 5-6. מראה־המקום בתעודה מתייחס לפרוטוקול הזמני של מועצת־הביטחון.
2. הנספח לא הודפס כאן. הצעת התיקון הצרפתית — ראה מס׳ 260 והערה 3 שם.

(S/P.V. 333, pp. 47-50.)[3] In any case, it is clear that an agreement affecting the inclusion of "large numbers of men of military age" amongst immigrants to Israel cannot be invoked to justify a practice of allowing no men of military age to be so included. Moreover, whatever may have been the position at that time, the only instruments at present governing the truce, in the view of the Provisional Government of Israel, are the resolutions of May 29 and of July 15, neither of which contains a single word justifying the exclusion of any body of civilian immigrants on the grounds of their age composition.

4. The view that the Cyprus ban has no basis in the truce resolution is supported by the following interpretation given by the Mediator to the Security Council:

> My interpretation was that the resolution (of May 29) did not prohibit immigration *nor did it appear to place any complete or positive ban on the inclusion of men of military age in such immigration.* (S/888, para. 10)[4]

Despite this clear statement, the United Kingdom Government continues to place "a complete and positive ban on the inclusion of men of military age in immigration" from Cyprus. More astonishing still, Mr. Rees-Williams,[5] on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, found himself able on July 28 to inform the House of Commons that in placing this complete and positive ban on the inclusion of men of military age in immigration from Cyprus, his Government was "carrying out the opinion of the Mediator in this matter." In advancing this view, Mr. Rees-Williams omitted the above quoted paragraph of the Mediator's ruling and withheld any reference to the Mediator's confirmation of the fact that these detentions are "an act of the United Kingdom authorities on the island of Cyprus and of them alone." (S/P.V. 333, pp. 47-50)[6]

It is clear to the Provisional Government of Israel that the truce resolution can be violated not merely by neglecting to apply its restrictive provisions, but also by forcibly withholding such liberties and opportunities as it legitimately confers. Member States who arrogate to themselves a right of discretion not conferred upon them by the Security Council and not based on a strict reading of its resolution, may reasonably be deemed to be violating that resolution.

The detention of these people in Cyprus is a denial of fundamental human rights. We have the extraordinary spectacle of a government holding in indefinite captivity 7,500 men and 3,500 members of their families without any judicial process of charge or trial. Indeed, the United Kingdom

3. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 333rd Meeting, 13.7.1948, p. 18.
4. המובאה מתוך הדין־וחשבון של המתווך למועצת־הביטחון, 12.7.1948, מסמך או"ם S/888.
5. דייוויד ריז־ויליאמס, סגן שר־המושבות.
6. ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 333rd Meeting, 13.7.1948, p. 18.

representative has persistently declined, despite frequent challenge in the Security Council, to specify the offence against any existing law on the strength of which these people are held captive and denied liberty of movement.

The Provisional Government of Israel assumes that all members of the Security Council will also be aware of the deep humanitarian issues which are involved in this case. I attach as an Annex to this letter certain references which may assist members of the Security Council in their study of the problem.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Sincerely yours,

Aubrey S. Eban
Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel

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שיחות י. לינטון — ג׳יימס מקדונלד (בלונדון, ב־30 ביולי וב־4 באוגוסט 1948)
Meetings: I.J. Linton — James McDonald
(London, 30 July and 4 August 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.04/37/12

London, 4 August 1948

Secret

I met Mr. McDonald at Waterloo Station on his arrival on Friday morning, the 30th July, and arranged to meet him the same evening for a talk.

Mr. McDonald told me that he had seen the American Ambassador, Mr. Douglas, that afternoon, and that he hoped that it would be possible to arrange an interview for him with Mr. Bevin. (Mr. McDonald telephoned me later that evening to say that his appointment with Mr. Bevin must be kept strictly confidential, as any leakage would probably prevent it from coming off.)

Mr. McDonald said that possibly our people in Tel Aviv might feel that he had been dilly-dallying, and that he should have gone to Israel immediately after his appointment. He had, however, thought it best to stay a little while in America to study the situation in Washington and become acquainted with the people to whom he would have to report. The results, he said, had been worth-while. He showed me a letter from President Truman, couched in friendly terms in which the President asked him, in addition to the reports which he would be making to the State Department, to report to him also directly. The President charged him to look particularly into the following problems:

1) The lifting of the arms embargo.

2) Timing of de jure recognition.

3) Economic and other assistance. (I am quoting from memory as I only had an opportunity of reading the letter hastily.)[1]

Mr. McDonald told me that Mr. Marshall had originally been opposed to his appointment, but he felt that he was now on a friendly footing with him, and had won his confidence. He had also, although not to the same degree, established friendly relations with Mr. Lovett.

Mr. McDonald thought that it would be very useful for him to see the Pope *en route* to Tel Aviv. He proposed to go to Switzerland to see Dr. Weizmann, then to Rome, and to Tel Aviv by air via Athens. He asked me to explain to Mr. Shertok why he had delayed his journey to Tel Aviv, and what had been achieved as a result of the delay.

Mr. McDonald then asked me what the situation was in London and I briefly reviewed the position for him. He then asked whether I had any special points to suggest for his interview with Mr. Bevin. I said that I had heard of a conversation which Mr. Bevin recently had with an American Jew, in which Mr. Bevin was reported to have spoken angrily about America, and to have complained that the President was responsible for the trouble in Palestine. He had also spoken of the rising tide of anti-semitism in England, and had declared that he had no intention of recognising Israel. I suggested that Mr. McDonald might consider stressing the following points in his talk with Mr. Bevin.

1. That President Truman had a genuine interest in the settlement of the Palestine problem, and that he would not permit as far as lay in his power, that anything should be done to destroy the State of Israel, which he had recognised a few minutes after its establishment. Further, that the President was opposed to any infringement of its sovereignty, or to any diminution of its territory.

2. That the arms embargo would be lifted if the Arabs were to resume hostilities.

3. That sympathy for Zionist aspirations and for the new State was not limited to Jews, but was widespread amongst the general population of the United States.

4. That a Republican victory in November would not mean a change in American policy.

5. That British policy in regard to Palestine created friction in Anglo-American relations.

6. That a renewal of fighting in Palestine would place Great Britain before a dilemma, and would increase Anglo-American friction.

7. That peace in Palestine would come when the Arabs faced realities, and recognised that the State of Israel could not be wished away or fought away.

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1. ראה מס' 366 והערה 3 שם.

8. That withholding of recognition by Great Britain was an encouragement to the Arabs to continue their hopeless struggle to wipe out Israel.

9. That it was as much in the interests of Great Britain, as in the interests of peace in the Middle East and of Anglo-American relations, that Britain should give recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel as quickly as possible.

Mr. McDonald saw Mr. Bevin on Tuesday afternoon, and this morning he told me that he had been accompanied by the American Ambassador, Mr. Douglas, and Mr. Lewis Jones. The interview had been a short one, and Mr. Bevin had spoken practically the whole time. Mr. Douglas had hardly an opportunity of telling Mr. Bevin what Mr. McDonald's mission was. Mr. Bevin had been explosive, bitter and full of accusations. He had referred to the shooting of British soldiers, to the fact that five British civilians had been kidnapped by an illegal organisation, and that the Government of Israel was taking advantage of this illegal act to stage a trial of persons who had been taken in territory which was not under its jurisdiction. At one stage Mr. McDonald had referred to the pledge which Mr. Bevin had given to the Anglo-American Enquiry Committee, and had said that perhaps that pledge was not as unqualified as Mr. Bartley Crum had made out.[2] Mr. Bevin interrupted by saying that he had given a definite pledge, and that he had kept his word, because he had accepted all the ten recommendations of the Report, whereas America had picked out only one of the recommendations for acceptance.[3] At another stage, Mr. McDonald had said that he had hoped that he would have a British colleague in Tel Aviv with whom he would be able from time to time to talk things over. Mr. Bevin had interjected sharply "I cannot say anything about that." Mr. Douglas had not intervened even when Mr. Bevin had made accusations against America.

Mr. McDonald said that in the face of Mr. Bevin's outburst, he had not been able to make any of the points which he had prepared. He thought, however, that the interview had been useful, because it had given him an insight into the atmosphere of the Foreign Office.[4]

Mr. McDonald had not been able to see Mr. McNeil (who is in Geneva) and Mr. Michael Wright[5] (who is on leave) but he managed to have a talk (in the presence of Mr. Lewis Jones) with Mr. Burrows, the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and had made the points which he had hoped to place before Mr. Bevin. He had asked Mr. Burrows with what British representative he should keep in touch in Palestine, in case he

2. לדברי קראם, חבר ועדת־החקירה האנגלו-אמריקאית של 1946, הבטיח בווין לקבל את המלצות ועדת־החקירה. (ראה Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain*, p. 61).
3. את ההמלצה להתיר כניסתם של 100,000 יהודים לארץ־ישראל.
4. על פרטי הראיון עם בווין, ראה James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, pp. 23-26.
5. מייקל רייט, עוזר המנהל הכללי במשרד־החוץ הבריטי.

had something to convey to His Majesty's Government. Mr. Burrows had replied that they had no representative in Tel Aviv, but that Mr. Marriott was acting as Consul-General in Haifa.

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א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין
O. Gass to P. Bernstein

מברק 222
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/129/11

Washington, 4 August 1948

Thanks your two messages.[1] Agree your views. State Department lays great emphasis meeting Mediator Haifa, August fifth.[2] If Mediator meeting does not result immediate prospect reopening Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, State [Department] concedes immediate necessity restoration tanker flow crude or, as second best, tanker flow refined products. [Department of] State's concession, however, does not amount to commitment to achieve this flow of crude or refined. State [Department] inquired Israel's minimum monthly requirements refined products by individual types. I agreed to inquire whether you could furnish this information. Could not elicit firm promise from State Department to assure supply these minimum essential requirements. State [Department] emphasized necessity concurrence oil companies, and would only promise to try and asked for further discussions.

Gass

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן NI-3/154. התקבל: 6.8
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 5 August 1948 (21.10)

In long conversation Sobolev revealed 1) Mediator's request Jerusalem force with heavy equipment encountering solid resistance United States, France, Belgium and Secretariat; he would almost certainly have to modify

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1. ראה מס' 404; מס' 401 הערה 1.
2. ראה מס' 424. הפגישה התקיימה במשרד־החוץ בתל־אביב.

demands, opinion definitely favours primary Jewish, Arab, responsibility in respective areas, provided Governments accept responsibility Dissident activities. 2) Mediator has not thought at present formulate political suggestions, but will concentrate secondary matters; doubtful even if will report Assembly. Confirms this from his talk Bunche. 3) Our application admission should be filed whenever we think likely acceptance, need not trouble with date-lines or time-limits, this can be settled any time before end Assembly.

In brief talk later, Bunche informed Gideon [Rafael], myself, Mediator's plans are as indicated by Sobolev. May 14th resolution[1] doesn't require Mediator's report Assembly. Confidentially said plan was set up smoke-screen of activity secondary issues while position crystallized further. Wished could have little cooperation Tel Aviv, probably meaning gesture refugees. Will meet him again after his trip Washington.[2]

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to Mr. Shertok

מברק מוצפן X143. התקבל: 6.8
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 5 August 1948 (17.16)

In conversation today, Ross reiterated United States desire see Israel in United Nations, but also, for third time, stressed that entry Transjordan would render this much less difficult. Hinted we might explore Soviet reaction. Myself unwilling do this since it might prejudice our relationship, leading no results. Suggest inform Golda [Meyerson].

Eban

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1. החלטת העצרת המיוחדת בעניין מינוי המתווך — ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך בעמ׳ 786־787.
2. במברק נוסף הודיע אבן, שלדברי באנץ׳ זנח המתווך את הרעיון של מסירת ירושלים לידי הערבים. (אבן אל שרתוק, 6.8.1948, 93.01/2180/22).

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א. אבן אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (לייק סאכסס)

A. Eban to the President of the Security Council (Lake Success)

העתק: 93.03/94/6

[New York], 5 August 1948

Sir,

1. I am instructed by the Provisional Government of Israel to address you regarding the water supply for Jerusalem, and to request that this matter receive the urgent consideration of the Security Council.[1]

2. The salient facts are:

a. The main source of water supply for Jerusalem is at Ras-el-Ain on the coastal plain, from where the water is pumped to the city through a pipeline.

b. As a result of Arab action, the supply was cut on May 10.

c. Under the truce which came into operation on June 11, by virtue of the Security Council Resolution of May 29, the Mediator ruled that the water supply was to be resumed under United Nations control, as the truce would otherwise work to the military advantage of the Arabs (see Mediator's Report, S/888, para. 12).
The water source at Ras-el-Ain, and part of the pipeline, were at that time under the control of Iraqi and Arab Legion forces.

d. On July 7, when the prolongation of the truce was under discussion, the Mediator reported to the Security Council that despite repeated representations, no water had been permitted to flow into Jerusalem during the period of the truce. Describing this as one aspect of the truce which had been entirely unsatisfactory and required strong expression of Security Council views, he added: "I have informed the Prime Minister of Transjordan that this situation is in clear violation of the terms of the truce since the situation of the population of that city at the end of the truce will inevitably be worse than when it began, as the population has been using up its water reserves. The Arab authorities have never formally refused to permit water to flow through pipes under their control, but continued delay in reaching a decision has had the same effect." (S/869, dated July 7)

e. On July 7 the Security Council adopted a resolution appealing to the interested parties to accept a prolongation of the truce, and the President made the following ruling: "I consider that, by virtue of the resolution which was adopted today, it is incumbent upon the Media-

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1. ראה מס' 410.

tor to take measures regarding the supply of water to the population of Jerusalem." (S/P.V. 331, p. 106)

f. On July 13 the Mediator made the following verbal statement to the Security Council: "Unfortunately, the water supply question of Jerusalem had not been fully solved when I left Palestine last Saturday, owing to the delay — and the very unfortunate delay — of certain Arab Governments in arranging for the water supply of Jerusalem which, in my opinion, was in the spirit of the terms of the truce agreement." (S/P.V. 333, p.6)

g. On August 2 the Chairman of the Truce Commission informed the Security Council that the Government of Transjordan had refused to allow water and foodstuffs to reach Jerusalem, and warned of the serious consequences that might result — in particular, that it might lead to a Jewish attack upon the Arab positions in the Latrun sector. (S/938)

3. This recital of the relevant facts establishes that the Security Council is here confronted not with any isolated or sporadic incidents in the field, but with a calculated violation of the truce by Arab Governments — a violation which has been uninterruptedly maintained so far throughout both periods of the truce. The motive is transparent: by depriving the Jewish inhabitants of water for a prolonged period, during the hot and rainless summer months, it is hoped that they will be brought to such a pitch of suffering that their endurance will be broken and they will be forced to capitulate to the Arab aggressors who have been unable to subdue the city by direct assault.

The Arab Governments concerned have up till now been able to pursue this course with impunity, but it will be appreciated that the situation cannot be indefinitely tolerated by the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem, and by the Provisional Government of Israel, which bears the responsibility for their welfare and protection. To avert a complete breakdown of the truce as a result of this violation (amongst others), the Provisional Government of Israel is of opinion that immediate action by the Security Council is essential. Since the violation of the truce has at various times been certified and emphasized by the Mediator, by the Truce Commission, and by the Security Council itself, the way would appear to be clear for the Council to take appropriate action.

Yours truly,

Aubrey S. Eban

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ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק
L. Kohn to M. Shertok

העתק: 130.02/2444/19

[Tel Aviv], 5 August 1948

As I don't know what transpired during the talks of Bernadotte in the Arab capitals and in Jerusalem, I cannot visualise what exactly he is going to talk to us about this afternoon. It may be that he will just repeat his previous pleas with new arguments or with new force. Perhaps he may tell us about his changed plans during the coming weeks. It seems to me, however, that the initiative in all these talks has throughout been with the other side. The Arabs press him on demilitarisation, Arab refugees, immigration, etc., and he transmits that pressure to us. It may be that we have no longer any use for Bernadotte at all, but he is still there, and he seems to be kept in being not only by the British but also by the Americans and the French. I am particularly disturbed about the Americans taking up the Arab refugee stunt. There may be more behind this than meets the eye. It is conceivable that the American ambassadors in the Arab countries, none of whom are friendly to us, are warning the State Department that these pauperised, embittered refugees may become a ferment of revolution — i.e. communist revolution — in the neighbouring Arab countries and that they should therefore be brought back to Palestine.

I am therefore suggesting that we might perhaps make a definite move on our side and officially propose to Bernadotte this afternoon that he should convene an official conference of representatives of the State of Israel and of the Arab States to meet on the 15th of August in Rhodes or elsewhere. The conference should be on his initiative but not under his chairmanship. The meeting should be held alternatively under Jewish and Arab chairmen. This official proposal we should motivate to Bernadote somewhat as follows:

We are at the present moment in a strong position, politically and militarily, and we are every day entrenching ourselves further, so that we have nothing to lose by a prolongation of the present state of affairs. But we are conscious that the situation is playing havoc with the Arab governments, and we are not inclined to take the short-sighted view that their discomfort is necessarily a blessing for us. We know we have to live with them, and we are not interested in pushing them into the abyss of internal struggles. We are in fact prepared to help them build for themselves a golden bridge to withdraw from the impasse into which they have manoeuvred themselves by their military adventures and conceit. We are

not laying down any preliminary conditions. They can raise in such a conference anything they like — Arab refugees, territorial claims, financial and economic problems, etc. We are definitely willing to meet them, to bring about a stabilisation of the position in the Middle East.

Such a move, on our part will, I think, first of all have the effect of putting the Arabs on the defence. The last move in this direction, to which you referred a few days ago, was the letter of Elias to Azzam Pasha,[1] but this was at the beginning of December. If the Arabs reject this proposal, we shall have gained something *vis-à-vis* the United Nations. The fact that we are basing our proposals on our concern for the stabilisation of conditions in the Middle East will look well with the Americans and may be used against Bevin.

In this connection I would like to bring to your notice that a few days ago Sheringham called again here and saw me in the presence of Rows[on].[2] The conversation was random, but indicated clearly that at least he realises that the British have to make a move and change their present sulky attitude. He said — most emphatically off the record — that to him it was clear that the Arab refugees could not return to Israel. He suggested that it might be a good thing for us to propose buying up the land of the Arabs who have left Palestine and placing the money in bulk at the disposal of a Settlement Agency which would place them elsewhere. He suggested settlement *en bloc* in Transjordan. There may be good reason for not doing exactly this, but the idea as a whole has something to recommend it, and the fact that it comes from this quarter is significant.

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1. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 14.
2. שבתאי ראוסון (רוזן), היועץ המשפטי של משרד־החוץ.

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שיחת מ. שרתוק ואנשי משרד־החוץ עם הרוזן ברנאדוט ועוזריו (בתל אביב, ב־5 באוגוסט 1948)

Meeting: M. Shertok and Members of the Staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with Count Bernadotte and Assistants (Tel Aviv, 5 August 1948)

פרוטוקול: 130.02/2426/5

NOTES OF A CONVERSATION WITH COUNT BERNADOTTE ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 5TH, AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Present: Count Folke Bernadotte
General Lundstrom
Messrs. J.N. Reedman
M. Vigier
Stavropoulos
Mohn
Sir Raphael Cilento
George Barnes
. . .
Mr. M. Shertok
Dr. B. Joseph
Dr. W. Eytan
Dr. L. Kohn
Mr. R. Shiloah

COUNT BERNADOTTE: I have here an agenda. The first question is an important one, extremely important, and it would be good if any misunderstandings or differences of opinion might be discussed. When I saw Dr. Joseph in Jerusalem on Tuesday, I had heard the night before on the radio from a Tel Aviv station, where you, Mr. Shertok, were quoted as saying that if the fighting in the Negev did not stop, the Israeli troops had the right to attack Egyptian troops, not only there, but even in other places. I am not, of course, quoting word for word.[1]

I got a little worried, I must admit, because when I was at Lake Success and the Resolution of the 15th July was adopted by the Security Council, we had talks with members of the Security Council about the spirit and

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1. שרתוק אמר את הדברים במסיבת־עיתונאים בתל־אביב, ב־2 באוגוסט, בתגובה על תפיסת ביר־עסלוג׳ על־ידי המצרים לאחר התחלת ההפוגה. שרתוק סיפר שהוא הודיע לראש משקיפי האו״ם בחיפה, שאם הפרה זו לא תיפסק, ״נהיה חופשיים לנקוט פעולה חריפה לא רק בביר־עסלוג׳ אלא נגד כל עמדה מצרית שנבחר בה.״ (ראה ״דבר״, 3.8.1948).

meaning of this Resolution, and we came to the decision that there is a difference between an order to a truce and an agreement of truce. If one party starts fighting, the other party is not automatically allowed to start the war again against that party. As I said to Dr. Joseph, it is only human to say that if I am shot at, I will shoot back — that is one thing if it is for self-defence; but to start an organised offensive I feel is absolutely not in accordance with the Resolution of the 15th July.

May I hand you this paper. In this paper I have set out my thoughts regarding this matter, which are not only my thoughts, but those of members of the Security Council. These are instructions which we will give to the observers.

MR. SHERTOK here took the paper from Count Bernadotte and read out the following:

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE OBSERVANCE OF THE TRUCE

1. According to the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on 15th July "subject to further decision by the Security Council, or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force . . . until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached." No party may unilaterally put an end to the truce.

2. No party may take the law into its own hands and decree that it is relieved of its obligations under the Resolution of the Security Council because in its opinion the other party has violated the truce. The latter is not an agreed truce negotiated by the parties and which may be terminated as stipulated by them or according to certain rules. The Security Council, having determined "that the situation in Palestine constitutes a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter," has ordered the truce as a provisional measure pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation. According to Article 39, the Security Council shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40 makes it clear that the Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. On these premises it is obvious that only the Security Council is competent to decide what measures should be taken against the violator of the truce, and that should either party resume hostilities under any circumstances, it would act against the decision of the Security Council.

3. The Resolution of the Security Council, besides ordering the truce, entrusted the supervision of its observance to the Mediator, who is instructed to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce. Such procedures are intended to prevent

breaches of the truce and, should they occur, to facilitate appropriate action.

4. If one party finds itself under unprovoked attack, it should limit its self-defence to operations necessary to repulse such attack pending action by U.N. Observers. Such Observers shall recall to the parties concerned the terms of the truce. Any refusal to comply with these terms, particularly by refusing to issue a cease-fire order or to take the necessary measures indicated by the Observers for putting an end to the breach of the truce, shall be reported by the Observers. Whatever the result of operations undertaken in self-defence, the *status quo ante* shall be restored.

5. On the basis of the reports of the Observers the Mediator either shall take such appropriate action as is within his capacity or shall inform the Security Council in order that the Security Council may take any action required under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Signed: F. Bernadotte
August 5, 1948

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Would you like to hear my comment on this point? This may call for a little further consideration to give you our mature judgment on this very important issue, but these are my off-hand comments. I quite understand and appreciate your point of view, and it is not for me to say it, but I am prepared to say it is a perfectly legitimate point of view. However, it strikes me as being rather theoretical, and I do not know to what extent it would place us in a tenable position if we were strictly to adhere to the limitations which you have outlined. It is all very well for the Security Council to convene at the time which it may deem appropriate and proceed to take measures, but it is unrealistic to assume that in the meantime the situation in Palestine will be crystallised and wait for the Security Council decision. It may and it may not. If there is a breach of the truce and one party takes the law into its own hands, the situation may not remain crystallised. It may get out of hand. However well-meaning and honest the assurance of a remedy by the Security Council may be, it may in effect prove to be a purely academic assurance.

What we are faced with here is not just an ordinary breaking of the law and isolated attacks here and there. We have had such things in Palestine in years gone by when we had attacks on life and property and we met them by way of self-defence, and our action was always provoked by and directed against the attack with which we were immediately concerned, and we used to set our faces against any retaliation. Because settlement A was attacked by village B, therefore settlement C should retaliate against village D was never our policy. But what we face today is not an ordinary outbreak of lawlessness but a regular war situation. There are armies in this war, and

fronts, and to accept this thesis would mean for us to accept a situation in which the enemy would have the initiative of breaking the truce against which we would not be able to take any effective action. The enemy may move up its troops from various parts of the front and concentrate a superior force against us, and by way of breaking the truce overwhelm us in that particular sector of the front, so that even our self-defence would be of no avail unless the enemy knew we may attack him elsewhere. Assuming that the Egyptians are bent on breaking the truce, they will know they can do it with impunity. If they concentrate a large force against Asluj, they can overpower our defences there, and at the same time our forces on other sectors will not be able to do anything and the Egyptians will know it. That would bring us very nearly to losing the war against the Egyptians because of a one-sided latitude which they would enjoy, and the one-sided limitation accepted by ourselves. We do not know what view the Security Council will take. The incident may call for investigation, and even if the Security Council takes the right decision from our point of view, it would take time to implement it. In the meantime, the dice would be loaded heavily against us. I would rather suggest the following formulation of the position. Peace is indivisible, war is indivisible, truce is indivisible. If there is no truce at a certain sector, then there is no truce on that whole front. We might even go further and say that as all these Governments have combined in a joint adventure, there is some joint responsibility applying to all they do, and if we are attacked on one front, we may retaliate on other fronts. We may have to take up such a position if things become more serious, and if it really becomes a confusing question whether we are in a state of war or truce, as it is now the question on the southern front. The truce has made some difference there, but only in degree, not in kind. If we limit ourselves to mere counter-attack by way of self-defence, we stand to lose, and I am sure you do not want us to lose in that sense because the other party takes undue advantage of the position, but that would actually be the effect of such a policy.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: On the other side, if we follow your principle (I realise it is your first reaction), then let us say that the Arabs have said the Jews broke the truce in the north and so they have the right to attack, and as there are only Jewish forces against all the Arab countries, then the Transjordan army should have the right to start an attack on the Jewish forces there. I am afraid that when one side thinks the other has broken the truce that may light the fire of war again. This is absolutely against the Resolution of the 15th July, and surely you do not think that is the right thing.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Actually, if it was a fact that we broke the truce on a certain sector or front, I would not be able to deny the Arabs the right to react against us on other fronts. The only question then to be investigated is who broke the truce, and fix the responsibility at once. I would certainly

not be against this being investigated. When I say that if the Egyptians attack us at Bir Asluj, we are entitled to react on a sector nearer the seaboard, I do not say the Security Council should do nothing. They should certainly go into the business and fix the responsibility, but while it takes time to fix such responsibility, we cannot be expected to sit with folded arms. We may not be strong enough to repulse an attack at a particular spot, and our only effective way of action might be through an offensive somewhere else; if that is denied to us, we would be at a disadvantage. The enemy might concentrate large forces at a certain spot without our knowledge. The only self-defence that would be possible for us might prove ineffectual, and the Egyptians might be able to take position after position and establish facts, while we are invited to rely on an eventual *status quo ante* which it is promised to us will be restored.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I quite agree that it could be a temporary military disadvantage, but it would be a very great disadvantage for the other side if they continue their attacks and gain ground, in the long run.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I am sure that what you have just said would have made a deep impression on us if it had been said on the 1st December, 1947. But it is said today, on the 5th August 1948, after all the bitter experience that we have gone through. I know you are speaking perfectly in good faith and utter honesty, but what are the facts of the situation which we cannot ignore? They are that there has been Arab aggression in progress for months past, without being checked by the Security Council by way of making use of the powers vested in it by Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Charter. We have repeatedly pressed this point that we are faced with open aggression. The Egyptian army has no business whatever to be where it is today. That is the whole point, and no effective action was taken to check or liquidate that aggression, so we cannot place such implicit reliance on the resolution of the Security Council and disregard the changes in the physical situation around us. What you refer to as a temporary military advantage may well be translated into a permanent territorial advantage. We must do our best to prevent their having such a temporary military advantage for fear it might prove permanent. May I tell you a story? During the last war two British officers came here from El-Alamein on short leave. They went to the Old City and among other places came to the Wailing Wall and found some Jews praying there. So they said to them: "What are you doing here?" And the Jews replied: "We are praying for your victory, but don't rely on us." That is what we think about the Security Council and I don't think we can be blamed.

R[EUVEN] SHILOAH: I would like to remind C[ount] B[ernadotte] that even during the first truce it was made clear to us that in case we are attacked, we should only report orally. We then challenged this point of view, particularly basing ourselves on practical experience. It was on the Syrian front and we lost territory there and placed ourselves in an unfavourable position

at the resumption of hostilities, because of this same principle. After the truce began, Mishmar Hayarden was taken, and we could not repulse the attack because there were no observers present. The matter remained a debatable point, and we had to resume the fighting under a disadvantage. In the south there are observers, but to all practical purposes they are not operating. Today is the 16th day since the beginning of the second truce and the position there is changing all the time. I think it would be perfectly reasonable to accept this principle where there is some mere sniping or insignificant incidents, but when you have a very detailed plan worked out, as the Egyptians have, to capture a key position which would perhaps change the entire military situation (the objective is Bir Asluj, which would open communications between them and Hebron which they have not now got), then it is a very serious affair.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Bir Asluj lies on the main Egypt-Palestine highway from Ismailiah to Jerusalem.

R[EUVEN] Shiloah: The capture of that place by the Egyptians would mean a very serious change in the situation, and our only way is to stop them at their base, which is Gaza or El-Arish. Three days ago they attacked by armour, artillery and aircraft. Their planes took off from El-Arish and the normal thing would have been to attack El-Arish. We did not do it and restrained ourselves, but if this goes on for some time, then this resolution does not mean very much.

M[OSHE]S [HERTOK]: To sum up, Count Bernadotte, I do not think we can agree to let initiative rest merely on one side in breaking the truce. That is to say they, the Egyptians, can always exercise an element of surprise, and we should not be able to retaliate. Secondly, we cannot agree that they should be able to bring a superior force to bear on any given spot while we would not be in a position effectively to defend ourselves. Thirdly, it is a war, and war operations cannot be taken to bits and pieces and treated in isolation from one another. They all form one coherent whole and must be treated as such.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: It is quite right what you say about the first truce. But that interpretation was mine and not that of the Security Council, but now the situation is different, when the Security Council has ordered the truce and decided on certain things. There are rumours, for instance, in Jerusalem on both sides that perhaps the Irgun might start a *putsch* there. If that should happen now and if those principles should not be applicable, then all the Arab forces should have the right to start a war — well, that is absolutely not the decision of the Security Council. You say, Mr. Shertok, and I understand you, that if I had said this on the 1st of December 1947, you would have understood it better than now. I could also have understood it if I had said it on the 8th July, but don't you think that anyhow

there has been some stiffening in appearance and in the wish of the Security Council after the resolution of July 15th?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Definitely, and I do not deny for a moment that the present resolution, both in content and tone, is different, so therefore we have some hope that at least responsibility will be fixed and some reaction will be forthcoming. As to the full effectiveness of this resolution, the willingness of the Security Council to take real action and its ability to remedy the situation we still have our doubts.

MR. REEDMAN: In the first place it must be borne in mind that these instructions are also being given to the other side. In the manner in which you have put your case to us, you have assumed that you did not break the truce at any point. None of our observers can start out believing that. They must investigate every case with free minds as to who started it. Most of these cases are under observation. It is quite true that for various reasons of transport difficulties, etc., we have been unable to get observers into some of these spots and working in sufficient numbers as would be desirable, but I think this should also be borne in mind that these new instructions coincide with the arrival of a hundred more observers who are now expected, which will gradually strengthen the machinery of the Mediator for dealing with breaches, and for fixing immediate responsibility, or at any rate being on the spot to press home the necessity for a local cease-fire. In this way it will be possible to localise these incidents and bring them to an end, or at least arrive at a clear conclusion as to who was responsible. This statement is being circularised to both sides, and we must start on the assumption that either side may be responsible for breaches of the truce.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Count Bernadotte, your starting-point was a comment on something I was reported to have said. I did say it. So what you are now commenting on is merely a verbal statement and not an act, which is some indication that we are not inclined to rush headlong into such situations. This was a warning in which we tried to point out to the other side what we would regard ourselves entitled to do in a certain eventuality, that is unless they stopped their attack. In principle we maintain fully our position that we are entitled to do it. In practice we are not likely to rush into such situations, and we shall be only too pleased to see you prevent such acts.

I must say, however, that the fact that this is communicated to both sides does not meet the issue I have raised. If we assume that there is a righteous party and a wrongdoing one, this puts a premium on wrongdoing and penalises righteousness. If one is bent on breaking the truce, then under this ruling they can get away with it with less loss than the party determined to observe the truce.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: But you said the same thing to the State Council meeting the other day. You said that you would try to beat off any attack

made on you during the truce and would not in the process refrain from conquering new territory.[2]

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Quite right. If you are in hot pursuit of the enemy, you cannot always draw the line where you will stop. It may result in gaining new ground and this is the right punishment for the enemy. We shall certainly not refrain from taking new positions in such cases.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: This paper is given to you and it will be given to the Security Council for information. I suppose that if the Security Council does not share my opinion, they will tell me so and say I am in the wrong. About the Egyptian matter I strongly protested to the Prime Minister, and we have sent not only observers to the spot, but this afternoon Mr. Azcarate and his staff are also going to Gaza to investigate the matter. We have done what we can.

There was one point on which Dr. Joseph and I agreed on Tuesday, and that was [that] we were not pleased with the way the observers had arrived in Palestine and the Arab countries. But now we are getting more observers and so things will be easier.

Now, our next point — and these thoughts are not quite new. They do not apply (merely?)[3] to Jerusalem. We think it would be a good thing to establish the lines of the two parties, and it would be good to have, say a kilometre of no-man's land in between, and the observers would contact the commanders in the field of both sides, and then they could cooperate with them and have these lines established firmly on a map. If there should be some differences in opinion between the two parties as to where the line should go, the observers will have the right to make a decision. Generally, we will discuss all these things with your Chief of Staff, if you think it is a good thing. When establishing the lines, we would ask for one kilometre between them.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: That would, of course, depend on the terrain. If we are holding a hill position, you would not expect us to give it up.

GENERAL LUNDSTROM: Of course not.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Then General Lundstrom will discuss this with your men.

(Here General Lundstrom and Mr. Mohn withdrew to a separate conference [with] Mr. Shiloah and Colonels Yadin and Baruch.)

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Our next point is the refugees and I would like to discuss this while Sir Raphael[4] is with us here.

M[OSHE]S [HERTOK]: Before we leave the first point, and seeing that the paper you handed to me goes to the Security Council, we shall also have to inform the Security Council of our opinion.

2. ראה מועצת המדינה הזמנית, פרוטוקול הדיונים, כרך א', הישיבה השתים־עשרה, 29.7.1948, עמ' 5־6.
3. כך במקור.
4. סר רפאל סילנטו, מנהל האגף לפעילויות סוציאליות במזכירות האו"ם.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Yes, of course.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: There are three kinds of refugees: the first category is the refugees in Arab countries, the other is refugees in Palestine, and the third is refugees in Israeli territory. I may be wrong, but the third category seems to have been concentrated in the Nazareth area. When I reported to the Security Council after our verbal conversation last week, I got back a telegram from them. I still feel of the opinion that these refugees should ultimately return to their homes, even during the truce, as I hope it will be a definite truce. You do not share my opinion,[5] but we would like to discuss this now. You said one of the reasons was security, and I can understand that this point has to be dealt with very carefully. I can understand that this point must be of great importance, as you do not want fifth columnists, as you put it. You also said that unorganised mass return would be undesirable as it would create serious problems, and you say you cannot agree to the return in substantial numbers during the truce. Do you mean that a limited number might be allowed to return, and, if that is your meaning, we have worked out some details and basis of discussion which need not be discussed at this moment here. Perhaps Mr. Reedman can continue this discussion after I am gone. First of all the return of refugees in territory controlled by Israeli forces or in the State of Israel. Secondly, there might be considered the question of citrus farmers as the season begins soon and from a commercial point of view it might be possible that such people be allowed to return, and also communities whose villages, though deserted, are intact. And others, for whom employment is available in their previous homes. Lastly, special cases on humanitarian grounds. These are just thoughts put down on paper. If you are in favour of discussing them in the future, I would suggest that Sir Raphael do this today and Mr. Reedman continues it.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Actually I was afraid that the use by us of the phrase "admission of any substantial number" might give rise to a misunderstanding. You will appreciate that when such a letter is written, quite a few people take a hand in the drafting. In the original draft this was specified and it said clearly that the only thing we envisaged is the return of people in rare cases and exceptional circumstances on purely compassionate grounds, some especially deserving cases, say, families which were torn and such like. When the letter came to me for signature, I saw that phrase had come out. I first thought to have it changed, but as it was rather late in the day, I left it at that. What we meant was that only in exceptional cases would we allow people to come back. We would deal with each case on its special merits, and if people apply, there are military governors who will judge each case on its merits. We are against whole categories of people

5. ראה מס' 406.

returning while the war is on. It is not a question of negotiating a general arrangement. The problem is one of relief which has to be provided wherever the people are, not by moving them. For instance, the Nazareth group is within our territory, and no doubt something is being done for them. But if you mean that those who now live outside our territory should be returned, this cannot now be done.

SIR RAPHAEL: Generally speaking, the situation is that it would not be possible to contemplate at this time the return of people outside your own territory. Am I right in this?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Yes. With all due respect, Count Bernadotte, we understand that you are acting in a dual capacity: first, as Mediator charged by the Assembly to mediate on the major issue with a view to exploring a general political adjustment, and secondly as charged by the Security Council with the observation of the truce. Under which part of your terms of reference does this question of dealing with the refugees come?

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I am the Mediator and I also have to work on humanitarian grounds as to how to treat people, and it is my duty to do so according to the Resolution of May 14th. (Mr. Stavropoulos here produced the text of the Assembly's Resolution of May 14, 1948, and pointed to para 1(c) empowering the Mediator to invite the cooperation of international organisations for the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine).[6] Do you think Sir Raphael could get from your proper department information about what the Jews are doing for the Nazareth group?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Any information that you would like to have will be placed at your disposal.

SIR RAPHAEL: I would like a general outline as to what is being done for the Arabs in Israeli areas. Something general is what I would like to get.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I will ask one of my colleagues dealing with this matter to let you have what you want as soon as possible.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Sir Raphael, Mr. Reedman thinks perhaps he can arrange for you to go tomorrow morning to Nazareth and then to Haifa. I will not be leaving Haifa until tomorrow afternoon.

SIR RAPHAEL: Can we go to Nazareth with one of your officers? I would like to start at about 7 a.m.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: As soon as the meeting is over I will arrange it.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: There may be Arabs in Nazareth who wish to go back to their villages which are also in Israeli occupation.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: That question can be gone into.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: We have now an important question and that is the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. That was the reason why I asked Dr. Joseph to be here, as he is your representative there. You will recall that last

6. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, הערת־עורך בעמ' 786.

time I asked you if the Israeli Government were in principle for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, and then you sent me a letter which was not quite clear to me,[7] so I sent a telegram to Reedman and he spoke to Mr. Eytan, and the result was that without thinking of the details how it should be done, you were in favour in principle of the demilitarisation scheme. We have the same answer from the Arab side, they are in favour in principle. When I was in Jerusalem, I got the impression that there is nervous tension and we feared that something might happen which might destroy the city and bring about a lot of casualties, and therefore I am of the opinion that the sooner we begin negotiating the details the better it will be. I am prepared to start at any time with my representatives and with your people. I am prepared to return to Jerusalem on Monday afternoon and stay there a few days to discuss the problem. Do you have any comments?

DR. JOSEPH: Did you get a copy of the letter I sent to the Belgian Consul?[8]

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I did not.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I think it was made clear to Mr. Reedman that I was not in a position to make the affirmative statement that my Government accepts in principle a demilitarisation scheme. I was not then and am not now in a position to make such a statement. I had indicated however that in the operative part of our resolution consisting of three points,[9] namely in the third paragraph of it, we said we were prepared to consider any arrangement which, etc. This, I indicated, did not exclude the possibility of demilitarisation. On the other hand, other forms could be found to give protection to the city without resorting to demilitarisation. I did not go on record that we accepted the principle of demilitarisation. We accepted the principle of protecting Jerusalem against destruction, and will accept any form this may take. In connection with this project, we cannot again help benefiting from our experience which has been very unhappy in regard to the whole business of Jerusalem. We spent many weeks at Lake Success collaborating in the formulation of a statute for Jerusalem for an international regime, which has now been shelved for an indefinite time. There were other arrangements in the negotiations on which we took part, investing much time and effort in them, yet they came to nought, such as a separate truce for Jerusalem, also a separate truce for the Old City. So perhaps it is permissible for us to be a little inquisitive and ask how serious is this project? We would like to know what size the international force would be, so that it could resist attack from any side. How real is that assumption altogether that an international force would be available? We were told by a representative of the American Government, a member of the U.N. Delegation, Mr. Ross, that their idea of demilitarisation is that

7. ראה מס' 358, 389.
8. במכתב הזה הסביר ד. יוסף את עמדת ממשלת ישראל לגבי פירוז ירושלים ברוח דברי שרתוק להלן. (ראה מכתבו אל ניואנהויס, 3.8.1948, 130.02/2443/2).
9. ראה מס' 389.

there should be a Jewish police force for the Jewish area, an Arab for the Arab area, and a small U.N. personnel merely to exercise tasks of supervision.[10] Well, this is something that is quite different from our discussions at the first stage. We have had so many discussions about Jerusalem which have proved in the end to be merely theoretical. We would not like to have a repetition of it.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I made it clear at Lake Success that we should have an international police force. I said the minimum number of men we needed is 2,500. When you talk of U.N. men, I was told at Lake Success that it would take two to three months before such an armed police force could be recruited and brought here. In the meantime, however, the idea was that representatives from the three countries on the Truce Commission should send a similar number of men, who will be released when the U.N. sent their men. The idea was that Jewish police was to continue its function in the Jewish area and the Arab police in the Arab parts. You say now that the third paragraph of your letter did not exclude the possibility of the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. That is not the impression I gathered from Mr. Reedman and he told me that you had accepted it in principle.

MR. REEDMAN: I said it was my impression that the acceptance was in principle.

DR. JOSEPH: That does not mean acceptance when you "do not exclude."

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: From a practical point of view you do not exclude demilitarisation and that means no objection that on the spot we go into details, and when we have them on paper and see the results, then it can be forwarded to the parties and then see if it is acceptable to them both.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I would prefer that some plan be put to us on which we could comment.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I think such a plan should be worked out with your people.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: In that case our starting point would not be demilitarisation. We would seek to evolve a regime that would protect Jerusalem, perhaps a special truce, fixation of the lines, stricter observance of the truce, and before we have exhausted these possibilities we will not look at a measure like demilitarisation which means removing Jewish forces and arms, to us a terribly grave risk.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: What Mr. Shertok suggests now we are proposing to do in any case.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: The point is that there is actually very little truce in Jerusalem. Sniping is continuous, and there is also occasional shelling. The first thing is to stop all this and make the truce real. If you do this, perhaps it will achieve the purpose of point three, namely it will prevent further destruction of Jerusalem.

10. ראה מס' 397.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: The demarcation of the line may stop sniping.

DR. JOSEPH: We suggested the posting of observers at all delicate points on both sides. That may solve the problem.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: I suggest that we sit down and try to see to what extent the meaning of the word can be put into effect.

DR. JOSEPH: That presupposes we agree to a demilitarisation scheme.

WALTER EYTAN: To clear the ground, may I suggest that we agree to a formula something like this: that demilitarisation shall not be looked upon in itself as an end, but the end to be obtained is the protection of Jerusalem against further destruction, and Count Bernadotte sees in demilitarisation an end to this.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: While we can suggest other means to that end.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: The Mediator is bound to continue his efforts to bring about demilitarisation.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: You appear to prefer this procedure, that we should give you another paper on demilitarisation. But if we do that, your answer might be that we do not want to discuss it as we did not like your paper.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We shall give you a reasoned comment on your paper. We are not averse to the idea of starting negotiations, but they need not start with demilitarisation. Let us first exhaust other possibilities.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: Our paper must be on demilitarisation according to the Security Council, and if it gets no further because we have not had an opportunity of exchanging views with you, why then we must report this situation to the Security Council. Whereas it might be possible to work out something, not calling it by any name, which would be acceptable to both sides and to the Security Council as a working arrangement.

DR. JOSEPH: Is it not the real position that the atmosphere is not yet ripe for such discussions?

MR. STAVROPOULOS: The demilitarisation is something which has been *suggested* to the Mediator. It is not as absolute as the truce. There is a difference there.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We are fully aware of the difference. Demilitarisation is not "mandatory", as they say in America.

MR. STAVROPOULOS: If you reach any other kind of formula, well and good.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Dr. Joseph, you say things are not yet ripe for such a discussion. It seems to me the situation in Jerusalem is tense enough, and we feel it is right to take some such steps.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We are quite prepared to negotiate on how best to relieve the tension prevailing in Jerusalem.

DR. JOSEPH: There is a good deal of sniping and shooting in Jerusalem and one would not think that there is a truce on, and so some talk of this is necessary.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I am agreed that there should be discussions between your people and ourselves in Jerusalem to see how best the situation can be remedied.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: The American Consul-General is here and I can tell him that the position of the Israeli Government is that he could start talks about what can be done in Jerusalem.

DR. JOSEPH: I take it from what you said in Jerusalem that the talks should be with Colonel Brunsson[11] and one of the members of the Truce Commission.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Yes.

DR. JOSEPH: I will certainly comply with this, but I must be frank and say that most of my task will be devoted to listening at the beginning.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Now as regards the matter of planes.[12] We have four D.C.47s and the Security Council made arrangements we are to get five planes from London. We have planned to use these planes not over Palestine territory, only to land in Haifa to put down or take off passengers or couriers. We have received your reply on this matter where you say that you cannot allow these planes to use your airfields. In effect, you say we have not been controlling the truce in a proper manner. When I heard that the Secretariat had engaged these five planes I was far from being happy because I realised that they would hamper our disposition of these planes, but it is still more difficult for us to supervise the truce if one of these planes is not allowed to land in Haifa, and take passengers and then go on somewhere else. It is not our intention to use them in Palestine, but only for reconnaissance in Arab countries.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: As regards their use for reconnaissance in territories other than Israeli, this does not diminish our opposition to them, but rather the opposite. Supposing you had decided to recruit British personnel for duties of supervision in Iraq or elsewhere, we could not say we are not going to let you do so, but we would have to take exception to it because we do not trust them. We cannot trust them with objectivity. It may happen that a particular British person is even more objective that a Swede, but as far as national allegiance is a determining factor, it must be taken into account. And we say, a priori, a British officer cannot be trusted with objectivity in this conflict.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: They are merely pilots, or call them drivers if you will, of the planes and they would not even leave the plane in Haifa. They are not observers at all.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We would be much happier if British personnel were altogether eliminated. When Colonel Begley comes down to Latrun and

11. קולונל נילס ברונסון, ראש צוות משקיפי או"ם בירושלים.

12. חמישה מטוסים בריטיים הוחכרו על צוותם לשימוש המתווך. הדבר עורר ביקורת רבה בציבור ובעיתונות בישראל.

brings with him a Jewish officer to meet a representative of the Arab Legion, invariably a British officer appears. In these circumstances our people cannot but regard the British as a party to the conflict. If I may be permitted to talk to you quite informally, why should you do it? It is unfair to the rest of your personnel. They will all be tinged, so to speak.

W[ALTER] E[YTAN]: From the point of view of your public relations it is the worst possible thing that can happen. You know that the press here is not at all favourably disposed to your mission. The U.N. Secretariat, by giving you the five British planes and crews, is putting you at a tremendous disadvantage as far as public opinion is concerned. This thing will be seized upon because public opinion is what it is, and this is the result of thirty years of happenings in this country, and you would be tarring yourselves with a brush which you would not care to tar yourselves with.

MR. STAVR[OPOULOS]: But the Secretariat does not accept this. If your argument is good, then many of the U.N. people should be sent back. If you feel like this, then everyone should be examined as to his religion, the school he went to, his political convictions, etc.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We know exactly who the people are on the U.N. personnel. That is permanent staff for whom the Secretary-General is responsible. But these people are different. You have recruited people to supervise the truce, and we said early on in the day that the inclusion of Britishers would not be agreed to by us. Whatever the function of these people may be, they form part of the recruited personnel for supervising the truce and so we take objection. I think it is a wrong thing to do and must result in an unfair attitude.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: In a way I can understand your argument, but I can tell you that when I got this information, I cabled Lake Success and said it was very unfortunate. Mr. Bunche is now there and will try and get them exchanged. In the meantime we are hampered in our supervision of the truce. Next time you say we are not doing our duty, I might come back and say it is because of lack of transport and planes.

MR. REEDMAN: As they are only going to come to Haifa and will not be based there, and the planes are only chartered for a short time, we should be allowed to use them for an interim measure.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: It will be regarded by our people as the thin end of the wedge which we will not be able to explain away. We cannot help this.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Now as regards convoys to Jerusalem. We discussed this matter on Tuesday in Jerusalem and delivered a paper to Dr. Joseph in which I tried to describe my opinion on this.[13] Dr. Joseph was of the opinion that we should control only certain convoys, and if the Jewish Government had the possibility of using other routes entirely under Jewish control, that would be the business of the Jews. I do not mean to say you

13. המכתב לא נמצא.

would bring in weapons on that road. I am of the opinion that all supplies coming into Jerusalem on whatever road should be included in U.N. control, and the amount of food and other material coming into Jerusalem shall be only that which is permitted to come in. Was not that the meaning of our conversation?

DR. JOSEPH: There was the further point whether or not the quantity of food should be restricted. The attitude I took up was there should be no restriction of quantity inasmuch as the period is not fixed and may last for months, and even if it should be controlled then the proper procedure should be to exercise such control only on the main highway.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: My opinion is that although the period of the truce is not fixed, the quantity of food brought into the city should be in accordance with the first truce agreement.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Regarding quantity, I thought this had been settled last time we had our meeting. I remember it was said that as this is an indefinite truce, the question of limitation of quantity did not arise. We discussed the question of the main road, and the water supply, but there was no question of limitation. I have it on record in a cable to our representative at Lake Success giving the gist of our conversation, and I included in that cable that it was understood there would be no limitation of quantity.[14] I hear from Dr. Joseph that this question was reopened and I am surprised. The whole conception of fixing the quantity of food can make sense only if it attaches to a besieged city which is allowed to bring in supplies only because there is a truce. But Jerusalem was no longer a besieged city when this present truce "broke out" as people say in Palestine. As far as its military position is concerned, it was on the offensive when the truce put the lid on the fight, and as far as its connection with the State of Israel is concerned, not only had it a corridor connecting it with the State of Israel, but this corridor was enlarged as a result of Arab foolishness in failing to agree earlier to the prolongation of the truce. We deny the validity of the whole conception that we are under any obligation to adhere to any special regime in Jerusalem, any more than in Tel Aviv or Haifa or Tiberias. This is a city in Jewish occupation, firmly linked up with the State of Israel, with freedom of movement on the so-called Burma road. It was a bit bumpy to travel over it when I went to Jerusalem the other day, but this only took me some thirty years back when all our roads were in the same state. It was a well-known German definition of a Turkish road in the first World War that it is "a line parallel to which you travel." Therefore, the conditions set for the first truce no longer hold good. They have to be adjusted to a different set of circumstances. Actually we would be within our rights in claiming complete freedom of even bringing arms into Jerusa-

14. הכוונה, כנראה, לשיחה שהתקיימה ב־26 ביולי. בעיית האספקה לירושלים אינה מוזכרת בפרוטוקול השיחה וגם לא במברק אל אבן מיום 26.7.1948 (93.03/94/10).

lem. What we would not be within our rights in claiming would be to bring in arms into Israel, but whether arms should be in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tiberias or Jerusalem, is a purely internal matter. But as to food there is no question. The question arises as regards the use of the road. People might say that if we use the main road through its entire length, including the section between Qubab and Bab-el-Wad, then we pass within no-man's-land. If you insist on checking the quantity then, we might say we forgo the advantage of using the main road and take in food by the more difficult route. And then there should be no checking, just as you do not check food sent from Tel Aviv to, say, Rehovoth.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: When you say that you should be entitled to bring in as much food as you like, and perhaps even arms, I want to quote the decision of the 15th July which reaffirmed the resolution of the 29th May. And if we go back to the resolution of the 29th May, it speaks of assuring that stocks shall not be more than they were at the beginning of the first truce.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I am sorry, the resolution of the 29th May does not speak of it at all.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: But it is here in my instructions of [June][15] 8th. (Reads the relevant passage.)[16]

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: We do not think that all these rules apply to this truce. These rules were drawn up for the first truce, which was fixed for 28 days and was terminated. We are now in a new phase which is an indefinite truce.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: When this was discussed in the Security Council on the 14th [July][17] the question was raised what would be the terms of the truce, and I said it would be the same terms, except for men of military age, regarding whom I said that upon your request I agreed not to keep them in camps. This was put forward to the Security Council and I was sure that both parties would follow the agreement of the first truce during this second period, except for the point dealing with men of military age.

DR. JOSEPH: But the situation has changed and the same conditions do not apply. The military situation has changed and we have free access to Jerusalem, and so there can be no question of such a condition.

MR. STAVR[OPOULOS]: Then the Arabs can say they will not give water, nor let food pass through the main road, if you use the Burma road for this purpose.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: The main argument which forced the Arabs to let our food convoys pass through Latrun is that we can cut them off from Ramallah. There is here a quid pro quo.

15. במקור בטעות: יולי.
16. ראה מס' 156, סעיף 6viii.
17. במקור בטעות: מאי.

MR. STAVR[OPOULOS]: Then why did you ask for free access through the Latrun road?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Because it is a more convenient road, well metalled and quicker.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: If you take this position, then I cannot understand why the U.N. should help you with convoys on the ordinary road. If you can get your own convoys through, then why do you need us?

DR. JOSEPH: The point is that you should help us get the food in along the main road, otherwise we will have to stop the Arabs from getting their food and that would lead to a breach of the truce.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: But the Arabs signified that they would let our convoys through. Colonel Begley took one of our men there and they were met by a British officer who spoke on behalf of the Arabs. He was told that the convoys would pass, and this was accepted. He was also told that Jewish mechanics must be allowed into the pumping station and he accepted that, too. Yet the next day the convoy appeared and the Arab Legion would not let it pass through. We went to Colonel Begley and said that in that case the Arabs would not get their own convoys through, as we would stop them. Our dispositions had already been made with a view to taking such action. Colonel Begley asked us to give him 48 hours' grace, during which time he was sure he would bring the Arab Legion to reason, and that we should not start reprisals. Views among our people differed, but I was able to prevail in favour of waiting the 48 hours, as I was not anxious to have any trouble, however legitimate I considered our proposed reaction to be. Then you arrived and you told Dr. Joseph you were promised a reply the following day. We knew why the British officer had originally agreed to our using the main road, as he was in a hole, our forces being behind him, not only in front of him. He knew that we could cut off Arab supplies any time we wanted to, and so he thought it best to submit. Two people can play at that game.

DR. JOSEPH: Was a reply given to you, Count Bernadotte, by the Transjordan Government?

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I think the American Consul-General will have received a reply. If your opinion is right, then that paper can be thrown into the waste-basket.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: There are many rules which apply to any truce; these are valid; but there are rules which were conceived in a certain set of strategic circumstances, because the position was different at the beginning of the first truce than at the beginning of the second truce. That was a definite truce in point of time, but this is an indefinite one. What if it lasts forever, must food quantities necessarily remain the same in Jerusalem? Meanwhile children are growing up and eating more; the population may incrase. It must be adjusted.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: That is flexible, of course. Unfortunately I do not

know at all the details and cannot discuss the business of Latrun. We have heard your opinion and that is that unlimited food should be allowed to come in, and I can only say I do not agree with that opinion. We have to report to the Security Council that this has been a difficult issue and that the Israeli Government feels I am wrong, that you think it is not applicable to this truce, and we will hear what they say.

DR. JOSEPH: If anyone is anxious for this to be a lasting truce, how can we expect it to continue if we are treated in this way, where food is doled out to us? The people must feel that as far as they are concerned the war is over.

MR. STAVR[OPOULOS]: Yes, if you demilitarise Jerusalem then this question would be settled as well.

MR. VIGIER: If you can get the water to flow, why raise trouble now about the food?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Do the Arabs make their consent to the renewal of the water supply contingent on the limitation of food?

MR. VIGIER: Suppose we tell the Arabs there is to be no control of food, and then they say — well, they will not allow the water to come through, what then?

MR. REEDMAN: It would be better at this stage to adhere to the conditions of the previous truce, and if in a few days the water is arranged, then it will be possible, on the basis of a full report of the whole situation in the light of all circumstances, to put the matter before the Security Council and you can argue your position then.

DR. JOSEPH: I think perhaps the suggestion made now is one which can be agreed to. So the question remains open for a few days and we see if the Arabs give us water, and then either we will decide that the quantity of food is enough and so won't press the issue, or else we will raise it.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I am very anxious to avoid letting this drift into a renewal of fighting. Secondly, I want to test the Arabs on this point. Is it really that the only thing which prevents them from agreeing to letting water come in is the fear we might bring in excessive food? So we are prepared to let the matter rest for a few days.

Count Bernadotte here handed Mr. Shertok the following document which the latter read out:

> Iraqi Director-General, according to the press on July 27th, said Iraq would, if the Haifa refinery is placed under international control, resume pipeline exports of crude oil. Israel is aware, a Provisional Government of Israel spokesman admitted, attempts to operate refinery on basis tanker supplying crude oil is a poor second choice to normal operations. Spokesman states Israel is willing for refineries to operate under international supervision and to distribute the product on a historical basis.
>
> Because above press report as well as stated position of Provisional Government of Israel spokesman, together with importance Haifa

production to normal consumers, please discuss informally this question with Bernadotte. You may suggest he attempt again to arrange for operation refineries and complementary facilities and for distribution of product on historical basis. This could be done on basis his functions under May 14th General Assembly Resolution.

[State] Department considers such operation would be without prejudice to final solution of question of refineries and might temporarily be handled in category of common services, such as electric power and water for Jerusalem, which are necessary to the well-being and safety of the population of Palestine.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: What is your position regarding the piping of oil?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: The American telegram is based on a press report of a statement made by an Iraqi official. The main question that arises is in connection with the phrase about "historical basis". This means, I take it, the mode of distribution before this war started. According to our version, the gentleman expressly stated they would agree for the flow of oil to be resumed on condition that the whole quantity is exported and none used in the country. This is, of course, a basis we cannot accept and we reacted to that statement through our Arabic broadcast and said the gentlemen in Iraq are slumbering; that there is a State of Israel, and we shall have something to say as to what is to happen to that oil. Our condition is that we shall also benefit from it. Our share we must have. So we must find out what is the attitude of the Iraqi Government. Suppose, for the sake of argument, we would meanwhile agree to international control and would get nothing in return, we would then be on record as having merely prejudiced our position. We will not, of course, cancel the concession of the refineries. We are prepared to honour it and respect the interests of international capital, but only as a sovereign state. As to what the Iraqi Government is prepared to do, if you can use your good offices to obtain information from them, that we would appreciate.

MR. REEDMAN: I think the note you read out has reference to the present situation and not to an ultimate settlement. That is to say the situation existing in the period of truce and the purpose behind it is to get oil flowing because it is needed not only by you, but by people in Europe, and the question would be whether you would be interested that if it were possible to persuade the Iraqis to let the oil flow through, the pipeline and the refineries could be worked, with you taking what the whole of Palestine usually took, on the basis of some kind of agreement under an international supervision.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK] I do not think international control is called for. Nor is it connected in any way with the truce. As to guarantees, we shall give every possible guarantee. Actually, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If we do not properly distribute the first instalment, you can always turn off the tap.

MR. REEDMAN: Unfortunately, however, the oil is in the hands of the Iraqis and they have to be persuaded.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Yes, and they are cutting off their noses to spite their faces and losing dollars which they are badly in need of. My Government is against any international control over any part of Israeli territory.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I brought this up because the U.S.A. wants an answer.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Surely the American Government is ably represented in Iraq by its Minister and can find out all it wants to know, and then we can see what there is to talk about.

[.....][18]

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: I want to raise the question of free access to the Wailing Wall.[19] I want to point out that Sunday week will be the anniversary of the destruction of the Jewish Temple by the Romans. We are a people afflicted with a long memory. Traditionally this is a day of mourning because the Temple has not yet been rebuilt, and Jews have always gone to the Wailing Wall on that day to pray there. This time it may be that for the first time in history that this custom will be interrupted — just in the first year of the establishment of the Jewish State. In the course of our discussion today there has been continuous reference by both of us to what the Security Council has or has not said in this or that resolution, and we all attached importance to what it says. It said repeatedly that one of the conditions of the truce is the freedom of access to the Holy Places. It would be utterly grotesque if this year, of all years, it would be interrupted.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: When I was in Jerusalem, I asked for information regarding access to the Wailing Wall, and the reply I got was that the Arabs had accepted access by the Jews, but they had said the Jews should go through a certain gate and the reason for that was because this way it would be safer. But the Jewish reply was that they wanted to go through by another gate.

DR. JOSEPH: The information given to you, Count Bernadotte, is partly correct, but the reason is not correct. The Arabs want the Jews to go through the Jaffa Gate, but they add they cannot be responsible for any sniping at the Jews which may happen as the road there is very narrow. The reply we gave was that if you worried about sniping then let us pass through the Zion Gate which means cutting out most of the Arab territory and then come at once into Jewish territory, but the Arabs were unwilling to let us go through that gate for one reason and another. That is the position.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: I will take this up and have a word with the American Consul-General. Of course, with the demilitarisation of Jerusalem all this would be straightened out.

18. קטעים אחדים, הנוגעים לאישיותו של אחד ממשקיפי האו"ם, לא הודפסו כאן.
19. ראה מס' 245.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Last time you very kindly expressed your readiness to let me have confidentially some picture as to the distribution of your forces in neighbouring countries.[20] I made this statement to our Council of State and I would like to be able to substantiate it.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: As soon as the plan is ready we will give it to you. There has been some delay in the arrival of our staff.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Then there is the problem which worries us and we want to mention it. The lot of our people in Cairo is unenviable. There have been excesses against them as well as governmental measures such as confiscating their property. Of late a new feature has been added by the explosion of bombs which are used either to destroy Jewish property or as an excuse for mob reprisals — also non-Jews have got hurt in these excesses. I was wondering whether you personally, or Mr. Azcarate, could raise the question with the Egyptian Government. It excites the feelings of our people against the Egyptians and makes restraint very difficult.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: The impression I got was that the Egyptian Government is not in favour of these bombs. I can understand your point of view and it is my duty to try and press down all this nervous tension. I will ask Mr. Azcarate that he should say to the Egyptian Government that I hope they will be able to stop this as it is not creating good feelings.

DR. L[EO] K[OHN]: You might say to Mr. Azcarate that before the end of the British Mandate, the Egyptian Government sent a message through the Red Cross to ask us to allow Egyptians living in Palestine to leave and return to Egypt, and this was achieved through our good offices and with our help. Immediately after the 15th May they started war on us. It never occurred to us that the Egyptians would do this the very next day after we had so kindly helped their nationals to get out of here.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Now the last point I want to mention is one to which we attach considerable importance. We would like to approach officially you as Mediator and ask that you transmit an offer to the belligerent powers on the other side to meet us for a peace conference.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Allright, I will do that. You said last time you were prepared to do that, but you added that you were prepared to meet them for a peace conference provided they accepted you as a sovereign state. Does that condition still hold good?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: That would be implied if they accept our invitation.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Can we get that request in writing?

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Yes, it would mean that the Government of Israel requests you to transmit an offer for the other side to meet the Government of Israel. Perhaps we can fix a date for an answer.[21]

.20 ראה מס' 380.
.21 ראה מס' 431.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: My programme is that I go now to Haifa, until tomorrow afternoon, and then on to Rhodes, and then I go to Jerusalem next Monday and stay until Wednesday, returning to Rhodes on Thursday. After that I hope to go to Sweden to attend a Red Cross Conference. I have had a telephone call from the Red Cross to say that they will extend an invitation to you to be present as observers. No doubt this invitation will come to you through your representative in Geneva. The Red Shield of David will also be asked to send observers.

M[OSHE] S[HERTOK]: Yes, I hope our observers will have a chance to greet you there, and if they ask for your guidance or help I am sure this will be extended to them.

C[OUNT] B[ERNADOTTE]: Most certainly.

The meeting convened at 2.30 p.m. and ended at 5.20 p.m.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 109/143. התקבל: 6.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 5 August 1948

Ambassador Douglas cabled Marshall Bevin's proposals regarding combined U.S.-British effort achieve peace Palestine basis Mediator's proposal.[1] Bevin promised influence Arab[s] and suggested Truman do the same regarding Jews. Truman has been advised by his White House advisers reject Bevin proposals as conflicting official U.S. position and party platform.

Truman plans appoint Ben Cohen member U.S.A. delegation U.N. Assembly Paris. Expect Ben be more co-operative this time.

Jessup presented Truman report on delegation's activity Security Council showing his more friendly attitude on Palestine. Jessup expects difficulties for U.S. delegation next month when Cadogan chairman. He suggests firm attitude and continuation present United States line irrespective Cadogan.

Recent State Department secret poll on embargo, loan and recognition produced unfavourable result for Israel. However, White House taken validity this poll with certain reservation.

Epstein

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1. ראה דוגלאס אל מזכיר־המדינה, 2.8.1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1266-71.

426

א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
E. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 652
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/126/1

[New York], 5 August 1948

In talk with Langenhove, he stated only question holding up Belgian recognition and support admission is question of chosen time. Agrees we fulfill all qualifications, but afraid premature action. Argumentation closely followed British lines, adding that Assembly, with opportunities international consultation, is likely clarify position. Confirmed Belgian reluctance manpower commitments for Mediator.[1] Admitted Belgian view November Jerusalem Statute [2] too ambitious for United Nations capacity

Eban

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מ. טוב אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Toff to A. Eban (New York)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/66/30

[New York], 5 August 1948

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MR. ROBERT F. WOODWARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS

The interview was arranged by our mission in Washington and the Middle East Division of the State Department. Our conversation lasted 40 minutes and was very cordial and frank. I informed Mr. Woodward that the purpose of my trip to Latin America as Envoy Extraordinaire of the Government of Israel was to establish direct diplomatic and consular relations with the governments which have already recognized Israel and to discuss recognition with the rest, and pose the problem of Israel's admission to the United Nations. I called his attention to the fact that in view of the U.S. position in Latin America and the role that the U.S. played in the United Nations in the Palestine question and in Israeli questions, I had understood that it was of primary importance to speak directly with him, to which he replied that he appreciated my confidence.

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1. ראה מס' 397.
2. הכוונה, כנראה, לפרק הירושלמי בהחלטת העצרת הכללית מ־29 בנובמבר 1947.

I explained to him that once I had fulfilled the requirements of the protocol, I would immediately get in touch with the American Ambassador of each capital in order to acquaint him with the nature of my mission and to advise him of the fact that in my conversations with the respective governments, I will emphasize the part played by the U.S. and the certain support which it will give to the admission of Israel in the U.N. and the sympathy with which the Government of the U.S. would regard the speedy recognition of Israel. He agreed that it was very important that the American Ambassador of each capital receive instructions to this effect. In the event that he did not get to express this thought spontaneously to the respective Foreign Ministries, at least he would be authorized to answer favourably in case he was consulted by the above mentioned Ministries. I likewise observed to Mr. Woodward that in the press conferences and public celebrations I would not fail to emphasize the position of the U.S. with regard to this problem, and above all I thought it essential to avoid any contradiction in my attitude in case of an eventual position of silence or neutrality on the part of the American Ambassador, which could create embarrassment.

Regarding recognition, I observed that on the whole there is willingness on the part of the governments and great sympathy both in public opinion and in the parliaments of the various countries, but that undoubtedly nothing could have been better to hasten the above recognition than some encouragement on the part of the U.S., which is considered the pilot in this international question.

I gave him the list of the six South American countries that have already recognized Israel,[1] which, according to what I was told, he lacked. Mr. Woodward thought it very opportune to inform the American Ambassadors of my trip and my mission, with which he, personally, was in agreement, but he had to consult with Mr. Rusk of the U.N. Division and the Middle East Division before taking any steps. He asked me to send him my itinerary and wished me success.

Note: My impression is that Mr. Woodward understood perfectly well that it would be very embarrassing for the U.S. if the Ambassadors should assume an unfavourable position. The repercussion of this attitude would obviously be unfavourable in American public opinion.

1. ונצואלה, אורוגואי, גואטמלה, פנמה, קוסטה ריקה וניקרגואה.

428

מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 3/204
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/23

Tel Aviv, 5 August 1948

Your line should be as follows:[1] Preface — aggression caused us revise whole attitude to King, leading serious doubts whether not preferable Arab Palestine should stand alone. Nevertheless, in view past friendship and in order explore all possibilities peace, we making further renewed attempt at understanding, but fact aggression and its results naturally influenced our attitude. Anyhow, we have no confidence in Bernadotte and prefer direct dealings to his mediation.

1) Boundaries as November 29th with substantial changes our favour.

2) Balance to be joined Transjordan.

3) Economic alliance not on lines November 29th, but such as would result assistance Transjordan.

4) Non-repatriation refugees to Israel but their settlement in Transjordan, including Arab Palestine and other countries, with King's political assistance and our financial help.

5) Efforts our behalf obtain development loan U.S.A. for King.

6) Although practically entire new Jerusalem in our hands, we agree King should have certain part of it. We are to keep bulk new Jerusalem and present corridor to Israel. Old City to be administered by us and him jointly, with international umpire.

7) Special agreement regarding Dead Sea, ensuring equality control and benefits.

8) Assistance our part his admission U.N. and recognition by U.S.A. Cable reaction.

Shertok

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1. ראה מס׳ 416. הוראות אלה הגיעו לאחר שהתקיימו עוד שתי פגישות בין ששון וציר עבר־הירדן בלונדון. ששון מסר לנציג סקירה על השתלשלות המאורעות מנקודת מבטה של ישראל. הוא דיווח שנוצרו יחסים טובים בינו ובין הנציג העבר־ירדני. (ראה ששון אל שמעוני, 3.8.1948, 130.15/3749/1).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן IN-5/51
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/22

Tel Aviv, 6 August 1948

Regarding admission U.N., would like be assured matter being pursued greatest possible energy. Our dropping overnight designation "provisional" is out of question,[1] while /election/ will take time. Must press for our immediate admission as we are invoking precedents France, India.[2] Cable position, prospects.

Shertok

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א. אבן ומ. קומיי אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban and M. Comay to M. Shertok

מברק 658
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22

[New York], 6 August 1948

Your IN-5/51.[1] Action taken so far as follows: 1) Began by approach to United States, eliciting attitude which cabled to you,[2] also formal assurance Soviet support.[3] 2) Had detailed conversation Canada, France, Belgium, all of which promised their preliminary reaction shortly; simultaneously communicated Ottawa, Paris.[4] 3) Toff interviewed State Department Latin Division before setting out his tour.[5] Received assurance Ambassadors [that] both capitals concerned would react favourably to inquiry. 4) Have just completed memorandum for circulation to Council delegations setting out political, legal, reasons our admission,[6] this being trans-

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1. ראה מס' 212.
2. צרפת היתה בין מייסדות האו"ם, והודו התקבלה לאו"ם, שעה שכיהנו בהן ממשלות זמניות.

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1. מס' 429. 2. מס' 398, 421. 3. ראה מס' 364.
4. ראה מס' 372, 403. 5. ראה מס' 427.
6. "admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations", 18.8.1948 (93.03/72/16).
עיקרי התזכיר ראה במס' 448.

lated French, Spanish. 5) Have prepared background memorandum editors, column-writers,[7] hoping stimulate press support. 6) Necessity assure admission in forefront all our conversations American circles. 7) Meeting Colombian Tuesday for full discussion. 8) Local action instituted to influence more dynamic American initiative. Believe no possible step omitted our end. Regarding prospects, everything depends nature American influence, which, if sufficiently determined, can certainly procure South Americans' support, greatly influence Canada, Belgium. General tendency delegations to assume position clearer when Assembly opens. Clearly our task is not convince them our eligibility, which is generally accepted, but persuade them this action urgent and contributing to stability rather than prejudicing mediation as they fear. All friends agree inadvisable, unnecessary, file formal application until some assurance favourable vote. Will make further intensive effort coming weeks, including new meeting American delegation, compare notes, urge more positive initiative.

Eban and Comay

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מ. שרתוק אל הרוזן ברנאדוט (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 6 August 1948

Sir,

In confirmation of my oral statement to you at our meeting yesterday,[1] I beg to request, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, that you be kind enough to transmit to the Governments of the Arab States now at war with Israel our offer that their representatives should meet the representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel for the purpose of peace negotiations.

The Provisional Government would be grateful for the earliest possible communication of the Arab Governments' replies to this proposal.[2]

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs

7. ראה "The admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations", 2.8.1948, (93.03/72/16).

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1. ראה מס' 424, עמ' 486.
2. רק הממשלה המצרית השיבה לפנייה זאת—תשובה שלילית פסקנית. (ראה Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release No. 3, 20.8.1948 .130.02/2410/1).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק מוצפן IN-7/71
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/22

Tel Aviv, 8 August 1948

Reference my 955.[1] 1) Do you consider we might urge action under Chapter VI, Article 33, Section 2?[2] Proposing this because understand from Reedman that while Arab leaders greatly apprehensive renewal hostilities, fear their direct acceptance idea meeting us conference table will be /their/ complete undoing Arab world, therefore need be coerced by higher authority which would cover them internally. 2) Should my 955 be cabled direct President[3] or sufficient you do it?

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH965
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/22

Tel Aviv, 8 August 1948 (12.00)

Your X143,[1] see no reason you shouldn't inform them you been told this repeatedly, stressing you yourself hold no brief. See what reaction will be. Don't think this will cause harm as they themselves urged us sound position, we merely transmitting results our soundings. Unless you definitely feel averse this course, suggest you try it, particularly as we cannot exclude possibility having seek major settlement this direction, in which case would anyhow have prepare ground. If this reasoning correct, con-

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1. שרתוק אל אבן, 6.8.1948 (130.09/2329/1). במברק — הנוסח של מס' 431.
2. הסעיף מסמיך את מועצת־הביטחון לתבוע מצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך ליישב את הסכסוך בדרכי שלום, כגון משא־ומתן, תיווך, פיוס, בוררות וכו'.
3. נשיא מועצת־הביטחון (אז נציג ברית־המועצות י. מאליק).

433

1. מס' 421 (בעניין הצעת רוס, שנציגי ישראל יבדקו את יחס נציגי ברית־המועצות לאפשרות שעבר־הירדן תתקבל כחברה באו"ם במקביל לקבלת ישראל).

sider above course best beginning for preparation, as in opening gambit we appear entirely unidentified. Otherhand our mere mentioning him to them would be great asset for Elias' [Sasson] parley.[2] Cable whether my meaning clear and your proposed action.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל ג'. רידמן (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 8 August 1948

Sir,

I write to draw your attention to the following breach of the truce by the Egyptian authorities.

When the American ship *Marine Carp* called at Alexandria on Tuesday, August 3rd, the Egyptian officials who boarded it seized a cargo of Israeli goods destined for the U.S. The cargo consisted of 35 crates containing ceramics, books, and citrons (fruit required for Jewish ritual purposes). The American Consul-General is reported to have been present on board during the proceedings.

The question of the interference by the Egyptian Government and other Governments of the Arab League with the normal traffic of non-military goods to and from Israel, was raised by me in my discussions with the Mediator at the beginning of the first truce period.[1] The Mediator promised at the time to make it clear to the authorities concerned that the seizure of such goods would constitute a violation of the truce. I now beg to request that his attention should immediately be drawn to the above incident with a view to appropriate action on his part.

I should be grateful if I could be informed without undue delay what steps have been taken in the matter.[2]

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister of Foreign Affairs

2. שיחות אליאס ששון עם נציג עבר־הירדן — ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 453.

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1. לא נמצא איזכור של הנושא בשיחה, אך ראה מס' 168, סעיף 8.
2. ראה מס' 481.

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שיחת ד. הורוביץ — ג׳. רידמן
Meeting: D. Horowitz — J. Reedman

130.02/2425/1 :דין־וחשבון

[Tel Aviv], 8 August 1948

The conversation took place upon the request of Mr. R[eedman] and lasted for two hours.

Mr. R[eedman] stated first that he does not believe in a quick and positive response from the Arab States to Mr. Shertok's peace appeal.[1] They could not climb down as quickly as that. A retreat of that kind, which would involve the recognition of Israel, would have very serious internal repercussions. However, he would like to convey to Mr. D[avid] H[orowitz] informally but most reliably the information in his possession that Egypt is most anxious to back out of the war as quickly as possible. That fact was surprising and astonishing for the United Nations Mission, but there is no doubt as to the reliability of the information. The problem is one of finding a face-saving device to enable both Abdullah and the Egyptians to back out as quickly as possible. Iraq is difficult but does not count in that connection, particularly if Egypt, the most powerful of the Arab States, is backing out.

D[avid] H[orowitz]: What will be the British attitude and what role will the British factor play in this whole situation? It would be of some importance to know it, as plans of any Arab State are subject to influence, and to some extent direction, by the British factor.

Mr. R[eedman] said that here again he would like to inform us of a very important new development. He could say with some certainty that most probably the recognition of Israel will be effected before the Assembly of the United Nations, possibly within the next few weeks. It would have been already carried into effect some time ago were it not for the personal attitude of Bevin. However, the view is prevailing in British Government circles now that recognition is imperative at any rate, and in this case it would be better to have it soon and be done with it, in order to rebuild afterwards relations with the Arab States, than to carry on with that lingering problem which always looms on the horizon and may hamper such restoration of relations at the most inconvenient time.

Of course, the main problem is that of the truce. He understands that the truce is a very precarious thing and cannot continue indefinitely. A truce for an indefinite period can be expedient only if it leads to some kind of solution very soon, otherwise it must break down.

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1. מס׳ 431.

D[avid] H[orowitz] added some arguments for supporting this view.

R[eedman] said that the plan is to get the Assembly of the United Nations to adopt a resolution which would impose on the Arab States some kind of settlement on the most general lines. It would to some extent fix the position and recognize Israel and perhaps admit it to the United Nations, and at the same time appoint a Boundary Commission. That would enable Egypt and in consequence all the Arab States to retreat, under the pretext that they have to abide by the decision of the United Nations.

D[avid] H[orowitz] asked, why then bother with the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, which is after all a blind alley and incomprehensible against the background of the truce, and as according to R[eedman]'s view, soon an all-round settlement would be arrived at.

R[eedman] explained that the Count and his advisers are well aware of the fact that the demilitarisation of Jerusalem is a blind alley, but it is better to fill the present time, when there is no possibility to start peace negotiations, with talks about the demilitarisation of Jerusalem than with violations of the truce. Such talks are convenient for marking time and create some focus for discussions of minor issues. The negative result is a foregone conclusion, but something good may come out of it and that is mitigation of the position in Jerusalem. There will be no demilitarisation, but there may be better demarcation of military positions, cessation of violations of the truce, sniping etc., which will be some kind of compromise or substitute for demilitarisation. This result is quite desirable.

Another minor issue of that kind is the refugee problem. Here D[avid] H[orowitz] made a remark that the return of the refugees would presumably be a factor making for a prolongation of the war. At present the refugee problem is an inducement to the Arab States to reach a final settlement, while a solution of the refugee problem would leave no such inducement. They could and would probably prolong the cold war for an indefinite time. Anyhow, the return of refugees during the truce could not be contemplated for security reasons.

Mr. R[eedman] said he agrees to both arguments of D[avid] H[orowitz] a) that a solution of the refugee problem would weaken the inducement for the Arab States to reach a final settlement, and b) that the return of refugees could not be contemplated for security reasons. However, what he was thinking of was a small trickle of refugees as a gesture, but even that is not important. The return of refugees during the truce can at any rate have little if any effect on the problem of refugees as a whole, as it is unthinkable that Israel would admit a large number of refugees before a final settlement. What is important, is a gesture, even a declaration or indication that Israel intends to solve the refugee problem after a final peace settlement.

D[avid] H[orowitz] said that the refugee problem can theoretically be solved in one of the following three ways:

a) Return of the refugees.

b) Resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries.

c) A combination of the two, i.e. return of some and resettlement of most of the refugees in Arab countries.

Mr. R[eedman] declared his preference for the third method. He would think it very advisable that Israel should indicate that it is interested to solve the refugee problem within the frame of a peace settlement. He emphasized again the precarious situation of the truce and that an indefinite truce can only be reasonable if it is conducive to a quick solution.

D[avid] H[orowitz] mentioned the danger of supply of arms to Arab States during the truce period and rumours to that effect.

Mr. R[eedman] very strongly denied these rumours. He said the French and Belgian Governments are very anxious to establish effective control and are doing everything in their power to control any traffic of arms. England did not supply Egypt even those supplies for which payment was made before the 15th May 1948, and the Egyptians are complaining bitterly for that reason. Of course, there is an arms racket everywhere and they may get a small supply, but they are of no consequence for the general supply situation of the Arab States.

As to violations of the truce, it would be a fallacy to say that these violations are only on the Arab side. The observers are well informed and they know that violations of the truce are of frequent occurrence on both sides. The impression is that the Jews are anxious to end the truce and to resume hostilities. That impression is gaining ground, both in Arab States, where it causes great apprehension, and in United Nations circles. He considers the tendency as extremely dangerous. The present truce is on the order of the Security Council and violations of the truce would lead immediately and inevitably to sanctions either against the Jews or the Arabs or both parties. Jewish authorities are recently very noncooperative in their relations with the authorities of the United Nations. This is felt from the bottom in relations with the liaison officers to the top level. This is very deplorable and not conducive to the settlement of the problem.

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מ. שרתוק אל ב.ש. שיטרית[1]
M. Shertok to B.S. Shitreet

העתק: 130.15/2570/15

תל אביב, 8 באוגוסט 1948

מכיוון שעלתה על הפרק שאלת מדיניותנו כלפי החוגים והאישים השונים בקרב הציבור הערבי בשטח מדינת ישראל ובשטחים המוחזקים על־ידינו, הנני מציע לקבוע את הקווים הבאים:

1. יש לשתף במידה מתאימה את אנשי הליגה לשחרור לאומי[2] במוסדות שנקים, אם השתתפותם לא תרחיק חוגים חשובים אחרים שאנו מעוניינים בהם. אבל מכל מקום אין בשום פנים להרכיב את אנשי הליגה אלופים לראש הציבור הערבי ולמסור לידיהם הנהלת מוסדות ועניינים במונופולין, אם גלוי או נסתר, אם ישיר או עקיף.

2. בכל סידור של הנהלה פנימית לתושבים הערבים בשטחים הנכבשים יש להישען בעיקר על החוגים והאנשים אשר שיתפו אתנו פעולה מקדמת דנא, בכללם אלה שעמדו בקשר אמיץ עם המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית ועם הקרן־הקיימת לישראל, פרט לאותם האנשים אשר הובאשו בעיני הציבור כסוכנים מכורים ואשר שכר שיתופם עלול לצאת בהפסדו.

3. יש לחו[ת]ר למגע ולהבנה הדדית עם אנשים וחוגים ממחנה מתנגדינו שהינם בעלי משקל בציבוריות הערבית והמוכנים כיום לשיתוף־פעולה אתנו, אם על יסוד הכרה במדינת ישראל בתוך תחומיה, או לשם הקמת שלטון עצמאי בחלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל המערבית.

4. מבלי שנוכל להוריד לגמרי מעל סדר־היום את האפשרות של סיפוח חלקה הערבי של ארץ־ישראל המערבית למדינת עבר־הירדן, עלינו להעדיף הקמת מדינה ערבית עצמאית בתחומי ארץ־ישראל המערבית. על־כל־פנים עלינו לחתור לבירור האפשרות הזאת ולהבליט את היותה רצויה לנו ועדיפה בעינינו על הצעת הסיפוח.

ברצוני לקבוע כאן כהנחה המובנת מאליה והמקובלת גם עליך, שבכל השאלות המדיניות האלו קובע משרד־החוץ את הקו, אלא אם כן החליטה הממשלה אחרת. מכאן שאני מביע תקוותי הנאמנה, שהעיקרים שניסחתי לעיל ישמשו בסיס לפעולה מתואמת.

הנני לבקשך להורות לעושי דברך לדאוג, במסגרת יכולתם, שגם משרדים אחרים שיש לפעולתם נגיעה במצב האוכלוסיה הערבית יתנהגו לפי אותם הקווים. הבטחת הדבר תחייב מידה מסוימת של פיקוח מצד משרדך, בשיתופו של משרד־החוץ, על פעולתם של משרדים אחרים בתחום העניינים הערביים בישראל.

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1. בכור שלום שיטרית, שר־המשטרה והמיעוטים בממשלה הזמנית.
2. הליגה לשחרור לאומי בפלסטין — מפלגה קומוניסטית ערבית, שהיתה פעילה בארץ־ישראל מאז אמצע מלחמת־העולם השנייה. לאחר כיבוש הגליל המרכזי ונצרת, קשרה מפ״ם קשרים עם הליגה ומסרה לידיה את ניהול לשכת העבודה שנפתחה בנצרת. (ראה שמעוני אל ששון, 19.8.1948, 130.15/2570/11).

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א. ששון אל י. שמעוני
E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni

מברק מוצפן 4/22. התקבל: 9.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 8 August 1948

Ask Shertok whether I should continue try to contact other Arab representatives or I should wait for conclusion present talks with Transjordan.[1]

Sasson

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 670
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22

[New York], 10 August 1948

Your IN-7/71[1] seeking expert legal advice. My first reaction strongly negative since we are now in Chapter Seven clearly designated as innocent party in a breach of peace. Would lose ground if returned to Chapter Six before resumption of war definitely ruled out as possibility. Above all note dangers Article 37 Paragraph 2, enabling Council recommend terms of settlement under Chapter Six. Cabling further.[2]

Eban

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1. שרתוק הורה לששון להתמיד בנסיונותיו ליצור מגע עם נציגים אחרים בלי להמתין לתוצאות השיחות עם נציג עבר־הירדן. (ראה שמעוני אל ששון, 13.8.1948, 130.09/2329/23).

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1. מס' 432.
2. ראה מס' 439.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 671
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22

[New York], 10 August 1948

Your IN-7/71,[1] second point. Propose draw attention [Security] Council orally to your 955 in hope elicit favourable comment from those who constantly preach conciliation. Am in touch with delegations.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק X145
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/22
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 10 August 1948

Lie informed me: 1) Bunche saw Marshall yesterday, conveying Mediator's request troops for demilitarised areas; received firm refusal. Marshall willing send only unarmed observers. 2) Mediator through Bunche has asked British, French, American Governments their view his suggestions. Have warned Fischer, Epstein. 3) Himself seeing Marshall, Truman, tomorrow; intends pressing our admission. 4) Arce[1] unpopular at home, contravening instructions, therefore Foreign Minister probably going Paris. 5) His own views against expansion Mediator's apparatus, against renunciation November Resolution, against immediate return Arab refugees. /Stressed/ utmost secrecy point two.

Eban

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1. מס' 432.

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1. חוזה ארסה, הנציג הקבוע של ארגנטינה באו"ם.

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שיחת מ. שרתוק — הרוזן ברנאדוט (בירושלים, ב־10 באוגוסט 1948)

Meeting: M. Shertok — Count Bernadotte (Jerusalem, 10 August 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/11

NOTES OF A CONVERSATION WITH COUNT BERNADOTTE AT LUNCHEON AT MY HOUSE IN JERUSALEM, TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1948

Count Bernadotte thought that of late we were driving too hard a bargain. We had reached the peak of our good-will in the U.N. just on the eve of the second truce. He himself was then at Lake Success and found our good-will very high. Since that time, he felt, our stock was dropping. He was sure that if we had made some gesture with regard to the refugees, by way of readmitting a certain proportion, this would have raised our prestige sky-high.

He wanted to know what our real policy was regarding the truce. In his observers' impressions, particularly in Jerusalem, our line seemed to be to do everything possible to provoke the Arabs into a major breach of the truce, so that full-scale fighting could start again, which would enable us to conquer more territory. Was this really the case?

His staff was generally complaining about us. He assured me that they were all coming to Palestine entirely unprejudiced, but after having been here for some time, they could not help feeling that we were fighting not merely the Arabs, but also the U.N. observers.

As for the future, there was no question but that the Arabs had lost the game, militarily as well as politically. The Jewish State had come to stay. He did not think that anything would come of our peace offer[1] at this stage, but this did not mean that there need be a resumption of fighting.

He disclosed that in his last talk with him, Nokrashi Pasha had expressed himself definitely against the renewal of the war. He gathered that the Arabs would be willing to be coerced by the U.N. into recognising Israel and eventually making peace with her. This was the line they had taken with regard to the second truce. They had made a show of determination to fight by rejecting the Mediator's proposal to prolong the truce, but when the Security Council put its foot down, they gave in. It was a face-saver to them *vis-à-vis* their own public. It was tantamount to their saying: you saw that we were ready to fight the Jews but surely you cannot expect us to fight the whole world.

He did not doubt that the Assembly would confirm the existence of the Jewish State and then there would be nothing for the Arab States but to

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1. ראה מס' 431.

recognise it in deference to U.N. decision. The problem was, what would happen to the Arab part of Palestine? Theoretically there were three possibilities:

1) A separate State.
2) Annexation by Transjordan.
3) Dividing up the territory between the neighbouring States.

He was inclined to rule out the third eventuality. Nokrashi had told him that Egypt had no ambitions at the expense of the Gaza District. Why, protested Nokrashi, if we were to annex that part, we would be proving right all those who had been maligning us by spreading the lie that we had entered this war not to rescue the Palestine Arabs but for purposes of self-aggrandisement. Nor did Nokrashi fancy the idea of the Arab part of Palestine being joined to Transjordan. He preferred that territory to be set up as an independent State. Generally the idea of annexation to Transjordan was unpopular in Arab League circles: they did not want to see the balance of power in their own midst materially changed. On the other hand, the drawbacks of this eventuality were obvious: no leadership, no governmental apparatus, nothing to start building upon.

The Count took the line of showing that he was completely excluding (3), and that as between (1) and (2) he was keeping an open mind and seeing pros and cons for either.

While on the point of his talk with Nokrashi, he inserted parenthetically the following story. In the middle of the conversation Nokrashi said: "Do you know who is in the ante-chamber? The Mufti of Jerusalem! He came to see you. I assure you that this is not staging — nothing prearranged — he just came and announced himself. Won't you see him now that he is here?" The Count had replied that he would not see the Mufti, as he had such a bad name in U.N. circles and in view of his whole past. Nokrashi then pointed to the physical fact that the Mufti was right there in the next room which the Count had to go through in leaving; would he not shake hands with him? To this the Count replied: "As I have shaken hands with Himmler, I don't mind shaking hands with the Mufti!"

This may or may not have been an allusion to the reported new rapprochement between the Egyptians and the Mufti, as well as an indication of the possibility that in the event of Arab Palestine standing alone, the odds were that the Mufti would control it.

The Mediator said that he would still ask the Arabs, before leaving for Sweden on Friday, whether they had any reply to our peace offer. For his own part he would not make any new proposals. Upon his return from Sweden he would meet the Arabs and me and review the position. He would then decide whether to make a report to the Assembly and what to report. He hoped very much that the truce would continue and that further exacerbation of feeling would be avoided. It was to him a foregone conclusion that the Assembly would endorse the existence of the State of Israel

and the way would thus be paved for its acceptance by the Arab world.

Throughout the conversation the Count rather significantly avoided any reference to the question of boundaries.

My contribution to the conversation contained the following points:

1) We definitely favoured the truce, though its indefinite duration faced us with formidable problems and though we felt certain that if the war had continued, we would have stood a good chance of conquering the whole of Western Palestine (with this assumption the Mediator concurred, but said he was relieved to hear that we were determined to observe the truce).

2) The impression conveyed to him by the observers that the Jews were "fighting them", was in a sense not unfounded. The presence in Israel of a large body of foreign people coming here to lay down the law on behalf of the U.N. went against the grain of the man in the street. Jews were asking themselves: what had we done to deserve this? Why should Americans, Frenchmen, Belgians and Swedes be coming here to boss us? Is there any such international supervision over France, Belgium or Sweden? Why should we be treated as inferiors, when at long last we had achieved our independence? And so on. It was quite a natural revulsion of feeling [*sic*] which thinking people were trying to suppress but which was quite unmistakably there. (The Mediator said he was very much interested to hear this explanation which had not occurred to him.)

3) I doubted very much whether our agreement to readmit certain categories of Arab refugees would have really raised our stock. Perhaps it would, with idealists, but, unfortunately, the world was not ruled by them. I felt sure that hard-boiled people would have formed a very poor idea of our political acumen. They would most certainly have said: "We thought the Jews were much smarter. Fancy giving away such a trump card without getting anything in return!"

4) On the problem of our relations with the Arab world I explained that for the Arabs to accept Israel signified a difference in kind from their present intransigent attitude, whereas to accept it with a large Arab minority or with a small one, with November 29th boundaries or with a larger area, would merely mean a difference in degree. It might prove impossible to get the Arab States to recognise Israel, but if they were at all prepared for it, I did not think that the territorial or population aspect would prove an insuperable obstacle.

5) On the merits of the question of the refugees, I indicated the vast potentialities of absorption in Syria and Iraq, instancing Jamil Mardam's[2] statement to me that the District of Damascus alone could take in one million more people without anyone being the worse for it, as well as the continuous clamour of Iraq for more population. The resettlement of

2. ג'מיל מרדם, ראש ממשלת סוריה. בשנות השלושים היו פגישות בין מרדם לבין מנהיגים ונציגים ציוניים, ביניהם שרתוק.

300,000 people in those countries was not merely practicable, but in the measure in which it would be accompanied by an investment of new capital obtained from the realisation of assets in Palestine, it would be a distinct boon to the countries and Governments concerned. On the other hand, the State of Israel would much more quickly achieve its full internal stability, and its peaceful relations with the Arab world would be put on a much firmer footing. However pampered the Arab minority in the State of Israel might be, they would always complain of unfair treatment, and their complaints would always act as an irritant in the relations between Israel and her neighbours and serve as a perpetual excuse for the latter to try and interfere in the affairs of the former. In the long run it was in the interests of all concerned that the Arab minority in the State of Israel be a small and not a large one.

6) As to his assurances that the recognition of the effective existence of the State of Israel by the Assembly was a foregone conclusion, the truth was that this question no longer worried our people. To them the existence of their State was such a patent fact that they could not conceive anyone in his senses trying to deny or ignore it. What was worrying them was the question of area and the question of full sovereignty. They were still not quite certain that attempts might not be made to tamper with their freedom in respect of immigration policy, which they would resist at all costs. As to the area, experience had proved that the frontiers must be defensible and that those drawn up in the Assembly's Resolution were not (the Count interjected that the indefensible character of those frontiers was obvious); therefore, there must be additions to the area as fixed in the Resolution. A larger area would, like a smaller Arab minority, make for stability and peace. There was a danger of irredentist leanings in our midst which the Government would have firmly to resist, but which it preferred to see die of themselves. A smaller area might lead to permanent unrest whereas a larger one, even though it would by no means extend to the whole of Western Palestine, would secure complete internal acceptance.

7) As regards the three alternatives for the fate of Arab Palestine, their preferability to us was in the order in which they were mentioned by the Mediator, namely: a separate State was most preferable, and the breaking up of the territory into fragments, each to be annexed by one of the neighbouring States, was the worst possible eventuality, which we would in all probability fight to prevent. We did not exclude the possibility of annexation by Transjordan, seeing that Transjordan was at least administratively, if not financially, a going concern, while Arab Palestine was today, to use Metternich's phrase with regard to Italy, a "mere geographic conception." It was no political entity at all and had no leadership. Still, efforts might be made to find out whether a group of people could not be welded together to serve as a centre for a separate State. While we would not fight to prevent the joining of Arab Palestine with Transjordan, we

were very much disillusioned by King Abdullah's misguided truculence, and, anyhow, a smaller and a weaker neighbour was preferable to a bigger and stronger one. Transjordan and Iraq belonged to the same dynasty and might, in the course of time, be bracketed together under a common crown. The prospects of having the Iraqi Empire right on our doorstep was not one which we could relish. This would be different in a context of complete peace and collaboration: each of the two territories would then offer a good market for the produce of the other. But it would mean giving quite undue hostages to fortune to rely on that prospect, which today, to say the least, was highly problematical.

Over coffee we were joined by General Lundstroem (Sweden), General Riley[3] (U.S.) and Colonel Begley (U.S.) who came accompanied by our liaison officers Shnurman,[4] Adler[5] and Wachs.[6]

The question of our withdrawal from Ajanjul and Buweiriya and the readmission of their Arab villagers was raised.[7] I said that I had authorised the readmission on the express understanding that the villages would remain in our military occupation. The proposition that we should withdraw had not been put to me at all. The Swedes insisted that we must withdraw, while Colonel Begley confirmed that in his talks with us he had agreed we needn't, probably hoping that he could get away with our not withdrawing as far as the Legion was concerned.

Count Bernadotte insisted on our withdrawal, as according to his observers we had occupied those places only during the truce. I said this was news to me, and I could make no comment before inquiring from the General Staff. I added that, assuming for the sake of argument that the observers were right, our withdrawal could only be discussed in the context of a general arrangement which would provide for the withdrawal of Arab forces from all positions which they had occupied during the truce in various parts of the country. I instanced the case of Tel El-Aziziyat and Sakhnin, both in Galilee, and mentioned that there had also been similar incidents in the south. General Lundstroem thought that I was perfectly right, but that we need not wait for a general arrangement: each case could be examined and settled separately.

I enquired about the prospects of water supply and traffic over the main road to Jerusalem via Latrun, and made it clear that to us the readmission of Arabs to those two villages was part of a deal enabling the water supply

.3 גנרל ויליאם ריילי, מפקד משקיפי או"ם האמריקאיים בארץ־ישראל; מסוף ספטמבר 1948, ראש המטה של משקיפי האו"ם בארץ־ישראל.
.4 יוסף שנורמן (שני), קצין־קישור למשקיפי האו"ם בירושלים.
.5 יונה ג'ון אדלר, קצין־קישור למשקיפי האו"ם בירושלים.
.6 צבי וכס, מזכיר צבאי של המושל הצבאי בירושלים.
.7 שני כפרים סמוכים ללטרון. אנשי האו"ם התנו את הפעלתה מחדש של תחנת־השאיבה בלטרון בפינוי הכפרים האלה.

to be re-started. The Swedes denied that there was any element of quid pro quo in the business: each case had to be treated on its merits, etc. Begley agreed on the one hand with the Count by saying that the resumption of the water supply was no condition for the return of the villagers and, on the other hand, with me by confirming that in actual fact the water supply would start functioning as soon as the villagers were allowed to return.

During my tête-à-tête conversation with the Count, and later in the general talk, the question of the violations of the truce in Jerusalem repeatedly came up. The Count reiterated the suggestion he had made to Dr. Joseph that for a period of three days both sides should agree not to react to the firing of the other party in the hope that, as a result, firing would gradually die down and completely subside. I said that this was a question of trust and of practical experience. Supposing the Arabs were encouraged by our not returning their fire into advancing and occupying positions in no-man's-land? Would we still be expected to hold our hand? The question of preventive firing would arise straightaway if we thought they had something of the sort in mind. Actually we did think they had such a design, as witness the fact that they did not evacuate certain positions in no-man's-land which they had expressly undertaken to do in the truce agreement signed by the Commanders on both sides. The first question was to make the Arab Commander honour his signature. Otherwise it was idle to expect us to enter into new arrangements.

The fact that two points in no-man's-land which the Arabs were under obligation to vacate were still in their hands was confirmed in the general talk, and the Count said that this being so, he thought I was right and one had to concentrate first upon making the Arabs play ball as regards their past undertakings. Colonel Begley murmured that he was sure the Arabs would withdraw from those two positions the following morning.[8]

Returning to the question of the water supply, the Count said it was useless to await a formal reply from the Transjordan Government, which appeared to be labouring in this regard under great pressure from the other Arab States. The course he had decided upon was simply to take over the Latrun Pumping Station and run it. This is what they were now going to do.

M. Shertok

8. ראה גם מס׳ 452. הלגיון הערבי לא פינה את עמדותיו בשטח ההפקר והסכם הפסקת־האש בירושלים לא כובד. בעקבות פנייה נוספת של שרתוק הבריק המתווך, שההבטחה לפינוי העמדות בשטח ההפקר ניתנה לו על־ידי מפקד הלגיון הערבי בעיר, שנודע לו ממשקיפיו שאחת העמדות כבר פונתה, ושהוא הורה למשקיפים לדרוש את פינויה של העמדה האחרת לאלתר. ברנאדוט ביקש משרתוק לעשות ככל שידו משגת למען תופסק האש בירושלים. (ראה חילופי מברקים שרתוק־ברנאדוט, 18.8.1948, 130.02/2425/1).

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מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)

M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

העתק משוכפל: 93.03/94/6

[Tel Aviv], 10 August 1948

Sir,

In reply to the cable of the Assistant Secretary-General dated August 3,[1] I beg to request that you convey to the President of the Security Council the following information regarding the four questions contained therein:

1. *Question of Displaced Persons of Jewish Nationality in Europe.* The number of displaced persons of Jewish nationality in Europe dependent upon Jewish charitable support totals approximately 250,000 in camps and other places in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Cyprus, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Tangiers.

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee expends nearly two million dollars every month for their maintenance, relief, vocational training, education and other requirements. Despite this vast expenditure, three years after the war these persons remain utterly uprooted and frustrated, living the demoralizing life of camp inmates and social outcasts, for the most part in places evoking tragic memories of the mass slaughter of their kith and kin and amidst a population which is only prevented by the presence of Allied occupation armies from venting an inveterate hatred against the Jews.

The most recent investigations of this problem were made by Mr. Earl B. Harrison on behalf of the President of the United States;[2] by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States (April 1946); and by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine appointed by the General Assembly (September 1947). All these reports advocated substantial Jewish immigration to Palestine as the only solution affording immediate relief and responding to the wishes of the people concerned. At its second regular session, the General Assembly, in the Resolution on Palestine, recommended that substantial Jewish immigration to Palestine should begin in February 1948 under the full control of the provisional Jewish governmental authorities. It was, however, not possible to comply with this recommendation until Israel became an independent sovereign state on May 14, 1948.

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1. סובולב אל אבן, 3.8.1948 (93.03/94/6); ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 445.
2. האריסון נשלח על־ידי הנשיא טרומן ביוני 1945 לחקור את מצבם של העקורים חסרי המולדת ובמיוחד את מצב העקורים היהודים בגרמניה.

Efforts made by the British and American Governments during the past three years to find suitable areas outside Palestine for the resettlement of Jewish refugees have produced no tangible results. The Provisional Government of Israel which, since the proclamation of the State on May 14, has absorbed 28,551 immigrants, has decided to continue and even enlarge this rate of absorption during the coming months and years. The economy of the State of Israel is urgently in need of working hands — for existing agricultural settlements, industrial enterprises and public works, as well as for the execution of a comprehensive development programme in the coming years.

2. *Question of Arab Refugees in Palestine and Neighbouring Countries.* The number of Arab refugees in Palestine and the neighbouring countries is estimated at about 300,000. Most of them left Palestine during recent months in the wake of the war of aggression launched against Israel by neighbouring Arab States. They left partly in obedience to direct orders by local military commanders, and partly as a result of the panic campaign spread among Palestinian Arabs by the leaders of the invading Arab States.

The primary responsibility for the havoc wrought among the Arab population by the war thus rests with the five Arab States who first actively promoted the anti-Jewish disturbances which followed the decision of the United Nations General Assembly of November 29; and then, upon the termination of the British Mandate, unleashed a full-scale war of aggression against Israel, without any declaration of war, in flagrant violation of their obligations under the Charter, and in defiance of the decision of the General Assembly.

The Provisional Government of the State of Israel did not force these masses of Arabs to leave their homes. Indeed the great majority of them fled before the State of Israel came into existence, at a time when the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power was responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the welfare and security of the population. However, while the invasion of Palestine territory by Arab armies continues and before a peace settlement is reached, the State of Israel is unable to readmit them, apart from exceptional cases on compassionate grounds. Their return would create a most acute security and economic problem, saddle the young State with an incalculable economic and financial responsibility, and affect the balance of military advantage which the present truce is supposed to maintain by directly benefiting the aggressor States, whose lawless invasion of Palestine is the sole cause and origin of the Arab refugee problem.

In the view of the Provisional Government of Israel, the responsibility for providing immediate relief for the Arab refugees should primarily be borne by the Arab States. Only when the aggressors are ready to conclude peace with Israel can the refugee question in its entirety come up for a permanent constructive solution as part of the general peace settlement and

with due regard to Jewish counter-claims for the destruction of life and property caused by Arab aggression as well as to the position of Jewish communities in Arab countries and other relevant considerations.

The Provisional Government of Israel is ever ready to enter into negotiations towards such a settlement and has recently asked the Mediator to transmit its proposal in this regard to the Arab Governments concerned. A full statement of the attitude of the Provisional Government of Israel in this matter is to be found in my letter to the Mediator of July 30 (Doc. S/949).[3]

3. *Question of Relief and Assistance to Above.* The reply to this question is implicit in the previous replies.

4. *Question of Jewish Refugees Detained on Cyprus.* The number of prospective Jewish immigrants detained on Cyprus today totals approximately 12,000, but will be reduced this week by the arrival in Israel of 750 small children, invalids and men above military age, to about 11,500.

The United Kingdom Government is ready to release another 4,000 women, children and old people, but not men between the ages of 18 and 45, who number about 7,500. This refusal is contrary to the express terms of the Security Council Resolution of May 29, which allows men of military age to enter the country provided that they are not conscripted nor trained for military service. It has also been certified by the Mediator to rest on no authority or discretion of his and not to have been requested by him as essential for the maintenance of the truce. The consent of the British authorities to admit the 4,000 dependents has no practical significance, as the wives and children will not leave without their husbands and fathers. Among those still detained are many who have already been held prisoners in Cyprus camps for fourteen months, having previously been in German concentration camps and post-liberation D.P. camps for a total of several years.

Food rations provided by the British authorities are utterly inadequate and the position is only slightly improved by the efforts of Jewish charitable organizations. The continued detention for an indefinite period of thousands of able-bodied people, dooming them to enforced idleness and the impossibility of normal family life, is causing bitter resentment among the detainees, their relatives in Israel and the population of the State of Israel generally. It is moreover contrary to the definite pledges given by the United Kingdom Government prior to the termination of the Mandate that immediately thereafter the Cyprus detainees would be enabled to proceed to Palestine.

The Provisional Government of Israel takes this opportunity of reiterating its most emphatic protest against this lawless procedure which causes gratuitous human suffering and constitutes a breach of the truce agreement. A full statement of the views of the Provisional Government of Israel

3. מס' 406.

on this subject may be found in the letter addressed to the Security Council by the Representative of Israel at the United Nations on August 4 (Doc. S/946).[4]

M. Shertok

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א. גאס אל פ. ברנשטיין ומ. שרתוק
O. Gass to P. Bernstein and M. Shertok

מברק 224
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2420/1

Washington, 10 August 1948

At invitation State Department, Epstein and Gass August 10th had extended discussion relating reopening flow of crude oil to Haifa. Present for State [Department] were Acting Chief [Near] Eastern Office,[1] Chief Near Eastern Division,[2] Chief Petroleum Division[3] and others. State [Department] said there appeared to be differences in their understanding our terms for reopening Haifa in Washington as compared the understanding of their representative Jerusalem, repeat Jerusalem. We suggested they might get clearer picture Tel Aviv or Haifa. Conflict in understanding related to 1) our willingness accept U.N. Mediator control-point Haifa Refinery and 2) our willingness distribute refined products from Haifa when fully operating to all Middle Eastern countries in accordance with past usage. We explained: 1) that Israel rejects internationalising Haifa Port. 2) That Israel rejects internationalising Refinery in any way that goes beyond past practice. 3) That Israel accepts fact that Refinery has international management and that Refinery is in fact a free zone, free of customs duties and other taxes. 4) That Israel accepts U.N. Mediator control-point at Refinery similar to one on Jerusalem road, with sole function of proclaiming that output is going to all consumers in accordance with past usage. Emphasised that output cannot go in accordance 1947 or other past usage until full production restored, but that continuous approximation past usage possible as full output approached. Emphasised also willingness accept owners' management of Refinery, provided accompanied by full production and supply. All State Department officers present expressed complete satisfaction with our point of view and promised to communicate it promptly to their representatives for urgent action. We fail understand

4. מס' 417.

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1. ג'וזף צ'. סאטרתווייט.
2. גורדון ה. מאטיסון.
3. רוברט ה. איקנס.

what misunderstandings can have necessitated today's meeting in view of our clear coverage of these points in our Memoranda of June 16th and July 27th[4] and the corresponding cables to you.

Gass[5]

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 683
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

New York, 11 August 1948

Your MH965.[1] Your meaning clear, will merely include subject in reporting on reactions various delegations without however advocating admission of neighbour[2] to facilitate own entry. Will report reaction if any. In previous conversation[3] he expressed good-humoured curiosity about how neighbour would prove himself independent, effective, peaceloving.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
A. Eban to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/127/9

[New York], 11 August 1948

Will shortly submit formal memorandum Parodi on arguments our admission United Nations.[1] U.S.A., U.S.S.R. have formally assured support; believe France holds balance of influence, ought not wish be responsible perpetuating uncertainty another year. Have you any preliminary reaction their attitude this subject? Canada, Belgium, privately inform us our case for eligibility very strong, only outstanding question opportune time.[2]

Eban

4. מס' 195, 385.
5. ראה מס' 450 וגם מברקו של ברנשטיין אל גאס מיום 12.8.1948 (93.01/2207/1), שבו הודיע על מחסור חמור בנפט גולמי.

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1. מס' 433.
2. עבר־הירדן.
3. אולי מוסב על השיחה עם י. מאליק ב־5 באוגוסט — ראה מס' 447.

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1. ראה מס' 430, הערה 7.
2. בתשובה הודיע פישר, שעניין קבלת ישראל לאו"ם עדיין לא נדון במשרד־החוץ הצרפתי, אך על־פי המידע שבידו, העניין יידון ברוח חיובית, אך לא לפני תחילת חודש ספטמבר. (ראה פישר אל אבן, 13.8.1948, 93.03/127/9).

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 112/117 התקבל: 12.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 11 August 1948

On Shiva Rao's[1] recommendation saw today his brother,[2] newly appointed Indian Ambassador. He is shrewd and highly cultivated person. He said Indian public more friendly towards us than before, but Government will remain cautious, view large Moslem minority and position other Dominions. He accused British for supporting Moslem Indians and the aggressive trend in Moslems everywhere. Jewish prestige been raised positively among colonial people as result our fight British.

I enquired informally whether Indian Government be interested start relations Israel along cultural and economic lines prior to establishment official relations. He will consult Nehru, and said our initiative in this respect will probably be most welcomed. He suggested further continuation our conversation.

Epstein

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2384/21

[New York], 12 August 1948

Subject: Note on conversation with Mr. Jacob Malik

On August 5th, after a discussion on procedural matters arising from his Presidency of the Security Council, Mr. Malik turned to a general discussion of the Near Eastern situation.

He expressed his deep admiration of Israel's military effort. The Soviet view had always been that the Arabs were overrated as a military power, and they had reached this conclusion out of their view of the social weaknesses of the Near East and of the essential disunity amongst the various elements of the Arab League. Nevertheless, they had not expected any such débâcle.

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1. ב. שיווה ראו, עיתונאי הודי, חבר משלחת הודו לאו"ם.
2. סר בנגאל רמה ראו.

Mr. Malik informed me that it was now the unanimous view amongst all delegations that the State of Israel was an irrevocable fact. I asked him if that applied even to those who were behaving as though no State of Israel existed. He repeated his view that all members of the Security Council — and, he believed, even the Arab member,[1] in the secret depths of his heart — were now of the view that the State of Israel had come to stay.

In the ensuing discussion on the nature of Arab society and culture, it became clear to me that the Soviets regard themselves as having made a correct analysis and a correct decision, of which they now expect to reap the fruits. He hinted that he assumed our appreciation of the fact that the various forms of assistance which we had received from East European and Balkan countries were in the last resort a consequence of Russia's favourable attitude.

His government assumed that an event so drastic as losing the Palestine war could not pass the Arab world by without deep effects. They expected that there would be some questioning of the popular character of the regimes and that we might look forward to a period of increasing upheaval. I analyzed the defects of the Arab social structure by a detailed description of Egyptian society with the relevant statistics. This appeared to interest him deeply, and he asked for such material as we had on these subjects to be brought to his attention. He repeatedly expressed the view that the Arab League's military adventure responded in no way to the interests of the Arab people. He further hinted that the British position had been undermined, not merely in Palestine but throughout the Near East, and that this too represented success for the Soviets' Palestine policy.

We discussed the social, economic and cultural future of Israel. He was anxious to know details of industrial prospects, and expressed the opinion that the economic and social effects of Israel's development would have a profound influence on the Middle East as a whole. He agreed with me that it was this prospect which explained much of the opposition to Israel's development. He indicated that he would like more precise knowledge concerning our industrial and social programme for the next few years.

Conclusion: It is clear that while the U.S.S.R. has a great deal of subjective sympathy for our cause, its attitude rests on the still more stable foundation of enlightened self-interest. They regard their decision to support Jewish statehood as having triumphantly justified itself in terms of the essential objectives which they pursue in the Near East. Those objectives do not include any hope that Israel will become a satellite of the Eastern bloc. No resentment is ever expressed in these conversations against our obvious interest in improving our relations with the Western powers. The Soviets,

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1. נציג סוריה.

however, are aware that their attitude deserves and is probably earning sympathy for them in Israel as well as in certain sections of American public opinion. It also strengthens their moral position in the United Nations. These gains for them are entirely compatible with our own independence. It is the essential fact of Jewish statehood rather than the orientation of the State which conforms with their objectives at this time.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 691
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/72/16

[New York], 12 August 1948

Propose submitting Security Council delegations memorandum on admission under following headings:[1] 1) Israel is peace-loving state within meaning Article Four, Paragraph One,[2] which constitutes sufficient grounds admission. 2) Assembly already recommended acceptance our admission by virtue part I, F November Resolution,[3] all of whose conditions have been fulfilled. Admission Israel not dependent admission Arab State. Independence Israel has become effective both in general sense and accordance formal definition part I, F November Resolution. Brief account follows proving effectiveness independence governmental authority. 3) Short comment on relations Jewish people and Israel United Nations. 4) Israel's admission is factor of stability, creating lawful irrevocable facts, thus deterring aggression by removing its main objective; early admission is therefore element peaceful adjustment, non-admission prolongs uncertainty, encourages violence. Assume it is realized submission such memorandum, while not equivalent formal application or requiring immediate Council action, is regarded as moral commitment to apply admission. Publication this memorandum to be occasion favourable press comment here.

Eban

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1. ראה מס' 430 והערה 7 שם.
2. של מגילת האו"ם.
3. ראה מס' 403.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

93.03/72/16 :תזכיר

[New York], 12 August 1948

Subject: Admission of Israel to the United Nations

We have now approached all delegations on the Security Council with the exception of Syria and China; the latter will be seen in the next few days. The French, Canadian and Belgian representatives have referred to their governments for a preliminary opinion. The United Kingdom believes that the application would now be premature and can only be seriously considered in the light of the situation existing when the Assembly convenes.

2. One feature emerges very clearly from all our conversations. There is no serious attempt to question our eligibility in terms of Article IV of the Charter; or to deny that Israel is a peace-loving state; or to pretend that a case can be made out against us as a satellite of a great power, introduced not on its own merits but in order to reinforce a great power's influence. In fact, it seems clear that the neutral powers on the Security Council would find themselves hard-pressed at this moment to give a reasoned judgment for non-admission. Their embarrassment is increased by their past declarations in favour of universality and by the International Court of Justice which has given an advisory opinion to the effect that ineligibility under Article IV should be the only valid grounds for refusing admission.[1]

3. From this there follows the argument which the delegations of France, Canada and Colombia have frankly stated, namely, that the only outstanding question is the choice of time (French: *opportunité*). Would our admission assist the process of mediation or obstruct it? Should it follow a "final settlement" or might it be a factor in that final settlement? It becomes clearer each day that our exposition must concentrate on the theme that our admission would be a factor of stability and permanence and therefore of an accelerated settlement.

4. For some reason these delegations believe that a great beam of light will appear on the horizon at the end of September relieving the present alleged obscurity. It is difficult to find any grounds for this belief. Few of them consider that the Assembly is likely to be any more decisive in spirit than the Special Assembly.[2] The argument rather boils down to the feeling

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1. ראה חוות־הדעת של בית־הדין הבינלאומי מיום 28.5.1948, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48*, pp. 796-801.

2. העצרת המיוחדת השנייה של האו"ם, שזומנה באפריל 1948 כדי לדון בשאלת ארץ־ישראל וההצעה האמריקאית למשטר נאמנות זמני.

that the opportunities of close mutual consultations on a high level will enable these powers to make their decision more rapidly. (It should not be overlooked that permanent delegations here are composed, as a matter of course, of civil servants and career diplomats.)

5. In the light of the above and until we can estimate the strength of the American effort on our behalf, no calculation of prospects can be made. I shall be in Washington on Wednesday to meet with Mr. Ben Cohen and with Mr. Gross of the United States delegation and also perhaps with a member of the U.N. Division of the State Department.

6. Whatever our prospects are, they will only reach their full potentiality if we file an application. I wish to report my opinion that we should apply early in the proceedings of the Assembly, whether or not our acceptance is certain. My reasons are as follows:

a. Nothing is to be gained from withholding our submission. If anything, the effects of not applying will be worse than the effects of an unsuccessful application. Everybody will understand that non-application is a sign of certainty that we do not have the votes. Nothing therefore is gained or avoided by way of lost prestige.

b. The act of submitting our application forces our supporters to commit themselves. The United States and Soviet Union delegations, in the course of the arguments, will be called upon repeatedly to make pronouncements defending our eligibility, our peace-loving character, our effective independence, etc. etc. This process itself, whatever its results, is an important asset for our position in the United States, where we need to seize every opportunity of pressing home and emphasizing the American commitment. If, in addition, as does not seem impossible, we could get the support of France, Canada and Colombia, or one or two of them, this argument becomes stronger still. The very fact that we are a state whose application for membership is most seriously considered by certain great and small powers, makes the efforts of Arabs and others to revoke our sovereignty appear increasingly fantastic.

c. It may be urged that we should avoid the situation of Italy, Finland, etc., whose applications have for the moment been rejected and who are in the unenviable waiting-room. There are, however, two points to be made against this apprehension. In the first place, it is no mean thing to be on a level with Italy and Finland, which are states of unimpeachable sovereignty; to be on a level with them is perhaps better than to have a *sui generis* character in which our international identity is obscured. Once we were on a level with them, we should immediately have a better position, since the only factor obstructing their admission is their alleged satellite status and the general atmosphere of American-Soviet rivalry. Where this factor does not apply, the obstacles to admission are not considerable or serious.

d. There appears to be growing public pressure in England in favour of stabilization and recognition. It would be embarrassing for the British representative to make a far-fetched argument against our admission. The easiest thing for him would be not to pronounce on the issue at all. We have no reason to make life easier for this school of international thought.

e. A methodical diplomatic and public relations campaign can only revolve around an actual application for admission. It cannot be worked up to serious dimensions around the prospect of such an application.

7. In arguing the above, I should not like to be interpreted as regarding rejection as a certainty. It seems important however that we should have it firmly in our minds that in all circumstances and conditions we are going to apply. I believe that this certainty would have a deep moral effect on the quality of our own work. In this, as in many other recent episodes, the factor of challenge is vital in that it forces the logic and merit of our position to the stage of decision, and reveals the advocates of procrastination as having no counsel or resource.

8. A scrutiny of our statehood, peace-loving character and eligibility is something to which we can submit ourselves with confidence.

I should like to be informed whether this general approach is endorsed, and especially, whether it can be assumed that our application will, in all events, be submitted.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH1010

נוסח יוצא: 130.02/2420/1

[Tel Aviv], 13 August 1948

Disturbed by Oscar [Gass]'s[1] 224. Paragraph three unwarranted, first part factually, second politically. Formulation point four too far-reaching by way acceptance control; would prefer greater elasticity, enabling verification that distribution proceed as agreed, without use that particular terminology. Cable comments.[2] Main unknown is Iraq's attitude. Accor-

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1. מס׳ 443.
2. ראה מס׳ 460 ומברק של אפשטיין וגאס מיום 18.8.1948 (130.09/2308/6). במברק נאמר, שהמשא־ומתן עם מחלקת־המדינה בעניין הנפט התנהל מאז יוני 1948 על־פי קווים שאושרו על־ידי שרתוק; שרתוק נתבקש להודיע אם ברצונו לשנות את ההנחיות, אף ששינוי כזה, לדברי אפשטיין וגאס, יביא לידי הפסקת השיחות עם מחלקת־המדינה וחברות הנפט האמריקאיות. ראה גם מברק נוסף מאת אפשטיין אל שרתוק מאותו יום, 130.09/2308/6.

dance message transmitted Mediator by Consul General Jerusalem, State Department assures Iraq's readiness restart flow,[3] whereas accordance our monitoring Iraq declared would do so only on condition no oil used by Israel but all reexported.

Shertok

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

אור ליום 12.8.1948 פוצצו ערבים את תחנת השאיבה בלטרון, שנמצאה בשטח ההפקר, ומנעו בכך את חידוש אספקת המים לירושלים דרך הצינור הישן. ב־12 באוגוסט הודיע המתווך למועצת־הביטחון, שבעקבות הפיצוץ הוא הודיע לממשלת ישראל, שתעכב את פינוי שני הכפרים — (שבו התנה קודם את חידוש הזרמת המים לירושלים - ראה מס' 441 והערה 7 שם). הודעת המתווך ראה מסמך או"ם S/963.

למחרת נדונה השאלה במועצת־הביטחון. בסיום הדיון הוחלט, שנשיא המועצה יודיע למתווך, שהמועצה לקחה לתשומת־לבה את הודעתו מיום 12 באוגוסט ומורה לו לעשות את כל המאמצים הנחוצים כדי להבטיח אספקת מים לתושבי ירושלים (ראה *SCOR, Third Year,* 349th Meeting, 13.8.1948).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH1031
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 13 August 1948

Further regarding Security Council.[1] Please make statement at Council meeting following lines: First, instruction regarding Latrun. After outrage demonstrated either Arab Legion's bad faith or its inability prevent mischief, while U.N. staff likewise proved incapable secure resumption water supply either by negotiations or by direct action, and even protect plant from destruction, we urge U.N. place us in occupation pumping station for repairing damage and assisting us obtain necessary machinery quickest possible way, otherwise shall be constrained regard ourselves free take whatever action may deem appropriate view ensuring full-scale water supply Jerusalem. Instruction ends. For your information: 1) Emergency water supply from Hulda via Bab el Wad started yesterday almost in nick

3. ראה מס' 424, עמ' 483־484.

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1. ביום הקודם הבריק שרתוק אל אבן את נוסח פנייתו אל נשיא מועצת־הביטחון בעניין פיצוץ תחנת־השאיבה בלטרון — ראה הערת־עורך לעיל. (המברק בתיק 130.09/2329/1).

of time for replenishing dwindling water stock of city, but this will only slightly increase present extremely meagre war rations, probably unexceed one fifth normal. 2) We also consider laying pipes from main Ras el Ain line, link up with Hulda supply, but this will again result only slight further increase, enabling us utilise Hulda pipes to capacity, while size these pipes remains limiting factor. 3) Mediator offered us assistance regarding latter operation. Our reply is any alternative emergency scheme can only provide extremely limited relief, and no such scheme requires U.N. assistance as we control territory and possess pipes. 4) Only real solution is restarting Latrun, where we do require U.N. assistance for occupation station and securing new machinery unobtainable Israel. Unless this forthcoming, shall be free act our own regarding Latrun. 5) Mediator probably take advantage Latrun crisis press his programme armed U.N. guards. We should discourage such move *vis-à-vis* delegations and even discountenance it in open Council, emphasising can rely only on ourselves. Background explanation ends. Second instruction regarding truce generally. State behalf Memisrael they unable contemplate indefinite duration truce, which in absence peace and in view continued presence invading armies on soil Palestine, imposes on them heavy burden war expenditure, prevents them effectively tackling reconstruction, also subjects them international supervision, which utterly unwarranted in long run, and forces them contend with attempts limit their freedom regarding immigration policy. Therefore we urge fixing early time-limit for present truce, by which either peace must be concluded or invading armies must leave, on understanding that failing either, we resume freedom action as only way out of present impasse, of untenability of which Latrun outrage is such glaring demonstration.

Shertok

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

מברק MH1030
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/128/9

Tel Aviv, 13 August 1948

Further for Security Council meeting. Connection press reports Mediator accusing us aggressiveness Jerusalem and stating he received affirmative reply from Arabs to his order unreturn fire while we haven't yet replied,[1] facts are as follows: 1) We unaware on what grounds allegation

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1. המתווך אמר את הדברים בשיחה עם עיתונאים בשדה־התעופה בחיפה ב־11 באוגוסט, לפני צאתו מהארץ. (ראה נקודות מתוך שיחה של הרוזן ברנאדוט עם עיתונאים, 130.02/2425/1).

regarding our aggressiveness is based. Joseph, myself, refuted this charge in conversations with Mediator in Jerusalem.[2] 2) On August 10th, at meeting Jerusalem, Mediator sought my reaction to proposal he made previously to our Military Governor to effect both sides should undertake unreturn fire for three days, view putting end present sporadic sniping, shelling. Myself replied he should first get Arab Legion to honour undertaking signed by both commanders evacuate positions in no-man's land — which we did, Legion didn't — only then new arrangement discussable. Myself explained would be extremely difficult for us undertake unreact to Arab firing in absence this indication good faith their part, as firing might be prelude to occupation further positions, which we by unfiring be unable prevent. Mediator agreed this was reasonable attitude and undertook action accordingly. 3) While above positions remain in Arab Legion's occupation and we unaware whether, what, steps taken secure their evacuation, Mediator addressed Joseph letter August 11th, which also addressed Arab Legion, containing order that "firing of any kind, even in answer to firing by other party, shall be forbidden as from Friday, August 13th, 0600 Israeli time", not for three days but for indefinite period. Letter also contains sentence "self-defence must be limited to real defence and not extended to unnecessary exchange of shots."[3] 4) Joseph replied today as follows:[4] From beginning truce we urged Mediator's staff put end sniping, ordered our people unsnipe. This order now been repeated with addition sniping from other side should be un-answered. This order be maintained for reasonable time, view enabling U.N. observers put end sniping other side. We unable agree similar rules should apply shelling since one mortar or artillery shot capable destroying entire position, therefore if such weapons used against us, shall be obliged reply in self-defence, view preventing destruction. We draw attention fact that after agreement regarding lines no-man's land signed by Arab and Israeli commanders Jerusalem, Arab Legion occupied and continues in occupation buildings and positions within that zone; therefore, unless next few days observers able prevail Legion evacuate accordance their undertaking, shall consider ourselves free to eject them view enforcing no-man's land arrangement; also if during truce Arabs occupy new positions and observers unable provide redress, shall consider ourselves entitled take action. In general, if attacked, shall be obliged defend ourselves and repel attack, but if Arabs honour their signature or if observers succeed rectifying position as agreed between two parties and indicated on map initialled by both, and if Arabs unopen fire and unattempt violate truce, then truce will be complete, as we on our part shall not assume offensive nor open fire generally in violation truce. Gist Joseph's letter ends.

Shertok

2. ראה מס' 441. 3. המכתב בתיק 130.02/2443/2.
4. ראה יוסף אל ריילי, 13.8.1948, 130.02/2443/2.

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ה.ביילין אל ו. איתן
H. Beilin to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.02/2412/26

חיפה, ז׳ באב תש״ח
13 באוגוסט 1948

שיחה עם מר מריוט, 7.8.48

[1][.....]

כאשר שאלתיו אם, ומתי, תחזור ההנהלה הבריטית לתפקידה,[2] אמר כי הוא מניח שמתנהל משא־ומתן ברגע זה, אך עלי להבין כי אין כאן רק עניינים מסחריים גרידא. ישנם, אמר, שלושה צדדים המעוניינים בנפט: אנו (הבריטים), היהודים והערבים. לאמריקה אין כל השפעה על הערבים — בזה אין כל ספק. על הבריטים אפוא לשמור על האינטרסים שלהם וגם של הערבים.

יכול הוא [מריוט] לאמר לי כרגע — המשיך — ולא יתנגד אם אמסור את אשר הוא אומר לשר־החוץ (אף כי לא היה רוצה שהדבר יפורסם בעיתונות), שהוא עושה מאמצים כבירים כדי למצוא ״מודוס ויוונדי״ בו יכירו באיזה אופן שהוא במדינת ישראל, אף כי אין ממשלתו מוכנה להכיר בנו רשמית. הוא הציע כבר למשרד־החוץ הבריטי שיסדרו שהוא או דאו,[3] לפי הוראות מלונדון, יבקש פגישה עם שר־החוץ שלנו. זה יתפרש כמובן — ובצדק — כהכרה בנו. אין הוא חושש שההתנגדות מצד הערבים תהיה חזקה במידה שתהיה באם ממשלת בריטניה תצהיר ברגע זה שהיא מכירה במדינת ישראל. הוא מתחיל להרגיש, כי מתפקידו להצביע על העובדה שהמדינה קיימת. מצבו ביחס אלינו — כשאין אנו מכירים בו, ולא הוא בנו, באופן רשמי — הוא ללא נשוא (intolerable).

שיחתנו הופסקה על־ידי בואו של מר שרינגהם. כנראה לא רצה מר מריוט להמשיך לדבר על הנושא הזה בנוכחותו.

ה. ביילין

נאלצתי לכתוב בעיפרון, כי מכונת־הכתיבה העברית שלנו נתקלקלה, ואתך הסליחה.
ה.ב.

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1. החלק הראשון של השיחה לא הודפס כאן. הוא עוסק בביקור צפוי של אנשי משטרת ישראל בקונסוליה הבריטית בחיפה כדי לברר שאלות בנוגע לסגל העובדים שלה ולנשק הנמצא ברשותם.
2. הנהלת בתי־הזיקוק — ראה הערת־עורך, עמ׳ 392־393.
3. סר יו דאו, הקונסול הכללי של בריטניה בירושלים.

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שיחת מ. פישר — ר. שומאן (בפאריס, ב־14 באוגוסט 1948)

Meeting: M. Fischer — R. Schuman (Paris, 14 August 1948)

העתק: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 15 août 1948

L'audience avait été motivée par mon désir de faire une visite de courtoisie au nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères. On m'avait recommandé de ne pas abuser de cette circonstance pour soulever des problèmes politiques, mais M. Schuman lui-même m'en a donné l'occasion.

Comme la conversation a porté d'abord sur la trêve et sur l'action de Bernadotte, au sujet duquel M. Schuman a exprimé une opinion défavorable, il m'a été facile d'éviter que M. Schuman ne prenne une attitude critique à l'égard de notre nouvelle position, en ce qui concerne Jérusalem, en prenant les devants et en critiquant âprement la proposition de Bernadotte concernant la remise aux Arabes de la Ville Sainte. J'ai remarqué, d'ailleurs, que M. Schuman avait lu la note que j'avais remise à ce sujet au Quai d'Orsay.[1] Il a lui-même dit qu'il concevait fort bien que la proposition de Bernadotte devait avoir eu pour effet de raidir notre position.

J'attribue à la dernière bévue de Neuville, concernant les Soeurs de Sion, d'Aïn-Kerem,[2] le fait que M. Schuman n'a fait aucune remarque lorsque je l'ai assuré de notre désir constant de respecter les Lieux Saints et les Etablissements français.

J'ai remercié M. Schuman pour l'aide morale et matérielle que nous avait apportée la France et pour tous les gestes qui prouvaient que le gouvernement français envisageait la nécessité de nous reconnaître. J'ai, en particulier, demandé que l'envoi d'un Chargé de Mission souffre aussi peu de délai que possible.[3]

M. Schuman m'a dit que le nouveau gouvernement n'avait pas encore discuté la question de Palestine et que cette discussion aurait lieu dans les quinze jours à venir. Le gouvernement devra ratifier la décision de l'envoi d'un Chargé de Mission et devra étudier, non seulement la question de la reconnaissance, mais aussi arrêter ses positions de principe pour la prochaine session de l'O.N.U.

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1. ראה מס' 400 והערה 1 שם.
2. נוויל התלונן — ומיד התנצל וחזר בו — על הרחקתן כביכול של נזירות "אחיות ציון" מהמנזר בעין כרם. (ראה חילופי מברקים, פישר — משרד־החוץ, 11־12.8.1948, 130.10/2540/3).
3. ראה מס' 413.

J'ai exposé les raisons pour lesquelles la reconnaissance, par la France, avant la session de l'O.N.U., était essentielle. M. Schuman m'a dit que je connaissais certainement les difficultés qui avaient jusqu'ici empêché cette reconnaissance, mais qu'il estimait fort possible que la position que la France serait amenée à prendre à l'O.N.U., serait facilitée par une reconnaissance préalable.

J'ai ensuite exposé à M. Schuman sous quelle forme j'envisageais que la reconnaissance pourrait se faire sans éveiller les réactions que craignent les résidents d'Afrique du Nord. Là-dessus, M. Schuman m'a déclaré qu'il était heureux de pouvoir me dire que plusieurs députés musulmans lui avaient dit qu'ils comprenaient fort bien que la France devrait reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël mais qu'ils lui demandaient seulement de ne pas agir avec précipitation. "Il y a là un changement d'attitude très caractéristique."

A la fin de l'entretien, M. Schuman m'a affirmé qu'il était persuadé que les intérêts français et israéliens étaient liés. Il comprenait parfaitement notre position et il espérait que nous comprenions celle de la France. J'ai répondu que nous apprécions pleinement la délicatesse de certaines situations, mais qu'elles ne pouvaient pas avoir le même poids que des intérêts qui sont vitaux, non seulement pour nous mais encore pour tous ceux qui, tôt ou tard, auront à faire face aux adversaires auxquels nous avons opposé une résistance victorieuse.

J'ai enfin demandé à M. Schuman de m'indiquer le membre de son Cabinet qui serait chargé de maintenir la liaison avec moi. M. Schuman a dit que son Directeur de Cabinet, spécialiste des Finances, était trop ignorant de la question et qu'il désignait donc le sous-directeur du Cabinet, M. de Bourbon-Busset, qui est diplomate, et auquel il donnerait les instructions nécessaires.

M. Schuman, au cours de tout l'entretien, était très cordial et attentif. Il a fait allusion à "votre président, le Dr. Weizmann, que j'ai eu l'honneur de rencontrer" et à "votre ministre des Affaires étrangères."

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 716
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 16 August 1948

Suggest you ask Mediator's staff what action it proposes taking to comply with Security Council instruction ensuring swift resumption

water.[1] This resolution was intended cover any effective steps such as purchase engines, allow access engineers etc. Might be useful have some answer by Wednesday meeting.[2]

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 717
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 16 August 1948

Reference our attitude truce limitation,[1] presume Memisrael intention at present is discredit idea permanent truce, focus attention on early need peace settlement. Presume you don't wish me make formal request Council for fixing time-limit. Council would certainly reply by requesting Mediator's opinion since this involves revision of truce terms. Presume you agree inadvisability bring Council into emergency sessions during September under Cadogan's presidency, which otherwise limited one week only at end month. Ben-Gurion speech[2] [and] your interview,[3] as reported here, interpreted by some as threat renew hostilities; would be helpful if I could say that while Memisrael advocates earliest conclusion truce, so long as truce in force, it will observe it to extent that it isn't violated by other side. Please cable whether my understanding correct and particularly whether any action required Council beyond declaration our viewpoint.[4]

Eban

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 518.
2. ישיבת מועצת־הביטחון שזומנה לדיון בהמשך קיומה של ההפוגה — ראה מס' 464 והערה 2 שם. בתשובה למברק הזה ציין שרתוק, שהמתווך מקיים ככל הנראה קשר עם מועצת־הביטחון בדבר רכישת ציוד חדש לתחנת־השאיבה. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 17.8.1948, 130.09/2329/1).

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1. ראה מס' 451.
2. בישיבת הפתיחה של מועצת האיחוד העולמי של פועלי־ציון — התאחדות, ב־14.8.1948, הצהיר בן־גוריון שמדינת ישראל לא תסכים להפוגה ללא הגבלת זמן, ואם לא יהיה בכוחו של האו"ם להבטיח את השלום בזמן הקרוב, תצטרך מדינת ישראל לעשות זאת בכוחה היא. (ראה "דבר", 15.8.1948).
3. הכוונה כנראה לראיון שנתן שרתוק לכתב ה־*New York Daily Worker*, שבמהלכו השמיע דברי ביקורת על גישתו הבסיסית של המתווך ועל הצעות הפתרון שלו, שמהוות פרס לתוקפנות. הראיון פורסם ב־*Palestine Post* מיום 13.8.1948.
4. ראה מס' 464.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 47/85
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/19

Tel Aviv, 16 August 1948

Please try explore following approach President. He should address Arab Governments following terms: Truce is practicable and makes sense only if leads to peace within reasonable period. Absence early peace prospects causing progressive /violations/ truce, making its sliding into renewal full-scale war inevitable. Therefore, unless they respond Israeli peace offer, there can be no guarantee for indefinite continuation truce, and if war is renewed as result their rejection offer, it will be difficult for him resist public pressure for lifting embargo in favour Israel. Cable views.

Shertok

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן
M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 16 août 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

Je vous envoie ci-joint les comptes rendus de mes entretiens avec M. Schuman et avec Guy Mollet.[1]

1. J'ai ébauché une formule que j'essaye de lancer par divers moyens directs et indirects et qui a reçu un accueil favorable dans le parti socialiste, dans le parti M.R.P. et chez certains fonctionnaires du Quai d'Orsay.

La difficulté pour la reconnaissance est principalement celle de choisir le moment. En effet, il n'y a pas un fait nouveau qui puisse justifier que la reconnaissance se fasse aujourd'hui plutôt que demain ou dans un mois.

L'autre difficulté est la situation en Afrique du Nord. Cette difficulté peut être très grave s'il y a des élections cantonales en Algérie, cet automne. Il est probable qu'elles n'auront pas lieu, mais en attendant, tous les partis qui briguent des voix en Afrique du Nord se montrent très réservés pour des raisons de plateforme électorale.

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1. הדין־וחשבון על הפגישה עם שומאן ראה מס׳ 454. הראיון עם גי מולה, המזכיר הכללי של המפלגה הסוציאליסטית בצרפת, מצורף למכתב, אך לא הודפס כאן.

Dans ces circonstances, ma formule tend à porter l'effort maximum sur le plan gouvernemental. Une reconnaissance qui aurait lieu entre le 1er et le 15 septembre après le début des vacances parlementaires éviterait les interventions de députés musulmans. Bref, ma formule est la suivante:

Le gouvernement français publierait une note dans la première quinzaine de septembre, dans laquelle il serait dit que, de l'avis du gouvernement, une série d'événements s'échelonnant sur une période de plusieurs mois et allant depuis la reprise des relations postales et l'établissement, à Paris, d'une Représentation du Gouvernement Provisoire d'Israël jusqu'à l'envoi auprès du Gouvernement d'Israël d'un Chargé de Mission, constituait une reconnaissance de fait.

J'ai eu l'impression, au cours de mon entretien avec Schuman, que Marc Sangnier,[2] qui avait été touché à ce sujet, et qui est un des principaux dirigeants M.R.P. de M. Schuman, lui en avait déjà parlé.

[.....][3]

Maurice Fischer

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מ. קומיי אל צ. אינפלד[1] (יוהנסבורג)
M. Comay to Z. Infeld (Johannesburg)

העתק: 93.02/181/5

[London], 17 August 1948

Confidential,

Dear Zvi,

I meant to drop you a line from New York just before I left to give you the latest picture there, but my plane went off on Saturday instead of Sunday, so I am doing so from here, which enables me to say something about the London end as well.

It has now become unlikely that the "Palestine Question" will once again be fully dealt with by separate committees, etc., at the General Assembly in Paris. It will, of course, come up in the reports of various organs, such as the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Social Economic Council, and we shall ask the right to participate in any such discussions, although our new status as a non-member State presents greater procedu-

2. מארק סאנייה, נשיא כבוד של ה־M.R.P., אחד משני הנשיאים של הוועד הצרפתי למען הכרה בישראל.
3. חלקו האחרון של המכתב לא הודפס כאן.

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1. צבי אינפלד, המזכיר הכללי של ההסתדרות הציונית בדרום־אפריקה.

ral difficulties than confronted the Jewish Agency as a non-Governmental Agency. Up to recently, it has been assumed that the Mediator would try to gain the support of the General Assembly for his original set of proposals, or some revised edition of them. Although this cannot be ruled out entirely, the indications are to the contrary. His tentative proposals have met with complete lack of response from any quarter; he now seems rather deflated, and is concentrating on the truce plus a couple of other issues like the Arab refugees and the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, and is remaining inactive regarding any more long-range political settlement. Dr. Bunche, who is at present in New York to press for more support regarding observers and equipment, has stated in private conversation that the Mediator is not obliged by his terms of reference to render a political report to the General Assembly, and will concentrate now on the issues I have mentioned above, leaving major political questions to take care of themselves for the time being. Coming from Bunche, this is significant; in a long discussion which Eban and I had with Count Bernadotte and Bunche at Lake Success, the day before Bernadotte returned from there,[2] it became clear to us that Bunche was the real author of the political proposals, and it was Bunche who defended them to us in the Count's presence.

Generally, Bernadotte's stock is not very high at present, although the Security Council remains only too happy to let him go on carrying the baby wihout their interference. We gather that the top people in the United Nations Secretariat are not enamoured of his efforts — firstly, because he has ridden roughshod over the November 29 Resolution, which the Secretariat is most anxious to maintain as intact as possible, for the sake of U.N. itself; secondly, they are wary of his tendency to saddle U.N. with commitments and responsibilities which it does not want — for instance, getting the U.N. flag involved with the oil interest in Haifa. Nor is Washington at all pleased with his handling of the ticklish Jerusalem problem. His proposal to give it to Abdullah was embarrassing in the United States; while his most recent proposal for demilitarizing the city, by installing a garrison drawn from the three truce countries, has met with a very chilly reception from the State Department, which has no intention of getting American troops involved there. Our own attitude towards him has stiffened a great deal lately, as you are aware; and although this might make many people irritated with us, it further undermines the Mediator's position, which is after all dependent upon the amount of cooperation he can get from both sides. We would remove [him] from the scene altogether if we had the option. His mere presence there is unsettling, and he remains a potential instrument of pressure against us for territorial and other concessions.

We were recently tipped off that through Ambassador Douglas the Foreign Office sought an indication from the State Department as to the

2. ראה מס' 338.

possibility of Anglo-American backing for Bernadotte's proposals,[3] to which the American reaction was non-committal or even unfavourable.

Since there is little prospect of any settlement in the near future either through Bernadotte or by direct negotiation, the general tendency amongst Governments and U.N. delegations is to try and keep the situation static and prolong a military and political stalemate. Opinion in Israel, on the other hand, is piling up behind the urge to bring matters to a head. This kind of uncertain and indefinite truce is an economic and psychological strain, and is made the pretext for withholding international recognition and admission to U.N. We have seen this recently in investigating the prospects for our admission. We are assured of the support of only three countries on the Security Council — the U.S.A., Soviet Russia and the Ukraine. Other countries that we need in order to make up the minimum of seven votes — such as Canada, France, Belgium, Colombia — are playing "hard to get." There is also no sign that the United States is genuinely and actively trying to rally support for our admission. The countries I have mentioned, or their U.N. representatives, do not dispute our qualifications for admission under Article 4 of the Charter, but they are sitting tight in the hope that something might turn up out of the truce or Bernadotte's efforts or out of renewed discussion in Paris, which might make it easier for them to support us. For reasons I have set out above, the prospects of such daylight suddenly appearing are remote. Under the circumstances, we may have to make up our minds within the next month or so, whether to drop our application for the time being or lodge it and run the risk of rejection. The latter course would at least compel our reluctant potential supporters to face up to the necessity of adopting a definite attitude.

Although we have made considerable progress during the last couple of months in consolidating our position before the Security Council, it remains a weak one when it comes to votes. As a rule, there is a group favourable to us consisting of the U.S.A., the two Slav countries and France, and a hostile group which includes the United Kingdom, Syria, China and Belgium. Both Canada and Colombia have also been largely swayed by Britain, but lately we have succeeded in pulling them over a little bit. Toff is at present visiting Colombia and certain other Latin American countries, and hopes to do some good there. Argentine, the eleventh country, never has anything to say and practically always abstains.

A few words about Washington. I would describe the relations between our Washington representatives and the State Department as correct but reserved. Although no blatant hostility is shown, they work steadily to hold up certain concessions to us to which the President is committed, such as the loan and de jure recognition. One gets the feeling that while they regard such concessions as inevitable, they want to hang on to them as bargaining

3. ראה מס' 425.

counters in a final settlement. The White House makes periodic interventions as a result of local pressure, but these are spasmodic, and the President and his entourage are engrossed in their own affairs nearer home. The loan affair is characteristic. It was thoroughly thrashed out with the experts in various Government departments, and more or less accepted as sound by the Import-Export Bank. Of the hundred million dollars, about twenty million were to be spent on foodstuffs, and all the balance on investments in agricultural development, industrial plant, shipping, etc. According to the tentative discussions it was to be repaid over 12 years, with interest of 3 to 3½%. All of a sudden, Epstein received a letter from the Chairman of the Import-Export Bank, saying that the loan could not be actively considered at this time. We found out subsequently that this had been done at the instance of Lovett, the Under-Secretary of State. When Epstein was received by the President, he happened to mention this; the President seem[ed] surprised, as he had understood that the loan was going through without difficulty, and he said he would take the matter up with Marshall.[4] He subsequently said to Jacobson, his Jewish ex-partner from Missouri, that he thought the loan would be allright, and Jacobson could tell Dr. Weizmann so. Presumably, he had the matter reopened, and then forgot about it again; at any rate we have heard nothing more officially. This episode throws some light on what goes on in Washington. All the same, our Washington people remain hopeful that there will be partial performance of party pledges in time for the elections.

One important matter on which some progress has been made in Washington concerns the Haifa Oil Refineries. (Note this is confidential.) Our representatives have had a series of discussions with the two American companies interested in the Iraq Petroleum Company (Socony-Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey), and with the oil people in the American Government. The Americans are not at all upset about our seizure of the refineries — in fact they regard it as the obvious thing to have done — but they are concerned about getting the output going again. The proposals discussed were that we should ensure the necessary labour, and even the management if the British were unwilling to do so; that we would receive our normal share of the refined products (about 15%); that other Near Eastern countries would similarly get their ordinary requirements; and that the balance would be available for European needs. The State Department people insist that London is also interested in getting production going again, and that the difficulty lies with Iraq. If the Iraqis persisted in cutting off their noses (i.e., oil royalties) to spite their faces, the American companies were prepared to appreciate a scheme whereby sufficient crude oil would be brought from the Persian Gulf by tankers to Haifa. We are not without levers in these talks — for instance, we have physical possession of

4. ראה מס' 399.

the refineries, and we have alternative sources of supply such as Rumania. I repeat that all this is still in the discussion stage and therefore confidential.

To come to London from New York, Washington and Lake Success is like coming to another planet. Now that the British troops are out, Palestine is a dead issue as far as the public and the press are concerned. In the press and "well informed circles", such as the Chatham House[5] crowd, the unfriendly and offensive tone to which we are accustomed about ourselves is now coupled with a disillusioned and critical tone in talking about the Arabs, whose miserable showing against us is felt to have let down their British friends and supporters. Even de facto recognition of Israel is still very far away, although official and unofficial opinion (including Mr. Bevin) now takes for granted that a Jewish State is a permanent feature of the Middle Eastern landscape. When it comes to recognition, Foreign Office officials like Beeley argue that Britain's position, as well as that of the present Arab Governments, has become very precarious, and that any fresh anti-Arab moves would result in these Government being swept away, and if succeeded by other forces, much more fanatical and anti-foreigner. Presumably, Chiefs of Staff backed them up by claiming that any increase in anti-British sentiment would make it difficult to maintain British bases in Iraq, Transjordan, the Canal Zone and Cyrenaica. It is this type of argument which the Foreign Office is using in order to persuade the Dominions and the European countries to follow her [*sic*] go-slow policy as regards ourselves. One must add to this the personal factor of Mr. Bevin's feelings. Accounts which have reached us of recent talks with him, particularly one by Dr. James McDonald on his way through London,[6] indicate that he still flies into a fury at the mention of Palestine or Israel. At the same time, the Foreign Office seems anxious to maintain contact with us on an unofficial level. Hector McNeil promised Nahum Goldmann a letter recognising his presence in London as an Israeli representative — although the fact that this letter has not yet come through after six weeks shows that other people are not so happy about it. We have taken over Palestine House in Manchester Square for our mission here, and it will include consular services. Here again, the Foreign Office was prepared to be helpful by endorsing the application to the Ministry of Works for the reconstruction of the premises. Our representation here for the moment consists of Goldmann, Ivor Linton (respective First Secretary and Consul General); Rosette (Press) and Lee (Passport Control Officer). The London Executive of the Jewish Agency is simply disintegrating.

I am moving on to Israel later this week, and will write again from there.

My cordial greetings and best wishes to everybody.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Comay

5. אנשי ה־Royal Institute of International Affairs.

6. ראה מס' 418.

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א. גאס אל ר. איקנס (ואשינגטון)
O. Gass to R. Eakens (Washington)

העתק: 93.08/364/10

Washington, 17 August 1948

Dear Mr. Eakens,

I have received a rather important response from Israel to my communication of the substance of our discussion in Mr. Hare's office on August 10th. The Provisional Government of Israel makes the following points:[1]

1. No objection whatsoever is raised to the presence of U.N. observers at the Haifa refinery, and no such objection has been raised at any time by Israel. On the other hand, the Provisional Government of Israel sees no great substantive value in such presence. The Provisional Government will have to take steps, in any case, to assure that no such damage to the refinery occurs as resulted recently at Latrun from the gross and irresponsible negligence of U.N. observers.

2. No objection is raised by Israel to the return of the refinery to British management provided that British management will operate the refinery and assure adequate supplies to meet Israel's needs. This has always been the position, and the British management has always been fully aware of this willingness.

3. The crux of the matter lies in considerations quite separate from those covered in points 1 and 2 above. The Provisional Government of Israel calls attention to the fact that the whole plan of approach of the Department of State with respect to the reopening of the Haifa refinery presumes Iraqi good-will in restarting the flow of crude through the pipeline under appropriate face-saving guarantees. On the other hand, all information available to the Provisional Government of Israel indicates that the Iraqis are prepared to restart the flow of crude only if the condition be accepted that none of the refined product goes to Israel but all is re-exported. It should surely be possible for the United States Government to settle this most basic issue by direct inquiry in Baghdad, and all further progress along these lines is contingent on this one point. This is surely the crux of the matter.

4. In view of its judgment that the Government of Iraq is not prepared at the present time to play its part in a restarting of Haifa operations based on the resumption of the flow through the pipeline, the Provisional Government of Israel calls the attention of the Department of State again to the approach to this problem presented in its memorandum of July 27th. In

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1. ראה מס' 443, 450.

that memorandum (point 9) the Provisional Government requested the immediate resumption of the supply of crude from the Persian Gulf by tanker for refining at Haifa. Adequate supplies of crude for this purpose exist in the Persian Gulf, and the resumption of this normal delivery is in no way dependent upon Iraqi good-will. This program is the only one that is assured of immediate, positive consequences.

5. The Provisional Government emphasizes that all parties cooperating in or condoning the cessation of operations at the Haifa refinery are committing a serious violation of the spirit of the United Nations truce. It is surely of the essence of that truce agreement that the position of Israel should not be weakened during the truce period by forcing it to live — as it has largely since the middle of April — by running down its stocks of petroleum.

6. On July 27th, when the Provisional Government communicated to the Department of State its project for the reopening of Haifa based on a flow of tanker crude,[2] the same project was presented — as it had been less formally at an earlier date — to the principal oil companies (British, American and French) who are interested in Haifa. The question of the resumption of the flow of crude to Haifa was presented to those companies as a matter of the most extreme urgency. Three weeks have passed. The interested oil companies have not lifted a finger. They have not shown the slightest helpfulness but have instead, quite unnecessarily, continued to complement the Iraqi oil blockade by another equally effective, though less formal, blockade of crude petroleum coming from sources outside Iraqi control.

7. In view of these facts, the Provisional Government of Israel regards itself as having given a sufficient time interval (as suggested in the memorandum of July 27th, Point 11) for the oil companies normally interested in Haifa to demonstrate their intent to comply with the spirit of the United Nations truce. On the contrary, these companies have continued to violate the spirit of that truce most flagrantly. While hoping that the misconduct of these oil companies will be corrected promptly, the Provisional Government will no longer place its reliance exclusively on supplies from those companies.

I am instructed, as I have been repeatedly since June 16th, when the first formal memorandum on this question was presented to the Department of State, to emphasize the urgency of a constructive resolution of these questions.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Gass

Economic Adviser to the Provisional Government of Israel

2. מס' 385.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 10/82 ; 11/28
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/23

Tel Aviv, 17 August 1948

Belgian Consul General sent King [Abdallah], 6th August, holiday greetings, expressing *inter alia* wish see peaceful relations between him and Israel. On receipt letter 7th August, King sent urgent message Consul General visit him immediately. Conversation Palace, 8th August, King referred me several times as "my friend Shertok", asked Consul transmit us proposal representatives should meet Cyprus informally. Regarding refugees, King said will keep all Mufti people in Transjordan, hoped we would readmit others. Requested Consul send him reply. Have asked Consul reply we agree meet but prefer Paris to Cyprus. As King knows you are in Paris, he will understand.

Shertok

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י. שמעוני אל א. ששון (פאריס)
Y. Shimoni to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 13/54
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/23

Tel Aviv, 17 August 1948

Shertok's instructions for conversations with non-Transjordanians:[1] don't enumerate detailed benefits resulting from agreement with us in order not to offend by demonstrating our superiority. Stress readiness to conclude close alliance unaffecting our sovereignty, similar to alliance between Arab League states, though such alliance could not be termed Arab.

Shimoni

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1. ראה מס' 437.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH1056 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/11

[Tel Aviv], 18 August 1948

After several preliminary skirmishes in conversations with Shiloah and Behar[1] regarding whole problem immigration men [military] age, Mohn yesterday raised question full-dress manner in interview with me, pointing out numbers this category already admitted were excessive, asking for halt pending clarification whole issue and mentioning 500 per month as figure which Mediator certain stage had in mind. Myself replied negatively regarding halt, stated matter been under consideration and decision reached accept no numerical limitation whatsoever admission men military age who arrive as ordinary immigrants, and generally suffer no infringement our normal immigration programme as result truce and its supervision. Reaffirmed our acceptance and faithful observance only two limitations, namely non-admission fighting personnel and non-mobilisation, non-subjection training, men military age admitted. It was then Mohn expressed satisfaction with arrangements control this regard. On major issue, Mohn stated rather gravely would report Mediator, who might find necessary raise issue Security Council. Myself replied we ready have it out at Security Council, where we would base ourselves on resolution May 29th /and reject/ binding character Mediator's interpretation in application to present truce. All this for your information. Let sleeping dogs lie time being.[2]

Shertok

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1. יהושע בכר (שי), המנהל הכללי של משרד העלייה.
2. אבן דיווח באותו יום, שהמתווך אכן פנה בעניין זה אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם וביקשו להתקשר עם הממשלות הנוגעות בדבר כדי להגביל את מספר העולים יוצאי צבא. טריגווה לי סירב והציע שהמתווך יגיע לידי הסדר עם ממשלת ישראל או יבקש ממועצת־הביטחון לפסוק באופן מפורש בסוגיה זו. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 18.8.1948, 130.09/2337/7).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (New York)

MH1057 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/11

[Tel Aviv], 18 August 1948

Your 717,[1] agree first and fourth sentences also last part fifth, but all this not enough. You should add if major violation such as Latrun and Jerusalem continue, we shall consider ourselves free react. You should proceed urge [Security] Council fix early time limit for present truce, indicating Memisrael will soon have very seriously ponder question for how long more it can endure unwarranted irksomeness international control, when duration truce indefinite and no definite peace in offing.[2]

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 119/202. נשלח: 19.8; התקבל: 20.8
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 18 August 1948

Heydt,[1] myself, today had long talk with Acting Chief Near Eastern Division Hare and assistant.[2] Analyzed present situation, explaining reasons why we oppose unlimited truce. Stressed major obstacle to peace [is] Arab /hope/ that by political intransigence able make up for military defeat. Said their hopes partly based Israel recognized by only fifteen countries and only de facto by U.S.A. Further emphasized Arabs encour-

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1. מס' 456.
2. ב־18 באוגוסט דנה מועצת־הביטחון בהמשך קיומה של ההפוגה בארץ־ישראל. נציגי ארצות־הברית וקנדה מתחו ביקורת על דרישתה של ממשלת ישראל, שייקבע מועד לסיום ההפוגה. נציג ישראל הדגיש שממשלתו תקיים את ההפוגה בקפדנות כל עוד היא בתוקף, אך דרש לקבוע מועד קרוב לסיומה וללחוץ על הצדדים לפתוח בשיחות שלום ישירות לפני מועד זה. הישיבה נסתיימה ללא החלטה. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 352nd Meeting, 16.8.1948).

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1. אוריאל הייט (הד), עוזר לנציג המיוחד של ישראל בארצות־הברית.
2. גורדון ה. מטיסון.

aged by Bernadotte's /peace/ proposals and continued British opposition to Israel. Urged U.S.A. assistance procuring definite peace settlement by firm policy of full recognition, support Israel admission U.N. and economic assistance, and also active influence on Arabs and British for recognition and final peace with Israel. Explained we basically adhere to November 29, but Mediator's /departures/ endanger whole structure U.N. resolution. Added we still adhere principle internationalization Jerusalem, but if unachievable, sole alternative to Arab domination [is] Jews taking over. Also elaborated on our relations U.S.S.R. /along/ lines taken in my conversation Marshall.[3]

Hare was unable or unwilling make statement on substance, only declaring U.S.A. will support peace efforts, asking for patience, restraint, Israeli /leadership/. Promised pass on content our conversation to Marshall, Lovett.

Heydt raised question ban D.P.'s military age leave U.S.A. Zone Germany.[4] Was promised speedy consideration.[5]

Epstein

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ו. איתן אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)
W. Eytan to A. Lourie (New York)

מברק מוצפן IN-10/60
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/22

Tel Aviv, 18 August 1948 (18.40)

Your X153.[1] 1) Pope and Spellman[2] reject Mediator plans for Arab Jerusalem, but will make no public statement. 2) Vatican policy keeps aloof from Palestine question, mainly interested what extent Israel Communist. 3) Vatican likely be last state to recognise Israel. 4) High level Israeli diplomatic visit discouraged, Pope stating categorically would not receive Weizmann.[3]

Eytan

3. ראה מס' 383.
4. ראה מס' 470.
5. השווה דין־וחשבון על השיחה ב־FRUS, 1948, V, pp. 1316-17.

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1. לוריא אל שרתוק, 16.8.1948 (130.09/2337/7). לוריא ביקש לדעת את תוצאות שיחתו של ג'יימס מקדונלד עם האפיפיור.
2. הקרדינל פראנסיס ספלמן, הארכיבישוף של ניו יורק, נשיא ה־Catholic Near East Welfare Association.
3. ראה גם J.G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, pp. 32-5.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

Lake Success, 19 August 1948 (18.43)

Soviet, French and American delegations indicated desire our support Jerusalem cease-fire, therefore gave general support, reserving right self-defence as non-violation of truce in para. d.[1] Endeavoured secure withdrawal para. c, but proposers were content state no interference domestic jurisdiction implied; obligation, unlike responsibility, normal [*sic*], not statutory.

Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק 738

נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 19 August 1948

Strong indication imminent move by Mediator exclude military age men from transports until further notice, on grounds recent excessive proportion. Believe letter sent Lundstrom accordingly. Presume you would decline accept ruling and appeal [Security] Council, demanding reference to passage in May resolution purporting justify this step. Notwithstanding your recent cable this subject,[1] should we not alarm friends and become active Washington? My view — if this materializes, question personal confidence Mediator should at least be tentatively raised, without however repudiation substance of truce.[2]

Eban

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1. ב־19 באוגוסט דנה מועצת־הביטחון, על־פי בקשת המתווך, בהפרות ההפוגה בירושלים. בתום הדיון נתקבלה החלטה המפנה את תשומת־לב הצדדים לחובותיהם לגבי קיום ההפוגה על־פי החלטת המועצה מיום 15.7.1948 — ראה נספח ז, עמ' 671. (ראה *SCOR, Third Year*, 354th Meeting, 19.8.1948).

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1. מס' 463.
2. שרתוק ענה ב־22 באוגוסט: "בהחלט, פעל על־פי שני המשפטים האחרונים של מברקך." (המברק בתיק 130.09/2329/1).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק AE 32
נוסח יוצא: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 19 August 1948

After my talk with Secretary-General, Bunche informed me gist his two talks Stockholm. Mediator complains that at time when men military age arriving in large numbers, no system of notification to observers or facilitating their presence at ports is carried out by you. Subsequent checking of cards therefore of little value. Mediator explains while detention no longer required, all other provisions original system notification more necessary than ever view increase numbers. Mediator considers proportion of men military age on *Pan York* abnormal, not consistent with normal civilian immigration.[1] Bunche privately explains difficulties avoidable if each shipload, large or small, presented normal age distribution. By reaching understanding on percentage age composition, question of any fixed numerical limitation avoidable. Gather you may be approached for gentleman's agreement on basis defining reasonable percentage, unaffecting absolute total. My view — if anything tolerable can thus be worked out, this preferable to raising [Security] Council, since alignment Mediator versus one party always unpromising, Council's formal endorsement any restrictive principle highly undesirable.[2]

Eban

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1. ה"פאן יורק" הגיעה ב־18 באוגוסט ממארסיי לחיפה כשעל סיפונה כ־2200 עולים, מהם כמעט אלף בגיל הגיוס. (ראה רשימת עולים בגיל הגיוס, 17.8.1948, 130.02/2426/9).
2. כעבור יומיים הודיע אבן במברק נוסף, שבאנץ' כנראה לא היה כן בשיחתו אתו והמתווך יוזם התערבות מרחיקת־לכת יותר בנושא העלייה. לאור זאת, מוטב שהמתווך — ולא ממשלת ישראל — יפנה למועצת־הביטחון, מפני שהמועצה נוטה תמיד לשמור על מצב קיים ולדחות שינויים. (ראה אבן אל שרתוק, 21.8.1948, 93.03/126/2).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן 50/165
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/22
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2207/1

Tel Aviv, 19 August 1948

See my MH1056 addressed Eban.[1] Meanwhile new crisis arose Germany, where American authorities originally adopted British line preventing emigration of men military age, subsequently referred matter Mediator, whereupon latter laid down impossible procedure of requiring lists names be referred to him for approval before departure. As we in conflict with Mediator over numerical limit, which he holds we have already exceeded, see little hope assistance his part in breaking deadlock American zone. Essential you make direct /representations/ State Department and President with Joint Distribution Committee [and] others support, view their instructing European Command allow men military age leave unhindered, contenting themselves only with our undertaking not mobilise or train them under Security Council resolution May 29th. Men military age with families now form great bulk D.P.s. Wives, children, will not leave alone. Unless ban removed, evacuation from American zone will come to standstill. Inform Eban should support your action by /contact/ U.S. delegation. Fully realise difficulties, but matter most serious, please do utmost.[2]

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן NI-7/86. התקבל: 21.8
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/7

New York, 20 August 1948

Learned from informal conversation with State Department's legal adviser Gross that official circles Washington much concerned our depar-

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1. מס' 463.
2. בתשובה על פנייתו של אפשטיין ענתה מחלקת־המדינה, שההגבלות על עליית יוצאי־צבא מן האיזורים האמריקאים בגרמניה ובאוסטריה יוסיפו להיות בתוקף: לא תורשה עליית גברים בגיל גיוס אלא על־פי היתר מפורש של המתווך. (ראה אפשטיין אל מזכיר המדינה, 26.8.1948, 93.08/364/10; צ'. זאלצמן אל אפשטיין, 3.9.1948, שם).

tures November 29 Resolution and by what they call "imperialistic desires" Israeli Government.[1] Convinced importance our relations U.S.A. Government and public requires /most cautious/ behaviour this matter. Suggest while explaining reasons some our actions as caused by war and Bernadotte peace proposals, we continue adhere fundamentally U.N. Resolution; otherwise expect dangerous confusion and attempt behalf our enemies use matter against us, which may become detrimental next Assembly U.N.

Epstein

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 121/113. התקבל: 21.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 20 August 1948

Bartley Crum saw Truman today before departure for Israel. Truman indicated he expects McDonald report on situation Israel and his advice regarding de jure recognition. He mentioned Marshall and Lovett opposition "grounds Israel Government becoming [—][1] chauvinistic and imperialistic", in constant departure from U.N. Resolution and opposition truce.[2]

Crum's conversation reveals our difficulty State Department and stresses importance most cautious action and restraint in public statements on our policy and aims. Truman asked Crum present him report on situation Israel upon his return U.S.A. Crum, accompanied Frank,[3] leaving for Israel next week, write series articles for *Star* which will support election Truman.[4]

Epstein

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1. ראה תזכיר של מארשאל אל הנשיא טרומן, 16.8.1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1313-15; ראה גם מס' 472.

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1. במקור מופיעה כאן שוב המלה Government.
2. ראה גם מס' 471 והערה 1 שם.
3. ג'רולד פראנק, עיתונאי אמריקאי.
4. בעקבות מברק זה ומס' 471 הורה שרתוק לאפשטיין לבוא מיד ארצה להתייעצויות דחופות. (ראה מברק מיום 25.8.1948, 93.01/2207/1).

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(שיחות י. לינטון — ב. ברוז, ה. בילי (בלונדון, ב־19 ביולי 1948

Meetings: I.J. Linton — B. Burrows, H. Beeley (London, 19 July 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.04/37/12

London, 20 August 1948

Secret

On Thursday, August 19th, I was informed by Mr. Balfour that Mr. Burrows would like to see me in connection with the talk which Dr. Goldmann had had with Mr. Hector McNeil.[1] He suggested that I should call at the Foreign Office at 3.15 p.m. on Friday. I told Mr. Balfour that there were one or two matters which I wished to raise with him, and we arranged that I should call on him at 3 p.m. Mr. Balfour was not at the Foreign Office when I arrived, but I saw Mr. Beeley, who had just returned from leave. He asked me whether we had already received permission from the Ministry of Works to go ahead with the alterations and decorations at the Manchester Square premises.[2] I said we had not yet received a reply, but that the Ministry of Fuel had agreed that we should get the oil we needed for the new heating system. I explained that a new hitch had occurred because we had now been informed that it was necessary to obtain permission from the London County Council Town Planning Committee for the use of the premises for our purposes. In view of what the Chairman of the Committee told me about a year and a half ago, I gathered that there would be no difficulty about premises in Manchester Square, but if there were any obstacle I hoped that the Foreign Office would feel able to give us a letter. Mr. Beeley said that if the need arose, they would be prepared to do so. He also thought that we should soon get a reply from the Ministry of Works, now that the Foreign Office supported our application.

I said that the second matter I had intended raising with Mr. Balfour concerned some documents which I had received from our Foreign Office; they concerned our mercantile and naval flags. These documents had been sent to various governments through our representatives. I then handed Mr. Beeley the two documents, and he said he would find out which Department was interested in them, and pass them on.

I then went to see Mr. Burrows with Mr. Beeley who, however, left us alone after introducing us. Mr. Burrows said that when he had heard that it had not proved possible to arrange a meeting between Dr. Goldmann and

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1. מדובר כנראה בשיחה שהתקיימה ב־15 ביולי — ראה מס' 331.
2. משכנה המיועד של נציגות ישראל בלונדון.

Mr. McNeil, he had hoped that Dr. Goldmann would see him. I said that it had not been conveyed to us that Mr. Burrows wanted to see Dr. Goldmann, and in any case Dr. Goldmann had only been in London one day.

Mr. Burrows said that with regard to the conversation which Dr. Goldmann had had with Mr. McNeil, there were two points on which he would like to give me some information.

The first was the question of communications: they were agreeable to correspondence with us, but letters addressed to us would be on an unofficial basis. There was, of course, no difference in regard to content between unofficial and official letters; but in the case of unofficial correspondence, the letters were addressed to individuals; they would, for instance, write "Dear Dr. Goldmann", with the usual ending. The second point was in regard to the title which Dr. Goldmann decided to use. Dr. Goldmann had raised this question with Mr. McNeil. The title they would like to suggest was: "Agent of the Jewish Authorities". I said that this would be unacceptable for two reasons; first that the word "agent" had rather an ominous sound. Mr. Burrows said it was quite common in British diplomatic practice; they had a number of representatives who were called "agents". I said that in other countries the word had sometimes a different connotation, and was associated with quite different kinds of activity. But the words to which more substantial exception would be taken were "Jewish Authorities". Who were they? We had already had an example of the kind of confusion which nomenclature of that type was likely to create: the case of Mr. Marriott's letter protesting against the reopening of the Haifa refineries.[3] Mr. Burrows said he had not heard about that (he was away on leave at the time). I told him briefly what had happened.

I said that Dr. Goldmann represented the Provisional Government of Israel, and the purpose of discussing the question with Mr. McNeil was to find a mutually satisfactory formula which would give expression to that fact. We should shortly be opening our office here, and the plate outside would read: "Office of the Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel." Mr. Burrows said that they did not desire to lay down the form of title which Dr. Goldmann wanted to assume, but it was obviously not possible for them to give recognition to the particular title I had mentioned, because it would imply recognition and they could not do this in the present circumstances. I said that non-recognition could mean either silence or repudiation; when we opened the office (which would be sometime at the beginning of September), and described ourselves in the way I had mentioned, would that lead to a statement of repudiation from the Foreign Office? Mr. Burrows said that it would not do so because after all, it was not really their concern what we called ourselves. I said that I wanted to make

3. ראה ס. מאריוט אל ה"שלטונות היהודיים", 20.7.1948 (130.02/2457/4). ראה גם הערת־עורך, עמ' 392־393.

this clear because if we were to open the office and anything were said by the Foreign Office subsequently which might cause us to close the office, the results would be very damaging. One of the purposes of having a representative here was to smooth the way to a proper relationship. Mr. Burrows said that they would make no statements, but if a great deal of publicity attended the opening of the office, and questions were asked in Parliament, they might of course have to reply that the establishment of the office here did not imply recognition of Israel by His Majesty's Government.

During subsequent conversation I mentioned that it was our intention also to open a Consulate-General, and said that we were already issuing visas to people in this country who desired to proceed to Israel on business as visitors, newspaper representatives, etc. Some Government departments were referring people to us for Israeli visas. There were also other services which we were called upon to render, e.g., certification of documents, etc.

Mr. Burrows said that, apropos of what I had just said, it was curious that Mr. Marriott, who, of course, was in a somewhat anomalous position in Haifa, had been subjected to a good deal of pin-pricking. I said that I had not heard of it. Mr. Burrows said he had heard that Mr. Marriott had been asked to reduce the size of his guard, and that exception had been taken to the fact that it was composed of members of the Palestine Police;[4] he had been asked to deliver a letter, which he was taking to the airport, for censorship, etc. Mr. Burrows wondered whether there was deliberate intention to force Mr. Marriott to leave the country. I said that I had not heard of any of the incidents mentioned by Mr. Burrows, and I did not believe that there was any such intention. The word "deliberate" suggested that there was a directive; I was sure there was no such thing. The fact that we were trying to establish a proper relationship with His Majesty's Government, and were taking steps to that end, should have made that clear. In the same way as people in this country needed the services of our Consul-General here, there was need for a British Consul-General in Israel: Israeli citizens were coming to this country on all kinds of business and needed visas. Mr. Burrows said that he thought it was somewhat curious, particularly as they were doing what they could to facilitate our work here; not that it was very much, but in any way in which they could help, they were prepared to do so. I said Mr. Burrows had mentioned the Palestine Police; I did not want to go into the past, but one had to take into account the legacy which the Palestine Police had left behind. Mr. Burrows had spoken of the anomalous position of Mr. Marriott. It was indeed anomalous, and as long as it was allowed to remain so, difficulties of one sort or another could probably not be entirely avoided. But it was not only for these technical reasons that proper relations ought to be re-established without delay and recognition

4. ראה מס' 453, הערה 1.

accorded to the Provisional Government of Israel. Such recognition would go far to facilitate and hasten the settlement of the Palestine problem, and help in restoring peace.

I mentioned that Dr. Goldmann would probably be returning to London at the beginning of September, and Mr. Burrows said he would be very glad to see him when he was back here.

Mr. Burrows also said that if any problems arose in connection with our technical work here, he would be glad if I would let him know, and he would see what could be done to help.

IJL

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן
M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 21 août 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

Après beaucoup d'hésitations j'ai cru pouvoir, dans ma lettre du 19 août,[1] donner une note optimiste au compte rendu de mes efforts en faveur de la reconnaissance. Je l'ai fait avec plus de prudence que l'esprit, régnant ce jour-là, semblait le permettre et cependant, je crains de m'être un peu trop avancé.

La note ci-jointe vous donnera la raison de mes nouvelles appréhensions.[2] Il est certain que M. Schuman est encore très mal informé de la question palestinienne et il est, d'autre part, évident que les éléments hostiles à la reconnaissance dans le parti M.R.P. ne restent pas inactifs.

J'ai prévu, pour les jours qui vont suivre, une série de démarches qui ont pour but d'essayer de neutraliser les résistances. Reste toutefois la possibilité que les arguments qui sont fournis à M. Schuman par les éléments qui nous sont hostiles au M.R.P. ne sont que des prétextes servant à couvrir une attitude dictée par des influences ou des considérations d'ordre extérieur.

Je dois voir Léon Blum demain, et j'espère toujours que s'il consent à jeter dans l'affaire tout le poids que lui confère son prestige personnel et la position qu'il occupe dans le gouvernement, la chose pourrait être enlevée. Mme Blum, que j'ai vue hier, me disait que son mari était "enthousiasmé"

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1. פישר דיווח שיש סיכוי להכרה צרפתית בישראל תוך החודש הקרוב, בתנאי שלא יופיע גורם בלתי־צפוי שימנע זאת. (ראה פישר אל איתן, 19.8.1948. 130.02/2382/12).
2. ראה "Note sur les hésitations du M.R.P. dans la question de la reconnaissance," 20.8.1948. 93.03-127-9. (הלוט לא נמצא במכתב המקורי ששוגר אל איתן).

par la formule de reconnaissance que je lui avais soumise. Il faut que vous sachiez qu'il ne peut être question que d'agir sur le plan gouvernemental. Si la question était amenée devant l'Assemblée, nos adversaires mettraient au vote l'urgence de la question. Comme les Chambres entrent en vacances le 1er septembre, cette urgence serait certainement votée par les communistes seuls et ceux, dans le gouvernement, qui veulent faire traîner la question, seraient encouragés dans leur attitude.

Dans l'entretien avec Marc Sangnier, dont il est question dans la note ci-jointe, M. Schuman a souligné que jamais il ne céderait sur le point de l'internationalisation de Jérusalem. Il a confirmé encore une fois qu'il considérait que les rapports du Quai d'Orsay avec la Représentation d'Israël à Paris étaient des rapports officiels, et l'impression de M. Sangnier était que Schuman estimait nous avoir, de ce fait, déjà donné une grande satisfaction.

A propos de la nomination de M. Goldberg,[3] j'ai fait savoir au Quai d'Orsay que je demandais pour lui l'exequatur. Comme la France a des consuls en Israël, il semble difficile que l'on refuse, dans la pratique, de considérer M. Goldberg comme un consul. Je pense qu'ils s'en tireront en me donnant l'exequatur verbal.[4]

J'ai mis Gideon Raphaël, à son passage à Paris, en rapport avec l'organisme compétent du Quai d'Orsay s'occupant de l'accueil des délégations à l'O.N.U. Il a été reçu en conformité avec les assurances qui m'avaient été données préalablement.

M. Kenen,[5] qui est à Paris en ce moment, s'est mis d'accord avec Najar pour l'organisation du travail commun qui sera à faire dans le domaine de la presse avec la session de l'O.N.U. Je remarquerai, à ce propos, que M. Najar a très bien organisé son département. Vous vous serez certainement rendu compte de l'excellente tenue des bulletins d'information et des revues de presse qui sortent de son département. J'ai demandé à M. Najar de reprendre la publication du bulletin imprimé qui paraissait du temps où nous étions l'Agence Juive.[6]

Veuillez croire, mon cher Eytan, à mes sentiments très cordiaux.

Maurice Fischer

3. אברהם גולדברג (גלבוע) מונה לקונסול ישראל בפאריס.
4. גולדברג אכן קיבל אישור (exequatur) בעל־פה, אך הובטח שבאופן מעשי אין כל הבדל בין מעמדו למעמדם של קונסולים אחרים (ראה Entretien avec Monsieur Binoche, 25.8.1948, 93.02/172/15).
5. ישעיהו קנן, מנהל לשכת האינפורמציה של משלחת ישראל לאו״ם.
6. הכוונה ל־*Bulletin de L'Agence juive pour la Palestine* — עלון חדשות שיצא מטעם משרד הסוכנות היהודית בצרפת בשנים 1947־1948.

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מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (לייק סאכסס)
M. Shertok to T. Lie (Lake Success)

MH1097 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.02/2425/1
העתק נוסח נכנס: 93.03/94/6

[Tel Aviv], 22 August 1948

Have honour acknowledge receipt your telegram communicating text resolution adopted by Security Council on August 19th.[1] Would appreciate your transmitting following questions to President Council, with view to elucidating practical implication Paragraphs (d) and (e) of resolution: 1) Is point (d), by forbidding reprisals and retaliations by one party against violations truce by another, tantamount to encouragement of unilateral violations, seeing that under this injunction party determined violate truce would be free from fear of strong counteraction by other party? 2) Does Paragraph (d) imply determination on part of Security Council to apply immediate sanctions against offending party in contradistinction to past experience, signally illustrated by fact that persistent obstinate violation truce by Arabs in preventing resumption of water supply to Jerusalem and recent sabotage by them of pumping plant evoked no sanctions by Security Council? 3) If there is no intention to apply sanctions, what other redress does resolution offer to aggrieved party except bare establishment fact that its adversary placed himself in the wrong? 4) Does Paragraph (e), which states that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of truce, signify an undertaking on part of Security Council to restore position to *status quo ante* if, say, new territory is occupied as result violation of truce, or is intention merely to condemn offender as having gained advantage to which he was not entitled? 5) If latter is case, what effective guarantee does resolution offer to aggrieved party that its position will not be worsened as result violation of truce by adversary if it itself abstains, as admonished, from seeking redress by its own action? An early reply to these questions would be deeply appreciated.[2]

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1. ראה נספח ז, עמ' 671 ומס' 467.
2. בתשובה על המברק הזה הודיעה מזכירות האו"ם, שתוכן המברק הופץ בין חברות מועצת־הביטחון. (ראה הממונה על ענייני מועצת־הביטחון אל שרתוק, 24.8.1948, 130.02/2425/1).

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א. לאדאס אל מ. שרתוק
A. Ladas to M. Shertok

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 22 August 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the following cable from Count Bernadotte, sent from Stockholm on the 21st August, 1948:

On the 19th August I reported to the Security Council the following:

> I wished to submit to the Security Council before it adjourned the following interim report regarding the demilitarisation of Jerusalem: The resolution of the 1[5]th July[1] instructed the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. As soon as I returned to the area from New York, I personally initiated discussions on the matter, urging the parties to agree on demilitarisation. Negotiations are proceeding in Jerusalem between my representatives and the Arab and Jewish authorities separately. In a draft proposal submitted to me on the 11th August, the Arabs fully accepted the principle of demilitarisation, though putting conditions. The Jewish authorities, although they had initially stated that they did not exclude demilitarisation, have not in fact shown readiness to accept the principle.[2] In my opinion this is due more to political reasons relating to the future status of Jerusalem than to mere military considerations regarding the present conflict. Besides, even if both parties were to agree on this issue, demilitarisation could not be put into effect without a strong and adequately armed United Nations force to be provided immediately. Under these conditions, I wish to inform you that I have serious doubts whether demilitarisation can be attained in the near future.

The Security Council discussed this report on the same day, and its President addressed to me the following cable:

> 2917. Acknowledging your cablegram dated 19th August, I wish to inform you that the Security Council, having taken note of the above cablegram concerning the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, desires to state that it relies on the Mediator to make all efforts to achieve speedy results on this matter, to which the Security Council attaches serious importance.

Signed: Yakov Malik

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1. ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־670. במקור כתוב בטעות: 19 ביולי.
2. ראה מס' 424, עמ' 474־478.

I therefore have the honour to request your Government to consider again the matter, with a view to arriving at a speedy solution. You will agree with me, I hope, that only demilitarisation may effectively put an end to the senseless firing which only brings suffering to the population of Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

Alexis Ladas

Acting for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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תכנית לפירוז ירושלים

Scheme for the Demilitarization of Jerusalem

העתק: 130.02/2425/1

[Tel Aviv], 22 August 1948

On August 20th, the U.S. Special Representative sought our reaction to the following scheme of demilitarising Jerusalem, transmitted to him by the State Department, which he explained had emanated from Arab quarters and been under consideration before the U.N. Truce Commission:

1) The demilitarisation scheme is to be adopted without prejudice to the final settlement of the Jerusalem problem, which depended on the solution of the problem of Palestine in general.

2) The demilitarised area to be larger than either the Municipal or the Town Planning area and is to include Shu'fat, Isawiya, Bethlehem, Beit-Jala and Lifta.

3) Non-military supplies for Jewish requirements to be subject to joint U.N., Arab and Jewish control.

4) Arabs and Jews to run their respective areas in regard to local administrative services while central services, such as electricity, sewerage, water supply and telephone to be administered by the U.N.

5) Arab and Jewish police forces to be established in equal numbers and to be equipped with ordinary police arms. U.N. guards to protect the boundaries.

6) Reversion to *status quo ante* as regards population. Arabs and Jews to regain their homes.

7) For security reasons, "pockets" to be avoided.

8) Jewish house owners in Arab areas and Arab house owners in Jewish areas to "opt" (?).

9) Former Government buildings to be placed under U.N. auspices.

10) Restoration of looted property or payment of compensation therefor, particularly in areas occupied without fighting in violation of the truce which existed on May 14th.

11) Jews to be allowed to visit Holy Places on dates and in numbers to be fixed under U.N. supervision.

12) Census to be taken of Arab property now in Jewish hands so as to prevent further wilful damage.

Note: The above is a summary of the State Department version of the scheme, not a verbatim copy.[1]

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מ. פישר אל מ. שרתוק
M. Fischer to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 33/67
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/23

Paris, 22 August 1948

Quai [d'Orsay] insisting our cooperation pipe-line Haifa. British want both flow and Refinery operating, while France and U.S.A. satisfied crude oil only. Quai proposes we undertake all crude oil for shipment if Iraq reopens flow. Faced with French, American agreement, British would consent. Our requirements refined fuel will be met by beneficiaries crude oil. Negotiations with Iraq will be made by commercial firm interested, after our agreement obtained. Please telegraph.

Fischer

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 124/249, 125/221, 126/230. התקבל: 27.8/25.8
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2329/21

Washington, 24/26 August 1948

Following considerations may be relevant in attempting foresee course Paris Security Council and General Assembly meetings:

1) As expected, no evidence whatever that Henderson's departure has worked any fundamental change in State Department attitudes. Our calculations should therefore assume that action of American delegation Gen-

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1. שרתוק הודיע לנציג האמריקאי, שתכנית זו אינה יכולה לשמש בסיס לדיון, בעיקר מכיוון שכוח או"ם לא יוכל למנוע את נפילת ירושלים בידיים ערביות. אשר לעתידה של ירושלים, הרי ישראל רואה זכות לעצמה לחזור ולבדוק את שאלת הכללתה של העיר בתחומי המדינה (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 25.8.1948).

eral Assembly will be most substantially affected by old established attitudes and prejudices, by general predisposition towards Arabs, by most influential British position and by anxiety combined Chiefs of Staff avoid Arab unrest.

2) Truman personally continues sympathetic, but as reported probabilities are that there exists either tacit or express bi-partisan agreement not to make Israel major issue in campaign. Certainly no major political figure has spoken out regarding Israel since Philadelphia Convention.[1]

3) Favourable American public opinion gradually being undermined by widespread publicity given alleged Israeli chauvinism and aggressive tendencies. Every statement from Israel regarding incorporation Jerusalem into Israel or other territorial adjustment has been magnified and headlined here, and whether deliberately or by accident less distinction is drawn recently on this subject by press between official and Irgun Zvai Le'umi statements. President himself has referred to this in private conversations, and State Department has also stressed point in conversations with us. Widespread critical comment also resulted from alleged injury by Israeli forces to Holy Places. This may have hurt us particularly with Catholics, who politically are exceedingly powerful here. Finally all hostile forces unite in publicizing and shedding crocodile tears regarding plight Arab refugees. These three factors constitute backbone current British and pro-Arab propaganda.

4) Most significant is increasing tension between U.S. and U.S.S.R. Assumed here that there will be no overt hostilities this year, but open clash by next spring or summer regarded well within range of possibilities if U.S.S.R. persists in present course and determines take more drastic action regarding Marshall Plan. Evidence accumulating that although U.S.A. regards acquiescence in conference with U.S.S.R. as perhaps necessary from point of view world opinion, it nevertheless assumes U.S.S.R. would violate any major agreement which might be reached and therefore feels that until western Europe and Germany are stronger economically and politically, preferable for the time being that there [?be] no further paper agreements with U.S.S.R. and if possible no further negotiations. General objective U.S. policy thus appears to be speedy rearmament itself and western Europe, leading re-establishment balance military power in world, coupled with sufficient stability in central and western Europe to resist penetration which has enabled U.S.S.R. extend control over eastern Europe. In addition, U.S. airforce, military leaders, have lately given increased public emphasis to strategic importance Middle East. Apparent that basic desire United States military is to keep area quiet, avoiding both military operations and such social ferment as might invite increased

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1. ועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית בפילדלפיה — ראה מס' 322.

Russian activity there. Reasonable assumption therefore that U.S. will press hard for settlement Arab-Jewish differences in Paris, and in view of world issue at stake, will probably not hesitate to sacrifice Jewish interests if thereby the American delegation believes greater stability can be assured.

5) Foregoing suggests following conclusions: a) Paris meeting may be vital from point of view future Israel and in relation to great powers, particularly U.S. In view of magnitude of issue, you may wish consider coming yourself Paris, before or without waiting for our admission UNO, in mobilizing strength no less than presentation of case. b) Greatest dangers could be averted by evidence of possible agreement between Israel and some or all Arab leaders, without Bernadotte or UNO. This would add tremendously to Israel's prestige and strength. Turks may be useful at certain stage negotiations. c) Urge greatest caution in all public statements regarding territorial changes which may endanger 29th November Resolution as legal basis existence Israel. d) Repeated emphasis by American correspondents on facts regarding Israeli concern for Holy Places and on Israel in relation to Arab refugees would be helpful. Important increase and strengthen our contacts with Christian religious circles and especially Vatican. e) Truman waiting for reports from McDonald regarding loan, recognition and UNO admission in order use these to revise State Department attitudes. Every effort should be made to have McDonald's recommendations in Truman's hands before U.S. delegation leaves for Paris. f) I am urging our friends Government circles, and especially White House, increase their activity coming crucial weeks. Suggest Silver cable his friends requesting same. g) Finally suggest that Paris be recognised not only as threat which might undo much that has been accomplished, but also as best possible forum from which to present Israel's case.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)

M. Shertok to A. Lourie (New York)

MH 1120 מברק
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/1

[Tel Aviv], 25 August 1948

August 23rd Mohn informed Kohn Mediator empowered him fix time-limit after which further entry men military age be prohibited pending clarification issue. Bearing mind ships *en route*, he fixed deadline September 2nd, 20.00 our time. If we disregard injunction, Mediator will report Security Council. Mohn sought our reaction Mediator's decision, also date. Message transmitted me Jerusalem, whence instructed Leo

[Kohn] reply unable agree suspension or limitation any category immigrants, feel convinced this course not only constitutes no violation Security Council resolution May 29th but accords intention its framers. We urge Mediator not fix date for prohibition but defer matter until end September, when we both make our submissions Security Council. To this Mohn replied behalf Mediator unable defer prohibition, as meanwhile we might introduce thousands. Again urged us make direct representations Security Council.

Mediator's tactics apparently challenge us secure majority our favour, but myself consider our approach Security Council utterly unwarranted and initiative rests with Mediator.[1] Moreover, approach Security Council devoid practical significance view prorogation.[2]

Shertok

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ו. איתן אל א. לונדסטרום (חיפה)
W. Eytan to A. Lundström (Haifa)

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 26 August 1948

Sir,

It is exactly one month since the Mediator promised to let Mr. Shertok have a list of the observers posted to the neighbouring Arab countries and their exact location,[1] and a fortnight since a written reminder in this regard was sent to Mr. Reedman.[2]

Today, in the sixth week of the second truce, we are still without any authentic knowledge as to whether and to what extent the frontiers, ports and airfields of the countries which have waged war on Israel are controlled by the U.N. with a view to ensuring the observance of the truce. Reports which reach us about movements of troops and war material create a definite impression of either a complete absence of control, or of a control that at best is ineffectual. The incidents of the seizure by the Egyptian authorities of shipments of non-military goods consigned to and from Israel, including books, appurtenances of religious worship and relief

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1. ראה מס׳ 469 והערה 2 שם.
2. הנציגים של חברות מועצת־הביטחון וחלק מסגל מזכירות האו״ם היו אז בדרכם למושב עצרת האו״ם בפאריס.

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1. ראה מס׳ 380.
2. ראה איתן אל רידמן, 12.8.1948, 130.02/2426/7.

supplies, to which the attention of your Headquarters was drawn in each case without our being informed of any action taken in the matter,[3] likewise raises the question whether there are any U.N. observers in the Egyptian ports, or, for that matter, in the ports of other Arab countries.

It is appreciated that the institution of full and effective control at the inception of the second truce was delayed for some time by the non-availability of the requisite personnel, but such initial delay cannot possibly justify the fact that at this late stage we are still without the promised information and are left in a state of complete uncertainty as to the extent of supervision exercised by the Mediator's staff over enemy territories.

In these circumstances Mr. Shertok feels unable to authorise an affirmative reply to your letter of August 22nd addressed to our Chief Liaison Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Baruch,[4] concerning arrangements for the supervision of Israel airfields, as acceptance of the proposed arrangements would signify acquiescence on our part in what may well turn out to be a purely unilateral enforcement of the truce against the State of Israel.[5]

I am, Yours faithfully,

W. Eytan
Director-General

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א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

העתק: 93.08/365/1

Washington, 26 August 1948

Dear Mr. Kaplan,

On July 3rd I wrote you a letter which grew during the writing into a brief review of the general position of Israel as I see it here.[1] Yesterday, when Eliahu [Epstein] told me that he was going to Israel as immediately as it could be arranged, I re-read that letter with the idea of revising its judgments and bringing it up to date. The critical review of one's past prognostications is always a helpful starting-point in making new ones. I found nothing to change in what grew out of my own perception regarding the essential direction of U.S. policy; substantial confirmation of the judgment

3. ראה למשל מס׳ 434.
4. המכתב בתיק 130.02/2426/7.
5. בתשובה נשלחה רשימה מפורטת של משקיפי האו״ם ומקומות הצבתם. (ראה מוהן אל איתן, 29.8.1948, שם).

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1. מס׳ 264.

of my Israeli "military" informants with respect to the underlying military situation; and serious elements of error only in what my Israeli political informants had contributed with respect to probable Arab (and British-Arab) actions. There may be a moral in this threefold outcome, but if so, I will not attempt to find that moral today!

Yesterday, after consulting with Eliahu, I sent you a brief cable[2] which was provoked by the foolish and irresponsible — and, no doubt, also partisan — series of "optimistic" interpretations of the drift of American public policy on Israel which our press here has reported to have been made by various American delegates to the meeting of the Zionist Actions Committee in Jerusalem. It is difficult to restrain one's revulsion at people who will so play with matters vital to other people's lives and will perhaps also attempt to argue their fitness for even wider Zionist responsibilities by pointing to pretended achievements in the United States. I can only repeat flatly the essential burden of that cable: Truman is *not* pressing action for an Israeli loan; the U.S. is *not* moving toward de jure recognition of Israel; the U.S. is *not* acting behind the scenes, where it counts, to secure admission of Israel to U.N.; there is *not* the slightest competition on these issues between Democrats and Republicans. Anybody who contradicts these four points is either uninformed or engaged in deception. It is one of the most oppressive burdens of my position with the Israeli Mission in Washington that I am not in a position to say these things publicly.

In my cable to you yesterday, I expressed concurrence in a previous much longer cable of Eliahu's to Shertok,[3] and I *do* concur in the views there expressed. Their limitation, which is perhaps inherent in the cable form, is that they stop at the threshold of current policy action. Except for recommending cables from Silver to his friends and the use of Paris as a platform — all together *très peu de chose* as our French friends, I believe, would put it — they barely confront the hard decisions of today. I put the real decisions in the form of five basic alternative policies, though other permutations are no doubt possible.

Policy Number One Adherence November 29 decision. Exclusive Western orientation. Diplomatic action.

In my opinion, *disastrous.* Israel would receive no weapons for defense from Eastern Europe and probably none from the West either. No admission U.N. The U.K.—U.S.—Arab combination would eventually force modification November 29 frontiers and organize Israel-Transjordan as Western military outpost. Immigration rights dubious. Capital from U.S. would be available.

Policy Number Two Adherence November 29 frontiers. Passive occupation of Jerusalem pending U.N. establishment of an international regime. Neu-

2. לא נמצא.
3. מס' 479.

trality between East and West. Financial "negotiations" with U.S. Effort to gain admission to U.N.

In my opinion, means indefinite prolongation of present stalemate.

Will not get into U.N. Will not get substantial U.S. loan. U.K., Arabs (laggardly backed by U.S.), will try negotiations to whittle away November 29 and force close union with Transjordan, combined with exclusive Western orientation. Prolonged mobilization, with intolerable economic burden, leading eventually either concessions U.K. and Arabs or adoption other policy.

Policy Number Three Rejection November 29 frontiers in Galilee and elsewhere, but eventual acceptance international status Jerusalem when U.N. prepared to put real international police force in Jerusalem. Open war with all Arab armies on next provocation. Complete elimination Arab armies from Palestine during three weeks fighting. Neutrality between East and West. Reorientation frontiers of Israel on more defensible lines justified by (a) Arab aggression (b) failure U.N. to defend Israel. Effort to gain admission U.N. Financial negotiations U.S. *Maximum public relations effort U.S.*

In my opinion, this is the only sound policy.

It will *not* result in early admission to U.N. It will *not* result in an early U.S. loan. But it is the only policy which offers any assurance of an eventual stable and satisfactory existence for Israel.

Its crux is ability of Israeli armies to defeat Arab armies quickly. Without such ability, this policy needs complete re-evaluation from the military and economic points of view.

Policy Number Four Identical with three but refusing, under all circumstances, to internationalize Jerusalem.

In my opinion, [there] will never be normal relations with the West. Will push Israel eventually into Policy Number Five.

Policy Number Five Identical with four, but based on exclusive Eastern orientation.

In my opinion, less disastrous in the short run than Policy Number One, but in the long run slavery, breach of relations with Western Jewry, cutting off of flow of Western resources for building of Israel.

. . . .

It would, of course, advance the achievement of any of these alternative policies to a very great extent, if even a half-hearted understanding could be reached with Transjordan or Egypt. I have however no knowledge of the probability of such a thing and have therefore not been in a position to take it into account.

. . . .

As you can judge from the above, I take no great pride in the foreign policy of the country of my birth and choice. I see no reason to expect any great improvement in this policy in the near future. And I cannot comfort

myself with any far-reaching dichotomy between the sound heart of the American people and the evil action of the U.S. Government.

The foreign policy of the Government of the United States, at the present time, has only one objective: killing Communists. The Government of the United States is not anti-totalitarian. It is not pro-democratic. It is not interested in aid to the needy. All over the world, it works most successfully with people who represent property and privilege, vested interests and vested power. It is for white against colored; empire against colony; strong against weak. It is for business as usual.

The American people have emerged from a great war confident of their ability to transmute economic power into military power. The wanderings of American soldiers all over the world have brought no feelings of kinship with other peoples except perhaps in the form of vague stirrings which can have only long-term consequences. The American people, despite many strains, is prosperous today to an extent quite unparalleled in American history. Prosperity is, in this case at least, accompanied by complacency. Those people who are more directly responsible for moulding and making American foreign policy of course confront issues and make decisions which are not contemplated by ordinary people, but that is true in every society. It would be difficult to say that, in any more significant sense, American foreign policy is out of accord with the sentiments and thinking of the American people.

. . . .

All this makes personally a very difficult climate in which to work for Eliahu particularly. It is no particular hardship to the rest of us, but I know I would find it very hard to take in his position. He fortunately bears up under it with great calm and equanimity. He now receives — as indeed Shertok did in the past — only the most routine courtesies from the Department of State. Eliahu has asked Lovett for an interview to discuss our loan application repeatedly, for months, and has never received an interview. (This is the exact parallel of Shertok's experience with Lovett when Shertok was here.) Eliahu's letter to Lovett of August 3rd on the loan matter[4] remains unacknowledged: I believe that, in ordinary diplomatic relations, such a failure to acknowledge a communication is to be regarded as a deliberate insult. But such things are all in the day's work, and I do not consider them as anything but indications of the general climate of things that reach deeper.

It is not a tragic impasse which I am presenting in this account. There *is* a way out and it can be found more readily than the way could some months ago. Things are *not* more difficult now than they were some months ago: they are noticeably easier. I think that when we have gained the perspective of time, we shall appreciate that the most critical days are behind us so far

4. מס' 412.

as the establishment and first consolidation of the new State of Israel are concerned.

There are many economic matters and a few personal matters on which I would have liked to have an opportunity to write you. Perhaps I shall still add an annex to this letter on some of the economic matters. But Eliahu is leaving in a couple of hours and I must be sure to have at least part of what I wish to write in his hands.

Best wishes to all our friends,

Oscar Gass

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

העתק: 130.15/3749/1

תל אביב, כ"א באב תש"ח
26 באוגוסט 1948

אליאס היקר,

זה כבר רציתי לכתוב לך, אך טרדות יום יום לא הניחו.

התעוררתי עכשיו מחדש להריץ אליך שורות מספר למקרא אגרתך אל [—][1] מ־16 בחודש זה.

תמהתי במקצת על טכסיס הוויכוח שנקטת במכתב זה. כנגד העלילות והדיבות הנפוצות לגבי כוונותינו המדיניות אתה טופח על פניו את העובדה הניצחת, כי מנהיגינו הכריזו שאין להם כל כוונות כאלה. כלום באמת אתה סבור, שיש בכוחה של הכרזה בלבד לסתור האשמה ולהוציא חשד מן הלב? עצם העובדה שאין בפיך הוכחה אחרת אלא הסתמכות על דיבור־פה בלבד עשויה אך לחזק את החשד.

לא זו הדרך לשכנע את היריב. הדרך היעילה היחידה לדחות את ההאשמה היא להוכיח, כי היא מופרכת מעיקרה מתוך היותה סותרת את האינטרס העצמי של הצד הנאשם. בתחום זה יש לנו מבחר עשיר של ראיות חותכות, אשר התפלאתי כי לא נזקקת להן.

אין זה מענייננו להתפשט על פני ארצות ערב, כי מהותה של תנועתנו היא ריכוז ולא פיזור; אין לנו תקומה לאורך ימים אלא בפיתוח יחסים כלכליים אמיצים מאוד עם הארצות השכנות ולכן מענייננו להתפייס אתן ולא להוסיף לקומם אותן נגדנו; אם אנו שואפים למכור את תוצרתנו התעשייתית בארצות השכנות, הרינו מעוניינים בהגדלת יכולת קנייתן, מה שייתכן רק על־ידי חיזוק עצמאותן והפיכתו למכשיר של התקדמות

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1. שם הנמען — אישיות מדינית ערבית — לא הודפס כאן. המכתב לא נמצא.

כלכלית; אנו עם המפוזר בעולם כולו והתלוי ברצונן הטוב של המעצמות האדירות — היעלה על הדעת כי נעלם מאתנו, שעל־ידי מדיניות של התפשטות וכיבוש לא רק נפסיד את התמיכה אלא נגייס נגד עצמנו לחץ שלא נוכל לעמוד בפניו? הופעתנו על הבמה הבינלאומית כגורם תוקפני מוכרחה להתנקם בגורלם של הקיבוצים היהודיים בארצות שונות ואף שיקול זה מוכרח לבלום את יצרינו; ועוד ועוד בכיוון זה מתוך הדגשת האינטרס ולא תביעה לאמונה בכנותנו ובמוסריותנו הנעלה.

הנני מסכים בדרך כלל לשיטה שנקטת, להציף את המזרח התיכון בנחשול של מכתבים; אבל נראה לי כי מכתבים קצרים ונוקבים עשויים להיות יותר יעילים מאגרות מפורטות ומקיפות. כן הנני מוצא בכמה מכתבים הדגשה מיותרת של האופי הפרטי של פנייתך ולעתים — כמו במכתב ל־[—][2] — גם הדגשת האופי הפרטי של קשריך בעבר. חוששני כי הדגשות כאלו מכניסות למכתבים נימה של אי־כנות. אין אתה מחויב, חלילה, לפתוח את מכתביך "בשם המלכות", אך לעומת זה אין מחובתך גם להצניע לכת ולהעמיד פנים כאילו אתה איש העומד מן הצד המוכן בנסיבות מסוימות לגייס את השפעתך האישית להשגת המטרה.

אני מצטער מאוד על הפרסומת שזכתה לה שליחותך בימים האחרונים.[3] לא במעט גרמו לכך דיבורים מיותרים מצד אנשינו. פרסמתי בעניין זה הכחשה נמרצת ואני מקווה כי במידה שיש סיכויים כלשהם להתקדם בדרך הקשה שאתה הולך בה, לא יבולע להם על־ידי בולמוס הפרסום שעבר כבר את שיאו.

בברכה,

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק L231
נוסח יוצא: אצ"מ Z4/20151
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2425/1

[London], 27 August 1948

Understand from conversation Cadogan, question our invitation to [Security] Council table during British chairmanship[1] now under consideration. My view acceptance any euphemism unthinkable. 1) No precedent for government in diplomatic relations with other governments consent be addressed in non-governmental capacity. 2) Non-recognition does not

2. ראה הערה 1 לעיל.
3. מוסב על ידיעות בעיתונות הישראלית בדבר קיומן של שיחות שלום מקיפות עם הערבים בפאריס. משרד־החוץ הכחיש את הידיעות האלה. (ראה "דבר", 25־26 באוגוסט 1948).

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1. נציג בריטניה היה יושב־ראש מועצת־הביטחון בחודש ספטמבר.

justify improper designation; France, Belgium, Colombia, habitually address us properly and would almost certainly do so if became chairman. 3) July 15th resolution[2] implicitly recognized us. 4) Mediator likewise. Conclusion is that stubborn resistance incorrect designation rests on unanswerable case, and in light of two recent precedents would be likely to succeed. This implies determination to decline improper invitation if necessary for such few meetings as held September. Please cable if you agree. Believe we might influence Cadogan's action if I could tell him informally in advance that Memisrael will participate in Council if invited, otherwise will not intrude. Am certain you share this view, but welcome confirmation.[3] Please inform Goldmann.

Eban

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א. גאס אל א. קפלן
O. Gass to E. Kaplan

מברק 302
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2220/1

Washington, 27 August 1948

Lovett yesterday informed Epstein that State Department now raising no political objection to Export-Import loan. Lovett however emphasized that Bank requires much more project information. Do not know whether this merely amounts to substituting one more politic excuse for inaction for another less politic one. Will inquire at State [Department] and Bank soonest and inform you.

Gass

.2 ראה נספח ו, עמ' 668־670.
.3 לא נמצאה תשובה של שרתוק. במשך חודש ספטמבר לא דנה מועצת־הביטחון בעניין ארץ־ישראל (לבד מישיבה שהוקדשה לדברי אזכרה למתווך) וממילא לא התעוררה השאלה של הזמנת ישראל להשתתף בדיונים.

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מ. שרתוק אל ג׳. רידמן (תל אביב)
M. Shertok to J. Reedman (Tel Aviv)

העתק: 93.03/94/11

Tel Aviv, 30 August 1948

Sir,

In continuation of the interview which Dr. Mohn and you had with me on Thursday, 26th August,[1] I write to give you the information for which you asked regarding the forthcoming arrivals of immigrant ships.

Six ships which left Marseilles and Italian ports between August 24th and August 30th, and are due to arrive in Israel between August 30th and September 4th, are expected to bring an aggregate total of 4,374 immigrants, of whom 1,487, or 34%, will be men of military age.

The only subsequent departure so far fixed is that of September 3rd, when a boat with some 3,000 immigrants will leave from Italy, arriving on or about September 11th. Men of military age will form about one quarter of the total.

In the period between September 4th and the middle of the month there will be further arrivals of smaller boats, totalling 5,000 immigrants, of whom about 1,250 will be men of military age.

As I have already explained, the Provisional Government feels unable to modify its immigration programme on account of the truce, as it holds that the Resolutions of the Security Council impose no numerical limitation on any age group among the immigrants. Actually, it will be found from the study of past figures and of those cited in this letter that there is no fixed percentage for men of military age among the arrivals. As shown above, this percentage is due to drop in the coming fortnight.

I am, Yours faithfully,

M. Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs[2]

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1. לא נמצא דין־וחשבון מהשיחה, אך ראה מס׳ 480.
2. למחרת הבריק שרתוק ללוריא: ״רידמן אמר לשילוח, שלאור המכתב הזה הוא סבור שיש הצדקה להימנעות מהגשת אולטימטום לנו ולדחיית העניין עד לשובו של המתווך.״ (ראה מברק מיום 31.8.1948, 93.03/94/11).

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שיחות א. קצנלסון — הרוזן ברנאדוט ור. באנץ׳
(בשטוקהולם, ב־21 וב־30 באוגוסט 1948)
Meetings: A. Katznelson — Count Bernadotte and R. Bunche
(Stockholm, 21 and 30 August 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2446/2

סודי

בקבלת־הפנים לצירי ועידת הצלב האדום,[1] אשר נתקיימה ביום הפתיחה של הוועידה בביתו של הרוזן, הזמין אותי לסור אליו למחרת לשיחה על ענייני ארץ־ישראל. השיחה נתקיימה בחדרו הפרטי בבניין הוועידה (ברייכסטאג), בשעה 10, וארכה כשעה וחצי. לפני שפתחנו בשיחה, שאלתיו על גורל המחאה של מצרים וסוריה נגד השתתפותנו בוועידה. הוא העיר, כי המוחים מתכוונים לא להשתתפותנו בוועידה, אלא לציון שמה של מדינת ישראל ברשימת הגופים המיוצגים בוועידה. הוא ידרוש בוועדה המתמדת, אשר תדון על העניין ביום ב׳, לדחות את המחאה. (המוחים רצו להביא את העניין לדיון והחלטה בפלֶנוּם, והוא, כנשיא הוועידה, התנגד לזה והעביר את השאלה לוועדה המתמדת).

הוא פתח בסקירה מפורטת על המצב בארץ ועל גורל התיווך, **ואלה הן הנקודות העיקריות:**

1. הוא מודאג מעמדתנו התוקפנית, כפי שבאה לידי ביטוי בהופעותיו הפומביות (ולא בשיחות) של מ[שה] ש[רתוק]. זה נותן, אולי, סיפוק לקיצוניים, אולם זה ירחיק את הידידים. לדוגמא, אנשיו הוא באים כידידים וחוזרים כמתנגדים.

2. ההתקפות הבלתי־פוסקות נגדו ונגד אנשיו בעיתונות אינן מועילות, כמובן, אולם אין הוא נפגע על־ידי זה והוא ימשיך במאמציו. גם לא חדל להיות אופטימי על אף האכזבות.

3. הוא משוכנע כי מדינת ישראל היא עובדה שאין לבטלה, יהיה מה שיהיה יחסן של מדינות־ערב. לעומת זה אינו רואה כיצד תקום המדינה הערבית אם לא על־ידי מזיגה עם עבר־הירדן — המדינה היחידה המוכנה להתפשר אתנו.

4. אין סיכויים בשלב זה למשא־ומתן ישיר עם הערבים, גם לא עם עבר־הירדן, כי אין המלך בטוח בתמיכת נתיניו הוא. במדינות אחרות המצב עוד פחות יציב (עיראק). הם יעדיפו איפוא הכרעה באו״ם, אשר לא יקבלוה, **אולם לא ילחמו נגדה.**

5. העניין יחזור איפוא לאו״ם בעצרת פאריס, עם קבלת הדין־וחשבון שלו, אשר יוגש למזכיר הכללי או למועצת־הביטחון. הוא גם־כן יבוא לשם. הוא דואג לכך שהעניין שלנו יהיה ראשון בסדר־היום, ודיבר על כך עם טריגווה לי ועם הד״ר אוואט האוסטרלי, המועמד לנשיאות העצרת; גם ד״ר באנץ׳ דואג לזה.

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1. בסוף אוגוסט 1948 התקיימה בסטוקהולם הוועידה הבינלאומית של הצלב האדום; ממשלת ישראל הוזמנה להשתתף במעמד של משקיף. בראש משלחת ישראל עמד אברהם קצנלסון, המנהל הכללי של משרד־הבריאות.

6. דרושים שינויים בגבולות, שאינם עומדים בפני שום ביקורת בצורתם הנוכחית. ה־Kiss-points[2] לא יהיו נקודות־נשיקה, אלא נקודות־מריבה. את הגליל המערבי יש לצרף למדינה תמורת חלק מהנגב, אף כי הוא מבין כי אנו זקוקים למרחב, וכי אין בידי הערבים לפתח את הנגב. את יפו אין להוציא מגבולות המדינה העברית.

7. הצעתו הקודמת על ירושלים אינה קיימת יותר, אולם הוא אינו מאמין ביכולתו של או״ם לקיים בה משטר בינלאומי. בכל זאת יוחלט, לדעתו, על האינטרנציונליזציה, כי הרוב באו״ם יעמוד על זה. הוא אינו חסיד הקורידורים, אולם ייתכן כי אין מפלט מזה לגבי ירושלים — תל אביב. אם תקום ירושלים בינלאומית, על או״ם לשאת במימון המשטר, ולא על המדינות.

8. הוא מסכים כי מוטב להשאיר את עניין האיחוד הכלכלי להחלטתם החופשית של המעוניינים, אולם צריך להבטיח לערבים נמל חופשי, מכאן הצעתו על חיפה. אגב, נמסר לו כי במקרה שחיפה תישאר בידינו, יועבר צינור הנפט למקום אחר.

9. ההפוגה תימשך עד לפתרון הסופי, כי על כך הוחלט במועצת־הביטחון. הוא מבין כי קיום ההפוגה כרוך במעמסה כספית גדולה, ומשום כך יש להחיש את הפתרון. אגב, עניין הדמיליטריזציה של ירושלים נכשל בגלל אי־יכולת של או״ם לספק את כוחות הביטחון. הוא מסכים כי השאלה אינה אקטואלית יותר.

10. הוא היה מחשיב מאוד ג׳סטה מצדנו בשאלת החזרת הפליטים, ולו גם בהיקף מצומצם, אולם מבין את הקשיים הכרוכים בזה.

הדברים הנ״ל נאמרו בחלקם בתשובה לשאלותי והערותי, בהם עמדתי בעיקר על הנקודות הבאות:

א. ירושלים והקשר בינה לבין המדינה.
ב. הגליל המערבי.
ג. אי־כפיה בעניין האיחוד הכלכלי.
ד. החשת ההסדר הסופי.

ציינתי בדברי, בין היתר, את השינוי המכריע שחל במצב לעומת נובמבר — בעיית הביצוע אינה צריכה להטריד הפעם את או״ם; וכן את הלך־הרוח בקרב היישוב, אשר לא ישלים עם זה שקרבנותיו היו קרבנות־שווא.

הרוזן העיר, כי הוא יודע מה רב המחיר ששילמנו בעד הניצחון. הוא נפרד ממני באמרו כי למד הרבה בשיחה זו וכי עלינו להיפגש שנית לשיחה נוספת.
(זכרון־דברים זה הועבר באותו יום לפאריס לששון, על מנת להעבירו ארצה).

השיחה השנייה על אותו נושא נתקיימה לפי הצעתו עם ד״ר באנץ׳, אשר הגיע לשטוקהולם ביום הנעילה של הוועידה (30 באוגוסט) ובפיו אינפורמציה אחרונה מלייק־סאכסס. הוא מצא שם רפיון ואדישות לגבי ענייננו:

1. העניין שלנו אינו מופיע כלל בסדר־יומה של העצרת ואיש אינו מעוניין לעת־עתה להעלותו.

2. נקודות ההצטלבות בין המדינה היהודית והמדינה הערבית לפי תכנית החלוקה של ה־29 בנובמבר.

2. העצרת עלולה אפילו להתפזר מבלי לדון על העניין, ואז ימשיך המתווך בתפקידו וההפוגה תישאר בתוקפה.

3. על חידוש הקרבות אין לחשוב, כי מנוי־וגמור עם האמריקאים למנוע זאת.

4. התביעה לפירוז ירושלים בתוקפה עומדת; הוא רואה זאת כתנאי מוקדם לכל דיון על הסדר סופי.

5. אם גם יגיעו בעצרת לדיון על הבעיה שלנו, לא יהיה זה לפני אחד באוקטובר.

6. ההתעניינות הכללית בבעיה זו פחתה מאוד, כי נקודת־המוקד הבינלאומית היא לא בארץ, אלא בברלין.

ד"ר א. קצנלסון

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 16/82, 17/22
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/23

Tel Aviv, 30 August 1948

Consul transmitted my reply Meir[1] only 27.8 when he saw him Amman, Karmi present.[2] Meir said he stopped London contact in view press leakage[3] but he about send foremost personality Paris, possibly Mulki,[4] who will contact you within few days. Asked him tell me he hopeful of results despite my having contend with extremists, and he with League. If agreement reached, he prepared go ahead without League. Question attitude Britain not raised. Consul again proceeding Amman few days. Have advised him see Kirkbride,[5] sound him regarding whole affair as coming entirely from him without implicating us.

Shertok

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1. המלך עבדאללה. בדבר פנייתו של שרתוק באמצעות הקונסול הכללי של בלגיה בירושלים, ז'אן ניואנהויס, ראה מס' 461.
2. עבד אל־גאני אל־כרמי, מאנשי חצרו של עבדאללה.
3. ראה מס' 483 והערה 3 שם.
4. פאוזי אל מולקי, שר־ההגנה של עבר־הירדן.
5. סר אלק קירקברייד, ציר בריטניה בעבר־הירדן.

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שיחת א. לוריא — ט. לי, ר. באנץ' (בניו יורק, ב־27 באוגוסט 1948)

Meeting: A. Lourie—T. Lie, R. Bunche (New York, 27 August 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/94/11

[New York], 31 August 1948

Before Mr. Eban's departure, he suggested that I might call on Mr. Lie before the latter's own departure for Europe. I called Mr. Lie on Friday morning, August 27th, and he arranged an appointment at 12 o'clock that day, as he expected to leave the following day for London.

Following some opening remarks, in the course of which Mr. Lie asked after Mr. Eban, I told Mr. Lie that I wished to consult him on a cable which I had received from Mr. Shertok (dated August 25)[1] with reference to a proposal by the Mediator to hold up the further entry of men of military age as from September 2nd. Mr. Lie said it might be useful in this connection to have Mr. Bunche present at our talk, as Bunche was leaving that evening for Stockholm. While we waited for Mr. Bunche to arrive, Mr. Lie asked me to read the telegram, which I did, omitting the concluding paragraph with reference to the apparent purpose of the Mediator's tactics, namely, to put the onus on *us* to seek to obtain a majority in our favour in the Security Council. Mr. Lie was obviously unhappy about the line which the Mediator was taking and remarked that he had urged that the Mediator should reach an agreement with us regarding the number of men of military age who might be admitted during the truce period. He added that Mr. Mohn had suggested 500 a month. Mr. Lie had indicated that this was far too low and could not be considered.

At this point Mr. Bunche entered and at Mr. Lie's request I repeated the content of Mr. Shertok's telegram. I told Mr. Bunche that with his knowledge and experience of Palestine, he would be fully aware that the most critical question — in fact, the one which had brought us to the final breaking-point with the Mandatory — had been that of immigration. It was inconceivable after what had been endured and achieved by our people in Palestine that they should now accept at the behest of the Mediator a limitation which they had fought so bitterly to destroy. It must be clear that the line now being pursued could result only in a head-on clash, and I could not imagine that that was the Mediator's purpose.

Mr. Bunche said that he would have an opportunity of discussing the matter with the Mediator in Stockholm and that subsequently he expected

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1. מס' 480.

to accompany him to Rhodes. The deadline indicated by Mr. Mohn as reported in Mr. Shertok's telegram was September 2nd, and accordingly there was still a little time left for further consideration. The Mediator had been upset by the high proportion of men of military age who had entered in one month since the beginning of the second truce. In reply to my question, Mr. Bunche said that the numbers were some 2600 as compared with 270 during the first truce.[2] I said I was surprised to hear that the figure during the first truce was as low as that given by Mr. Bunche, but in any case 2600 was not out of proportion for persons of this category as compared with the total immigration, which I understood to be at the rate of about 10,000 a month.

In the course of the conversation, Mr. Bunche said that the conditions applicable to the second truce were the same as those that had applied to the first, and in particular that Mr. Shertok had agreed in a conversation with Mr. Bernadotte that the latter's ruling that there should not be an undue proportion of men of military age among those entering the country should be maintained. I queried this and stated that it was my understanding that Mr. Shertok had not accepted any limitations with regard to immigration during the period of the renewed truce, except in regard to actual military personnel. The situation was a very different one from that of the first truce which had been for a defined and very limited period. In criticizing the pressure that the Mediator was bringing in this regard, I suggested that it was not obvious that the Arab States were at present concentrating their energies on this point, and I failed to understand why the Mediator should seem to be courting an inevitable crisis. Both Mr. Bunche and Mr. Lie reacted promptly to this by saying that the Arabs were in fact continuing to bring very great pressure indeed in this regard.

Mr. Lie mentioned that he had urged the Mediator to seek an agreed figure, and that the matter might further be discussed with him. The interview lasted about half an hour and on parting I wished both Mr. Lie and Mr. Bunche a pleasant and fruitful trip abroad. As I left, Mr. Lie asked Mr. Bunche to remain in the room, apparently to continue the conversation in private.

2. למעשה הגיעו בתקופת ההפוגה הראשונה 887 עולים בגיל הגיוס. (ראה שרתוק אל לוריא, 31.8.1948, 93.03/94/11).

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א. הייט, ד. גינסבורג וא. גאס אל א. אפשטיין (תל אביב)
U. Heydt, D. Ginsburg and O. Gass to E. Epstein (Tel Aviv)

מברק מוצפן 127/130. התקבל: 1.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/6

Washington, 31 August 1948

Following discussion today we here agree that there is absolutely no prospect receiving loan from Export-Import Bank at this time.

Heydt and Gass discussed loan status with Hare, Wilkins [and] Mattison today. Hare and colleagues indicated clearly State Department had not certified and had made no commitments certify political stability Israel to Bank at this time.

Ginsburg [and] Gass discussed loan status with Gaston.[1] Gaston said clearly, though informally and unofficially, that Board of Directors not prepared to act on loan application from Israel on redeemable basis or any other, pending the achievement of de facto peace in Palestine.

State Department personnel, unlike Export-Import Bank, merely interested in prolongation discussions.

Gaston underlined Bank would give earnest consideration to any submission by State Department relating to political stability and cessation of fighting in Israel.

Heydt, Ginsburg, Gass

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א. ששון אל י. שמעוני
E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni

העתק: 93.03/64/14

פאריס, 31 באוגוסט 1948

סודי

[.....][1]

ה. התחלנו לקבל בקביעות את "דבר", "הארץ", ו"פלסטיין פוסט". רב תודות לך על הסידור הזה. כן אנו מקבלים בקביעות את "השידורים הערביים".[2] אשר למכתבך

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1. הרברט גאסטון, סגן יושב־ראש הבנק ליצוא וליבוא.

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1. ארבע הפיסקאות הראשונות של המכתב לא הודפסו כאן.
2. תדפיסי השידורים של תחנות־השידור הערביות, שנערכו במחלקת המזרח התיכון של משרד־החוץ.

הארוך ורב־התוכן מ־19 לחודש זה,[3] אין מלים בפי להודות לך עליו. במכתב אחר אשתדל לענות על כמה משאלותיך. כאן רצוני למהר ולהעיר, כי נדמה לי ש״מחלקת המזרח־התיכון״ מתעסקת יותר מדי בענייני ערביי ארץ־ישראל. לאלה יש משרד מיוחד ועליו להתעסק בהם. עלינו להתרגל לכך, כי אנו שייכים למשרד־החוץ, וכי עלינו להתרכז בעבודות חוץ בלבד, כמובן מתוך תיאום עם האחרים: עם משרד־המיעוטים, המחלקה המדינית[4] וכו׳, אך תיאום בלבד ולא פעולה ממשית. אם אין למשרד־המיעוטים האנשים הדרושים לו לעבודה — יש לעזור לו למצוא אותם. אם אין לו ההבנה המספיקה — יש לתת לו את ההסברות והעצות הדרושות אך בשום פנים לא לעשות את העבודה במקומו. זה ראשית. שנית, נדמה לי כי נבצר מ״מחלקת המזרח התיכון״ להשקיף על העניינים ולדון על הדברים מתוך ראיית המצב ביפו, בנצרת, בשפא־עמר ובמקומות אחרים ערביים בישראל או בארץ־ישראל. מחובתנו לחרוג מן המסגרת הזאת, שנראה לי כי אתם מצטמצמים בתוכה, ולצאת אל המרחב. אילו הייתם עושים זאת, ברי לי כי לא הייתם נרתעים מפני הרוח השולטת בארץ כיום, והייתם משקיפים, למשל, על שאלות הפליטים הערביים והמשכת המלחמה בצורה אחרת. לפחות הייתם מגיעים למסקנה, כי לא רק על־ידי נצחונות צבאיים אפשר לסיים את המלחמה ולפתור את סכסוכנו עם העולם הערבי והייתם, ללא ספק, מנסים להחדיר את הדבר בלבם של קובעי המדיניות שלנו. בראשית המלחמה אמרתי כי לא נוכל להכריע את העולם הערבי בכוח, ואם נוכל — נבצר מאתנו, מתוך שיקולים רבים ושונים לעשות זאת. אם תתחדש המלחמה, אין לי כל ספק כי אפשר יהיה לנו לכבוש את טול־כרם, שכם ועוד. כן אפשרי יהיה לנו להכות בצבא המצרי, הסורי וכו׳. אולם נוכל רק להזיז את הערבים ממקום למקום וזה הכול. המתיחות לא תחלוף. השקט לא יבוא והשלום לא יתקרב. והשאלה היא: אם אנו מעוניינים בכך? אני מצטער מאוד שאינני בימים אלה לידכם וליד ״הגבורה״, כי אז לא הייתי נרתע מלשחות נגד הזרם לטובת הכלל.

דרישת שלום למ[שה] שנ[רתוק] ולכל החברים,

שלך,

אליאס

3. לא הודפס כאן. ראה בתיק 130.15/2570/11.
4. המחלקה המדינית של משרד־החוץ, בראשותו של ראובן שילוח, עסקה באיסוף מידע ובהערכתו ובקשירת קשרים עם גורמים ערביים.

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י. רובינסון וג. רפאל אל מ. שרתוק
J. Robinson and G. Rafael to M. Shertok

מברק UN4
נוסח יוצא: 93.02/182/7
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2404/3

Paris, 2 September 1948

Having learned yesterday Lie, Count, supposed meet, we asked Lie for interview. Was unable seeing us, but charged Cordier discuss immediate problems. We conveyed Cordier following points: 1) Sentiment Israel unfairness observers dealing behalf Mediator's truce violations, stressing various examples observers decisions and their inactivities on cases Arab flagrant violations. 2) Indignation country and Government regards immigration military age persons and methods used persuade us accept ban. 3) Mediator's concept his functions as organ revision Resolution November devoid legal basis and politically harmful, involving U.N. conflict with itself. 4) Surprise our Government Mediator's handling your peace proposals. 5) His bringing home Arab camp wrong idea possibility solving by-problems, as refugees, without attacking fundamental problem peace Near East.

Cordier's reactions presumably not only personal. Count tried hard bring parties together; would be happy slip out of picture as soon this achieved. Time works our favour, quoting alleged Arab acquiescence existence State Israel; their problem being now finding method accommodating themselves new situation. Advises us not to be too intransigent question immigration. We replied: 1) Unstable truce liable exploding any moment not by political decision Government level but by sheer nervous, tense, situation. 2) Stressed also tremendous financial burdens both Israel and U.N., therefore urgency converting truce into peace. 3) Method achieve this end — admission Israel U.N., which would supply Arabs excellent excuse their public opinion discontinue hostilities against member nation.

Today Secretary-General invited us his home for confidential conversation. His points: 1) Strongly advises you in our interest come Paris some ten-fourteen days beginning September 21, purpose "smelling" atmosphere before application admission. Stressed presence numerous Foreign Secretaries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Scandinavia, Argentine; also expected during this period, session Council Foreign Ministers Big Four dealing most important world problems. Will give you all due honours Foreign Ministers non-member states. 2) Advises most strongly against formal application admission before making sure necessary votes Security Council, since rejection will give enormous uplift Arab

hopes. His opinion Americans will support but not campaign. While British successfully delaying recognition various countries, no counteraction favourable to us is noticeable part U.S.A. According his information, British may not use veto but strongly campaign against admission. He also heard about U.S.A.-U.K. negotiations our subject, with State Department group getting along with some British unknown ideas, not sure endorsement White House. Secretary-General going soon Scandinavian countries, will tell them shame yielding British pressure re recognition. 3) Believes added possibility admission later stage Assembly by wholesale trading two blocs admission all applicants including Israel. This connection Secretary-General discussed yesterday [with] Sobolev chances trading admission Transjordan for Israel. Sobolev's definite view Soviets will not yield on Transjordan, however Secretary-General view in wholesale trading all applications Soviet may be ready compromise. 4) Strongly advises against any new policy statements made by you between now and your arrival. Secretary-General gave us following picture his conversation Count, Bunche: Cordier submitted them our representations. Bunche preparing report behalf Count submissible between 12-14 September. It was agreed report be addressed Secretary-General, not to General Assembly for submission governments. Secretary-General not sure whether Count will follow his advice abstain making proposals, view his commitments Swedish press, according which Assembly will take final decision. This connection Secretary-General advised Count not depart legal basis November Resolution, modifiable only mutual consent parties. He complained this connection Bunche's weakness. Under these conditions there will not be an item "Palestinian Question" on the agenda General Assembly. Secretary-General believes Count basically friendly our cause, trying convince Arabs immutability Israel and fact their irremediable military defeat. Secretary-General suggested Count continue activities patiently and informally, advises you deal Count more sympathetically and informally. Next move Count visit Alexandria, September 4, upon invitation [Arab] League, which meets this day to decide strategy. Most probable candidate Presi dency this Assembly Evatt, who is supported Britain, U.S.A., France.

Robinson, Rafael

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הצהרת ג'יימס מקדונלד בשיחה עם מ. שרתוק (בתל אביב, ב־6 בספטמבר 1948)

Statement Delivered by James McDonald at a Meeting with M. Shertok (Tel Aviv, 6 September 1948)

העתק: 93.03/64/14

The United States Government expresses the hope that Israel will become a great force for constructive rebuilding within Israel's own territory, and will be able to exercise a beneficent influence upon this whole area.

The U.S. Government desires to aid in every proper way in this constructive development.

I am requested to emphasise in the closest possible terms the statements which I made to you and Mr. Ben-Gurion during our first talks: the U.S. is determined to use all its influence to prevent the violation of the truce, and should, unhappily, such violations occur, will support in the Security Council an immediate action, if necessary under [Chapter] 7, against the aggressor. My Government feels strongly that such violations must not be tolerated, because the maintenance of truce is an essential prerequisite of peace negotiations.

My Government would be grateful if the Provisional Government of Israel would let it be known, through me, if the Israel authorities have any reason for confidence that any one of the Arab States or any group of Arab States is prepared to initiate peace negotiations.

In order to determine whether there is a basis for facilitating peace negotiations, my Government, in strictest confidence, desires to learn the reaction of your Government to the following suggestions which, although tentative and in the nature of "trying on for size", are put forward by my Government in its earnest desire to aid Israel in becoming a permanent force for the maintenance of peace and economic development in the Middle Eastern area.

The suggestions are advanced that:

1) Perhaps a solution can be worked out as a feature of any final understanding with Transjordan which would exchange a large portion of desert land of the Negev for that portion of fertile Western Galilee which Israel now occupies militarily.

2) While my Government believes that Jerusalem should be an international enclave along the lines recommended by the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, and the Trusteeship Council Resolutions of April and May, the U.S. would consider acceptable any other arrangement satisfactory to Israel and the Arab States, provided the safety of and access to the Holy Places is guaranteed.

3) The U.S. Government would like the Israel Government to consider some constructive measures for the alleviation of Arab refugee distress which is a factor influencing world opinion.

It should be clear that my Government feels that demands which exceed suggestions (1) and (2) above would be prejudicial to the possibility of effecting permanent peace in Palestine.

If the Israel Government is prepared at this time to make known to my Government constructive views in response to the above suggestions, the U.S. is willing to commend the above programme to the Mediator and the British Government, which it is contemplated can exert considerable influence on the neighbouring Governments.

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ח. וייצמן אל הנשיא טרומן (ואשינגטון)

C. Weizmann to President Truman (Washington)

העתק: ג"ו

Geneva, [6][1] *September 1948*

Dear Mr. President,

I have received from our friend, Mr. Eddie Jacobson, an account of the conversation which he was privileged to have with you a few weeks ago on the subject of the proposed loan to Israel. In his letter, Mr. Jacobson tells me that when he left you he felt confident of good news at an early date.[2]

I should have written earlier, but I have had to undergo an eye operation, and I have only just come out of the clinic. May I now express my deep appreciation of the keen interest which you have taken in this project? In sanctioning this loan, you will be giving assistance to those schemes of refugee welfare and economic and social development which have always attracted your interest in connection with Palestine and the Near East.

In his letter, Mr. Jacobson also informs me that he raised the question of de jure recognition of Israel and our entry into the United Nations. I feel that with those two steps you will be in a position to complete a political solution of this grave problem along lines which fully conform with the historic assistance which you gave on November 29th and May 14th.

I am certain that Jews and Zionists everywhere will always remember with gratitude your constant and effective support in critical times.

With warmest good wishes and personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Chaim Weizmann

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1. התאריך הרשום בהעתק שבגנזך וייצמן הוא 2.9.1948, ואילו במכתב שנשלח אל טרומן שונה התאריך ל־6.9.1948. (ראה צילומו ב־Frank J. Adler, *Roots in a Moving Stream*, p. 215).
2. ג׳ייקובסון אל וייצמן, 6.8.1948, ג"ו.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. הייט וא. גאס (ואשינגטון)

M. Shertok to U. Heydt and O. Gass (Washington)

T1W/121 מברק מוצפן
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1

Tel Aviv, 6 September 1948

Appreciate motives which prompted you speak out, but consider procedure unwarranted.[1] It should have been left to Government to react. Public relations considerations which dictate course action agencies operating on American scene do not apply to foreign legations. Moreover, language statement was intemperate by our standards, formulations far too sharp, and attempt drive wedge between State Department and White House too obvious to conform with international dignity. Generally demarcation line between one Government addressing another and local body criticising its own Government according old style was disconcertingly blurred. If immediate reaction was imperative, could be passed to Emergency Council which always concerned itself with questions D.P's. Please accept this for future guidance.

Shertok

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן

M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.02/2382/12

Paris, le 7 septembre 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

1. Les nouvelles ne sont pas bonnes. Comme je vous l'ai télégraphié, j'ai appris que la Grande-Bretagne avait fait une démarche énergique pour exiger que la France observe la solidarité de l'Europe Occidentale dans la question de Palestine.[1]

Je crois savoir qu'à la faveur de la crise gouvernementale[2] une réponse a

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1. בעקבות הודעת משרד־החוץ האמריקאי בדבר קיום ההגבלות על עליית יוצאי־צבא מגרמניה ואוסטריה (ראה מס׳ 470 והערה 2 שם), פירסמה הנציגות הישראלית בוואשינגטון הודעה, המותחת ביקורת על ההחלטה האמריקאית ומביעה תקווה שההחלטה, כפי שנוסחה, איננה מייצגת את הדעה הסופית של ממשלת ארצות־הברית. (ראה *New York Times*, 5.9.1948).

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1. ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 6.9.1948, 130.09/2344/4.
2. ב־28 באוגוסט התפטר הקבינט של מארי — לאחר שהיה בשלטון חודש ימים — בעקבות ויכוח על המדיניות הכלכלית של הממשלה. ב־5 בספטמבר הקים שומאן קבינט, שהתפטר כעבור יומיים. לאחר התפטרותו הרכיב אנרי קיי (Oueuille) קבינט חדש, ששומאן כיהן בו כשר־החוץ.

été donnée qui, en tout cas, permettrait difficilement à la France de reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël avant la session de l'O.N.U.

Le gouvernement français qui s'est constitué maintenant est le résultat de marchandages et de compromis qui ont donné lieu à de vives discussions et qui ont laissé un sentiment de grande amertume chez tous. Dans ces circonstances, nos amis dans le gouvernement ne peuvent pas songer à intervenir dans une question intéressant les Affaires étrangères — tout comme M. Schuman ne pourrait probablement pas, pour le moment, intervenir dans les questions touchant aux ministères qui ont été abandonnés aux socialistes.

Je suis allé voir cet après-midi M. de Bourbon-Busset (du Cabinet des Affaires étrangères de M. Schuman) et je lui ai dit que le gouvernement britannique avait fait connaître au gouvernement des Etats-Unis que la France suivrait la ligne britannique dans les affaires de Palestine. Je lui ai dit que cette nouvelle avait rencontré chez nous de l'étonnement et de l'incrédulité. Je lui ai rappelé que des promesses presque formelles avaient été faites déjà par M. Bidault, ensuite par M. Schuman et, enfin, tout récemment, par M. Chauvel concernant le départ pour la Palestine d'un Chargé de Mission (M. de Boisanger).[3]

M. de Bourbon-Busset m'a répondu qu'il n'avait pas connaissance d'engagement pris par la France vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre (il était fort embarrassé) et en ce qui concerne le départ de M. de Boisanger, il m'a déclaré que le projet n'était nullement abandonné. Je lui ai dit que je lui demandais de faire savoir à M. Schuman que nous lui serions infiniment reconnaissants de prendre la décision concernant le départ de M. de Boisanger dans les plus brefs délais, pour mettre fin à l'impression d'un alignement de la politique française sur celle de la Grande-Bretagne.

M. de Bourbon-Busset m'a promis d'en parler ce soir même à M. Schuman. Il croyait pouvoir me promettre que le départ de M. de Boisanger serait soumis à l'approbation du Conseil des ministres qui suivrait celui qui aurait lieu ce soir même, c'est-à-dire peut-être à la fin de la semaine ou sinon la semaine prochaine.

J'aurai, ces jours-ci, toute une série de rencontres, et je vais concentrer tous mes efforts sur la question du départ de M. de Boisanger. Inutile, pour le moment, de songer à une décision de reconnaissance.

2. Je vous envoie ci-joint copie d'une lettre que j'adresse à M. Binoche au sujet des Etablissements français.[4]

3. M. Trygve Lie avait déjà été vu par Gideon Rafael et Robinson.[5] Comme Gideon Rafael préférait que je ne voie pas Trygve Lie, je lui ai

3. קלוד דה בואסאנז'ה, פקיד בכיר במשרד־החוץ הצרפתי, מומחה לענייני ארץ־ישראל. ראה גם מס׳ 413, שם מדובר על שיגורו של אדם אחר — אלברט ואנטייה.

4. ראה פישר אל בינוש, 6.9.1948, 130.02/2382/12. פישר הבטיח שמדינת ישראל תכבד את הזכויות והפריווילגיות של מוסדות הדת הצרפתיים בישראל.

5. ראה מס׳ 492.

remis la copie de la lettre de Léo Kohn[6] afin qu'il la lui montre, ce qui, m'assure Rafael, a été fait.

4. Je vous envoie ci-joint le texte du compte rendu qu'André Philip a fait au groupe socialiste de l'Assemblée Nationale.[7] Si vous avez le temps d'y jeter un coup d'oeil, vous vous rendrez compte.

5. Ci-joint un rapport de Mishu Weissman.[8] Je ne le mets pas au courant de la pression nouvelle qui est exercée par le gouvernement britannique sur les pays d'Europe occidentale. Vous le ferez si vous le jugez nécessaire, mais j'ai pensé qu'il valait mieux le laisser prendre ses contacts sans trop le décourager.

6. Ci-joint une lettre de Ben-Menachem pour Shertok.[9]

7. Ce n'est pas sans hésitation que je vous fait part des réflexions que j'ai faites en ce qui concerne notre délégation à l'O.N.U.

Sans penser à assigner à Sasson ou à moi-même des fonctions dans notre délégation à l'O.N.U., il me semble qu'il eût été correct de nous adjoindre tous les deux formellement à notre délégation. En ce qui me concerne, il y a là simplement une question d'étiquette et, en même temps, une question de me donner un statut officiel que ma position actuelle en France ne me confère pas encore. Je vous ferais remarquer, à ce propos, que les ministres des pays arabes font tous partie des délégations à l'O.N.U.

En ce qui concerne M. Sasson, il me semble que sa nomination comme membre de la délégation s'impose à la suite du bruit qui a déjà été fait au sujet de son séjour à Paris.[10] Dans les explications qui ont été données, il a bien fallu faire entrevoir que M. Sasson préparait le travail de notre délégation. D'autre part, la présence de M. Sasson à la délégation ne peut être interprétée par tout le monde que comme un désir de notre part d'arriver à une entente avec les Arabes. Vous connaissez la modestie de Sasson et vous comprendrez pourquoi j'ai cru devoir me charger de faire ces remarques.

8. André Marie occupe le poste ministériel de Chef de la délégation française à l'O.N.U. M. André Marie ne nous est pas défavorable et la présence, dans son Cabinet, de M. Guérin de Baumont constitue pour nous un précieux atout.

Veuillez croire, mon cher Eytan, à mes sentiments très cordiaux.

[.....][11]

Maurice Fischer

6. ל. כהן אל פישר, 1.9.1948 (130.02/2382/12). במכתב יש סקירה כללית על המצב המדיני והערכה על שליחות התיווך של ברנאדוט. המכתב נועד לעיונו של ט. לי ושל אישים אחרים על-פי שיקול-דעתו של פישר. (ראה איתן אל פישר, 1.9.1948, שם).

7. לא נמצא.

8. ראה וייסמן אל איתן, 3.9.1948, 130.02/2384/16. וייסמן דיווח על שיחות בפאריס ובבריסל. על שליחותו של וייסמן ראה הערת-עורך, עמ' 579.

9. לא נמצא.

10. ראה מס' 483 והערה 3 שם.

11. שתי תוספות למכתב לא הודפסו כאן.

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ג. מאירסון אל מ. שרתוק
G. Meyerson to M. Shertok

מברק P2/40. התקבל: 8.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2325/4

מוסקבה, 7 בספטמבר 1948

בתשובה למכתבי מאתמול נתקבלתי היום על־ידי מולוטוב בקרמל לשיחה לבבית מאוד שארכה חצי שעה. הביע ביטחונו בכוח מדינתנו וממשלתה וכי נתגבר. הזכרתי בעיית הגבולות. דין־וחשבון מלא במכתב.[1] יודיעני על מועד טקס הקבלה.
גולדה

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נ. גולדמן אל מ. שרתוק
N. Goldmann to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 13/95. התקבל: 10.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 8 September 1948

Referring to your telegram No. 88.[1] Weltsch reports without foundation. Came here because Burrows [of] Foreign Office requested several times see me. If asked, suggest that you state no new approach nor proposals on our part British Government. Intend opening office representative Provisional Government this week Manchester Square without public announcement. Presume no objection on your side. Leaving Friday New York, returning 20th September Paris. Linton will move into new office when opened. Consulate-General will be opened later, probably temporary accommodation, perhaps Great Russell[2] at first, where Visa Department already functions, as Manchester Square still under reconstruction and only ready full use about two months time.

Goldmann

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1. המכתב לא נמצא, אך ראה על הפגישה בספרו של מ. נמיר, שליחות במוסקבה, עמ׳ 41־42.

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1. שרתוק אל לינטון (בשביל גולדמן), 7.9.1948 (130.09/2318/1). שרתוק התייחס לידיעות שהופיעו ב״הארץ״ מאת רוברט ולטש, סופר העיתון בלונדון, שדיווח כי שובו של גולדמן ללונדון קשור במגעים מדיניים מחודשים. שרתוק הזהיר את גולדמן מפני כל נסיון לפתוח בשלב זה במגעים מדיניים עם אנשי משרד־החוץ הבריטי.
2. המען הישן של משרדי ההסתדרות הציונית והסוכנות היהודית.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 20/96, 21/95, 22/89, 23/94, 24/29
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1

Tel Aviv, 9 September 1948

Belgian[1] again saw King Amman, assured him my behalf leakage occurred Tel Aviv, not Paris, you are completely innocent and acme caution.[2] King stated: 1) His delegation Alexandria,[3] consisting Ministers Defence[4] and Trade,[5] will proceed Paris as observers Assembly and will be available for discussions with you, with view working out peace settlement. 2) In order raise his prestige League, essential we agree admit refugees Ramleh, Lydda, whose distress particularly acute; but if peace programme, including above measure repatriation, not accepted by League, he will go ahead regardless. 3) He is taking steps check reported increase Husseini activity Palestine by sending contingents to affected areas. 4) He pressed Consul revisit him Irbid with my reaction.

Have asked Consul convey following: 1) He found me in extremely cautious mood, ready advance but very slowly, with one foot lifted but still in air not ready yet bring it down, as not sure of ground. 2) We have authentic reports 50% increase Arab armies in Palestine during truce, therefore forced strengthen our positions along entire front, cannot possibly spare force necessary ensure security twin towns such as mass repatriation would entail. Nevertheless let his representatives contact you, bring up question, we shall react on merits. 3) He should urge King start thinking seriously about resettlement in Transjordan bulk refugees now there, for which we might prevail upon U.S. give him loan.

When told Consul that King putting cart before horse, he replied King does not insist immediate repatriation, only wants this included in programme to impress League. Doubt whether Consul understood King correctly, particularly as he himself said King most hard-pressed by refugee problem. According Consul's information, Minister Defence skilful diplomat, resourceful, pliable, whereas colleague is stiff, take-it-or-leave-it kind man.

When they arrive, you should make sure they know how to find you, but

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1. הקונסול הכללי הבלגי בירושלים, ז'אן ניואנהויס.
2. ראה מס' 488.
3. משלחת עבר־הירדן למושב הוועדה המדינית של הליגה הערבית באלכסנדריה.
4. פאוזי אל־מולקי.
5. סעיד אל־מופתי.

take no initiative. If meeting materialises, and they raise question twin towns, you should make clear consideration partial repatriation possible only against background resettlement bulk outside Israel, which in long run will be real boon to King, his country and people concerned. Belgian saw Kirkbride, who would not be drawn, only said settlement must be imposed by U.N. Assembly. He was mildly disparaging in his references to King who he said was ageing. Please confirm this cable fully understood.

Shertok

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מ. פישר אל ו. איתן

M. Fischer to W. Eytan

מקור: 130.10/2516/10

Paris, le 9 septembre 1948

Mon cher Eytan,

1. Je vous ai envoyé un télégramme concernant la proposition qui avait été faite par la Grande-Bretagne à la France de se mettre d'accord pour agir en vue d'obtenir une tutelle anglo-française sur Haïfa et sur l'Hinterland.[1]

Cette proposition a été rejetée par la France, mais on me fait observer de tous côtés que l'Angleterre s'agite beaucoup pour la question de Haïfa et qu'elle semble déterminée à faire un très grand effort pour que ce port soit tout au moins internationalisé.

Tout en donnant à l'Angleterre une certaine satisfaction en ne faisant rien sur le plan officiel qui détache la France de la politique suivie par les autres Etats de l'Europe occidentale à l'égard d'Israël, il faut cependant souligner que la France se refuse à rencontrer les autres pays du Pacte à Cinq[2] pour une conférence concernant la Palestine. Tout dernièrement, la Hollande a proposé la chose au gouvernement français, et ce dernier a répondu qu'il ne voyait pas l'utilité d'une telle consultation.

Ceci indique que la France, malgré toute sa prudence et toute son hésitation, entend quand même maintenir sa liberté de mouvement.

2. Les Anglais reprochent d'ailleurs aux Français leur politique "isolationniste" dans la question d'Israël. Lorsqu'il était question des cinq espions anglais, arrêtés à Jérusalem,[3] l'ambassade d'Angleterre a demandé au Quai d'Orsay de se joindre à la protestation anglaise au Conseil de Sécurité.

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1. ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 8.9.1948, 130.09/2344/4. באותו מברק הדגיש פישר את הצורך בפעולה מדינית בוואתיקן, שהעדרה משפיע לשלילה על עמדת צרפת ומדינות קתוליות אחרות.
2. מדינות האיחוד המערבי — ראה מס׳ 240 והערה 2 שם.
3. עובדי חברת החשמל בירושלים — ראה מס׳ 327 והערה 1 שם.

La France a refusé, ce qui a donné lieu, du côté anglais, à des manifestations de mauvaise humeur assez brutales.

3. J'ai eu hier une très longue conversation avec M. Bonneau[4] qui vient de rentrer de vacances. J'ai insisté encore une fois avec la plus grande énergie pour que quelque chose soit entrepris qui fît perdre à l'attitude française son caractère de stagnation.

Evidemment, en les circonstances actuelles, on ne saurait songer à une reconnaissance, mais l'envoi d'un délégué spécial reste possible pour peu qu'un gouvernement soit constitué et reste quelques jours au pouvoir. C'est donc sur ce point que j'ai insisté en faisant comprendre qu'il était absolument indispensable qu'avant l'ouverture de la session de l'O.N.U., le monde occidental ait, tout au moins, fait ce geste de bonne volonté à notre égard.

M. Bonneau m'a promis tout son appui, et je ne doute pas de la sincérité de sa bonne volonté. Pour rendre la chose plus alléchante, j'ai proposé — et j'espère que vous m'approuverez — d'accompagner le délégué dans sa mission en Israël afin de faciliter son travail.

4. Au cours de l'entretien avec Bonneau, la question du pétrole a de nouveau été soulevée. Je ne saurais vous dire combien je déplore que des propositions aussi importantes que celles que j'avais transmises télégraphiquement à ce sujet soient restées sans aucune réponse.[5]

Je pense pourtant que vous appréciez à sa juste valeur toute l'importance que la France attache à cette question du pétrole, et que nous avons intérêt à empêcher que la France cherche uniquement du côté de l'Angleterre la solution de ces questions.

J'ai cru devoir, dans un télégramme précédent, vous répéter encore une fois combien je déplore que le Vatican ait été négligé.[6] Je ne me serais pas permis de le faire après les explications que vous m'aviez données si je n'avais pas appris que le Vatican avait fait demander à M. Schuman de ne pas reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël tant que la question de l'attitude d'Israël vis-à-vis des intérêts chrétiens en Palestine ne serait pas clarifiée.

5. On m'a fait remarquer, au Quai d'Orsay, que les observateurs français de l'O.N.U. n'avaient pas été très gentiment traités par notre censure en ce qui concerne leur courrier.

J'en ai profité pour me plaindre de l'attitude d'un des observateurs français à Haïfa, un nommé Chauvin. On m'a promis qu'il serait rappelé.

Je reviens à deux points de votre lettre du 1er septembre:[7]

4. גבריאל בונו, מנהל מחלקת אפריקה־לוואנט במשרד־החוץ הצרפתי.
5. ראה מס' 478.
6. ראה הערה 1 לעיל.
7. המכתב בתיק 130.02/2382/12. העניינים הנזכרים להלן הם: מעמדו של הקונסול אברהם גולדברג (ראה מס' 474 והערה 4 שם); שיגור קציני משטרה להשתלמות בצרפת; מתן מידע למיכאל וייסמן (ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 579).

Point 3. — Quand je parle de l'exequatur verbal, il s'agit effectivement d'une communication orale. Comme vous, j'apprécie la saveur de l'expression "note verbale".

Point 6. — De nombreuses fois déjà, des demandes analogues ont été faites. J'ai fait les démarches nécessaires, j'ai obtenu le consentement des autorités intéressées, et ensuite il n'a plus été question de rien. Cela me met dans des situations très pénibles. Comme je suis certain que les autorités françaises feront très volontiers le nécessaire pour permettre à nos jeunes officiers de police de se familiariser avec les méthodes françaises, je propose de n'entreprendre les démarches que lorsque ces jeunes gens seront arrivés en France.

Point 7. — Je maintiens le contact avec M. Weissman auquel vous avez confié une tâche que j'ose qualifier de surhumaine.

Veuillez croire, mon cher Eytan, à mes sentiments très cordiaux.

Maurice Fischer

[.....][8]

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

מיכאל (מישו) וייסמן, עורך־דין תל אביבי ולשעבר מראשי ההסתדרות הציונית ברומניה, התבקש לצאת לשליחות מדינית בארצות בנלוכס. מטרות השליחות היו:

״א. לבקר במשרד־החוץ של שלוש הארצות הללו על־מנת להסביר את הבעיות השוטפות של המזרח התיכון, את מצבה הנוכחי ותכניותיה בעתיד של מדינת ישראל, את היחסים בעתיד בין מדינת ישראל ושלוש הארצות האמורות וכיוצא בזה.

ב. לנסות להשיג את ההכרה בישראל מאת ממשלות שלוש הארצות הללו.

ג. עבודת הסברה כללית בחוגי המדינאים והעיתונאים בשלוש הארצות הללו.״

(ראה איתן אל וייסמן, 19.8.1948, 130.02/2384/16). ראה גם הדין־וחשבון הראשון של וייסמן מיום 3.9.1948, 130.02/2384/16).

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שיחת מ. וייסמן — פ.א. ספאק (בבריסל, ב־9 בספטמבר 1948)
Meeting: M. Weissman — P.H. Spaak (Brussels, 9 September 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2384/16

J'avais déposé ma carte et présenté ma demande d'audience le 3 septembre 1948.

J'ai reçu la réponse écrite lundi le 6 sept. que je serai reçu le 9/9/48 à 5 heures après-midi.

Un chef de Cabinet m'avait téléphoné un mot d'excuse, que le Premier était rentré de vacances, que des travaux et des visites s'étaient agglomérés, et qu'il espérait que je trouverais à faire et à voir en Belgique en attendant.

8. נספחים אחדים, שהיו מצורפים למכתב, לא הודפסו כאן.

Cependant j'ai appris par les journaux que le Premier avait reçu lundi le 6/9 le ministre de l'Egypte, le lendemain mardi le ministre de l'Irak, mercredi le nonce papal, et jeudi le 9 il avait passé une heure avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères néerlandais.

Cette dernière visite ne fut pas communiquée dans les journaux, elle me fut transmise par M. Fisher, d'Anvers, qui prétend être bien informé.

Je vous soumets ces circonstances "accidentelles" ou non, pour que vous ayez une image exacte de l'arrière-fonds de mon audience.

A 5.15 je fus reçu par M. Spaak avec un mot d'excuse pour le retard. Je lui remis la lettre[1] et je lui transmis le salut de la nation la plus vieille et de l'Etat le plus jeune, et après un court exposé dont les points principaux sont dans l'aide-mémoire joint, il me répondit et je tâche de reproduire aussi littéralement que possible.

"J'ai poursuivi avec sympathie et avec amitié pour la nation juive tout votre exposé, croyez-moi malgré le peu de popularité dont je sais [que] je jouis à présent parmi les Juifs et surtout chez vous en Israël (*sic*). Mais la question n'est pas seulement une question de droit et de justice — et même en ce qui concerne la justice j'ai quelques incertitudes — mais c'est une grave question politique avec de vastes échos, connexions et ramifications.

"Personnellement je dois vous dire: je ne comprends pas le problème juif. Je ne comprends pas la discrimination, c'est un sentiment que je ne peux même pas réaliser. Quand le prof. Weizmann m'a dit il y a quelques années, "nous voulons partir de l'Europe, nous sommes fatigués de l'Europe" je me suis senti humilié. Mais je sais que tous ne sentent pas comme moi, et le rappel du massacre des six millions, et, comme vous le disiez, un nombre égal à la population belge toute entière, je le reconnais, est un avertissement.

"Mais quand nous avons voté le partage, qui je veux bien le dire n'est pas une "décision" de l'O.N.U., mais une "recommandation" nous croyions que les Arabes y accéderaient, et que le problème serait résolu. Mais personne de nous comptait pas avec cette détermination des Arabes de faire effectivement la guerre. Tout ce problème arabe, toutes ces populations immenses, dont mes agents sur les lieux me décrivent le réveil croissant et le nationalisme grandissant, constitue pour moi une grave préoccupation. Votre observation, avec la carte que vous m'avez montrée, pour prouver combien est petit le territoire qui vous est alloué, soulève la sérieuse question de l'émigration illimitée à laquelle vous refusez de renoncer, en invoquant une souveraineté absolue et obstinée (*sic*), l'immigration sans contrôle attirera des centaines de mille de Juifs, et vos hommes d'Etat parlent de millions. Malgré les intentions les plus pacifiques des dirigeants,

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1. מן הסתם מכתבו של שרתוק אל שר־החוץ של בלגיה מיום 26.8.1948. במכתב — המלצה על וייסמן והסבר על מטרת שליחותו. (המכתב בתיק 130.02/2385/24).

le *petit* territoire et le *grand* nombre de population, créera physiquement *un besoin d'expansion.* C'est ce qui trouble les Arabes voisins, c'est ce qui m'inquiète. Sans une réglementation de l'émigration nous créons là des conditions *objectives* qui vraisemblablement mènent à la guerre."

A mon objection que les Arabes refusèrent d'accéder même à la recommandation de la Commission anglo-américaine qui demand[ait] une immigration immédiate de 100.000 Juifs, il demanda quels sont les besoins réels et prévisibles des Juifs pour émigrer. Je lui ai fait le compte de 1.000.00[0], environ 600.000 Juifs des pays Arabes et de l'Afrique du Nord et 400.000 dans l'Europe orientale, sans parler des besoins qui pourraient surgir en cas de nouvelles crises, et sans parler du besoin psychique de nombreux Juifs de regagner leur pays.

Réponse: "Un million, c'est beaucoup, mais c'est une limite quand même. Vous dites que les Arabes ont refusé les 100.000, et qu'ils refuseront d'autant plus le million — qui est un chiffre haut — mais premièrement les choses ont changé depuis, il y a tout d'abord la recommandation du partage, il y a la guerre, où vous tîntes bon, il y a ce fait — j'accentue un fait, ce qui est très important, mais qui est encore un simple fait: L'Etat d'Israël; tous ces changements rendraient les Etats Arabes plus malléables, mais surtout l'acceptation du contrôle ou d'une limite de l'émigration, ferait une grosse impression sur nous à l'O.N.U. et nous pourrions insister, exercer des pressions, nous serions à même d'écarter leurs appréhensions.

"Quand vous me dites pour écarter mes appréhensions et l'inquiétude des Arabes, que non seulement vous êtes un peuple pacifique mais que ce serait folie de faire la guerre au monde arabe avec lequel vous voulez vivre en bons termes, mais qu'encore il y a une O.N.U., une Charte, un Conseil de Sécurité, des sanctions possibles, je vous réponds: Vous avez prouvé vous-mêmes, et avec bravoure, que lorsqu'il le faut le monde arabe ne vous effraye pas; et vous serez mieux à le faire après avoir recueilli les millions de Juifs; et quant à l'O.N.U. — j'en suis très préoccupé, j'en ai été le premier Président — c'est une magnifique institution mais encore impuissante.

"Réfléchissez donc sérieusement à mettre une sourdine à cette passion pour la souveraineté absolue et pour un nationalisme sans condition que je comprends quand on refait un Etat après 2000 ans, mais les hommes d'Etat responsables doivent voir les faits et leurs développements possibles.

"Pour en venir donc aux questions soumises:

"Je regrette infiniment, mais je ne pense pas donner la reconnaissance à présent. Nous aurons l'Assemblée de l'O.N.U. dans quelques jours. Il ne serait pas politique de prendre position à présent.

"Nous avons désigné un médiateur. Ce serait lui jeter des bâtons entre les jambes, qu'une indiscrète et une inopportune prise de position à présent pour une ou l'autre partie.

"En ce qui concerne la distinction que vous faites entre la reconnaissance et la recommandation au Conseil pour l'admission à l'O.N.U., je ne

l'admets pas intégralement, mais même s'il y a du vrai dedans, ma position est de prendre position dans un règlement général, et alors je serai heureux de reconnaître l'Etat, qui a ma sympathie personnelle, et de voir la nation juive dans l'O.N.U. Du reste, je sais qu'Israël existe, et que tôt ou tard nous le reconnaîtrons. C'est de la politique non-réaliste de croire que ce fait pourra être supprimé. On ne peut pas remonter le cours de l'histoire, et supprimer un fait historique et social existant. Mais encore une fois, je le ferai dans le cadre d'une solution générale, et l'O.N.U. nous attend."

Quand j'ai demandé, en ce qui concerne l'admission à l'O.N.U. d'Israël, s'il jugeait que c'était *fair,* qu'alors que l'autre partie avait six membres dans le débat et dans le vote, Israël dans une question *vitale* dans toute la force du terme, soit jugé par contumace, il répondit, un peu irrité: "Comment pouvez-vous dire cela? En novembre nous avons fait sauter toutes les règles fondamentales et organiques de l'O.N.U., nous avons imaginé tous les trucs proceduraux, pour vous donner la possibilité de vous entendre. Et votre actuel ministre des Affaires étrangères, il en a usé, Dieu merci, amplement."

"Et aux séances du Conseil de Sécurité, vous avez l'impression qu'Israël est absent? Mais parfois on a l'impression que ce n'est que lui qui est présent. Comment donc pouvez-vous parler de 'contumace'?"

"Mais en dehors des questions de droit et justice, que je ne sous-estime pas et qui sont des facteurs, je relève votre observation que la tâche de votre gouvernement, d'un socialisme mesuré, devient plus difficile à contenir les gauches-extrêmes qui voient l'eau couler à leur moulin, pas l'appui intéressé — et je sais ce que ces protecteurs veulent — non pas votre bien-être — que l'U.R.S.S. et ses satellites vous donnent. J'avoue que pour un homme d'Etat réaliste — c'est un gros argument. J'en suis conscient. Je veux reconnaître que cet argument pèse énormément sur l'autre plateau de la balance en votre faveur.

"Il faut donc réfléchir encore. Je veux vous dire encore que je ne veux pas me mettre à l'abri du pacte à cinq[2] qui nous demande de nous consulter préalablement c'est-à-dire si ma sympathie prévalait et non le jugement froid, je devrais me consulter. Mais bien que la sympathie existe, elle ne prévaut pas."

A ma dernière question si en attendant une décision plus favorable, il voyait quelque objection à l'établissement d'un bureau officiel de la Représentation d'Israël, à l'instar de la Représentation de Paris, il répondit: "Vous voyez, à cela je ne dis pas non; je ne dis pas encore oui tout de suite, parce que je voudrais que vous mettiez par écrit votre demande pour que je sache exactement ce que vous demandez, mais j'y mettrai toute ma bienveillance."

Je suis sorti à 6.05. L'entretien prit 50 minutes.

2. ראה מס' 240 והערה 2 שם.

נספח

APPENDIX

AIDE-MÉMOIRE REMIS AU PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL M. SPAAK
LE 9/9/1948 PAR M. WEISSMAN

Le lien historique entre la Palestine et le peuple juif n'est pas mis en discussion. Depuis la Palestine a été sous des divers régimes, mais n'a jamais constitué un pays arabe indépendant.

En 1917, la Déclaration Balfour et le mandat, approuvé[s] par 52 nations la Belgique y comprise, affect[èrent] la Palestine pour l'immigration juive et la constitution dans ce pays d'un foyer national. Le prince Feyçal, porteur de parole du Mouvement National Arabe y donna son adhésion.

En vertu de ce mandat, 700.000 Juifs vinrent en Palestine.

La question ayant été soumise par la Grande-Bretagne à l'arbitrage de l'O.N.U., celle-ci, le 29 novembre 1947, décida la création d'un Etat Juif dans une partie du territoire de la Palestine dans lequel les Juifs formaient une majorité absolue.

Le 15 mai 1948, le mandat de la Grande-Bretagne cessa et ce fut le vide.

Les Juifs sur le territoire qui leur fut affecté par l'O.N.U. et où ils formaient la majorité, en se conformant à toutes les recommandations de l'O.N.U., constituèrent un gouvernement et proclamèrent un Etat. Sa raison d'être est donc historique, fondée en outre sur une grande majorité de la population et de plus sanctionnée par l'O.N.U.

Le lendemain de la proclamation de l'Etat, cinq armées envahirent la Palestine et l'Etat d'Israël fut obligé de se défendre. Il s'est défendu avec des sacrifices, mais avec succès, et il n'a rien perdu du territoire qui lui fut alloué. Après la première trêve, laquelle les Arabes refusèrent de renouveler, la lutte reprit et les Juifs élargirent le territoire tel qu'il fut arrêté par l'O.N.U. La deuxième trêve vint arrêter une offensive en plein déroulement. Mais le gouvernement d'Israël se conformait aux ordres du Conseil de Sécurité.

L'Etat existe. Son gouvernement exerce une souveraineté incontestée sur son territoire. Tous les services publics fonctionnent. 16 Etats l'ont reconnu. Le gouvernement d'Israël sollicite de la Belgique de prendre acte de ces réalités historiques, démographiques et de droit international et de donner sa reconnaissance.

En outre, Israël a demandé son admission à l'O.N.U. conformément à l'article 4 de la Charte, et sollicite que la Belgique, membre du Conseil de Sécurité, donne son vote pour la recommandation.

Il est d'une élémentaire justice que lorsque l'autre parti est représenté dans l'O.N.U. par six membres arabes qui discutent et votent, le cas d'Israël ne fut jugé par contumace, parce qu'il n'est pas admis à l'O.N.U.

Problème d'émigration: Le gouvernement belge est prié d'avoir présent en sa mémoire qu'en 1948, quatre années après la libération en Europe, il y

a encore des centaines de milliers de Juifs derrière des fils barbelés, et pour lesquels il ne se trouve pas un endroit dans le monde. Toutes les conférences internationales pour trouver une place à ces malheureux ont échoué. (Evian, Bermuda).

Intérêts économiques: Tandis que l'Angleterre, tout en faisant opposition à l'Etat d'Israël, n'a pas manqué de laisser des agents de commerce qui facilitent toutes sortes de transactions entre Israël et la Grande-Bretagne, la possibilité de nouer des relations économiques suivies entre l'Etat d'Israël et la Belgique est rendue difficile.

L'Etat d'Israël est en phase d'équipement et d'investissement. C'est un client important et qui paye une monnaie forte. La normalisation des rapports entre les deux pays pourrait faciliter des rapports économiques.

Considérations morales pour l'appui de la Nation Belge:

Durant la guerre, les Juifs perdirent six millions d'hommes, l'équivalant de toute la population de la Belgique, et l'Europe fut impuissante a les aider. Ceci n'inclut pas, et nous n'oublions pas les actes généreux et d'assistance et de protection, accomplis sur place par certaines nations, inclusivement la Nation Belge. Mais le grand [*sic*] du désastre ne peut pas être empêché parce que la nation juive est apatride.

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מ. שרתוק אל חברי הממשלה

M. Shertok to the Members of the Provisional Government

העתק: 130.02/2384/21

תל אביב, ו' באלול תש"ח
10 בספטמבר 1948

הוראות למשלחת ישראל לעצרת האו"ם

לסעיף הראשון בסדר־היום של ישיבת הממשלה ביום א', ח' באלול תש"ח (12.9.48), הנני מציע את המסקנות הבאות:

1. נציגותנו כלפי האומות המאוחדות תופיע פומבית לפני המוסדות המתאימים אך ורק אם תוזמן לכך בשמה המפורש כנציגות מדינת ישראל.

אינני רואה סכנה רצינית שבסופו של חשבון תנוסח ההזמנה אלינו אחרת, אבל מכיוון שייעשה בלי ספק הנסיון לסלף את מעמדנו, עלינו לקבוע עמדה ברורה בשאלה זו ולהודיע עליה מראש למזכירות הכללית ולמשלחות הראשיות.

2. על הממשלה לתת סמכות למשלחת להגיש בזמן המתאים למועצת־הביטחון, במשך מושב העצרת, בקשה רשמית על קבלת מדינת ישראל לאומות המאוחדות. חברי הממשלה ילמדו מהחומר המוגש להם לקראת הישיבה, כי בימים האחרונים

הוזהרנו על־ידי המזכיר הכללי ומזכיר מועצת־הביטחון[1] לא להגיש את הבקשה עד אם ניווכח שיש לה סיכויים בטוחים להתקבל ברוב של שבעה. אף־על־פי־כן אני סבור כי עלינו להגיש את הבקשה, אך עלינו לעשות זאת לאחר התייעצות נוספת עם המזכיר הכללי ומתוך בחירת המועד המתאים מפאת החילופין בנשיאות מועצת־הביטחון.[2]

3. מגמת המשלחת צריכה להיות להביא לידי ביטול התיווך של ברנאדוט ולהשיג תחת זה המלצה מאת העצרת על משא־ומתן ישיר בין ישראל למדינות ערב.

4. אין המשלחת צריכה לעורר את שאלת הגבולות, אבל אם תתעורר השאלה על־ידי אחרים במועצת־הביטחון או בעצרת, תהיה תגובתנו כי אנו עומדים על הגבולות של כ״ט בנובמבר ודורשים בהם תיקונים נוכח ההנחות שנתבדו, הנסיון שנרכש והעובדות שנוצרו. בשיחות עם המשלחות עלינו לעמוד על כלילתם במדינת ישראל של הגליל כולו, העיר יפו והמסדרון לירושלים.

5. אשר לירושלים עצמה, אלו תהיינה הנחותינו:

א. הוכח שמשטר בינלאומי יעיל בירושלים לא יכון אלא בעזרת כוח צבאי ניכר וחמוש כהלכה.

ב. הוברר שהקמת כוח כזה במסגרת בינלאומית היא כיום מחוץ לגדר המדיניות המעשית.

ג. נוכח הפקרת העולם הנוצרי את ירושלים לכיבוש מוסלמי, השתתפות פיקוד בריטי במסע הכיבוש הזה, הצלת ירושלים משלטון ערבי בכוחם של היהודים בלבד, ועובדת שליטתה של ישראל כיום ברחבי העיר החדשה, הננו רואים עצמנו זכאים לחידוש התביעה על כלילת ירושלים בתחום מדינת ישראל.

כמסקנה מהנחות אלו נקבעת עמדת המשלחת כדלקמן:

א. אנו תובעים את ירושלים החדשה כחלק בלתי־נפרד של מדינת ישראל, אלא אם כן תוכח בעליל אפשרות מעשית של משטר בינלאומי אשר יבטיח הבטחה מוחלטת את קיומה, ביטחונה והתפתחותה של ירושלים העברית על כל מוסדותיה, עם זיקתה הלאומית למדינת ישראל, וימנע לחלוטין שלטון ערבי באיזה חלק שהוא של העיר.

ב. אנו מסכימים שהעיר העתיקה תימצא בשלטון בינלאומי בהשתתפות העדות הנוגעות בדבר.

ג. אנו מסכימים שבוועידת השלום בינינו ובין מדינות ערב תעמוד לדיון, בין השאר, שאלת כלילת חלק מסוים של ירושלים החדשה בשטח המדינה הערבית, בתנאי שבמשך שנים מספר לא תשמש ירושלים מרכז שלטון לא למדינה היהודית ולא לערבית, ושלא יחול שינוי במצב הזה אלא בהסכמת שני הצדדים.

6. בשאלת הפליטים הערבים תנקוט המשלחת בהופעותיה הרשמיות את העמדה שהוצהר עליה לא פעם: שום החזרה לפני גמר המלחמה, פרט למקרים בודדים; פתרון סופי של בעיית הפליטים כחלק מההסדר הכללי עם בוא [השלום].

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1. דברי ט. לי — ראה מס׳ 492. דברי קורדייר (למעשה עוזר אכסקוטיבי למזכיר הכללי של האו״ם) — ראה רובינסון ורפאל אל אבן, 9.9.1948, 93.02/182/4.

2. נציג ארצות־הברית עמד להחליף את נציג בריטניה בתפקיד נשיא מועצת־הביטחון ב־1 באוקטובר.

בשיחות בלתי רשמיות עם המשלחות תסביר המשלחת כי מוטב לפתור את הבעיה על־ידי יישוב הפליטים בארצות השכנות מאשר על־ידי החזרתם למדינת ישראל — לטובתם הם, לטובת הארצות השכנות, לטובת ישראל ולטובת יחסי ישראל עם שכנותיה.[3]

הערה: המסקנות דלעיל נוגעות בעיקרי הדברים הטעונים הגדרה מדויקת ואינן ממצות את כל השאלות העומדות והעלולות לעמוד על הפרק. בכמה מן השאלות האלו, כגון דרישתנו לחיסול הפלישה, עמידתנו על חופש העלייה וכו׳,[4] יש לסמוך על המשלחת שתנקוט את העמדה הנכונה גם בלי הוראה מפורשת.

מ. שרתוק

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מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)
M. Shertok to A. Lourie (New York)

מברק מוצפן IN-30/81. התקבל: 11.9
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/22

Tel Aviv, 10 September 1948

Conference with Mediator and staff Thursday, 2 hours, generally barren, [?un]inspiring, significant mainly for omissions.[1] Mediator did not raise questions immigration and refugees. He stated will submit report to Secretary-General for Assembly containing no recommendations. Assumes will be invited attend. Expressed view unless Assembly Paris solves problem, will mean suicide for U.N. to which he will be no party, implying will not continue after Assembly if no peace settlement. Transmitted me message from Secretary-General urging me come Paris. We have not yet decided.

Shertok

3. השווה מס׳ 515.
4. הוראות אלה, להוציא את הסעיף בעניין ירושלים, אושרו על־ידי הממשלה בישיבתה ב־12 בספטמבר. בעניין ירושלים הוחלט ברוב של 6 נגד 4 להתנגד למסירת איזשהו חלק מהעיר לידי הערבים. ביחס למשטר בינלאומי בעיר העתיקה הוחלט לא לנקוט יוזמה, אך להסכים לפתרון כזה, כאשר יוצע, אם הדבר יבטיח שירושלים החדשה תהיה בידי ישראל. שתי ההחלטות האלה נתקבלו ברוב של 5 נגד 4. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 12.9.1948).
עניין ירושלים חזר ועלה בישיבת הממשלה ב־26 בספטמבר לאחר דיון ובלחצו של שרתוק, הוחלט לשנות את ההחלטה הקודמת ולהורות למשלחת ישראל להסכים לשלטון ערבי בחלק מירושלים החדשה אם הדבר ימנע משטר בינלאומי בירושלים כולה. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 26.9.1948).

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1. ראה גם דין־וחשבון מפורט מיום 9.9.1948 (130.02/2426/5).

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מ. שרתוק אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)

M. Shertok to A. Lourie (New York)

מברק מוצפן IN-27/280, IN-28/94, IN-29/164
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2329/2
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2180/30

Tel Aviv, 10 September 1948 (18.30)

[.....][1]

In two conversations, first alone, second with Ben-Gurion, our reaction as follows: 1) Welcomed U.S. active interest promote final peace settlement, hasten termination present intolerable truce. 2) U.S. determination not tolerate violation truce has not yet been translated into action in face such major violations as wrecking Jerusalem water supply. 3) We have had favourable tentative response to our feeler from Transjordan, also approach from King on his own initiative, but apparently King's anxiety explore peace curbed by British policy achieve through present indefinite truce what they failed through war, namely reduction our territory and sovereignty. 4) We saw no reason why Negev desert should go to Arabs who already oversupplied with deserts for no useful /purpose/. Nothing happened since November 29 to prove area then assigned to Jewish State was not essential for its well-being. Other hand, events have proved those boundaries in need substantial improvement, as in Western Galilee. Main reason why our initial claim Western Galilee rejected by U.S. delegation was alleged need land reserve for Arab State Palestine; but if Arab Palestine joined with Transjordan, land reserves will be vastly increased. Generally we believe entitled whole Western Palestine, but were ready pay territorial price for agreement with Arabs. 5) Welcome element elasticity contained in paragraph on Jerusalem; but whatever solution, must insist maintenance corridor. 6) Consider immediate alleviation distress refugees primary responsibility Arab States; didn't see why international funds should assume liabilities in default wealthy Egyptian Government; if we admitted U.N., would contribute our share like all members. Could readmit now only very few in exceptional cases hardship, /each on individual merits/, which would be no contribution to effective solution problem. Such solution must await peace. Would urge utmost effort explore possibilities resettlement in vast neighbouring territories, which we would be prepared assist with our experience and expert advice,

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1. בחלק הראשון של המברק, שלא הודפס כאן, ניתן נוסח ההודעה שמסר נציג ארצות־הברית לשרתוק ב־9 בספטמבר — ראה מס' 493.
2. במקור בטעות "include". תוקן על־פי הנוסח הנכנס.

but did not [exclude][2] possibility return certain proportion — and generally agreed keep all doors open this regard. 7) Didn't see why U.S. should mediate between us and Mediator and/or British Government. Would be different if U.S. undertook mediate between us and Arabs. Our reaction ends.

On balance we inclined regard this move on part U.S. as step in right direction.[3]

Shertok

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א. הייט אל מ. שרתוק וא. אפשטיין
U. Heydt to M. Shertok and E. Epstein

מברק מוצפן W3T/201. התקבל: 13.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2307/7

Washington, 12 September 1948

Informed that Truman told War Veteran leader Klein,[1] seriously considering early de jure recognition but non-committal on loan. Truman expressed concern Czechoslovakian arms supply Israel and criticised Zionists for having killed his agreement with Bevin, apparently referring Morrison-Grady Scheme.[2] Apparently on Truman's request, Marshall telephoned Klein, promising immediate statement recognition. Later Klein saw Marshall who said in the past Arabs military, Jews political factor, now other way round, adding reportedly U.S. decision final settlement would please neither Jews nor Arabs. Marshall also raised question Czechoslovakian arms. Regarding D.P.'s Marshall said U.S. equally cannot allow manpower reach Israel during truce, explaining U.S. desire not interfere truce and Mediator's activity. In all talks Klein received impression State Department not withdrawn objection to loan, though Truman and Marshall promised renewed consideration. Following day Klein saw Dewey, latter advised by Vandenberg, Dulles, not issue statement Israel present moment but wait until occasional speech later in month; however

3. תוכן המברק הועבר גם לגולדה מאירסון במוסקבה.

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1. קליין נפגש פעמיים עם טרומן ב־9 בספטמבר — תחילה בראש משלחת של אירגון ותיקי המלחמה היהודיים ואחר־כך ללא מלווים. (ראה דיווח מפורט, אקצין אל סילבר, 10.9.1948, 93.08/365/10).
2. ראה תעודות, דצמבר 1947 — מאי 1948, מס' 45, הערה 7.

Dewey authorised Klein make statement on his behalf.[3] Understand Klein's aggressiveness Washington talk and subsequent serving spokesman Dewey greatly irritated Administration, but observers here hope stirred Truman action.

Heydt

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ש. פרידמן[1] אל ג. מאירסון (מוסקבה)
S. Friedman to G. Meyerson (Moscow)

העתק: 130.11/2492/16

תל אביב, ח׳ באלול תש״ח
12 בספטמבר 1948

לגולדה היקרה שלום וברכה,

שמחנו לידיעות הטלגרפיות הראשונות מכם, והננו מחכים לידיעות יותר מפורטות על התחלת פעולתכם. אני חוזר על כל ברכותינו הנאמנות לצעדיכם הראשונים, הלוואי ויקוימו במלואם כל איחולינו ותקוותינו הקשורים בשליחותכם.

מיום נסיעתכם נשלחים לכם מכאן עיתונים וחומר אינפורמטיבי ממשרד־החוץ. נא להודיע אם כל זה מתקבל בסדר. ייתכן שישנן תקלות, כמו בכל התחלה, ואם כך — אל תתרעמו. נעשה את הכול לתיקון. (אנו מכינים עכשיו משלוח של חומר נוסף). הדברים אשר בהם טיפל פקץ׳ הולכים ונגמרים ויישלחו בימים הקרובים. שמנו לב לבקשתכם הטלגרפית בענייני משלוח.

בין החומר האינפורמטיבי הנני שולח לך סקירה מיוחדת על מושב הוועד־הפועל הציוני. סקירה זו, יחד עם הידיעות שתקראי בעיתונות, תתן לך מושג מלא על מושב זה.

אמסור לך כמה פרטים על יחסינו עם הצירות הסובייטית כאן. היחסים טובים ותקינים. אחרי צאתך התקיימה שיחה ממושכת של מ[שה] ש[רתוק] עם הציר. ניתנה באותה שיחה הסברה על שאלה שהיתה אז אקטואלית: נסיונות המתווך להגבלת העלייה, הפעולה האמריקאית באותו הכיוון במחנות ומחאת צירותנו בוואשינגטון בעניין זה.[2] ניתנה הסברה מקיפה על התנגדותנו העקרונית לכל הגבלה מספרית של עלייה, על ההבדל בין ההפוגה הראשונה, שהיתה מוגבלת בזמן, לבין ההפוגה הנוכחית, על ערעורנו על עצם זכותו של המתווך לפסוק הלכות מסוג זה ועל הסיבה

3. לאחר הפגישה הודיע קליין בשמו של דיואי, שהוא תומך במתן הכרה דה־יורה למדינת ישראל לאלתר וגם בסיוע כספי ובהסרת האמברגו על משלוחי נשק אם יפרו הערבים את ההפוגה. דיואי עצמו סירב להגיב על הודעת קליין. (ראה *New York Times*, 11.9.1948).

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1. שמואל פרידמן (אלישיב), מנהל מחלקת מזרח אירופה במשרד־החוץ.
2. ראה מס׳ 470, 486.

שבגללה אין אנו מביאים את העניין למועצת־הביטחון אלא מעדיפים להשאיר את הדבר ליזמתו הוא. היתה הקשבה טובה. בשיחה קודמת שהיתה לציר אתי הוא גילה התעניינות בשאלת עתידו של החלק השני של הארץ: מדינה עצמאית או צירופה למדינה (או למדינות) אחרת. נתתי את ההסברה ברוח הדברים שדיברנו אתך ועם חברים אחרים לפני צאתכם.

אחרי צאתכם התקיימה לכבוד הצירות הסובייטית הצגה מיוחדת ב״אהל״ — ״שלמה המלך ושלמי הסנדלר״. הכול עבר טוב ויפה. הפתעה נעימה היתה ביקורו של הציר עצמו, אם כי קודם נאמר לנו שהוא לא התכוון להיות באותה הצגה. ניגנו את ההמנון שלנו והסובייטי, האולם היה מקושט דגלים. היו דברי ברכה טובים של הלוי.[3] האורחים נהנו מההצגה, השתתפו במסיבה אחריה, בה נשא הציר נאום קצר עם איחולים לאמנותנו העממית (זה היה הנאום היחידי במסיבה), אחר כך הצטלם עם הלהקה.

הציר התחיל בביקוריו אצל ראשי המדינה. עד עכשיו ביקר את שפרינצק, בתור ראש מועצת־המדינה. השתתפו גם יתר חברי הנשיאות. ביקר אצל שר־העבודה. כאן היתה שיחה מעשית ומעניינת על תכניותינו בבניין הארץ, על הישגי הפועלים בשטח תנאי העבודה. על הפרק אצלו ביקורים אצל שר־המשפטים, שר־התחבורה ושר־הכספים. אני משתתף בכל הביקורים האלה. בינתיים קיימו את ביקוריהם גם יתר עובדי הצירות. היועץ[4] היה אצל שר־החוץ ומספר עובדים אחראיים של משרדנו. המזכיר הראשון,[5] הקונסול[6] והנספח לתרבות ועיתונות[7] רק אצל עובדים שונים, ביניהם אצל מנהלי מחלקות המתאימות בתפקידיהם. בתכנית הציר לבקר מלבד השרים שלנו את ראש־העירייה, את התאחדות בעלי התעשייה ואת ההסתדרות. נא לשים לב לסדרים אלה.

היה לנו טיפול רב בענייני הבית לצירות. הודות להתערבות נמרצת מהמקומות המתאימים פונה באופן דחוף הבית בשדרות רוטשילד שאנו מעמידים לרשותם. עכשיו נעשים סידורים שיאפשרו להם להיכנס בימים הקרובים לבית. הדבר היה כרוך בקשיים רבים, אבל ראינו חובה לעצמנו לעשות את הכול כדי להתגבר עליהם. יש טיפול נמרץ בסידור דיורם של חברי הצירות. כמו־כן מזרזים בכל מה שאפשר את גמר הבניין על־יד העירייה, שישמש להם משכן קבע. רצונם להימצא באותו בית כבר בתחילת נובמבר ולסדר בו את קבלת־הפנים ביום 7 לנובמבר.

הצירות מעוניינת מאוד בסידור דחוף של קשר טלגרפי ישיר עם מוסקבה. הבאתי לשיחה מיוחדת עם היועץ בעניין זה את פרידברג (פריהר).[8] כנראה יוקם סידור פרוביזורי תוך שניים־שלושה שבועות. על התפתחות הדבר אודיע לך לחוד. באותה שיחה העליתי כמה דברים לפי בקשתו של ד[וד] ר[מז]:[9] קשר אווירי סדיר, שייט ישיר על פני הדנובה, פילטליזם. כל אלה קומפלקס אחד בשטח התחבורה. אני מניח

3. משה הלוי, במאי, מנהל תיאטרון ה״אהל״.
4. מיכאיל מוחין.
5. ולאדימיר רוז׳קוב.
6. ניקולאי סרגייב.
7. מיטרופאן פיודורין.
8. צבי פריהר (פרידברג), המנהל הכללי של הדואר.
9. דוד רמז, שר התחבורה.

שעניינים אלה יהיו נושא לשיחה, שתתקיים בימים הקרובים בין הציר ובין ד[וד] ר[מז].

הקונסול של הצירות בלווית אחד הנספחים ביקר בירושלים. דאגנו לסידורים המתאימים והם נעשו על הצד הטוב ביותר. קיבלנו תודה על סידורים אלה. בין השאר ביקרו במגרש הרוסים ובמנזר בעין־כרם. בימים הקרובים ייפגש י. רבינוביץ, המטפל ברכוש הרוסי בארץ, עם הקונסול של הצירות, ובקרוב תעמוד שאלה זו, כנראה, על הפרק. על התפתחות הדברים אודיע.

הנני דואג לקשרים של מוסדות התרבות שלנו עם הנספח של ענייני תרבות. עד כה נפגש כבר עם אנשי "אהל", מוסיקה לעם, התזמורת הפילהרמונית, הספריה הלאומית, עם קלינוב.[10] על דברים בעלי חשיבות בשיחות אלה אודיע.

עכשיו — לעניינים שאני רוצה מכם.

א. הביולטין בשפה הרוסית

נראה לי שיותר נכון יהיה, שאתם תוציאו את הביולטין במוסקבה על סמך החומר שתקבלו מכאן. לכם יותר ברור מהו החומר שיש לפרסמו ולאיזה מוסדות יש לשלחו. מה דעתכם?

ב. חיפושי קרובים.

הקונסול הסובייטי כאן מסר, שהם אינם מטפלים בעניין זה ולא יענו לבקשות של אנשים פרטיים. קיים במוסקבה משרד מרכזי לחיפושים על־יד וציק[11] ואליו צריך לפנות כל יחיד. אני מניח שבררתם אם תהיה לכם אפשרות לטפל בזה. היינו ברצון מקבלים תשובה חיובית בעניין זה.

הנני מסיים בזה את מכתבי הראשון אליכם. על דברים אחרים כותבים לכם לחוד.

הננו מחכים לידיעות על צעדיכם הראשונים, על פגישותיכם ועל כל הנעשה אתכם.

שלום לכולם.

ש.פ.

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ל. כהן אל מ. שרתוק
L. Kohn to M. Shertok

העתק: 130.02/2443/2

[Tel Aviv], 13 September 1948

At last week's meeting with Count Bernadotte,[1] he raised again the question of the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. He also referred to it in his press conference, saying that he had been pressed by the Security Council

10. ישעיהו קלינוב, ראש המינהל לעיתונות, הסברה, שידור וקולנוע במשרד־הפנים.
11. הוועד הפועל המרכזי של ברית־המועצות. מאז 1936 — הסובייט העליון.

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1. ראה מס׳ 503.

to push this matter ahead.[2] After the meeting I asked Bunche what made them bring up this issue again, seeing that they had heard our categorical views on the subject on several occasions before. He replied that the Security Council had asked them to raise the question afresh. He understood our arguments, but our general declaration that we wanted peace to be maintained in Jerusalem without demilitarisation was not sufficient. We should have some definite proposal as to how to maintain the peace in Jerusalem. The thing was likely to be raised again and again and to do us a lot of damage in the United Nations unless we had some alternative proposals.

In the light of all this, it seems to me that Dr. Joseph should be requested to prepare some scheme which could be submitted to the Mediator and possibly the Security Council. As you are aware, we did prepare some proposals for the pacification of Jerusalem on May 15th in Jerusalem and submitted them to the Consular Truce Commission. The position was as follows: de Reynier had submitted to us a plan for placing Jerusalem under the Red Cross flag. The Executive in Jerusalem considered this plan on Friday, the 14th May, and asked de Reynier to appear in the evening for a detailed discussion of his project. He did not come, for security reasons, but turned up the next day, when there was a lengthy meeting between the members of the Executive and Dr. Joseph on the one hand, and de Reynier and Marti[3] on the other. The Executive went a long way towards accepting de Reynier's scheme. In the afternoon they had a meeting with David Shaltiel, who poured cold water on the scheme, pointing out its obvious dangers. The Executive then dropped this scheme and took up another proposal which had been made by the Consular Truce Commission. Dr. Joseph and myself worked this up, and we went late in the afternoon to see the Consular Truce Commission at the Belgian Consulate, and submitted to them our revised scheme.[4] Nothing further came of it apparently, because the Arabs were not ready to consider the scheme. But it was an earnest of our readiness, even at that early stage, to adopt an agreed scheme for maintaining the peace of Jerusalem under U.N. auspices.

I suggest that Dr. Joseph should be requested to prepare a new scheme, fitting in with the present conditions, which we might use at Paris should this issue come up in the Security Council or in the General Assembly.[5]

2. הדברים נאמרו במסיבת־עיתונאים שנערכה לרגל בואו של המתווך לחיפה ב־7 בספטמבר. (ראה ״על המשמר״, 9.9.1948).
3. רולאנד מארטי, ראש המחלקה הרפואית של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי, ולשעבר ראש משלחתו לארץ־ישראל.
4. ראה ההצעה של ועדת ההפוגה והצעת־הנגד של הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית באצ״מ S25/8176, S25/5176. הצעת הצלב האדום ראה בתיק 134/778/2.
5. הערת שרתוק על המזכר: ״אני מציע שתכתוב מכתב למושל ירושלים ותציע לו לחבר תכנית.״

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פ. ברנשטיין אל א. גאס (ואשינגטון)
P. Bernstein to O. Gass (Washington)

מברק: 23

נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1

[Tel Aviv], 13 September 1948

Yours 299,[1] latest developments: 1) Three tankers Shell, Socony, one month supply, definitely directed to Israel, first tender due Haifa 24th. 2) Objection despatch our Rumanian purchases to Israel dropped, we are arranging shipment.[2] 3) We undertake not to place new orders in Rumania, provided no resumption hostilities and either satisfactory procurement programme Shell, Socony, next months or full reopening refineries. 4) Official proposals resumption work refineries not, repeat not, yet received.

Bernstein

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י. לינטון אל מ. שרתוק
I.J. Linton to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 18/195. התקבל: 15.9

נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2318/4

London, 14 September 1948

Deeply grateful your good wishes.[1] Will telegraph later regarding opening office, for which some internal technical difficulties still to be overcome, including personnel.

My personal appreciation situation here as follows: 1) Bevin still violent antagonist and supported by view Chiefs Staff, who warn against break with Arabs or further deterioration Anglo-Arab relations, urging necessity keeping Arabs quiet in interest British policy, strategic bases. 2) Some

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1. גאס אל ברנשטיין, 8.9.1948, 93.01/2220/1. גאס דיווח על יצוא דלק גולמי מהמפרץ הפרסי לארצות־הברית בכמויות גדולות ובמחיר זול.
2. תחילה התנתה חברת "של" את אספקת הדלק בביטול רכישות הדלק של ישראל ברומניה. (ראה ברנשטיין אל גאס, 6.9.1948, 93.01/2220/11).

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1. ראה מס׳ 498. שרתוק שיגר ברכות ללינטון לרגל פתיחת המשרד החדש של נציגות ישראל בלונדון. הוא הביע חשש, שבעניין יחסי ישראל־בריטניה גולדמן הופך להיות קרבן של משאלות לבו; האינפורמציה המגיעה מפאריס מעידה על עוינות בלתי־מתפשרת של הבריטים (ראה מס׳ 496). הוא ביקש מלינטון הערכה אישית של המצב בלונדון. (ראה שרתוק אל לינטון, 13.9.1948, 130.09/2318/1).

members Cabinet sympathise but unwilling take initiative in the matter within Bevin's province, who still dominates Cabinet foreign affairs. 3) In Foreign Office on level officials, [?revision] Middle East policy being suggested over and again in light weakness [and] failure Arabs militarily [and] politically, establishment Israel and its achievement, and support for Israel by America, Russia. In new conception, which slowly developing, existence Jewish State finds its place. 4) That recognition will have to come and is conceded, but this does not mean agreement or acquiescence 29th November or present boundaries. 5) Tendency is to delay official recognition until after deliberation U.N., perhaps until after American elections, for the following reasons: a) To see whether some solution can be found more agreeable Arabs, for instance boundaries, Jerusalem, Haifa, refugees, perhaps even immigration; b) To use official recognition as an inducement or pressure on us to agree solution which would otherwise be unacceptable. 6) Believe therefore closest watch essential on manoeuvres British delegation in Paris.

Linton

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ד.ב. יוסף אל מ. שרתוק
D.B. Joseph to M. Shertok

העתק: 42/287/704

[ירושלים], י' באלול תש"ח
14 בספטמבר 1948

אתמול ביקר אצלי הקונסול הבריטי מר בומונט, סגנו הראשי של סיר היו דאו. כפי שאמר לי, בהיותו בעיר חשב שמן הנימוס שיבקר אצל המושל הצבאי. השיחה היתה כללית בצורתה, אבל הוא אמר כמה דברים שאולי תמצא בהם עניין. אמר שכנראה שאנחנו מחזיקים היטב בשטח אשר בתוך גבולות ההחלטה של 29 בנובמבר אשתקד. אמר שמוכרחים להכיר בעובדות וטבע של אלה להתפתח. אמרתי שממשלתו בכל־זאת עדיין לא רוצה להכיר בעובדות. לזה ענה שאין כל ספק שזה יבוא. אמר שלמרות העבר הוא אינו רואה כל סיבה למה העם היהודי לא ימצא דרך ליחסים טובים עם העם האנגלי. בימי היאבקות אנשים רגילים לראות רק שחור ולבן, אבל אין הדברים למעשה כך. וכאשר יחסים חוזרים לתנאים רגילים אין הדברים נראים דווקא בשחור או לבן. עניתי שאם ממשלתו תכיר בממשלתנו, אין לי כל ספק שאנו נהיה תמיד מוכנים להשתדל להגיע להבנה ויחסים תקינים אתם. הביע את בטחונו שזה יבוא.

אמר שלדעתו נצטרך למצוא דרך לחיות בשלום גם עם שכנינו ובזה יכול להיות שהם יוכלו לעזור. עניתי שאנו סבורים שאין לערבב שני דברים. אנו מוכנים לסדר יחסים תקינים אתם מבלי כל קשר ליחסינו עם הערבים. ואשר לאלה, לדעתנו טוב יותר שאנו והערבים נמצא לעצמנו דרך להבנה. אנו מצדנו תמיד מוכנים לשבת עם הערבים ולחפש דרך לסידור. הוא אמר שהוא בטוח שהערבים לא רוצים בהמשך המלחמה, אבל לא ברור לו איך אפשר להביא את הדברים לכך שיסודר שלום. שאל ממני מה הפתרון שלי למצב הנוכחי. עניתי שהוא בוודאי יודע מה שכבר אמרתי לברנאדוט, שהמצרים יחזרו הביתה וגם אנשי הלגיון ואז יהיה שלום בארץ. הוא אמר שאולי אנשי הלגיון מפחדים שאם יעשו כן, למחרת נתפשט ונופיע פתאום ביריחו. אמרתי שאם זה העיכוב היחידי, אפשר לשבת מקודם ולדבר על תנאי שלום.

הביא את התלונה הישנה נושנה כלפי הערבים, שאף אחד מהם אינו מוכן לדבר בגלוי על מה שהוא חושב, והוסיף שבוודאי כל אחת ממדינות ערב מפחדת, פן השנייה תשיג איזה הנאה ויתרון על חברתה.

שאל ממני אם אמנם אין תקווה לסדר פירוז ירושלים. עניתי במלה אחת: לא. שאל: למה? אמרתי: מפני שאנו בוחרים לסמוך על עצמנו בדיוק כפי שאתם הייתם עושים לו הייתם במקומנו.

הביע את התקווה שאתן לו לבקר אצלי עוד פעם.

בדרך־כלל ניסה ליצור רושם שהם רוצים שנשכח את העבר ונקיים יחסים תקינים. בסופו של דבר הודיע שהוא ישלח את בסטאל (Bestall)[1] העירה מחר להתחיל לטפל בתשלום פנסיות לפקידי הממשלה המנדטורית, באמרו שהוא חושב שזה יעזור ליצור יחסים טובים, בכל אופן בשטח הלא־מדיני.

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ג. מאירסון אל מ. שרתוק
G. Meyerson to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן 17/71. התקבל: 16.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2325/4

מוסקבה, 15 בספטמבר 1948

בשיחת גולדה, נמיר, עם סגן שר־החוץ זורין, שהתנהלה שעה בידידות, הבטיח למסור לממשלתו ולמשלחתם בפאריס הערות בנוגע גבולות, נגב וגליל, ריבונות בעלייה, פליטים ערביים, ירושלים וחיפה. לגבי הגליל נגעתי בהצעות הנשמעות על צירוף איזורים ערביים לעבר־הירדן — ללא תגובה. זורין הבטיח אי־שינוי הקו הרוסי ועזרתם בכל תביעה צודקת.[1] שוחחתי על ענייננו בהרחבה עם ציר שוודיה רולף [סולמן], היוצא לפאריס כחבר משלחתם.

גולדה

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1. פרדריק ג'. בסטל, סגן־קונסול בקונסוליה הבריטית בירושלים.

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1. על השיחה עם זורין ראה גם מ. נמיר, שליחות במוסקבה, עמ' 52־54.

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ו. איתן אל מ. פישר (פאריס)
W. Eytan to M. Fischer (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 33/61. התקבל: 19.9
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/186/3

Tel Aviv, 15 September 1948

Jacob Herzog, Chaim Vardy, representatives Ministry Religious Affairs, fully briefed by us, leaving this week for Vatican, purpose demonstrate good intentions Israel Government, establish relations key people Middle Eastern affairs, engage "informal" discussions settlement Catholic rights Israel, not seeking interview Pope. This not political or diplomatic mission, but hope favourable political results.

Eytan

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י. ברזילי[1] אל מ. שרתוק
I. Barzilai to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.11/2492/20

פאריס, 16 בספטמבר 1948

שרתוק יקר,

בימינו אנו משתבשות תכניות רבות. בוודאי לא ידוע לך, כי עזבתי את הארץ כמעט שבוע ימים לאחר מסיבת־הפרידה הנעימה בביתך. חיכיתי בחיפה ימים אחדים לאווירון. ועתה שוב נתעכבתי בפאריס עקב שביתת פועלי־התעופה. היום אני מקווה לצאת לפראג ומיד עם יתר החברים להיכנס לוורשה.

בפאריס ערכתי ביקור נימוסין והיכרות אצל האמבסדור הפולני בצרפת פוטרמנט. השיחה אמנם ארכה קצת, אולם היא לא חרגה מתחום האינפורמציה על המצב בארץ ומתחום העניינים הקשורים בסידרי הקמת הצירויות הישראלית בפולין והפולנית בישראל. בסיומה של השיחה הוא אמר לי, כי כץ־סוחי נמצא כרגע במשרדו ואולי יהיה זה מן העניין להכירו. הסכמתי, כמובן, וקיימתי אתו שיחה ארוכה ומעניינת. ברצוני להעביר לך תמצית מדעותיו או נכון יותר הרהוריו.

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1. ישראל ברזילי התמנה לציר ישראל בווארשה והיה בדרכו למקום כהונתו.

נראה לו, כי אין לנו עניין להעלות בעצרת האו"ם הנוכחית בפאריס את בעית ארץ־ישראל. המתיחות הבינלאומית איננה מסייעת לנו. לדעתו, הפעם עוד יותר קשה לגייס — לו היה צורך בכך — את השני־שליש, שגייסנו בפעם הקודמת. ישנה איפוא סכנה של ערעור מעמדנו. לעומת זאת, במקרה הטוב ביותר נשיג אישור נוסף של ההחלטה הקיימת — אישור אשר בעקבותיו לא ישתנה מצבנו. הערבים יסרבו להכיר בהחלטה ואנגליה תתייצב מאחוריהם. בסיכומו של דבר — במקרה הטוב ביותר ישאר הסטטוס־קוו על כל החומרה שבו; מאידך קיימות סכנות רציניות, הכרוכות בחידוש או המשך הדיון הארצישראלי. יש לו ספקות, אם ארגון האו"ם — במצב היחסים הבינלאומיים היום — יכול לתת לנו סיוע מכריע. לדעתו, יש לטפח יחסים וקשרים לחוד עם כל מדינה ולהשיג לאט־לאט את הכרת המדינות בישראל. התרשמתי מן השיחה, כי אלטרנטיבה יותר קונקרטית נראית בעיניו — שמירה על מתח הגיוס הצבאי וכוננות לחידוש מערכה צבאית או משא־ומתן ישיר על שלום עם ערבים. יותר נכון — לא אלטרנטיבה, כי אם פעולה שלובה בקונצפציות השלום עם הערבים. **לא** נראה לו עניין הסיפוח של האיזור הערבי לעבדאללה. ערעור ההחלטה של האו"ם בדבר הקמת מדינה ערבית עצמאית עלול גם למוטט את החוליות האחרות של החלטת האו"ם, לאמור, ההחלטה בדבר הקמת מדינת ישראל עצמאית ודבר האחדות הכלכלית של ארץ־ישראל.

חשוב לאין־ערוך במצב זה — הכוח להחזיק מעמד, הכישרון לאורך־רוח וטיפול שקדני ורצוף **בכל חבר** באו"ם. זו היתה מסקנתו. נרמזו מצדו בשיחה קודם כול הסכנות לישראל, אם מתוך רצון להשיג הכרתם של המסרבים עדיין לעשות זאת נרחיק ללכת בקונצסיות מדיניות, שהן, לדעתו, מטבע הדברים נושאים נזק גם לנו ואינם לשביעות־רצונם של ידידינו. יחד עם זאת גילה הבנה לקשיים ולצרכים הכלכליים והפיננסיים של ישראל ואת ההכרח להסתייע בקיבוץ היהודי האמריקאי ולדאוג למילווים בלתי־משעבדים — למען לעמוד במערכה הצבאית ובמערכת הנחת היסודות למדינה.

איני מתכוון למסור את פרטי השיחה הארוכה ואני נמנע לחלוטין מלמסור את תוכן דברי בשיחה. נסיתי לרכז את תמצית הדעות שהוא השמיע ושיש בהן אולי עניין. בייחוד כוונתי לקטע הראשון — האם הננו מעוניינים בדיון בעצרת או לאו. אגב, לדעתו עצרת זאת לא תהא אולי עצרת של משבר גדול, אך גם לא תפתור אף בעיה רצינית אחת. אני מסתפק בשורות הללו. אכתוב מווארשה.

איש־שיחי הציע, שאם יועלה עניננו לדיון, לדאוג לטיפול נמרץ בחברי האו"ם, ומשום־מה ראה למועיל, שגם צירי ישראל, ובתוכם אני, נהיה בשעת הדיונים. אך זה, כמובן, נשאר לבחינתך. אני מוסר רק את דעתו, שנראה לו, ששהותי יכולה לחזק אולי את הקשר אתם מבחינה עניינית, אבל העניין כולו עוד לפנינו.

רב שלומות וברכות, שלך,

י. ברזילי

פ.ס. סלח־נא על צורת הכתיבה המשובשת. בעוד רגעים אחדים אני עוזב את פאריס. החבילות על ראשי.

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שיחת מ. וייסמן — א. לווינק[1] (בהאג, ב־15 בספטמבר 1948)

Meeting: M. Weissman — A. Lovink (The Hague, 15 September 1948)

130.02/2384/16 :דין־וחשבון

Amsterdam, le 16 septembre 1948

Le susmentionné Monsieur m'a reçu dans la présence de Mr. Adrianz[2] qu'il a présenté comme particulièrement intéressé à la question, et connaisseur. Mr. Adrianz avait été Ministre à Bagdad avant la guerre, pour une période de 9 ans.

Le Secrétaire Général s'est excusé de l'absence du Ministre qui était parti par Paris aux Etats-Unis le même jour dans la matinée, mais qu'en vue de la visite qui lui avait été annoncée, il avait rediscuté la question.

J'ai remis le pli et j'ai exposé le cas. J'ai surtout insisté que la reconnaissance nous est due. On ne peut rien nous reprocher. Nous ne sommes même pas un état qui se forme par sécession d'un Etat-parent et qui met les autres Etats dans un conflit de conscience entre les droits de l'Etat-parent et les droits de l'Etat qui s'est segrégé [*sic*] ou émancipé par l'insurrection.

J'ai insisté que sur le territoire de notre Etat nous avons la majorité de la population. Le mandataire du souverain antérieur s'est departi, en vertu de la décision de l'ONU et même de par sa propre volonté, de tous les droits de l'administration. C'était le vide. En vertu du droit naturel, la nation juive sur le territoire où elle formait la majorité a proclamé son indépendance, a constitué un Etat, en assurant et garantissant aux autres communautés une égalité parfaite.

Mais au droit naturel s'ajoute la Résolution de l'ONU qui consacre ce droit et qui nous ordonne de constituer un Etat.

J'ai donc demandé qu'est-ce qu'on nous reproche et que justifie le "refus de reconnaissance". La réponse du Secrétaire Général, autant que possible textuellement:

"J'ai écouté avec intérêt et attention votre exposé (suit une remarque flatteuse) et je veux écarter tout d'abord votre formule: "Refus de reconnaissance". Ce n'est pas exact et nous tenons a [le] préciser. Nous ne refusons pas de reconnaître, mais nous n'avons pas encore reconnu, et nous espérons pourvoir le faire dès que la situation générale le permettra.

Vous me demandez où est votre faute qui justifie la non-reconnaissance. Je vous réponds la non-reconnaissance n'est pas de votre faute. Vous ne méritez aucun reproche. Au contraire — je le dis franchement, tant

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1. אנטוניוס ה. לווינק, המזכיר הכללי של משרד־החוץ ההולנדי.
2. קורנליס אדריאנסה, מנהל המחלקה לעניינים משפטיים ומינהליים במשרד־החוץ של הולנד.

l'opinion publique que le gouvernement n'admirent pas seulement la grande oeuvre de colonisation qui est une merveille, mais également la bravoure et la vaillance avec laquelle votre armée et votre nation ont combattu pour sauvegarder leur indépendance. Notre Consul nous envoie des rapports pleins d'admiration pour la manière dans laquelle vous organisez votre Etat.[3]

Et malgré cela, je le regrette de ne pas pouvoir aujourd'hui, après votre exposé ou dans un ou deux jours, vous dire: Je vous reconnais, mais je vous dis que je désirerais vous reconnaître. Vous le méritez.

Vous connaissez la situation politique, nos pactes, nos intérêts un peu solidaires; nous n'avons pas la liberté totale. En dehors de ces pactes nous avons l'Indonésie."

Là-dessus j'ai demandé, qu'au moins, puisque leur conscience leur dit qu'il faut reconnaître, d'agir comme un membre du groupe auprès des autres, de presser auprès des autres pour accélérer la reconnaissance. Il vous est possible de soutenir que la pression de l'opinion publique rend difficile cette attitude négative à l'égard d'une cause aussi juste.

En ce qui concerne l'Indonésie[4] — j'ai dit — je me garde de toucher un problème que je ne connais pas, mais il est très étrange que lorsque la Ligue Arabe, c'est-à-dire tous les Etats Arabes se sont empressés à reconnaître le nouvel Etat, les Pays-Bas s'interdisent de reconnaître Israël. Mais c'est en vertu du même vieux principe — et combien plus éclatamment [*sic*] — affirmé-que vous étiez justifieś de nous reconnaître.

Ici, il regarda Mr. Adrianz et fit une note. Et il a ajouté que c'est un point qu'il va discuter avec le Ministre.

Il m'a promis d'agir auprès de la Belgique — de manière amicale, pour nous appuyer dans la demande d'admission. Mais malgré votre théorie, ajouta-t-il, que dans le Conseil de Sécurité la Belgique en votant exerce un mandat quasi international et qu'en principe il lui est interdit de conditionner son vote, des intérêts politiques particuliers à la Belgique, c'est quand même la Belgique qui vote. Mais je promets d'approcher le gouvernement belge.

En ce qui concerne le règlement pratique de toutes les questions quotidiennes, il est disposé de nous faciliter toute opération, formalité, de reconnaître nos agents — *short of formal recognition* — en fait comme représentant une réalité. Il a ajouté:

"Je crois que la manière dans laquelle nous avons reçu—pour nous vous êtes le représentant d'Israël — pour que vous ayez ce nom d'Israël vous n'avez pas besoin de reconnaissance — prouve combien c'est seulement un empêchement provisoire de vous reconnaître."

3. המשפט האחרון נוסף בשוליים בכתב־יד.
4. הולנד היתה נתונה אז בסכסוך עם הרפובליקה האינדונזית, שהוקמה ביווה ובסומטרה לאחר נסיגת היפנים.

Ici je me suis permis de demander: "Excusez mon impatience et mon indiscrétion. Est-ce que dans votre esprit vous avez fixé une date approximative à la reconnaissance?"

Réponse: "Sans nous engager, je vous dis si la trêve ne se transforme pas en règlement final, et ceci sans la faute d'Israël, nous agirons. Je ne peux pas donner de date, mais je ne la crois pas lointaine."

Mr. Adrianz a demandé ensuite — sans prévention ou parti-pris — quelle est la situation des Arabes, combien en sont restés, et était satisfait quand je lui ai raconté l'expérience réussie à Nazareth.[5] En ce qui concerne les réfugiés, j'ai fait connaître le point de vue, exprimé par notre ministre des Affaires étrangères. Les deux interlocuteurs ont reconnu expressément qu'il était étrange d'avoir demandé le retour des Arabes pendant la guerre et avant un règlement pacifique.

Le Secrétaire Général me dit qu'il serait désirable que je parle au Directeur des Affaires étrangères Mr. Bo[on].[6]

J'y fus conduit. C'est un jeune homme d'environ 35 ans. Il était au courant de mon entrevue avec son collègue belge Mr. Loridan.

En général, la discussion avec le Secrétaire Général s'est répétée, mais je souligne que lui aussi m'a dit: "Je crois que cette situation difficile de non-reconnaissance ne pourra pas durer trop longtemps."

Il croit qu'à l'ONU la question devra être réglée. Il a répété qu'il était prêt de nous faciliter le travail en Hollande.

Quand je lui ai dit que l'Angleterre n'a pas omis de nous laisser ses agents de commerce, parce que *business is before pleasure*, et que leurs bateaux visitent nos ports, il répondit: "Nos bateaux seraient disposés à vous servir, demandez nos tarifs; nous sommes disposés à vous vendre tout, sauf des armes." — Je vous prie de parler également avec le Directeur des Communications. Nous sommes très ennuyés que la K.L.M. fut obligée de suspendre ses courses.

J'ai vu le Directeur des Communications, qui m'a expliqué que leur ligne batavienne avait besoin des aérodromes égyptiens. A ma demande s'ils ne pouvaient pas utiliser les aérodromes d'Israël pour ne pas se soumettre au chantage des Egyptiens, il répondit que les avions de la compagnie qui assuraient le service avaient besoin d'aérodromes plus grands.

Il a voulu convoquer le Directeur de la ligne Mr. Plesman, mais il était absent. Il était à Bruxelles. Il me paraît que cette suspension des services les ennuie beaucoup.

M. Weissman

5. ראה מס' 436.
6. הנדריק בון, מנהל המחלקה לעניינים מדיניים במשרד־החוץ של הולנד.

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י. שמעוני אל א. ששון (פאריס)
Y. Shimoni to E. Sasson (Paris)

העתק: 130.15/2570/11

[תל אביב], 16 בספטמבר 1948

אליאס היקר,

1. במכתביך האחרונים אתה נוגע כמה וכמה פעמים ב״חילוקי־הדעות״ הקיימים כאילו בינך ובינינו.[1] קשה כמובן להסיר אי־הבנה, אם יש כזו, במכתב ולברר את הבעיות לגופן בכתב במרחקים כאלה. אולם נראה לי, כתגובה ראשונה להערותיך השונות, שאמנם יש כאן אי־הבנה. נראה לי שבבעיות היסודיות אין כל חילוקי־דעות בינינו, פרט אולי לבעיית הפליטים. ייתכן מאוד שיש הבדלים במזג, באופי, בגישה ובהרבה דברים קטנים שאינם נשקלים, אולם לא לגופו של עניין. אשר לבעיית הפליטים, הרי מסר לנו משה [שרתוק] — ונדמה לי שיש לי הרשות למסור את הדבר גם לך — כי המשלחת שלנו לאומות המאוחדות קיבלה כהוראה רשמית מאת הממשלה את ההוראה להופיע בכל הופעותיה הפומביות בעמדה הידועה, שכל עוד נמשכת המלחמה לא יורשו הפליטים לחזור, ואילו שוכם אחרי המלחמה יהיה נושא וסעיף בדיוני השלום. הוראה שנייה, להופעותיה הבלתי־רשמיות של המשלחת, לשיחותיה הפרטיות וכו׳, ניתנה לא מטעם הממשלה (משום שדיון על הוראה כזאת בממשלה היה מעורר ויכוח מפלגתי שרצוי למנעו) אלא מטעם שר־החוץ לבדו, והיא: ממשלת ישראל תהיה בוודאי מוכנה לדון בהחזרת חלק מהפליטים, וכן בהשתתפות קונסטרוקטיבית במאמצים ובמפעלים אחרים לפתרון הבעיה, במקרה ובתנאי שמדינות ערב יגשו באופן רציני ליישוב הפליטים מחוץ לתחומי ישראל.[2] זאת לידיעתך. משה אמנם לא התייעץ אתנו באופן סופי לפני מתן ההוראה הזאת וניסוחה המדויק, אולם הוראה זו — הראשונה הרשמית עם השנייה הבלתי־רשמית — מייצגת בהחלט גם את דעתנו ונותנת ביטוי לסיכומן של כמה וכמה שיחות שהיו בינינו ובין משה בנושא זה.

ייתכן שבבעיית פליטים זו יש באמת הבדלי־דעות בינינו. אולם בכל יתר רמזיך לא מצאתי כל דבר שלא הייתי מוכן לחתום עליו. לו, למשל, היית מופיע בארץ ומוכיח לעומדים בהגה שהמלחמה לבדה, ואפילו תוכתר בניצחון, לא תפתור את הבעיה פתרון סופי, לא היית כלל וכלל ״שוחה נגד הזרם״, כפי שאתה חושד. גם אנו מביעים וחוזרים ומביעים אותה דעה עצמה. גם בשיחותינו עם עיתונאים זרים וגם בדיונינו עם הממונים עלינו ועם חברינו אנו מביעים את הדעה, שבמלחמה מתחדשת תוכל מדינתנו להחזיק מעמד, אולי גם להנחיל מכות ולכבוש שטחים נוספים, אולם לא תוכל להכריע את העולם הערבי ולהנחיל לו תבוסה ניצחת, מבלי שנאחז גם באמצעים

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1. ראה מס׳ 491.
2. ראה מס׳ 502. ההוראה השניה לא נמצאה.

אחרים. הדרכים היחידות אל הפתרון נראות לנו — מלבד הגישושים והשיחות שאתה מקיים ויש להמשיך בהן בכל המרץ שמא יובילו לפחות להקלה — שתיים: או הטלת פתרון סופי רצוי על־ידי האומות המאוחדות והמעצמות הגדולות, או דיוורסיה, התקוממות, מרידה רצינית באחת הארצות הערביות שתפנה את כוחן ומרצן והתעניינותן של המדינות הערביות בהכרח אל אותו מקום התורפה (ואל בעיה זו עוד אשוב להלן).

2. גם טענתך שמחלקתנו עוסקת יותר מדי בענייני ארץ־ישראל ורואה את העולם הערבי באספקלריה ארץ־ישראלית יתר־על־המידה — גם היא נראית לי מוטעית, ובוודאי היא נובעת מריחוקך מאתנו. ברור לנו שמשרד־המיעוטים הוא העוסק בערבים שבפנים מדינת ישראל, ובדרך־כלל אין אנו מתערבים בפעולותיו. אלא שנתברר גם למשרד־המיעוטים וגם לנו, שאת הקו המדיני הכללי להתנהגותו רצוי שיקבע משרד־החוץ. ומאחר שכל עבודתנו חדשה ורק מתחילה להתגבש, וביחוד שענייני הערבים בפנים וענייני הפליטים הם חמורים ומסובכים, הרי על כל צעד ושעל מתעוררות בעבודת משרד־המיעוטים שאלות מדיניות עקרוניות המחייבות את השתתפותנו בדיון עליהן. אין אנו עוסקים בכל אלה מתוך רצון להשתקע בענייני ארץ־ישראל אלא מתוך הכרח לשמור על התיאום הדרוש ועל אחידותו של קו הממשלה. זאת ועוד אחרת: ענייני הערבים מחוץ לישראל, וביחוד בעיית המגע והחוטים המתחילים להשתזר בינינו ובינם, קשורים קשר הדוק עם הערבים שבפנים. לצערנו אין בפנינו אפשרויות חופשיות של מגע קל עם מדינאים ערבים מחוץ־לארץ. כל מי שרוצה לבוא אתנו במגע, כל מי שאנו רוצים לדבר אתו — אין אנו יכולים להביאו אלא באמצעות ערבים ישראלים. הוא הדין לגבי הדרוזים ושאר המיעוטים שבארצות השכנות, אשר הדרך אליהם מובילה דרך אחיהם שבפנים. גם עבודות חשאיות ונסתרות שאנו משתדלים לעשותן מעבר לקווי הגבול והחזית — אין דרך להתחיל בהן אלא באמצעות ערביי ישראל. כל זה מחייב אותנו להיות מושרשים עמוק גם בעניינים ערביים שבפנים מדינת ישראל ועל גבולותיה, אם כי גם אנו מבינים היטב שמשרד־החוץ עוסק בקשרים עם חוץ־לארץ.

3. הערתך על עניין היומן אשר ביקשתי את טוביה [ארזי] לנהלו[3] — הערה אשר ניכר בה מקצת רוגז — ציערה אותי. גם היא מבוססת, נדמה לי, על אי־הבנה. אם ביקשתי יומן כזה הרי לא לשם "ביקורת" — לפחות לא ביקורת כזאת שהיתה פוגעת בזכויותיו ובסמכויותיו של מנהל המחלקה, וגם לא לשם בדיקה אם מספרכם בפאריס גדול יותר מדי. ביקשתי את היומן פשוט מאוד לשתי מטרות: א. כדי לדעת, לדעת את הכול. אני מבין שיש דברים חשובים ויש דברים פחות חשובים, אולם מתוך הערכת עבודתכם שם הייתי מאוד רוצה לדעת גם על הדברים הפחות חשובים. הפעולה של זיאמה [זליקסון], למשל, בין הסטודנטים וכו׳ מעניינת מאוד והייתי מאוד רוצה לדעת פרטים עליה. גם טוביה סיפר לי על כמה וכמה פעולות, נסיונות וקשרים שעליהם לא ידעתי מאומה. דווקא באווירת הניתוק וההסתגרות בה אנו חיים כאן חשוב לנו מאוד לדעת את כל הפרטים. ודווקא הדברים שאתה מציין באותו סעיף על פעולותיו של

3. שמעוני התלונן שלמרות חילופי המברקים והדוחו"ת, אין יודעים במדויק מה עושים ששון וקבוצתו בפאריס, וביקש שאחד מאנשי הקבוצה ינהל יומן מפורט. (ראה מכתבו אל ששון, 26.8.1948, 130.15/2570/11).

זיאמה — לשם הגנה על גודל מספרכם בפאריס (אשר איש לא ערער עליו) — דווקא הם מוכיחים, לדעתי, כמה טוב היה לו קיבלנו מעין יומן קבוע. המטרה השנייה שלשמה ביקשתי זאת היא למען רציפות הרישום ושמירה על חומר לעתיד. הלא תזכור כמה ביקשתי אותך ואת טוביה להעלות על גבי הנייר את הקשרים שהיו לכם בעבר עם אישים ערבים שונים בארצות שונות — קשרים אשר מרבית תוכנם ופרטיהם ותוצאותיהם שמורה עד היום בזכרונו ובלבו של טוביה לבדו, במקום שיהיו רישומים מסודרים לתועלת כל העובדים בעניין. הבינונו תמיד שהימנעות מכתיבה היתה הכרחית בימי המנדט, אולם משהפכנו מדינה מותר לנו לנהל רישום מדויק — לנו, לממונים עלינו, לחברינו, לבאים אחרינו ולהסטוריה — על כל מה שאנו עושים. כן יש לחסל את השיטה של מקריות, חוסר רציפות ושל אקסלוסיביות מופרזת בקשרים. לכל המחשבות האלה הסכמת בשעתו, והן לא בוצעו רק משום שאי־אפשר להניע אותך ואת טוביה להעלות את העבר בזכרונכם ולרושמו (דבר שאני יכול להבינו). אולם למה נחזור על אותו משגה לגבי ההווה והעתיד?

4. גם דבריך על הצורך למנוע את ראשי האגפים שלנו משקיעה בניירות ולהפכם לאנשים פעילים בשדה המדיניות והמעשה — גם הם מהווים את הקו שבו אנו משתדלים ללכת, וכבר כתבתי לך על כך במכתבי הקודמים. אלא שלא בכל האגפים קל הדבר לביצוע: אגף ארץ־ישראל, למשל, יש לו שדה פעולה אקטיבית גם כאן; גם אגף סוריה והלבנון יכול למצוא דרכים לפעולה; אולם מה יעשה אגף מצרים, אגף עיראק? הלא בפניהם בארץ, בתנאים של היום, אין אפשרויות של פעולה אקטיבית רצינית. מצד שני לא נבטל אותם בגלל ליקוי זה שהזמן גרמו. אין גם לזלזל בצורך להמשיך, לפחות במידת־מה, בעבודת אוסף הידיעות הדרושות לכל פעולה אקטיבית. עם כל ההערכה לעבודתה של המחלקה המדינית,[4] אין בשום אופן לומר, שהידיעות שהיא מספקת לנו ממלאות את כל הדרוש לנו ונותנות לנו את הרקע וההבנה הדרושים. יתר על כן, גם בהגדרת התחומים בינינו ובין המחלקה המדינית נקבע בשעתו, בהסכמתך, שהם יעסקו בראש וראשונה באינפורמציה סודית שאין להשיגה בצינורות רגילים, ואילו שאיבת האינפורמציה מעיתונות מוטלת על מחלקתנו. עיקוב מדויק אחרי העיתונות של ארצות ערב, וכן החזקת ארכיב מסודר ורישום כהלכה בכרטיסיות וכו׳ — שהם דרושים בלי ספק לעבודתנו — מחייבים את ראשי האגפים להקדיש חלק גדול מזמנם לעבודת שולחן. ובמידה שמצמצמים את אפשרויות ההתרחבות שלנו ואין נותנים לנו לקחת עובדים נוספים וחדשים (ועל כך להלן), אין לשחרר את ראשי האגפים מן העבודה הזאת.

[.....][5]

שלך בידידות

יעקב

4. ראה מס׳ 491 והערה 4 שם.

5. פיסקאות 5 — 18 של המכתב לא הודפסו כאן.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק מוצפן T8W/143
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1

Tel Aviv, 17 September 1948

1) Understand McDonald addressed substantial despatch President, State Department, urging de jure, elaborating arguments for and countering arguments against.[1] 2) Reference your W3T,[2] Czech arms. Important you find earliest opportunity remind State Department and convey White House [that] in conversations with Loy [Henderson], Lovett, Marshall, from November 29th onwards, myself repeatedly stressed we most anxious receive arms from America, which is our first preference; but if America refuses, we will have to get arms wherever possible because matter life death, and felt sure they would have done same if in same position. There was no demur whatsoever at these statements. 3) Consul-General Jerusalem probably warning State Department danger threatening him on part Lehi. We don't minimise Lehi peril, trying watch situation, but they should know Consul-General [--] patronises saloon which is Lehi hangout, apparently gets involved in arguments with them [---].[3] 4) For your guidance — we informed Soviet Minister gist State Department's enquiry regarding our attitude peace terms and our reply.[4]

Shertok

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ו. איתן אל א. הייט (ואשינגטון)
W. Eytan to U. Heydt (Washington)

מברק מוצפן
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2308/1

[Tel Aviv], 17 September 1948

Your 130/17.[1] American Government asked Czechoslovakia cooperate to halt supply war material for Israel. Demanded not allow U.S.A. planes destined Israel use Czech aerodromes and repatriate by force U.S.A.

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1. ראה מקדונלד אל הנשיא טרומן, 12.9.1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1392-4.
2. מס' 505.
3. חמש מלים במשפט הזה לא הודפסו כאן.
4. ראה מס' 529.

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1. לא נמצא, אך ראה מס' 505, 516.

citizens engaged this traffic. Czechs orally replied transports to Israel consisted medicaments, food, electric supplies. U.S.A. Government assured Mediator efforts were continuing. U.S.A. Government specified location airfield.

Eytan

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

ביום ו׳, 17.9.1948, בשעות אחר־הצהריים, נרצחו בירושלים הרוזן ברנאדוט ומשקיף או״ם צרפתי — הקולונל סירו (Serot). ברנאדוט היה בדרכו לפגישה עם המושל הצבאי דב יוסף והיה מלווה על־ידי קצין־קישור של צה״ל. את האחריות לרצח נטל על עצמו פלג של לח״י — ״חזית המולדת״. בתגובה על ההתנקשות החליט מטה משקיפי האו״ם, בראשותו של הגנרל לונדסטרום, לפנות את אנשיו מן האיזור הישראלי של ירושלים. הפינוי החל להתבצע למעשה, וכוחות צה״ל נכנסו ל״חוות הלימוד״ בדרום־מזרח ירושלים, שפונתה על־ידי האו״ם, כדי למנוע יצירת חלל ריק בקטע זה של החזית. לאחר מכן חזרו אנשי האו״ם ותפשו את עמדותיהם. ממשלת ישראל נקטה צעדי חירום ופתחה בחיפושים ובמעצרים של אנשי לח״י ברחבי הארץ.

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מ. שרתוק אל ט. לי (פאריס)
M. Shertok to T. Lie (Paris)

MH 1302 מברק

93.03/130/4 :נוסח נכנס (ניו יורק)

[Tel Aviv], 17 September 1948

Outraged by abominable assassination of United Nations Mediator Count Bernadotte and Observer Colonel Serot by desperadoes and outlaws who are execrated by entire people of Israel and Jewish community of Jerusalem. Government of Israel is adopting most vigorous and energetic measures to bring assassins to justice and eradicate evil.

Moshe Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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ר. באנץ' אל מ. שרתוק
R. Bunche to M. Shertok

העתק: 93.03/130/4

Jerusalem, 17 September 1948

The murder in cold blood of Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and of Colonel Serot of French Air Force and United Nations Observer, in the Qatamon Quarter of Jerusalem today by Jewish assailants is an outrage against the international community and an unspeakable violation of elementary morality. This tragic act occurred when Count Bernadotte, acting under the authority of the United Nations, was on an official tour of duty in Jerusalem and in the presence of a Liaison Officer assigned to him by the Jewish authorities. He was well within the lines of the armed forces of your Government which has by official act assumed responsibility for that part of Jerusalem controlled by Jewish forces. His safety, therefore, and that of his lieutenants, under the ordinary rules of law and order, was a responsibility of the Provisional Government of Israel, whose armed forces and representatives control and administer the area.

This act constitutes a breach of the truce of utmost gravity for which the Provisional Government of Israel must assume full responsibility.

In this connection I feel obliged to record the view that the prejudicial and unfounded statements concerning the truce supervision attributed to you and Colonel Yadin as having been made at your press conference in Tel Aviv on Thursday, 16th September, and as reported in the *Palestine Post* on 17th September, are not the kind of statements which would be calculated to discourage reprehensible acts of this kind.[1]

Ralph J. Bunche
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General attached to the Mediator

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1. במסיבת העיתונאים השמיעו שר־החוץ וראש אג"ם טענות קשות נגד מנגנון הפיקוח של האו"ם. נאמר שהפיקוח בארצות ערב אינו יעיל, שהמשקיפים מתייחסים לתלונות הערבים על הפרות הפוגה בחומרה גדולה יותר מאשר לתלונות הישראליות, ושהם נוטים לעסוק בקטנות ולהתעלם מהפרות גסות. ראה גם מס' 520.

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מ. שרתוק אל ר. באנץ'
M. Shertok to R. Bunche

העתק: 93.03/130/4

Tel Aviv, 19 September 1948

Dear Mr. Bunche,

I write to acknowledge the receipt of your message transmitted to me yesterday by the United Nations Office in Tel Aviv.[1] The feelings of horror and outrage of the Government of Israel at the brutal murder of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot have been expressed in my message to the Secretary-General cabled to Paris on the evening of September 17th,[2] and in the official statement issued by the Government at noon yesterday.[3] You have in the meantime received the text of both, but I am attaching copies for your ready reference.

I take this opportunity of expressing to you personally my deepest sympathy in the terrible shock which you have experienced and in the personal loss sustained by you in the death of Count Bernadotte whose closest associate you were in all these trying months.

I learn that you have been appointed to replace Count Bernadotte as Acting Mediator, and I want to assure you of every possible assistance and cooperation on my part.

I regret to have to join issue with you over the concluding paragraph of your message. I deplore the note of recrimination struck in it and consider it unwarranted. All the evidence points to a careful planning of the assassination, and we are now satisfied that the preparations were completed by Thursday, September 16th. There can thus be no association between the murder and anything that appeared in the press on Friday morning. Moreover, the general tenor of our press conference on September 16th was quite different from what you have been led to assume. My statement contained no stricture whatsoever on the person of the Mediator. On the contrary, I indicated that on two occasions in my recent discussions with him he accepted the validity of my arguments.[4] As to the Mediator's staff, I prefaced my remarks by stating emphatically that not only did I not intend to impute any bias or ill-will to them, but that I felt convinced that they were striving hard to discharge faithfully their difficult and often danger-

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1. מס' 519.
2. מס' 518.
3. בהודעה נקראו כל האזרחים "לעזור בפועל ללא כל רתיעה לכוחות הצבא והמשטרה בגילוי הרוצחים ועוזריהם ובביעור נגע הטירור מעל אדמת ישראל." ("הארץ", 19.9.1948).
4. ראה מס' 519 והערה 1 שם.

ous duties. The burden of my criticism of the observation machine was based on purely objective grounds. I argued that it was physically impossible for the observers to be everywhere at all times and to keep under effective control the inordinately long front-line and frontiers, as well as the numerous ports and countless airfields scattered over vast territories, particularly at a time when the total number of observers assigned to neighbouring countries was only fifty-five.

I must add a word of general explanation why we considered that press conference imperative. For many days past we had been receiving reports, the authenticity of which we had no reason to doubt, about a considerable strengthening of enemy positions in various parts of the country, of growing enemy activity, and of evidence that an all-out Arab offensive was imminent. We did not have the impression that these warnings, transmitted by us to the Mediator's staff, were receiving the attention they merited. In these circumstances we felt bound to inform the public of the state of things as we know it to be.

I now wish to inform you of the steps taken by the Provisional Government in its efforts to apprehend the assassins and those responsible for the planning of the assassination.

As there seems to be little doubt that the group calling itself Hazit Hamoledet ("Fatherland Front"), which has acknowledged the authorship of the crime, is an arm of the dissident organisation Lohamei Herut Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), the Provisional Government has proceeded to take action against this organisation and its members. Accordingly, some 150 members of Lohamei Herut Israel were rounded up and arrested in Jerusalem, and over 50 more in Tel Aviv and other localities. Vigorous investigations are proceeding to probe deeper into the mystery of the crime and discover the real culprits. It is hoped that identification parades, with the help of the eye-witnesses to the crime, may be arranged soon.

At its extraordinary meeting last night the Government unanimously approved the measures already taken in Jerusalem and elsewhere and decided on the most vigorous prosecution of the investigation and the action taken against Lohamei Herut Israel. The Government adopted a special Emergency Regulation giving it sweeping powers to take action against terrorist organisations, their members and accomplices. The Regulation will be promulgated within a day or two. Further measures against terrorism and with a view to tracking down the assassins are under consideration, and I will keep you informed of such progress as we achieve.

Yours sincerely,

M. Shertok
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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י. וולפסברג אל מ. שרתוק
Y. Wolfsberg to M. Shertok

מקור: 93.03/64/15

סטוקהולם, 19 בספטמבר 1948

מר שרתוק הנכבד מאוד,

כבר הודענו על העיכובים ועל האיחור שלא באשמתנו בדרכנו לסקנדינביה.[1] שירות הקו *Panafrican* לקוי וחסר אחריות.

הדין־וחשבון שלי אינו אלא משלים מה שנכתב במכתבים שכתב ה׳ וייסבורד.[2]

בבואנו הנה ב־15/9 התחלנו מיד בפעולה. התקשרנו עם מר שטורך[3] ושאר האנשים הפעילים והמה מועטים. כולם הדגישו שאין סיכויים ברגע זה לשיחות עם המדינאים, היות והם התחייבו ביניהם לבין עצמם לדחות לעת־עתה את ההכרות ולחכות לעצרת ולתוצאותיה. ולפי שבאנו באיחור, כבר עבר זמן הדיונים המעמיקים, שכן שרי־החוץ וראשי המשלחות לאומות המאוחדות כבר עזבו את המדינות או עמדו או עומדים לעזוב.

בכל־זאת ביקשנו לקשר אותנו עם המיניסטר השוודי לענייני חוץ. מר שטורך, [-------][4] פנה אל שר־החוץ מר אונדן, ודרש ממנו שיקבלו אותנו. על אף הבחירות שהתקיימו היום הוא הסכים, והראיון יצא לפועל ביום 17/9 אחרי הצהריים. השיחה נמשכה כעשרים וחמש דקה. אני הבאתי לפניו את דרישתנו בדבר הכרת שוודיה במדינתנו ודבר הסכמתה כשתבוא בקשתנו להתקבל כחבר באומות המאוחדות. נתתי תיאור תמציתי אך קצר של מהלך העניינים מסוף נובמבר ושל השינויים המדיניים והאסטרטגיים שחלו במשך תקופה זו. הדגשתי את סוד הכוח, העמידה והחיים של מדינתנו הצעירה. נתתי ביטוי לעובדה, שאנחנו הצד שהיה נאמן ונשאר נאמן להחלטות או״ם, ואין הקולר תלוי בנו אם נשתנו פני הדברים והתאריכים שנקבעו אז. עשינו במרוצת החודשים מה שכל אומה שחירות, דרור [?] וכבוד נר לרגלה ואור לנתיבתה היתה עושה בתנאים כאלו. שרינו וגם יכולנו, והניצחון מוסיף לתביעותינו משקל.

נאמנותנו לאו״ם מזכה אותנו לדרוש מהמדינות הכרה. אנחנו מעוניינים שההכרה הזאת תבוא גם ובמיוחד מצד מדינות המערב, מאלה שמסורת דמוקרטית חיה בקרבן. האידיאלים הדמוקרטיים, אהבת החירות, משותפים לנו עם מדינות אלו. אין אנו

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1. ישעיהו וולפסברג ואליעזר ויסבורד יצאו בתחילת ספטמבר לשליחות מדינית בארצות סקנדינביה כדי לפעול למען ההכרה של מדינות אלה בישראל ולרכוש את תמיכתן בקבלת ישראל לאו״ם.
2. ראה ויסבורד אל שרתוק, 19.9.1948, 130.02/2384/17. במכתב יש פרטים נוספים על השיחה עם שר־החוץ השוודי אונדן ועל האווירה בשוודיה לאחר רצח ברנאדוט.
3. הלל שטורך, מראשי ההסתדרות הציונית והקונגרס היהודי העולמי בשוודיה.
4. חלק של המשפט, שעניינו אישי, לא הודפס כאן.

מכריעים בין שתי המערכות הגדולות בעולם, ואנו יודעים שדיננו יצא לזכות בנובמבר עקב השיתוף המעניין בין מערב ומזרח. אך אין ספק שלבנו לעולם שוחר חירות.

דיברתי על חשיבותה של ההכרה בשבילנו ובשביל העולם, והדגשתי כי צעד זה של הכרה מצד הרבה ארצות נוספות יחיש את תהליך ההרגעה והבאת שלום במזרח־התיכון. שכן קשה לערבים לצאת מהתסבוכת בכבוד, אך כאשר יכירו בנו רוב המדינות, כי אז ייווצר מצב בינלאומי כזה שאין לערערו וזה יביא לכלל מוצא של כבוד לשכנינו.

בתשובתו טען המיניסטר, שאין לממשלתו האפשרות לשנות את ההחלטה לדחות את עניין ההכרה עד לאחר העצרת. אף-על-פי שאין ממשלתו תלויה בדעת ברנאדוט, מכל מקום היא מתחשבת בשליחותו ותחכה לדין־וחשבון שהוא ימציא לאו״ם. שנית: ממשלת שוודיה תלתה את ההכרה במילוי תנאים שהותנו בנובמבר 1947. תנאים אלו לא נתקיימו ולא קוימו במלואם. לא הוקמה המדינה הערבית בארץ־ישראל בתוך הגבולות שנקבעו; לא נוצרה הברית הכלכלית. מכאן שעל העצרת לבחון מחדש את המצב ולהגדיר את התנאים שיביאו לכלל פתרון סופי. אשר לעתיד המדינה היהודית, יש לו תקווה שיש לה קיום, ובכלל יש בלבו אופטימיות מסוימת היות והוא שמע מפי המתווך שהמלחמה לא תפרוץ עוד. שני הצדדים כאילו נתנו הבטחות בכיוון זה.

השבתי לו שאי־מילוי התנאים של 29/11 תוצאת התנהגותו של הצד שכנגד. אנו הסכמנו לגבולות אם כי אין הם נוחים לגמרי, וקידמנו בברכה את הברית הכלכלית. שאפנו לשיתוף־פעולה מכיוון שעינינו נשואות לעתיד ומחוור לנו עד כמה גורלנו קשור לגורל הסביבה. אין בלבנו שנאה למדינות ערב, אך אין אנו יכולים לקבל את המסקנה הבלתי־הגיונית, שמכיוון שאויבינו גרמו להפרת התנאים של 29/11, עלינו לסבול ולהפסיד. המדינה שנוצרה ונוסדה היא לנו שאלת חיים ממש.

כאשר הזכרתי את עניין הגבולות, הוא שאלני מה עמדתנו עתה בנידון זה. אמרתי שקיבלנו את הגזרה אז בהנחה שיהיה שלום והסכמת כולם בארץ בדבר מימוש תכנית פלאשינג מֶדוֹ[5]. אך הנסיון לימדנו שאנו זקוקים לגבולות אסטרטגיים, ולפי העיקרון הזה נצטרך לתבוע שינויים.

אשר להכרה, הפניתי את תשומת־לבו לעובדה, שכמה מדינות הכירו בנו — מי *de facto* ומי *de Jure*. הוא הגיב על כך באמרו, שיש כאן חישוב פוליטי ומדיני. שאלתיו אם דעה זו חלה גם על מדינות דרום־אמריקה שהכירו בנו. הוא ענה שאין הוא יכול לפרש את כוונותיהן של אותן המדינות.

שר־החוץ אדם שקט, קריר, שקול ומדוד מאוד. תיארוהו מראש כעקשן ובלתי־אדיב. אין אני יכול לומר שהוא לא התנהג כשורה. הוא הקשיב קשב והשיב במשפטים מדודים, בטון שקט, אך לא ללא נימוסין.

שעה וחצי לאחר שיצאנו קרה בירושלים מה שקרה[6] ומצבנו קשה למדי. היינו צריכים לנסוע לנורבגיה להיפגש עם שר־החוץ לאנגה, כפי שקבע ד״ר פוקס, אך שמענו בשבת (18) כי הוא כבר יצא באניה בדרך לפאריס, במקום לטוס באיחור כפי שרצה. פגישה זו לא יצאה לפועל איפוא. בדניה לא הצליח מר סלור[7] להפגישנו עם

5. תכנית החלוקה. בפלאשינג מדו, במדינת ניו יורק, ישבה העצרת הכללית של האו״ם בעת החלטת החלוקה.
6. רצח הרוזן ברנאדוט.
7. בנימין סלור, יושב־ראש ההסתדרות הציונית בדנמרק.

השרים, אך יש תקווה שקאלה ברמן,[8] אחד מהסוציאל־דמוקרטים פה, יהודי־ציוני חם בעל השפעה שם, יכין את העניין.
ליום 20/9 מכינים פגישה עם העיתונות השוודית. עמדתנו תהיה קשה, אך סבורני שאנו מחויבים להופיע דווקא בימים אלה.
לשר־החוץ שלחתי מברק תנחומין לרגל רצח ברנאדוט.
האנשים המקומיים מחוגנו פוגשים אותנו באהדה.
אני אוסיף לכתוב על הפגישה עם העיתונות ועל כל המתרחש.
בברכה ובהערצה,

י. וולפסברג.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 25/75, 26/90, 27/27
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1

Tel Aviv, 19 September 1948

Belgian informed me today he visited King Irbid fourteenth, transmitted him my last reaction.[1] King said Egyptian, Iraqi, forces received scant reinforcements. Legion more strongly reinforced, but we need not worry as Legion firmly in hand. He again insisted gesture our part readmission non-Husseinis Lydda, Ramle, which would: 1) raise his prestige; 2) defeat intrigues Nokrashi, Mufti, and deal blow League as whole; 3) enable him get Egyptian army retreat from vicinity Jerusalem; 4) serve basis five years arrangement between us for "exchange population" between Palestine and Transjordan (by which he could only mean settlement Palestinians in Transjordan), solution problem electric, potash, concessions, possibly economic concessions to us in Transjordan. He agreed our territory should extend to Lebanese frontier and include Acre. He wanted Haifa joint city. He did not mention Negev. King's impatience indicated by fact his emissary appeared in Old City sixteenth view receiving my reply, as Consul mentioned I would be visiting Jerusalem those days in accordance my previous intention, which has not materialised. Have told Consul repatriation, even partial, out of question present stage, but would formulate reply within couple days such as would not snap thread. Consul about visit Amman again.

Shertok

8. קרל (קלה) ברמן, מפעילי ההסתדרות הציונית בשוודיה, חבר המפלגה הסוציאליסטית השוודית.

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1. בענין הפגישה הקודמת בין הקונסול־הכללי הבלגי, ניואנהויס, והמלך עבדאללה ותגובת שרתוק ראה מס' 499.

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

ב־20.9.1948 פורסם ברבים הדין־וחשבון שהגיש המתווך למזכיר האו"ם. המלצותיו העיקריות היו: החלפת ההפוגה בשלום של קבע או לפחות בשביתת־נשק יציבה; הכרה בעובדת קיומה של מדינת ישראל; שינויים בגבולות החלוקה של נובמבר 1947 — מסירת הנגב, דרומית מקו מג'דל — פלוג'ה לערבים ומסירת הגליל כולו ליהודים; המלצה לספח את החלקים הערבים של ארץ־ישראל לעבר־הירדן; מתן מעמד מיוחד לירושלים בפיקוח האו"ם; הפיכת נמל חיפה ונמל התעופה בלוד לאיזורים חופשיים; גישה חופשית לירושלים; הבטחת זכותם של הפליטים הערבים לשוב למקומות מושבם ומתן פיצויים לאלה שאינם רוצים לשוב. המתווך גם המליץ להקים ועדת פיוס, שתפעל למען המשך ישובה של בעיית ארץ־ישראל בדרכי שלום, תטפח יחסי ידידות בין ערבים ויהודים, תפקח על הסדרי גבולות, נמלים חופשיים, דרכים פתוחות וזכויות מיעוטים, ותדווח לאו"ם על כל התפתחות העלולה לערער את ההסדרים שאישר האו"ם או את השלום באיזור. ראה *Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestien,* 16.9.1948 מסמך או"ם A/648, עמ' 17-19.

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן U1/84. התקבל: 21.9
נוסח יוצא: 93.02/182/7
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2344/4

Paris, 20 September 1948

On publication Mediator's proposals,[1] we recommend cautious reaction, leaving Arabs with task hostile reaction. Please consider advisability early tentative reaction our end leaving Government further time detailed analysis. /Tone of/ reaction should take account extremely difficult atmosphere toward us here; important utilise opportunities praising Mediator's realistic approach on main issues. Secretary-General informed us no intention appoint new /mediator/ since aim is liquidate truce by final settlement. Meanwhile Bunche /in/ charge.

Eban

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1. ראה הערת־עורך לעיל.

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ר. באנץ' אל מ. שרתוק
R. Bunche to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2427/10

Haifa, 20 September 1948

Dear Mr. Shertok,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 September[1] which was handed to me by the United Nations Office in Tel Aviv yesterday, shortly after our talk in your office. I take this opportunity to say that our friendly discussion in Tel Aviv, relating largely to the great tragedy of Friday, was very satisfying.

May I thank you for your expression of deepest sympathy. All of us who have had the honour to work under the leadership of Count Bernadotte have been shocked and grieved beyond measure at the brutal and utterly insane murder of this great man of good will, whose only motivation had been to bring peace to the Holy Land through amicable negotiation with the contending parties.

I appreciate also the kind remarks made by you yesterday in memory of the Mediator and in connection with the interim role given me by the Security Council in the great drama of attaining peace for Palestine.

I have taken special note of those paragraphs of your letter which set forth the steps taken by the Provisional Government toward apprehending both the actual assassins and as well those responsible for planning the outrage, and the measures contemplated against terrorism generally. I will communicate this information to the Security Council, which has requested that it be kept informed of all such developments.

I fully appreciate that this dastardly crime has been shocking to you personally, to your Government, and to your peace-loving citizenry as it has to the members of Count Bernadotte's staff and to the United Nations generally. In this regard may I say that the official statement issued by the Provisional Government on 18 September[2] and your message to the Secretary-General of 17 September,[3] copies of which you kindly enclosed in your letter, were forthright, impressive and reassuring expressions.

It is a source of regret to me that in this sorrowful hour one note of misunderstanding arose in our original exchange of messages. This relates to the fourth paragraph of your letter, which takes issue with the statement in my message to you from Jerusalem of 17 September,[4] referring to certain

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1. מס' 520.
2. ראה מס' 520, הערה 3.
3. מס' 518.
4. מס' 519.

statements reported in the local press. I have neither desire nor intent to labour the point nor attribute to it excessive importance. But to minimise the possibility of continued misunderstanding over this matter, which has already been the subject of some distortion in the press, I wish to make myself perfectly clear.

This last sentence in my message was not intended to strike any note of recrimination nor to impute any motives to yourself or any other member of your Government, which would associate you or them even remotely with the wickedly calculated assassination of Count Bernadotte. It was intended merely to call to your attention the simple and obvious fact that statements in the press, and especially those attributed to high Government officials, inevitably have an important effect upon the climate of public opinion and therefore upon the attitude of the public, including its criminal and terrorist elements, toward the work of this mission.

If I may be specific with regard to the *Palestine Post* article mentioned, I noted carefully the statements attributed to you to the effect that you in nowise intended to impute any bias, ill-will or intention to discriminate on the part of either the Mediator or his staff. To the extent to which the analysis dealt with the inadequacies of the Truce Supervision machinery, there could be no possible cause for objection. But the article went on to attribute statements to you, although not directly quoted, which quite definitely impugned the motivations of the Truce Supervision Organisation and could only lead to the conclusion that our operation was deliberately partial and unfair. I refer, of course, to the statement that the Mediator's staff appeared to be laboring under "a political theory" that firmness must be shown toward your Government, while a policy of patience and lenience was to be shown toward the Arab Governments, and that therefore "quick decisions" were made against the Jews, while there was calculated "procrastination" with regard to Arab violations of the truce. This statement, which may not have been an accurate attribution, was certainly both prejudicial and unfounded, since it implicitly charged the Truce Supervision Organisation with pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination between the two parties. This is indeed a serious accusation, which, if true, could only lead to a justifiable public attitude toward this mission of opposition and contempt, and ultimately hostility.

That there have been undue delays in reaching decisions in some cases has been true. That there have been intended delays is emphatically untrue. Arab Governments have also complained of these delays. It is no secret, either, that these delays have been occasioned in some instances by the failure of the Governments concerned to extend full co-operation in our investigations.

You will, I am sure, understand my deep concern in this matter. Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot, a gallant French Officer, have just been murdered in cold blood. Our Organisation has thus suffered six fatalities

and seven wounded since the Truce Supervision began. In addition there have been many narrow escapes. The Observers and United Nations Secretariat personnel are engaged in this operation on the instructions of the Security Council. Their work is both thankless and hazardous. Yet they remain faithful to the task of ensuring peace in Palestine. I feel, as did the Mediator, a very heavy responsibility for their safety.

You may rest assured, that although our efforts at supervising the truce may be judged inadequate on one ground or another, there has been and there will be no wilful policy of discrimination against either side.

May I leave to your discretion the advisability of public release of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph J. Bunche
Acting Mediator

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
M. Shertok to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק MH 1358
נוסח נכנס: 93.08/373/23

Tel Aviv, 20 September 1948 (19.40)

McDonald today transmitted following message: "Have been asked convey that my Government considers that the task of U.N. so effectively begun by Bernadotte be vigorously continued and that it attaches greatest importance to maintenance present truce and continuation mediation efforts. My Government is confident that Arab and Jewish leaders will particularly refrain from taking any military action contrary to Security Council's truce terms and is also confident they will take every precaution prevent further violence." Myself stated in reply behalf Memisrael: 1) nothing further from our minds that by our own initiative and unprovoked volition do anything contrary Security Council's truce terms; 2) not only do we take every precaution prevent further violence inside territory but are most actively engaged tracking down culprits, associates and instigators Friday's assassination. Added our people on job hopeful of results; 3) informed him gist my MH1345 to New York.[1]

Shertok

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1. שרתוק אל לוריא, 20.9.1948 (130.09/2329/1). במברק מסר שרתוק על הנסיונות להגיע להסכם על פירוק היחידות הצבאיות של אצ"ל ולח"י בירושלים לפני רצח המתווך ועל הצעדים שאחזו בהם נגד האירגונים לאחר הרצח.

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א. אבן אל א. אפשטיין (ואשינגטון)
A. Eban to E. Epstein (Washington)

מברק UN 55
נוסח יוצא: 93.02/186/3
נוסח נכנס: 93.01/2220/8

Paris, 21 September 1948 (16.45)

From first conversations, American position will be support principles Mediator's report, reserve position territorial proposals pending detailed discussion.[1] Inform Lourie.

Eban

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ד.ב. יוסף אל מ. שרתוק
D. B. Joseph to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2443/2

ירושלים, י״ז באלול תש״ח
21 בספטמבר 1948

משה היקר,

אני רואה במכתבו של באנץ׳ אליך[1] פיסקה האומרת, שבטחון הרוזן ועוזריו היתה אחריותה של ממשלת ישראל. איני יודע, אם רצוי שאנו נכנס לוויכוח אתם בשאלה זו אם לא יחזרו להדגיש את הדבר. אולם ברצוני להזכירך, כי כאשר בראשונה נכנסנו למשא־ומתן עם משקיפי או״ם בקשר עם סדרי עבודתם באיזור שלנו, היה ויכוח עקרוני ביני לבינם: אני עמדתי על כך שהם יהיו מלווים על־ידינו בכל מקום שילכו, אף־על־פי שתהיה להם הזכות ללכת לכל מקום שימצאו לנחוץ בכדי למלא את תפקידם כמשקיפים. הם התנגדו לכך ותבעו זכות ללכת בעצמם לכל מקום ובכל עת שירצו, וגם טענו שהם אינם צריכים להיות תלויים ברשיונות שלנו, ושתעודת או״ם שהיתה בידי כל אחד מהם צריכה לשמש תעודת מעבר לכל הקווים שלנו. בוויכוח זה נימקתי את עמדתי גם בטענה, שלא רצוי שיתהלכו בקרבנו בלי ליווי, כי יש אצלנו

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1. השווה מס׳ 530, הערה 1.

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1. מס׳ 519.

הגורם של פורשים, והמלווים שלנו יהוו גם כן הגנה למשקיפי או"ם. הם, אשר בלי ספק ראו בעמדתי רצון לשמור לאו דווקא עליהם, אלא על מעשיהם, עמדו על שלהם. לבסוף החיים היו יותר חזקים מהשקפתי, והם למעשה השיגו את שלהם והתחילו להסתובב בלי ליווי.

כך נוצר מצב שבו, תודות לעמדתם הם, בהישען על רצונם להיות בלתי־תלויים בנו וחופשים לבוא וללכת בכל עת שהם רצו — ראינו אנו את עצמנו פטורים על־ידם וגם מחוסרי יכולת לדאוג לשלומם, כפי שיכולנו לעשות זאת, לו הם קיבלו את עמדתי הראשונה.

ספקותי, אם כדאי לנו לעורר את השאלה, נובעים מן החשש פן אלה שדנו אתי אז, לא ירצו לזכור כמוני אותו ויכוח; אבל אם אתה רואה חשיבות להדגיש את הדבר הזה, אני אחראי בעד דיוק העובדות כפי שאני מוסר אותן למעלה. אמנם נכון שהם יוכלו להגיד, שבמקרה זה היה ליווי, אבל רק של איש אחד, וזה לא היה מספיק להגן עליהם. דבר זה נכון, אולם העובדה נשארת, שלולא עמדתם־הם בכל העניין של ליווי, היינו בכלל נוהגים אחרת.

להלן אני מפנה את תשומת־לבך לפיסקה ממברקי אליך בעניין הנדון, ששלחתי אליך ביום 14.6.48: "האם כוונתך שלא ארשה ולא אתן שום הקלות למשקיפים לעבור קווינו ולבקר איפה שהם רוצים לשם השגחה עד אשר אתם תחליטו על כך, או עלי לסדר להם אפשרות ביקורים כרצונם ורק להשתדל להבטיח שהאיש שלנו ילווה אותם?"

וכן מברק אחר אליך, מיום 25.6.48: "האם גמרתם עם בּוֹנֶדֶה סידורי עבודה, ביחוד זכות המשקיפים להסתובב? אם כן, הודיעני פרטים. ברונסון תובע נמרצות זכות מעבר לשיך ג׳רח ולשער הגיא לכל אנשיו לפי תעודות שלו ובלי כל תעודה או מלווה מאתנו."[2]

והנה גם פיסקה מהדו"ח של ר. שילוח מיום 22.6.48, שנשלח אליך מרודוס:[3] "אמרתי כי הצענו לקולונל בונֶדה ללוות את אנשיו למקום המערכה (אינצידנט 'אלטלנה'), וקולונל בונֶדה אמר כי אין לו צורך בליווי וכי המשקיפים יבואו בכוח עצמם למקום."

שלך

דב יוסף
מושל צבאי

2. מברקים אלה לא נמצאו.
3. מס' 220.

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ח. הופמן[1] אל מ. שרתוק
C. Hoffmann to M. Shertok

מקור: 130.02/2426/8

מינכן, י"ז באלול תש"ח
21 בספטמבר 1948

פנימי

א.נ.,

הנדון: יציאת גברים בגיל צבא מן האיזור האמריקאי שבגרמניה.

אני חוזר למכתבי מ־7 לחודש זה[2]. הפרוצדורה אשר נדרשת משלטונות הצבא היא לעת־עתה זאת אשר נקבעה במברק של המפקדה מ־1 לספטמבר 1948,[3] זאת אומרת, יציאה של לוחמים אסורה בהחלט. אשר לגברים בגיל צבא, עלינו להגיש רשימה לשלטונות הצבאיים, אשר יאשרו שברשימה זאת אין אנשים לוחמים ואחר־כך עלינו להמציא את הרשימה הזאת לממשלת ישראל, אשר צריכה לקבל רשיון מאת המתווך. רק בהתקבל רשיון זה תינתן רשות יציאה. הודעתי כי לא אוכל לפעול לפי פרוצדורה זאת, אלא אם אקבל הוראות בכיוון זה ממשרד־החוץ הישראלי.[4] אבקשך להודיע לי מיד אם אתם מוכנים למסור רשימות כאלה למשרד המתווך, כי אז נתחיל בהכנות לעיבודן.

לעת־עתה למעשה העלייה יוצאת בלי מעצורים. קבוצות של מגויסים יוצאות בדרכי הבריחה, ובמשלוחים של משפחות מסתפק הצבא בהודעת בא־כוח הסוכנות היהודית, כי במשלוח אין גברים בגיל צבא. סידור זה לעת־עתה לא הופרע: גנרל קליי הודיע ליועץ לענייני היהודים, ד"ר האבר,[5] בתשובה לערעורי, כי אין בסמכותו לשנות את ההוראות אשר נתקבלו ממשרד־החוץ בוואשינגטון, אבל אין גם בכוונתו להכביד על יציאת היהודים. אני מניח כי לא ניתקל בקשיים, כל זמן שלא תבוא תלונה ממשרד המתווך לשלטונות האמריקאיים על עליית מספר גדול של גברים בגיל צבא מן האיזור האמריקאי. במקרה זה, כמובן, לא יעמוד לנו ההסכם־שבשתיקה הקיים כיום, והשלטונות האמריקאיים יגישו תלונה למשרד־החוץ הישראלי על־כך, כי נציגיו בגרמניה אינם מקיימים את תנאי ההפוגה.

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1. חיים הופמן (יחיל) עמד בראש משלחת הסוכנות היהודית לגרמניה, 1945־1948; קונסול ישראל באיזור הכיבוש האמריקאי, 1948־1949.
2. הופמן דיווח על ההסדרים הנהוגים לגבי עליית יוצאי־צבא ממחנות העקורים בגרמניה (ראה מס' 470) וביקש הוראות כיצד לנהוג. (ראה הופמן אל איתן, 7.9.1948, 93.08/376/20).
3. המברק בתיק 93.08/376/20.
4. ראה הופמן אל גנרל קליי, מפקד איזור הכיבוש האמריקאי בגרמניה, 7.9.1948, שם.
5. ויליאם האבר, היועץ לעניינים יהודיים במינהל הצבאי האמריקאי בגרמניה ובאוסטריה.

לכן אהיה אסיר תודה לך, אם תוכל להודיעני, כיצד אתה מעריך את הסיכויים להגיע לידי הסדר עם המתווך אשר יוכל להסיר את הקשיים בהם אנחנו עובדים כיום.

למרות הקשיים הנ"ל הצלחנו להעלות בחודש אוגוסט מגרמניה 3700 איש, בחודש ספטמבר נגיע ל־4000 עד 4200 איש. אנו מקווים להגיע באוקטובר למספר של 5000 עד 6000 איש. היום אנחנו מתחילים גם בהסעת עולים לאווירונים, ואנו תקווה כי הנסיון יצליח ונוכל לפתוח בקו קבוע מינכן — חיפה.

אני יוצא מחר לז'נבה למשא־ומתן עם איר"ו[6] בעניין תמיכתם בעלייה. את המשא־ומתן אנהל בשיתוף עם מר אדלר־רודל[7] ועם ד"ר האבר ומר בקלמן מהנהלת הג'וינט.

ד"ר האבר עומד לבקר בשבוע הבא בארץ ואבקשכם לטפל בו וברעיתו.

בברכה,

ד"ר חיים הופמן
קונסול ישראל

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ש. פרידמן אל ג. מאירסון (מוסקבה)
S. Friedman to G. Meyerson (Moscow)

העתק: 130.11/2492/16

תל אביב, י"ז באלול תש"ח
21 בספטמבר 1948

גולדה היקרה,

זהו מכתבי השני אליך.[1] לצערנו הרב חל בימים הראשונים, מסיבות לא תלויות בנו, עיכוב בשליחת החומר אליכם. בינתים הסתדר העניין ואני מקווה שקיבלתם כבר את העיתונים, הביולטינים וכו' אשר נשלחו אליכם.

אחרי השיחה עם הציר האמריקאי,[2] הידועה לכם כבר, הזמין מ[שה] ש[רתוק] את הציר הרוסי וסיפר לו אודותיה. השיחה היתה ארוכה. הציר הציג כמה שאלות. בין השאר: האפשר להבין מתשובתנו שאין אנו מתנגדים להחזרת הפליטים? בנקודה זו לא היה מה להוסיף לדברים שנאמרו בשיחה הנ"ל. שאלה שנייה: ההוצגו ההצעות כתנאים להכרתנו די־יורה, למתן מלווה, להכרתנו באו"ם? התשובה לשאלה השנייה היתה, שעל הכרה די־יורה לא דובר דבר; על ההלוואה — דברים בעקיפין; אשר לתמיכה בבקשתנו להתקבל באו"ם, ניתנה לנו כבר הבטחה מצד הנציגות האמריקאית באו"ם. הציר הסובייטי התעניין בשאלה, אם חלו שינויים בדבר המלווה. התשובה היתה, שהנשיא נוטה לצד חיוב ושהציר אצלנו המליץ על כך. היתה עוד שאלה, אם

6. I.R.O. — הארגון הבינלאומי לפליטים.
7. שלום אדלר־רודל, מנהל המדור ליחסים עם מוסדות בינלאומיים במשרד הסוכנות היהודית בלונדון; טיפל בענייני פליטים ועקורים באירופה.

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1. ראה מס' 506. 2. ראה מס' 504.

לא התעניין הציר האמריקאי במשא־ומתן עם ערבים. התשובה היתה שלילית. יחד עם מכתב זה תקבלי את הפרטים שמסר אוברי איבן (אבא אבן) על שיחתו עם י. מאליק.[3]

הציר הסובייטי ממשיך בביקוריו אצל חברי הממשלה. נוסף לאלה שכתבתי עליהם ביקר אצל שר־המשפטים, שר־האוצר ושר־התחבורה. השתתפתי בכל השיחות האלה. כולן היו מלאות עניין ונסבו על ענייני המשרד אשר בו היה הביקור. במשרד־המשפטים גילה הציר התעניינות בשאלות הקונסטיטוציה של מדינתנו, מעמדו של הנשיא וחוק הבחירות. באוצר היו שאלות על מס ההכנסה, אשר באותם הימים דנו בו במועצת־המדינה, על תקציב המדינה, על התקציב הצבאי, על הפוליטיקה של יבוא ויצוא. תשובותיו של השר נתנו הסברה טובה לשאלות אלה. הוסבר מדוע עורר החוק של מס ההכנסה התנגדות כה חריפה מצד השכבות העשירות בישוב, מדוע לא ניתן לפרסום התקציב הצבאי. כן ניתנה הסברה על הפרדת התפקידים והמעמסה בין המדינה וההסתדרות הציונית בשטח העלייה וקליטתה. במיוחד היה מדובר על אופיו של המאזן המסחרי שלנו, והוסבר שגם כשהוא פסיבי, הרי הוא חיובי מבחינת בניין הארץ, אם הוא משפיע על התפתחותה ומסייע לקליטת עולים. הציר הדגיש בדבריו שהוא מבין את המעמסה המשולשת המוטלת עלינו, היינו: הקמת המדינה, הנהלת המלחמה וקליטת המוני עולים, ומעריך את פעולת המדינה בשטחים האלה.

רבת־עניין וערה במיוחד היתה השיחה במשרד־התחבורה. דובר על כל שטחי פעולתו של משרד זה. הציר גילה התעניינות בשאלות הקשר האווירי עם ברית־המועצות, הקשר הטלגרפי הישיר, תחבורה ימית, גורלו של נמל חיפה בקשר עם פיתוח נמל תל אביב. השר הדגיש שנמל תל אביב אינו בא במקומו של נמל חיפה, אלא להשלימו, שגם נמל חיפה זקוק להרחבה ניכרת, ושייתכן שלשם זה יהיה צורך בהלוואות מהחוץ ואולי בדרך של קונצסיות תחת פיקוח הממשלה "ללא השתעבדות". השר הרחיב את הדיבור על ההכשרה הרצינית שקיבלו פועלי ארץ־ישראל בתוך עבודת הבניין בארץ, על הטיב המעולה של עבודתם, על המומחים החשובים הנמצאים בארץ ועל פעולות הבנייה הרבות שעשו אנשינו בארצות הסמוכות. כמו־כן על האיכות הגבוהה של חומרי בניין הנמצאים בארץ ובעיקר בשביל הבנייה מתחת למים. בסיום השיחה קיבל תשורה צנועה ונאה — בולי דואר חדשים העומדים להופיע וחוברת הסברה קצרה ברוסית.

התקיימה ארוחת־ערב אצל מ[שה] ש[רתוק], אליה הוזמנו הציר ויועצו. עברה באווירה טובה.

הצירות הסובייטית ממשיכה להתעניין בשאלת הרכוש הרוסי. הקונסול ביקר פעמיים בירושלים, נפגש עם י. רבינוביץ וקיבל ממנו הסברה ראשונה על מצב הדברים. המשך שיחות בעניין זה לא היה לפי שעה.

הולך ומתקדם עניין הבית בשביל הצירות. ישנם קשיים הידועים לכם. הם עוברים עכשיו לבית זמני: שד' רוטשילד 46, מקום בו היה המכון הבריטי. היה לנו בעניין זה טיפול רב ומייגע. בבניין זה יהיו זמנית בערך 3 — 3½ חודשים, עד שייגמר בניין גדול בן 36 חדר, שיימסר להם וישמש בחלקו גם לעובדי הצירות. גם כאן — טיפול מייגע, בעיקר מבחינה כספית. אנשים מהחוץ אינם מסוגלים לתפוס כראוי את הקשיים הרבים בשטח זה בארץ.

3. ראה מס' 447.

אינפורמציה כללית נשלחת לכם לחוד ואין אני נוגע בה כאן.

[.....][4]

שלום וברכה לכולכם

נ.ב. נבקשכם להמציא לנו העתקות מכל פניותיכם למוסדות הממשלה ולצירויות וקונסולטים שונים, מהתחלת עבודתכם ואילך.

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מ. שרתוק אל ד. בן־גוריון
M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion

העתק: 130.02/2425/2

תל אביב, י״ח באלול תש״ח
22 בספטמבר 1948

דעתך כי מוטב לנו לא להגיב לעת־עתה על מסקנותיו של המתווך המנוח בדין־וחשבון שלו למזכיר הכללי של או״ם, אינה נראית לי.

נתפרסמה התגובה האנגלו־סכסית והיא חיובית לחלוטין.[1] כן נתפרסמה התגובה הערבית והיא שלילית.[2] אם נוסיף להחריש, ייתרשם העולם לא מאי־אישורנו לדין־וחשבון אלא מאי־התנגדותנו לו, כי חזקה עלינו בעיני הציבור שאם יש לנו לערער על משהו, הרינו משמיעים את הערעור מיד.

אני חושב לסכנה ששתיקתנו תיחשב כהודיה ותזהה את עמדתנו עם הדין־וחשבון, ואז יתחילו חיפושים אחרי פשרה חדשה בין הדין־וחשבון לבין העמדה הערבית, לפי ההגיון הידוע לנו היטב.

אני מציע איפוא להורות למשלחת בפאריס או לדובר הממשלה כאן, להגיב תגובה ביקורתית ראשונה על הדין־וחשבון, מתוך הודיית־מה בחיוב שבו והדגשת השלילה.[3]

הודיעני נא את דעתך.

4. שני קטעים, שעניינם הרכב נציגויות ישראל לפולין ורומניה, לא הודפסו כאן.

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1. תגובת ארצות־הברית התפרסמה בפאריס ב־21 בספטמבר, בהודעה מטעם מזכיר המדינה מארשאל. בהודעה נאמר שמסקנות המתווך מהוות בסיס הוגן לפתרון בעיית ארץ־ישראל ושממשלת ארצות־הברית קוראת לצדדים המעורבים ולעצרת הכללית לקבלן בשלמותן, בלי להיכנס להתמקחות בפרטים. (ראה *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1415-16). שר־החוץ בווין אמר בבית־הנבחרים הבריטי ב־22 בספטמבר, שיש לראות במסקנות תכנית אינטגרלית אחידה ולהוציאה אל הפועל בשלמות וללא דיחוי. בווין גם הדגיש, שהממשלה הבריטית תומכת בהמלצה שהחלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל יסופח לעבר־הירדן. (ראה *456 H.C. Deb. 5s.* cols. 898-900). ממשלת צרפת החליטה, שהיא רואה את תכנית ברנאדוט כבסיס אפשרי לפתרון. (ראה פישר אל שרתוק, 22.9.1948, 130.09/2344/4).
2. ב־21 בספטמבר הודיע בקהיר מזכיר הליגה הערבית עזאם פאשה, שמדינות ערב דוחות את המלצת המתווך. (ראה ״דבר״, 22.9.1948).
3. ראה תגובת המשלחת בפאריס — מס׳ 531; תגובת דובר הממשלה — מס׳ 536.

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הודעה מטעם משלחת ישראל למושב השלישי של העצרת הכללית של האו"ם
Statement issued by the Israeli Delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly

העתק משוכפל: 93.03/126/1

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL[1] WITH REFERENCE TO THE BERNADOTTE PLAN, ISSUED IN PARIS, SEPTEMBER 22, 1948

The Israeli government is giving the most serious study to Count Bernadotte's important report to the General Assembly. The people of Israel are eager for peace with their Arab neighbours, and they will earnestly explore all proposals which are put forward as a basis for a final and lasting peace.

While it is welcome that the report expresses the central fact of Israel's independence and vitality as a state, it would nevertheless be premature at this stage to accept its conclusions in their entirety.[2] Careful study and discussion are obviously essential.

Thus, one of the conclusions which calls for the most critical scrutiny is the suggestion that the Negeb be excised from the State of Israel. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, after an exhaustive study of the Palestine problem, recommended that the territory of the Negeb be included in the Jewish state. This recommendation was accepted by the General Assembly. To exclude the Negeb from the State of Israel would be to take away two-thirds of its area, to reduce it to a miniature state, to constrict its growth, and to deny to the Jewish people the only available land reserve which offers the prospects of large-scale development.

In any discussion of the report, the future of Jerusalem will be the subject of special interest. Besieged by foreign Arab armies, the people of Jerusalem were cut off from food and water, suffering many casualties, and were finally rescued from starvation and death only because the State of Israel established a land bridge from the coast. Under the circumstances, the people of Israel, and especially of Jerusalem, will not look with equanimity on any plan which would jeopardize the fate of the 90,000 Jewish inhabitants of that city by cutting them off from direct contact with Israel.

The government of Israel will presumably have an opportunity of making its official comment on these and other important features of the report `before the appropriate organs of the General Assembly.

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1. ראה מס' 530; תגובה זו פורסמה ביזמת משלחת ישראל בפאריס לאחר שאחדים מחברי המשלחת הצביעו על הקשיים הנגרמים בהעדר תגובה רשמית. (ראה פרוטוקול הישיבה השנייה של המשלחת, 22.9.1948, 93.03/131/3).
2. שרתוק הורה שלא לחזור להבא על נוסח זה מפני שעלולה להשתמע ממנו נכונות לקבל את רוב המסקנות של המתווך. (ראה שרתוק אל אבן, 23.9.1948, 93.02/185/1).

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק UN 58
נוסח יוצא: 93.02/186/3
נוסח נכנס: 130.02/2414/22

Paris, 22 September 1948

Ross visited me midnight after meeting his delegation, seeking first reaction Marshall's statement.[1]

Have expressed astonishment at words "in its entirety", since report though undoubtedly thoughtful document, worthy discussion, contains startling proposals on which responsible Governments should reserve position pending discussion. Explained extremism Negev proposal, involving loss main Jewish interests: settlements in North, Aqaba, Dead Sea access. Also ignoring main elements Jerusalem problem such as Jewish need control supplies.

He replied these three words not inadvertent, Americans anxious avoid long delay and reach swift conclusion at psychological moment now favouring decisive action. Themselves willing listen arguments in committee, but undisposed far-reaching changes in report. Hoped we would not show intransigent or irredentist attitude.

At this stage I produced cable Weizmann sent to his Washington friends yesterday, expressing his resistance Negev proposal.[2] This appeared take him aback and he copied telegram, asking if it represented general moderate view. I replied yes. He asked if Weizmann intended publish his views, and I replied probably. He asked me convey Israel's direct reaction.

Other points in conversation: He stressed Haifa proposal showed complete respect our sovereignty, as also Lydda, no internationalization contemplated. Jerusalem proposal deliberately vague pending clarification question force. He reiterated emphatically American position still opposed international force for any part Palestine. His Delegation much impressed by vigorous anti-terrorist measures which /have/ redressed psychological balance our favour. He indicated that negative attitude our part would be disastrous for international opinion, while positive attitude our part would almost certainly lead to early acceptance application membership U.N. Another reason for swift action is their desire act before rival Arab Government formed in opposition to Abdullah.

In talks with other delegations are strongly /warning/[3] against precipi-

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1. ראה מס' 530, הערה 1.
2. מוסב על מברק מווייצמן אל רוזנמן (21.9.1948, ג"ו). ראה גם מס' 543.
3. בנוסח הנכנס כתוב בטעות: "are strongly warned".

tate commitment report as whole and stressing point our vital attachment Negev. Nahum [Goldmann]'s friend[4] invited me lunch today and discussion this afternoon.

We urgently await some tentative formulation Memisrael's attitude. General debate will last one week, our matter therefore probably arising about first October. Lie and Sobolev inform me anticipate no serious trouble our proper participation.

Aubrey Eban

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א. אבן אל מ. שרתוק
A. Eban to M. Shertok

מברק UN59
נוסח יוצא: 93.02/186/3

Paris, 22 September 1948

McNeil summoned me today saying he instructed by Bevin convey the following officially: 1) Britain supports settlement advocated by Mediator and will work for Assembly recommendation that basis. 2) Did not expect support by either side but expected acquiescence in settlement finally recommended. 3) Would support strongest resolution by Security Council against either side, repeat either side, attempting to set aside Assembly recommendation by military force. Added unofficially with "complete certainty", that settlement these lines would be immediately followed by British de jure recognition and advice other powers act similarly. Myself replied, would convey this most important declaration and could only react personally this stage. Drew attention Negev problem, showing map emphasizing three points, northern settlements, Akaba and Dead Sea as vital Jewish interests. He showed sympathy only for first. I added hope that his acceptance principle report would not commit them rigidly its territorial details. He replied would be less than honest if he held out hope of more than secondary modifications. Concluding he expressed personal conviction that normal relations ourselves a vital British interest. Made further comments Middle Eastern affairs, which am transmitting separately.[1] Expressed willingness receive me any time informally; I concluded informing him your imminent arrival, whereupon might seek further conversation. Britain will propose special committee deal with Palestine and then Italian colonies,[2] allotting four weeks maximum to each.

Eban

4. הקטור מקניל. על הפגישה אתו ראה מס' 533.

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1. לא נמצא. 2. ראה מס' 415, הערה 2.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן W9T/96. התקבל: 23.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/7

[Washington], 22 September 1948

Arrived yesterday afternoon. Several well-informed friends advise Mediator's plan prepared full cooperation Americans and British. McDonald conversations with us[1] support this view. Friends also believe existence informal Marshall-Dulles agreement bi-partisan policy on Palestine during elections. Friends emphasise importance Marshall reference report as a basis, repeat basis, settlement,[2] which opens possibility improvement frontiers. Truman promised several people more active support our demands, but not yet come out openly with any reference Israel.

Please advise continuation of conversations with McDonald and official position Marshall statement. Am postponing meeting Lovett till receive your instructions.

Epstein

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מ. שרתוק אל ג. מאירסון (מוסקבה)
M. Shertok to G. Meyerson (Moscow)

מברק מוצפן IP6/12
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2325/3

תל אביב, 23 בספטמבר 1948

מודאג ממאמר "פראבדה" נגד עלייה ממזרח־אירופה.[1] הבריקי הערכתך.[2]
שרתוק

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1. ראה מס' 493, 504.
2. ראה מס' 530 והערה 1 שם.

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1. מדובר במאמר של איליה ארנבורג ב"פראוודה" מיום 21.9.1948. ארנבורג שלל באופן פסקני עליית יהודים מברית־המועצות ומשאר הדמוקרטיות העממיות; הוא ציין שבארץ שורר משטר קפיטליסטי (ראה מס' 544; מ. נמיר, שליחות במוסקבה, עמ' 242־250).
2. לא נמצאה תשובה.

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הודעה מטעם דובר ממשלת ישראל

Statement by the Spokesman of the Government of Israel

130.02/2425/2 :טיוטה

[Tel Aviv], 23 September 1948[1]

A spokesman of the Government of Israel made the following preliminary comments on the conclusions formulated in the United Nations Mediator's Report to the Secretary-General.

Dealing first with the Mediator's Basic Premises, the spokesman said:

1) We wholeheartedly endorse the Mediator's aspiration for the return of peace to Palestine and the establishment of harmonious relations between Arab and Jew.

2) We welcome his assertion that the State of Israel exists and will continue in existence.

3) We prefer the boundaries of Israel to be finally fixed by formal agreement between the contending parties. Pending that, we regard the territorial settlement of November 29, 1947, as valid, but standing in need of certain improvements in the light of events since then.

4) Among the principles put forward as governing the delimitation of boundaries we miss those of defence, in the light of the dangers we have had to face and ward off unaided, and of the needs of development for the absorption of large-scale immigration.

5) With regard to the question of Arab repatriation, we cannot forget that the initial attack on the Jews after the November 29th resolution was launched by Palestinian Arabs and that the neighbouring Arab States justified their campaign of aggression against the State of Israel by the call for help which reached them from Arabs within its territory.

6) While the religious and international significance of Jerusalem is fully realised and respected, we must continue to stress its unique position in Jewish history and in present-day Jewish life, as well as the fact that it was the courage and the endurance of the Jews alone that saved the city from complete destruction and from subjection to Arab rule.

Commenting on the Mediator's specific conclusions, the spokesman stated:

1) We welcome the emphasis that the present indefinite truce must be superseded by a formal peace. As to an armistice involving "either complete withdrawal and demobilisation of armed forces, or their wide separation by the creation of broad demilitarised zones under United Nations supervision", we must utter a warning against a position of false equality.

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1. ההודעה פורסמה בעיתונות בארץ ב־24.9.1948.

In the first place, the withdrawal of the Arab armies of invasion from Palestine does not involve their diminution, while for the Army of Israel to demobilise means to reduce its effective strength. Secondly, by accepting the creation of a broad demilitarised zone the invading armies give up nothing which is theirs, whereas the State of Israel is expected to contract the limits of its territorial sovereignty.

2) On the detailed boundary proposals we see no justification whatever for the exclusion from the Jewish State of the large area of the Negev, comprising over two thirds of Israel's territory, with its vast and untapped potentialities, of which the Arabs are hardly likely to make any proper use within the measurable future. This proposal we shall oppose. As to the future of Lydda and Ramleh, one major consideration must be the absolutely vital necessity for the State of Israel to maintain an unbroken territorial connection with Jerusalem.

3) The situation as regards the Arab part of Palestine appears to be too confused to justify any definite comment.

4) Haifa. with its port and oil refineries, is and must remain an integral part of Israel. We are ready to grant all proper facilities for the use of that port by neighbouring States provided they are not unilateral but based on reciprocity. For example, it is inconceivable that Haifa should serve the neighbouring States while the latter are free to boycott Israel's goods. As to the refineries, all valid concessionary rights will be fully respected, but beyond that there is no justification for interference with Israel's sovereign rights. The same principle of reciprocity as applies to the port of Haifa should govern the facilities to be enjoyed by the neighbouring States as a result of the operation of the Lydda airport.

5) We consider ourselves entitled to claim Jerusalem as part of Israel, subject always to all due safeguards for the inviolability of and free access to all Holy Places and Shrines. The imperative need for a territorial link between Jerusalem and Israel's coastal plain has already been stressed.

6) The idea of establishing a U.N. Conciliation Commission deserves careful study but if such a Commission is appointed its duties should be limited to the smoothing out of difficulties and fostering friendly relations between Israel and its neighbours; they should not extend to anything which is tantamount to infringement of the normal sovereign rights enjoyed by Israel, as by any other independent State.

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ישיבה רביעית של משלחת ישראל למושב עצרת האו"ם
(בפאריס, ב־23 בספטמבר 1948)

Fourth Meeting of the Israeli Mission to the Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 23 September 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/131/18

Paris, 23 September 1948

Present: A.S. Eban, Dr. J. Robinson, G. Rafael, I.L. Kenen, M. Weissman, E. Sasson, M. Fischer

Mr. Eban reported on his talk with J. Malik and Tsarapkin of the U.S.S.R. Delegation. The Soviet Delegation is rigidly supporting the November 29th resolution. They don't see any necessity for changes. Their thinking is guided by terms of propaganda. Tsarapkin stated that the Russians will ask for the adoption of the Jerusalem statute. Malik gave the impression to be more flexible, but he warned us against asking for any change of boundaries since this would undermine our legal and international position.

Mr. Eban replied that we abide by the November 29th resolution, but the question arises what should be done with the territory occupied by the Israeli Army. He stressed our determination not to yield on the Negev, and made it clear that external considerations were involved which Malik promptly interpreted as "strategic and imperialistic interests". Malik ended the conversation by saying that the Soviet Delegation sticks to the November 29th resolution.

Mr. Eban then reported on a talk with Beeley, who expressed the view that Arab reaction to Bernadotte's scheme will be controlled by the Arab Government who will stand firm against any spontaneous popular outbreak. The Egyptians will withdraw from the Negev. The English continue to maintain their sceptical view about the value the Negev is supposed to have for us. Bernadotte's scheme will be adopted very quickly by the Assembly, which will only give general directions and leave the details to the boundary and conciliation commission, as provided under the Bernadotte scheme.

Rafael suggested that a concise summary report about the Negev should be prepared by the delegation for circulation among the U.N. members and the press. This suggestion was adopted, and Kenen was asked to prepare a draft.[1]

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1. ראה "The Importance of the Negev to the State of Israel", [נובמבר 1948], 93.02/186/16.
התזכיר הופץ בין חברות האו"ם.

Robinson drew attention to the fact that the Secretary-General had suggested in the General Committee that Bernadotte's report should be dealt with by the First Committee in all its three parts. This proposal was not accepted. The General Committee followed Malik's (Lebanon) proposal to submit the third part of Bernadotte's report on refugees to the Third Committee. Robinson stated that the second part of Bernadotte's report will not be brought before the General Assembly because it deals with the question of maintenance of peace which is a matter for the Security Council.

Sasson reported on a conversation between Fares el Khoury and Malik (U.S.S.R.). Fares told Malik that the new Palestine Arab Government[2] is against Abdullah, and enjoys the support from Egypt, which will hand over to this government Gaza and the Negev. Malik made it absolutely clear that the Russians will stick to the November 29th resolution, and said that the Arabs did not succeed by employing force and have no chance by taking anything else by force. Fares asked at that point that U.S.S.R. should extend their help to the Arabs in the same way as they did previously to the Jews. Malik interrupted Fares indignantly and said that they did not give any material help to the Jews and likewise will not support the Arabs.[3]

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מ. שרתוק אל ג. רפאל (פאריס)
M. Shertok to G. Rafael (Paris)

מברק מוצפן U46/110
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/181/8

Tel Aviv, 23 September 1948

For Eban. According most reliable French source, assassination produced volte-face in Western orientation towards us. Conference three Foreign Ministers,[1] perceiving in it Moscow's hidden hand, accepted under /Marshall's/ pressure necessity strengthen us in our hard fight against subversive element and redress balance by advising all Western Powers give us full recognition and by sponsoring our admission U.N. They contem-

2. ב־22.9.1948 הכריז הוועד הערבי העליון בדמשק על הקמת ממשלה ערבית בארץ־ישראל, שמושבה יהיה בעזה. אחמד חילמי מונה לראש־הממשלה וג׳מאל אל־חוסייני לשר־החוץ. המלך עבדאללה הודיע על התנגדותו הנחרצת לממשלה זו.
3. דין־וחשבון מלא על השיחה ראה במכתבו של ששון אל שמעוני, 23.9.1948, ארכיון בן־גוריון, תיק 1520.

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1. מוסב על פגישת שרי־החוץ של ארצות־הברית בריטניה וצרפת בפאריס, ב־22 בספטמבר.

plate territorial settlement based present military situation, which according source means exclusion Negev, /partition/ Jerusalem under international governor. By arrangement, France is to be first to recognise us. Surmise Frenchman's visit[2] connected these developments. Inform Fischer.

Shertok

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן W10T/77. התקבל: 24.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/7

Washington, 23 September 1948

Under increasing pressure of New York Democratic bosses, Truman promised de jure recognition between 1st October and 15th October. [—] however, matter depends now more upon development of Paris than upon election policy Truman.

View lukewarm attitude State Department on loan, Board Export and Import Bank decided any credit Israel during truce risky and be delayed until peace fully established.

[.....][1]

Epstein

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שיחת מ. פישר — א. פארודי (בפאריס, ב־23 בספטמבר 1948)
Meeting: M. Fischer — A. Parodi (Paris, 23 September 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.02/172/15

M. Parodi ne se rendait pas compte de la portée des stipulations territoriales des Propositions Bernadotte.

Dans une interview radiodiffusée, faite le soir du 20 septembre, M. Parodi avait déclaré que les Propositions Bernadotte lui semblaient raisonnables et, en les énumérant, il avait mentionné l'inclusion dans le territoire arabe du sud du Neguev. Aussi M. Parodi a-t-il été très étonné quand je lui ai montré sur la carte où se trouvent Majdal et Faluja. Sa réaction immédiate a été de dire qu'il avait commis une lourde erreur et que cette amputation radicale du Neguev lui semblait inadmissible.

2. ראה מס' 496.

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1. הפיסקה האחרונה, שעניינה המגבית היהודית המאוחדת, לא הודפסה כאן.

J'ai expliqué à M. Parodi que la perte du Neguev jusqu'à la ligne Majdal Faluja signifie à la fois la suppression de notre principale aire de colonisation, celle de nos accès à la Mer Morte et celle de notre débouché sur la Mer Rouge.

M. Parodi a dit que l'abandon du sud du Neguev ne lui semblait pas constituer une plaie mortelle, mais qu'il trouvait les deux autres exigences absolument raisonnables. Il ferait part de cette opinion à la Délégation américaine.

Nous avons ensuite parlé de Jérusalem. M. Parodi a dit que la France, en ce qui concerne l'internationalisation de Jérusalem, ne bougerait pas de ses positions. D'ailleurs, a-t-il ajouté, une Jérusalem juive impliquerait un corridor et nous savons que de tels arrangements ne sont pas souhaitables.

Je lui ai répondu que, bien au contraire, le rattachement de Jérusalem à l'Etat d'Israël avait une importance infiniment plus grande encore que le statut de la ville même.

Je lui ai expliqué sur quoi se fondait cette affirmation et il m'a dit qu'il admettait mes conclusions.

M. Parodi m'a dit qu'il ne pensait pas que la France pourrait aujourd'hui nous reconnaître. Il fallait ménager les Nord-Africains. Mais à la faveur de cette attitude, la France pourrait tout faire pour nous aider dans la question de nos frontières.

M. Parodi m'a dit qu'il me parlait en son nom personnel, mais qu'il était persuadé que le Quai d'Orsay suivrait ses directives.

Il m'a conseillé d'agir, de mon côté, sur les membres du gouvernement auprès desquels nous avons accès, afin que l'attitude du Conseil des ministres n'aille pas à l'encontre de sa ligne de conduite.

M. Parodi s'est ensuite laissé aller à une digression sur l'injustice qu'il y a à nous donner un territoire, la Galilée, où nous devrons réadmettre les réfugiés arabes, et à nous enlever, d'autre part, un territoire qui n'est presque pas habité.

M. Parodi semblait déjà songer à une sorte de compromis qui comprendrait notre accord pour le retour des réfugiés arabes en Galilée contre des avantages territoriaux dans le Neguev.

Il y a là, naturellement, une idée dont les conséquences peuvent être dangereuses.

M. Parodi m'a encore dit qu'il avait été réellement très touché de l'insistance que nous avons mise à demander la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël par la France. Cette insistance prouve, pense-t-il, que la position morale de la France dans le monde reste très haute, "l'Angleterre est fort irritée de se heurter toujours à ces positions morales françaises. Elle nous garde rancune de ce que Paris ait été choisi comme lieu de réunion de la session de l'O.N.U. et, hier encore, M. Hector McNeil ne cachait pas sa mauvaise humeur à ce sujet."

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א. ששון אל משרד־החוץ
E. Sasson to the Ministry For Foreign Affairs

העתק: ארכיון בן־גוריון 1520

פאריס, 23 בספטמבר 1948

ב־21 לח.ז. הופיע [--][1] אצלי במלון. סעדנו ביחד את ארוחת־הערב ושוחחנו כארבע שעות. לדבריו, הוא נשלח במיוחד על־ידי אנשי החצר כדי לבדוק אתי את האפשרויות של הסדר נפרד בין ישראל לבין מצרים. השליחות הוטלה עליו באופן פתאומי לפי הוראה מיוחדת מאת המלך. נדמה לו, כי מכתבי אל ראש לשכת־החצר, אברהים עבד אל־האדי פחה,[2] עשה את שלו. וכן הניגודים היסודיים בהשקפות ובאמביציות בין עבר־הירדנים ובין המצרים, שנתגלו בכינוס האחרון של הוועדה הפוליטית של הליגה הערבית, הוכיחו למלך ולתומכיו, שטובת מצרים מחייבת לנקוט במדיניות חיצונית נפרדת, שלא במסגרת הליגה הערבית.

לפני צאתו את קהיר נתקבל [--] לראיון אצל המלך, שנמשך כשעה. אחר־כך נתקבל לראיון אצל סגן ראש לשכת־החצר, חסן יוסף. בראיון הראשון הרצה על "קשריו הטובים עם כמה מאנשי משרד־החוץ של ישראל, בייחוד עם ששון." כן הרצה על הכוח הצבאי היהודי לפי מיטב ידיעותיו. הוא תיארו ככוח מאורגן יפה, חזק, בעל משמעת ונאמן להנהגתו. בראיון השני הוא קיבל את ההוראות הדרושות לו. הוטל עליו בעיקר לברר: א) מהן ההצעות שלנו לשלום: ראשית — עם העולם הערבי כולו במשותף, שנית — עם מצרים בנפרד; ב) מהן הערבויות שלנו: ראשית — לאי־התפשטות על־חשבון הטריטוריה של מדינה זו או אחרת מהארצות השכנות, שנית — לאי־הזדהות מדינת ישראל עם הקומוניסטים, דבר שמלך מצרים חושש מפניו מאוד.

לדבריו אין המשלחת המצרית לאו"ם בראשותו של ח'שבה פחה יודעת דבר על שליחותו המיוחדת. הוא צורף למשלחת על־פי המלצת החצר כקצין־ביטחון. אולם הוא הביא אתו הוראה אל הציר המצרי בפאריס, שיאפשר לו להשתמש ב"מזוודה הדיפלומטית" להעברת מכתבים ורפורטים אל ראש־החצר. הוא רשאי להיות נוכח בישיבות של המשלחת וגם להילוות אליה בהופעתה במושב האו"ם. משיחותיו הפרטיות עם אחדים מחברי המשלחת הוא הבין כי שתי המשלחות, הבריטית והמצרית, עומדות לקיים ביניהן כמה פגישות סודיות לשם דיון ידידותי על הסכסוך המצרי־אנגלי ולנסות להגיע לידי איזה הסכם פרילימינרי. בין יתר הדברים שעומדים על הפרק — עתיד הנגב. האנגלים רוצים לקבל את הסכמת מצרים לצירוף הנגב לעבר־הירדן. הם בטוחים, כנראה, שמושב האו"ם יאשר את הדין־וחשבון של ברנאדוט בשלמותו.

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1. במקור, כאן ולהלן, שמו של נציג החצר המצרית.
2. המכתב לא נמצא והעניין אינו ידוע.

בחלק זה של השיחה הרחיב [-] את הדיבור על "נבזות" האנגלים. אלמלא האינפורמציה המוטעית שלהם, אלמלא העידוד וההבטחות שלהם — אמר — לא היו המדינות הערביות נכנסות במלחמה נגד ישראל. האנגלים רכשו, לדבריו, את רוב העיתונות הערבית במצרים, בעיראק, בסוריה וכו', וכיוונו את דעת־הקהל בארצות ערב לפי רוחם. במקרים רבים שמו בפיהם של המנהיגים דברים שלא אמרום או הצהרות שלא נתנו אותן ועצרו בעדם את אפשרות התיקון וההכחשה. וכן מסרו ידיעות על "מזימות" מצד היהודים, שנתברר אחר־כך כי לא היה להן כל יסוד. נוסף לכך נטעו האנגלים בלבותיהם של מלכי ערב ושליטיה כל מיני אמביציות. לשוכרי אל־קוותלי בדמשק הסבירו, כי המלחמה בציונים לא זו בלבד שתוריד לגמרי מעל הפרק את תכנית סוריה הגדולה, אלא גם תביא לידי הרחבת גבולותיה של סוריה על־חשבון הגליל הארץ־ישראלי. לפארוק אמרו, כי הוא יכול להיפך לקיסר ערב וכו', ולעבדאללה אמרו, כי קרוב לוודאי שהוא יצליח לצרף לארצו את כל ארץ־ישראל ולא רק את החלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל. אשר למזכיר הליגה הערבית עזאם פחה ולמנהיגים ערבים אחרים בעלי השפעה — פתחו בפניהם את האוצר הבריטי. בזמן האחרון קנה עזאם פחה בניין גדול בקהיר ואין ספק, כי הכסף בא אליו מאנגלים, הן בקשר לשאלת ארץ־ישראל והן בקשר לשאלת לוב. נכון שקשה מאוד היום הנסיגה למנהיגי ערב. אולם, הדגיש [--], יטעה כל מי שיטען, כי מנהיגים אלה קוצרים היום את אשר זרעו. הם קוצרים את אשר זרעה להם אנגליה. כן יטעה כל מי שיניח, כי מעתה ואילך, לאחר שנפקחו עיניהם של המנהיגים הערבים, לא תוכל אנגליה להשפיע יותר על כיוון העניינים במזרח. ידה עדיין נטויה בכל מקום.

מכאן עבר לדבר על הכינוס האחרון של הוועדה הפוליטית של הליגה הערבית באלכסנדריה. לדבריו, לא הגיעו המתכנסים לשום החלטה אחידה בכל העניינים הנוגעים לארץ־ישראל. ולא זו בלבד אלא שגם חברי הוועדה נפרדו עם שני כיוונים שונים ביחס לעתידו המדיני של החלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל, בייחוד לאחר שעמדו על השקפותיו ודעותיו של ברנאדוט: עיראק ועבר־הירדן דרשו את צירוף החלק הזה לממלכתו של עבדאללה. מצרים, סוריה והלבנון עמדו בתוקף על הקמת מדינה עצמאית בחלק הזה, שתצרף אליה במרוצת הזמן גם את החלק היהודי. סעודיה ותימן עמדו מן הצד וניסו לפשר בין שתי התביעות. אשר לחידוש המלחמה בארץ־ישראל — לא נשמעה כל דעה חיובית, חוץ מדעתם של אחדים מהנציגים הארץ־ישראלים כג'מאל אל־חוסיני ואחרים מהמחנה שלו. אולם אין לצפות לכך שחילוקי־דעות אלה יביאו לידי שינוי כלשהו בעמדתם הידועה של נציגי ערב באו"ם. כולם יוסיפו להתנגד לחלוקת ארץ־ישראל ולהכרה במדינת ישראל. אך דבר אחד ברור: הם לא יסתלקו מחברותם באו"ם גם אם ישראל תצטרף אליו. את זה הוא שמע במפורש מאת "בעלי־הבית" שלו, הן בחצר והן בממשלה.

[--] לא ניסה להכחיש, כי ממשלתו מחזיקה כיום במופתי ובאנשיו ותומכת בתכניותיהם הפוליטיות. אולם אין היא עושה זאת מתוך הכרה ביעילות הצעד הזה, או מתוך רצון להפריע לישראל, כי אם מתוך חשבון עם הגוש ההאשמי, "שהוכיח במלחמתו בישראל את עליונות הצבא שלו על כל צבא ערבי אחר." גוש זה, אם יצרף אליו את החלק הערבי של ארץ־ישראל פלוס הנגב, הריהו יכול לאיים על עצמאותה של מצרים — דבר שלפני כמה חודשים לא היה יכול להעלותו על דעתו.

בסוף השיחה ביקש לדעת אם אנו מעוניינים בהסדר נפרד עם מצרים. לדעתו השעה הנוכחית כשרה לכך. לדבריו הפכתי לאיש פופולרי בארצו, הן בגלל מכתבי אל המנהיגים המצרים והן בגלל הפרסומים שהיו בזמן האחרון בעיתונים על מאמצי לשלום.[3] אולם עלינו להציע את הבסיס להסדר הזה, ולא לדרוש זאת מאת המצרים. בעצם זוהי מטרת ביקורו בפאריס.

הערה: לאחר התייעצות עם חברי כאן הכינותי את ההצעה המצורפת לזה כבסיס לשיחות בינינו לבין המצרים על הסדר נפרד. בדעתי להביאה לפניו לחוות־דעת. היא מיוסדת בעיקרה על המברק שקיבלתי בזמנו משמעוני ושהכיל את הוראותיו של מ[שה] ש[רתוק] לשיחות עם לא עבר־ירדנים.[4]

א.ש.

נספח

APPENDIX

le 22 septembre 1948

1. L'Egypte considérera la formation de l'Etat d'Israël comme un fait accompli. Elle cessera de lutter contre Israël et d'appuyer les autres Etats Arabes dans leur lutte contre Israël.

2. Israël respectera le régime actuel en Egypte et n'appuyera aucun élément, ni à l'intérieur, ni à l'extérieur de l'Egypte, qui essayerait d'ébranler ce régime ou de comploter contre lui.

3. L'Egypte s'engagera à évacuer son armée de Palestine, tant de la partie juive que de la partie arabe et de la zone de Jérusalem.

4. Lors de l'évacuation de ses troupes, l'Egypte s'engagera à:

a) ne pas conclure d'accord avec des forces militaires arabes ou autres permettant à celles-ci d'occuper les régions évacuées par les troupes égyptiennes;

b) remettre à l'armée israélienne les régions juives actuellement occupées par les troupes égyptiennes;

c) remettre les régions arabes évacuées aux habitants arabes de ces régions.

De son côté, Israël s'engagera à ne pas occuper les régions arabes évacuées sauf dans les cas suivants:

a) si une autre force arabe essaye de les occuper;

b) si les habitants de ces régions essayent d'attaquer leurs voisins juifs ou de troubler leur vie journalière.

5. Israël s'engagera à accepter n'importe quelle décision que les habitants arabes de la partie arabe de la Palestine prendront quant à l'avenir politique de cette partie — que ce soit de former un Etat arabe

3. ראה מס' 483 והערה 3 שם.
4. מס' 462.

indépendant dans la partie arabe de la Palestine, ou d'annexer cette partie à l'un ou l'autre des pays voisins — à condition que cette décision soit prise par un plébiscite tenu de façon absolument libre et sans la moindre influence ou pression de la part de n'importe quel pays arabe, ou de la part du Haut Comité Arabe qui, de l'avis de tous, Arabes et Juifs, a été le principal instigateur de l'effusion de sang en Palestine.

6. L'Egypte s'engagera à aider à établir les réfugiés arabes de Palestine qui se trouvent actuellement dans son territoire:

a) soit dans les régions arabes de la Palestine;
b) soit dans un ou plusieurs des Etats voisins;
c) soit en Egypte même.

De son côté, Israël s'engagera à:

a) prêter son concours à l'Egypte afin d'obtenir une aide financière internationale pour l'établissement de ces réfugiés dans un des trois endroits mentionnés ci-dessus;
b) examiner les demandes de compensation soumises par ces réfugiés qui ont des biens personnels en Israël;
c) examiner les demandes individuelles de retourner en Israël dans les cas exceptionnels.

7. L'Egypte et Israël s'engageront à se donner les garanties nécessaires contre l'expansion territoriale de l'un aux dépens de l'autre, tant qu'au présent qu'à l'avenir. La nature de ces garanties sera discutée et décidée soit au cours de négociations officielles ou non-officielles.

8. L'Egypte et Israël s'engageront à ne pas conclure d'alliance politique avec un tiers pays, qu'il soit occidental ou oriental, si cette alliance porte atteinte aux intérêts de l'autre. La nature de cet engagement sera précisée soit au cours de conversations préliminaires, soit au cours de négociations officielles ou non-officielles.

9. L'Egypte et Israël s'engageront à coordonner leur commerce, leur agriculture et leur industrie de façon à éviter toute concurrence, soit dans les marchés locaux, soit au cours de négociations officielles ou non-officielles.

10. L'Egypte et Israël se consulteront au sujet de leur armement militaire et de leurs mesures de sécurité, tant en temps de guerre qu'en temps de paix, de façon à permettre aux deux pays de repousser toute attaque étrangère contre leur indépendance, leur souveraineté ou leur territoire. Ces consultations couvriront les forces terrestres maritimes et aériennes. La nature de ces consultations sera discutée et décidée soit au cours de conversations préliminaires, soit au cours de négociations officielles ou non-officielles.

11. L'Egypte et Israël s'engageront à s'aider mutuellement en cas de nécessité afin de:

a) trouver la meilleure solution possible à tout conflit actuel ou futur entre l'une des deux parties et un ou plusieurs autres Etats;

b) obtenir des emprunts internationaux dans les meilleures conditions possibles.

La nature de cette aide sera discutée et décidée soit au cours de conversations préliminaires, soit au cours de négociations officielles ou non-officielles.

12. Israël s'engagera à entrer dans la "Ligue Arabe" dans les conditions suivantes:

a) si la Ligue change son nom et s'appelle "Ligue Orientale" au lieu de "Ligue Arabe";

b) si la Ligue s'efforce à contribuer à l'avancement et au développement du Moyen-Orient.

Autrement, Israël sera prêt à signer des traités d'amitié individuels avec tous les Etats arabes.

13. Israël sera prêt, si on le lui demande, à mettre à la disposition de l'Egypte, pour une période limitée, un nombre spécifique de techniciens et de savants qui aideront l'Egypte à développer son économie, son industrie, ses finances, etc.

14. L'Egypte et Israël s'engageront à veiller à ce que la minorité juive en Egypte et la minorité arabe en Israël jouissent des mêmes droits que les citoyens égyptiens, s'ils sont de nationalité égyptienne, et des mêmes droits que les étrangers résidant en Egypte, s'ils sont de nationalité étrangère. Les mêmes principes seront appliqués à la minorité arabe en Israël. Israël se réserve le droit de soulever la question d'un échange de ces deux minorités afin d'éviter à l'avenir tout conflit entre l'Egypte et Israël.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. ששון (פאריס)
M. Shertok to E. Sasson (Paris)

מברק מוצפן 30/68
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1

Tel Aviv, 23 September 1948

Suggest try following line argument with Egyptians.[1] They interested keep British out of Negev for fear their base there will dominate Suez Canal and nullify effects evacuation Nile Valley. We interested keep as much of Negev as possible for ourselves. Hence common ground between us for direct understanding. [.....].[2]

Shertok

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1. המברק נשלח לפני שהדיווח של ששון על שיחתו הראשונה עם נציג החצר המצרית (ראה מס' 541) הגיע לידי שרתוק.
2. המשפט האחרון לא הודפס כאן.

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א. אבן אל ח. וייצמן (ז'נבה)
A. Eban to C. Weizmann (Geneva)

מקור: ג"ו

Paris, 24 September 1948

My dear Chief,

From conversations here with the American Delegation, it seems clear that they will only be persuaded to change their attitude about the Negev by Presidential intervention. Information has reached me that Eddy Jacobson would be prepared to pursue Truman on his Western tour if he had a signal from you. I would most strongly urge you to send Eddy the same telegram that you sent Rosenman, if possible in simple language — for obvious reasons.[1] This telegram would both be an incentive to Eddy to act and a useful document for him to produce in the course of the conversation itself. It might be wise to allude to the Democratic Party pledge that no boundary changes would be authorised except with the agreement of the Government of Israel. It might also be wise to add a word about the complete reliance which you placed upon the President's word when he secured the retention of the Negev in November 1947.[2]

I would also suggest another useful thing to be done before your departure.[3] Trygve Lie has been a tower of strength to us throughout most trying circumstances, and we have retained his full sympathy and cooperation, even in the immediate aftermath of the Bernadotte assassination. It would, I think, be both useful and proper if you would send him a letter more or less on the lines of the enclosed draft.[4]

I am seeing Ben Cohen[5] this evening, and may then get a clearer picture of the American position — in which case I will phone you tomorrow.

With cordial greetings to Mrs Weizmann and yourself, I am as ever,
Yours,

Aubrey

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1. ראה מס' 532 והערה 2 שם.
2. וייצמן שיגר מברק כמבוקש. (ראה מברק מיום 27.9.1948, ג"ו).
3. וייצמן עמד לצאת לישראל.
4. הטיוטה לא נמצאה.
5. בנימין כהן נמנה על המשלחת האמריקאית לעצרת או"ם.

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ג. מאירסון אל מ. שרתוק
G. Meyerson to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן PI13/186
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2325/4

מוסקבה, 24 בספטמבר 1948

לידיעתך. עם הערכת הודעות השלטונות החוזרות על יציבות תמיכתם בישראל וגילויי היחס הידידותי הבולטים לצירות, אין להתעלם מהעובדות הבאות:

א. בדברי זורין,[1] גוסייב[2] — סגני מולטוב — ובאקולין[3] הידידותיים נשתלבו גם הערות שניתן לפרש אותן כי בעיית עלייה קיימת בארצות שמחוץ לגוש, ושמדינתנו בגלל שטחה הקטן ספק אם תקלוט את כל המליונים משאר הארצות. לפיכך הכרחית ליהודים מלחמה לסוציאליזם בכל ארץ.

ב. העיתונות מנסחת תמיכתה במלחמתנו, באשר מתנגדינו אימפריאליסטיים ומטרתנו עצמאות אמיתית.

ג. מאמר ארנבורג ב"פראוודה",[4] עשרים ואחד ספטמבר, למעשה בעד ישראל ונגד הציונות; שולל עלייה מכאן, מבולגריה, מיתר הדמוקרטיות העממיות, טוען כי אצלנו משטר קפיטליסטי, מצטט מיקוניס[5] במועצת־המדינה בדיון מעיד כי לא נציגי הפועלים בראש שלטוננו.[6]

טרם פנה אלינו הוועד האנטי־פשיסטי היהודי.[7] בדעתנו להתקשר מצדנו.

ד. עיתונאי אנגלי[8] אוהד לנו ומקורב לקומוניסטים, שחזר מביקור משותף עם ארנבורג בפולין, מספר כי בממשלה שם דנים על עלייה ונוטים נגד.

ה. בשיחות עם אנשי משרד־החוץ וציר פולין[9] הורגש שהם בוטחים באנטי־בריטיות שלנו, אך לא בכושרנו לאי־תלות מאמריקה. האם לעורר גם כאן שאלת כניסת עבר־הירדן לאומות המאוחדות?[10]

שלום.

גולדה

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1. ראה מס׳ 511.
2. על הפגישה עם גוסייב ראה מ. נמיר, שליחות במוסקבה, עמ׳ 56.
3. איוון באקולין, מנהל מחלקת המזרח הקרוב במשרד־החוץ הסובייטי; על השיחה ראה שם, עמ׳ 54־56.
4. ראה מס׳ 535 והערה 1 שם.
5. שמואל מיקוניס, המזכיר הכללי של המפלגה הקומוניסטית הישראלית.
6. מוסב על דבריו של מיקוניס בדיון על פקודות שטרי בנק ומטבע. (ראה מועצת המדינה הזמנית, ישיבה ט"ו, 16.8.1948, עמ׳ 13־14).
7. ועד של אנשי ציבור ורוח יהודיים ברוסיה, שהוקם ביזמת ממשלת ברית־המועצות בעת מלחמת־העולם על מנת לגייס את תמיכת העולם היהודי למאמץ המלחמה הסובייטי. הוועד חוסל בסוף נובמבר 1948 ורוב אנשי הציבור והסופרים היהודיים בברית־המועצות נעצרו. ראה גם מ. נמיר, שליחות למוסקבה, עמ׳ 250־251.
8. ראלף פארקר, בא־כוח סוכנות הידיעות טלפרס במוסקבה.
9. מריאן נשקובסקי, שגריר פולין בברית־המועצות.
10. ראה מס׳ 421, 433.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן W15T/223. התקבל: 27.9
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2308/7

Washington, 26 September 1948

Lovett called me in today informally at the request of Marshall and suggested something be done by us facilitate protection British Consul-General Haifa including staff, premises and diplomatic communications.[1] Lovett said British Consulate had been entered and attempts made open safes, also official pouch privileges been denied. Lovett pointed out unfortunate effects withdrawal British Consul-General would have this time view improved British attitude towards Israel, important early settlement Palestine question and reopening Haifa Refineries.

Further Lovett asked me my impressions visit Israel and my attitude Mediator's plan. I explained our position along lines your conversation McDonald and statement official [spokesman] Tel Aviv.[2] In reply to my question whether United States expects Arabs discuss peace with us directly or best United States endeavour get is another resolution, Lovett said that he and British doing utmost to persuade Arabs deal with us directly, but they do not expect more than Arab acquiescence when resolution adopted with support Britain and other states, who until now denied us recognition. Lovett suggested possibility discuss details Mediator's plan and was conciliatory in describing American desire to be friendly and helpful. He said international situation required our cooperation with democracies assure peace Middle East.

Understand view increased tension relations Russia, Marshall expected here soon and he and Lovett will direct from Washington activities American delegation Paris, including Palestine.

[.....][3]

Epstein

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1. ראה מס' 473.
2. ראה מס' 536.
3. הפיסקה האחרונה לא הודפסה כאן.

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מ. שרתוק אל א. אבן (פאריס)
M. Shertok to A. Eban (Paris)

מברק מוצפן U48/27
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/181/8

Tel Aviv, 27 September 1948

/In/ conversations you appear to emphasize corridor and soft-pedal Jerusalem itself. This liable mislead as regards our real attitude of claiming Jerusalem.

Shertok

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מ. קומיי אל משלחת ישראל למושב עצרת האו"ם בפאריס
M. Comay to the Israeli Mission to the United Nations General Assembly Session in Paris

מזכר: 93.02/2426/6

27 September 1948

NOTE ON DISCUSSIONS OF M.S. COMAY WITH BUNCHE, REEDMAN AND MOHN – HAIFA, 23RD AND 24TH SEPTEMBER 1948

I spent several hours with Bunche, Reedman and Mohn at the Zion Hotel in Haifa, on my way through to Paris, the discussions covering both the Bernadotte Report[1] (which was drafted by Bunche, assisted by Reedman) and, generally, the present position in Palestine. A full report was sent to Mr. Shertok before I left Haifa,[2] and I set out below a brief summary in the form of footnotes to the specific conclusions in Part I of the Report:

A. The Truce.

Bunche admitted frankly that the Security Council could not order the various armies to go home or to demobilise themselves, and that the United Nations could not, therefore, effectively and directly dismantle the present state of war. What could be done was to finalise political frontiers, guarantee them, and compel armed forces to adjust themselves to these frontiers,

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1. ראה הערת־עורך, עמ' 612.
2. ראה קומיי אל שרתוק, 23.9.1948, 130.02/2425/2.

even if it meant withdrawals from certain areas. In order to facilitate this, they had in mind that the boundaries should be based, as far as possible, on the de facto position, as officially crystallised in the present truce fronts.

The proposed Conciliation Commission would then try to damp down the tension and eliminate local conflicts by promoting wide neutral zones and similar measures. Compared with the present truce supervision, the task of such a Conciliation Commission would be enormously simplified, as they would no longer have to worry about restrictions on the entry of men or munitions. When I insisted that all these measures were merely palliatives as long as Arab armies were permitted to remain in Palestine and to face Israeli armies along hundreds of miles of straggling fronts, Bunche retorted that to a large extent the strain of military preparedness was the inevitable price for the establishment of a Jewish State as a small enclave in a hostile Arab world, and that even if we succeeded in driving the Arab armies out of the whole of Western Palestine, it would simply postpone still further the problem of our long-range relations with the Arabs. However, if their proposals were adopted and backed up by the United Nations, they were bound to have a powerful impact on the military situation for the following main reasons:

a) The Arab Governments were already in difficulties and, after they finally realised that the war was over, they would try to extricate themselves from their untenable position, and to wind up their unhappy military adventure as soon as possible, subject only to the requirements of face-saving.

b) The Arabs were bound to quarrel violently about the disposition of the Arab areas, which would crack their common stand against us wide open, and relieve the threat to Israel. This was already happening, as witness the dispute over the Palestine Arab Government.[3]

c) For the first time there would be joint Anglo-American pressure upon the Arab Governments in support of a joint Anglo-American settlement.

As regards the present truce, they all complained bitterly about the general unfairness and hostility to the truce observers, and the lack of cooperation with them.

Although Bunche's second letter[4] to Shertok after the Bernadotte murder diluted the effect of the first one,[5] he and Reedman were unrepentant in blaming the Israeli Government and press for creating a climate conducive of such acts of violence. This, together with a more specific charge of negligence against the Military Governor of Jerusalem for failing to take any security measures in the face of terrorist threats, are likely to be included in any official U.N. Report on the circumstances of the murder.

3. ראה מס' 537 והערה 2 שם.
4. מס' 524.
5. מס' 519.

Mohn, in particular, gave me at great length their grievances about the actual workings of the truce, especially our refusal to allow the observers on to the air-fields which, according to them, were being used with impunity for bringing in arms. He said that up till now the available observers had had to concentrate on stabilising and defining the fronts, and no less than 85 of them had been engaged in Jerusalem alone. Many of these could now be withdrawn for other duties and, in addition, they were getting another 300 [e]nlisted[6] men to act as assistant observers. They were now planning to tighten up the controls on points of entry and on internal lines of communication, both in Palestine and in the Arab countries. At the same time, he accepted that if the Bernadotte proposals were adopted, the whole system would be scrapped in the near future.

B. Frontiers.

The general object had been to revise the November 29th frontiers to conform with existing realities, except where there were special considerations to the contrary, e.g. with Jerusalem.

i) The main discussion I had with them was about the Negev. All the stock arguments were trotted out, such as the emotional fixation the Arabs have about the long wedge of Jewish territory thrust down between them; and the doubts about the validity of our development claims. In addition, there are the fresh arguments used to justify the exclusion of the Negev–Galilee, the necessity for defensible frontiers, and the internal expansion of *lebensraum* due to the Arab exodus. As regards the de facto situation, I got the impression that the Mediator and his staff had been much influenced by the fact that the Egyptians had succeeded in choking off the Negev on the Majdal-Faluja line, south of which there was a confused position, with no fixed fronts, and with the Jewish settlements maintained only by an airlift. Nevertheless, Bunche told me that in their discussions on the Island of Rhodes, the provisional line had been along the 31 parallel, and that this had finally been changed by Bernadotte on the plea that it would make his Report appear more balanced and less one-sided. (There was no hint of any strategic interest in the matter, but it is a reasonable assumption that London and Washington see the Negev as a strategic area with access to the Mediterranean at Gaza-Rafah and to the Indian Ocean at Akaba, and they would not welcome Jewish intrusion into the area.)

ii) Reedman said that he, for one, had stressed the strategic danger to Israel of the Lydda-Ramleh salient pressing against our main population centre, and argued that this would be a trouble spot. One of the major inducements to Bernadotte to have these towns handed back was the hope of parking 20,000 to 30,000 refugees there. Reedman also explained that the reference to following the 29th November line was somewhat ambiguous.

6. במקור כתוב בטעות: unlisted.

It was meant to be a purely local reference to the fact that Lydda Airport and Sarafand were to remain within Israel.

iii) Regarding Galilee, Reedman mentioned that the Mediator had become persuaded that an Israel-Lebanese common frontier would be desirable, and would be welcomed by the Christian Lebanon. He regarded the Lebanon and Transjordan as our two most likely bridges with the Arab world.

C. Haifa and Lydda Airport.

It was stressed that free port facilities in Haifa would be an economic boon to us, as it would enhance the position of Haifa as a leading Eastern-Mediterranean port, and also produce revenue. Examples like Salonika and Tangier were cited. The inclusion of refineries in the free port area was meant to provide Iraq with a face-saving formula for resuming the oil supply; while, at the same time, ensuring local Palestinian requirements.

D. Jerusalem.

According to Bunche, the idea was to revert to the November 29th Resolution and the draft Statute. He visualised the Partition of Jerusalem on a municipal level, with the Jews and Arabs responsible for the policing and security of their respective sections, and possibly a neutral zone between them. If an International Police Force appeared essential, he admitted that there was hardly any prospect of making up such a Force from national contingents, but it could be obtained by individual recruitment, and he claimed that Marshall had recently given him an assurance of support for such a scheme. I submitted that it was naive to regard the security of Jerusalem as having been established merely by a local police force as long as there were Arab armies in Palestine, but he brushed this aside by asserting that no Arab State would dare march on Jerusalem once it had in fact been taken over by a United Nations' regime.

E. Arab Refugees.

While they insisted that the right to return should be established in principle, they were all of the opinion that for the most part the Arabs did not want to go back and live under Jewish domination. Some distinction was drawn here between the middle class elements in the towns, who felt that they could not adapt themselves to live in an intensely chauvinistic Jewish State, and the illiterate villagers, numbers of whom did want to return because of their present wretched condition, but would drift off again when they saw some of the things that were alleged to be going on in Israel, such as destruction of villages and taking over of land.

According to Reedman, Bernadotte had at first thought in terms of a general return of the Arab refugees, but had retreated from this position when he came to realise the deep-rooted and permanent complications.

After that he had sought from Israel only a political and humanitarian gesture, but had been thinking in terms of resettlement elsewhere as the major solution to the problem.

I could not get any indication that actual proposals for resettlement had been drawn up; the only definite factor seemed to be the negative proposition that the Arab Governments were too inefficient and too corrupt to do the job themselves.

F. Admission to U.N.

Bunche repeated the arguments he had already made to Reuven Shiloah to the effect that we would invite certain defeat by pressing our application for admission at this stage. In his opinion it should be deferred, as this question would be bound up with the fate of the Bernadotte proposals, and with our own reaction to them.

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א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק
E. Epstein to M. Shertok

מברק מוצפן: NI-40/287, NI-42/100. נשלח: 28.9/27.9;
התקבל: 29.9/28.9
נוסח יוצא: 93.01/2180/19
נוסח נכנס: 130.09/2337/9

New York, 27/28 September 1948

Following summary my views situation as seen from this end: 1) Bernadotte's plan been prepared full cooperation Americans and British and brought to attention of France and possibly other countries in advance of publication in order /assure their support/ U.N. Assembly. 2) View tense international situation, U.S.A. will do utmost prevent renewal hostilities Palestine, and will press for adoption Bernadotte's plan /as/ new basis Palestine settlement. 3) Good reasons to assume existence bi-partisan policy on Palestine. Although for electioneering purposes Dewey been using indirect means support Palestine plank Republican Platform, he avoided making any statements /this respect himself/. Truman followed similar line by making promises to party bosses and Jewish friends but did not act or even speak as yet in our favour; however, in Truman case chances always exist that at certain suitable and perhaps unexpected moment Tuman may come out with important things our support, when he or close advisers will believe this may add to his popularity and help election campaign. Pressure on Truman therefore must remain our constant and primary object during coming weeks. 4) American public opinion as expressed through press and radio supports practically with no exception

Marshall's position on Bernadotte's plan and makes our situation less favourable than on previous occasions when we had to oppose U.S.A. policy on Palestine. 5) As explained by Lovett, maximum they expect from Arabs is acquiescence if Bernadotte's plan is adopted by General Assembly. Lack of U.N. machinery to impose decisions and American determination not to use their own troops means for all practical purposes repetition of November 29 situation with no guarantee for at least immediate peace. Any indication our part acceptance of Bernadotte's plan will shake the very foundations of November 29 resolution, cause loss of /important/ territory, nullify most of our military achievements and possibly create difficulties in our relations with Soviet bloc. Unless good chances exist for improving Bernadotte's plan, especially regarding Negev, Jerusalem, and assure support Soviet bloc new plan, the proposed substitute /in my view/ is most dangerous both politically and militarily. Marshall's statement, repeated by Lovett, that Bernadotte's plan can serve as a basis, repeat basis, for new settlement opens possibilities for improvement frontiers. Important we insist on direct negotiations Arabs. Although both Americans and British according Lovett are making efforts bring Arabs direct contact with us, am doubtful chances; but demonstration Arab intransigence helpful both negotiations and public relations. Please advise /your position/.

Epstein

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א. אבריאל אל מ. שרתוק
E. Avriel to M. Shertok

העתק: 93.03/64/15

פראג, 27 בספטמבר 1948

א. טסתי לבוקארשט ב־7 בספטמבר וחזרתי לפראהא ב־21 בו. ביום בואי לבוקארשט נפגשתי עם אגמי ועם ריקו [מנדלסון] שהגיעו ימים אחדים לפני.

ב. מיד עם בואי נודע לי, שלא אוכל לקיים את מטרת בואי העיקרית, כלומר, להיפגש עם הגב' אנה פאוקר, בגלל העדרה הממושך מהבירה. היא נסעה למקום נופש ברומניה בכדי להיות שם עם בתה החולה והחליטה להישאר שם לחופשה של שלושה שבועות.

ג. ימים אחדים לפני בואי מסרה הממשלה הרומנית את קביעת העולים לברית הקהילות היהודיות.[1] ברית הקהילות היהודיות ברומניה היא מוסד המבוסס על חוק

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1. ראה מס' 374.

המיעוטים הלאומיים והמייצג את העדה היהודית כולה; הנהלתה נקבעה על־ידי ממשלת רומניה ומורכבת היא ברוב המקרים מקומוניסטים בלבד; במקומות אחדים, כגון בוקארשט, יאסי וטימישווארה, נמצא מיעוט ציוני בהנהלת הקהילות. הממשלה נקטה בצעד זה לאחר הוויכוח הממושך שהתנהל בין "הוועד הדמוקרטי היהודי"[2] לבין ההסתדרות הציונית. בשלב האחרון של ויכוח זה הופיעו הצעות שונות שהבטיחו לקומוניסטים שליטה מוחלטת על ביצוע העלייה, ולעומת זאת ירדו מהפרק טענותיהם של הקומוניסטים מתקופה מוקדמת יותר, שיש לאסור בהחלט את עלייתם של ציונים ממפלגות "אזרחיות". בהבטחת רוב קומוניסטי בוועדה המבצעת את העלייה ראו הקומוניסטים היהודים מוצא פשוט יותר מוויכוח עם ההסתדרות הציונית על הפליה במפלגות הציוניות. כשרישום, מיון וקביעת העולים נמסרו לברית הקהילות היהודיות, לא דובר עוד על הפליה ועל איסור. סמכו על הקהילות היהודיות שתדענה למנוע את עלייתם של אלמנטים בלתי־רצויים.

ד. עוד בהיות אגמי ובהיותי אני בפראהא, הודיעו לנו מבוקארשט טלפונית על החלטת הממשלה הרומנית, וביקשו הוראות. באותם הימים התקיימו בבוקארשט שיחות מרובות בין נציגי מפלגות ציוניות לבין נציגי הוועד הדמוקרטי היהודי. אגמי ואנוכי חשבנו את השיחות הללו למזיקות לענייננו ונתנו הוראה לחברי ההסתדרות הציונית לא להיפגש ולא לשוחח עם אנשי הוועד הדמוקרטי היהודי. כוונתה העיקרית של הוראה זו היתה שלא ישתבש המצב עוד יותר לפני שיחותינו המוסמכות עם משרד־החוץ הרומני. מהוראתנו הסיקה ההסתדרות הציונית שאין לעשות דבר, ונתנה הוראות מפורשות לסניפיה בכתב, במברקים ועל־ידי רצים מיוחדים שלא להירשם לעלייה בהרשמה שנערכה על־ידי ברית הקהילות היהודיות. כפי שהסבירו לי מנהיגי התנועה הציונית אחר־כך, הם חשבו "שהציר יבוא, ייפגש עם הממשלה, ותיכף יסדר את כל העניינים."

ביום בואו של אגמי היו ההרשמות במלוא היקפן וביום בואי ננעלה ההרשמה בבוקארשט, ובשאר המקומות נמשכה רק עוד יום־יומיים. ההרשמה היתה מקרית ובלתי־שיטתית ביותר. פרסום ניתן לה בעצם רק על־ידי הודעותיה השליליות של ההסתדרות הציונית. היות ונמנעו מפרסום בעיתונות מטעמים מובנים, ובשל חוסר צינורות מתאימים מצד ברית הקהילות, לא הגיעה השמועה לקהל הרחב. היו אנשים שבילו לילות בתור כדי להירשם. מי שקדם זכה. נודע לנו ממקורות ציוניים שמלבד ההרשמה בקהילה היהודית, נרשמו חברי המפלגה הקומוניסטית במקום מיוחד. לא יכולנו לבדוק את אמיתות הידיעה, אולם נפגשתי עם יהודי חבר המפלגה הקומוניסטית, שלא מן הפעילים, שסיפר לי שמזכיר הסניף שלו — לא יהודי — הסביר לו שעליו לעלות עתה ארצה וללחום שם נגד האימפריאליזם, כי מקומו כקומוניסט ויהודי בטורי מלחמת השחרור של העם היהודי. רוב חברי ההסתדרות הציונית שמעו להוראת ההנהלה ולא נרשמו. עמדה שלילית זו ללא פעילות מצד ההסתדרות הציונית לשינוי שיטת ההרשמה איפשרה לוועד הדמוקרטי היהודי להאשים את הציונים ב"חבלות נגד העלייה, אי־ציות למוסדות ממשלתיים — ברית הקהילות היהודיות — עמדה עוינת למשטר" וכיוצא בזה.

2. ארגון המפלגה הקומוניסטית הרומנית בקרב האוכלוסיה היהודית. נוסד ב־1945.

ה. בהסתדרות הציונית ברומניה רשומים, לפי עדויות שונות, כ־100 אלף מבין ה־380 אלף יהודים החיים במדינה. עם התלויים בהם מגיע מספר חברי ההסתדרות הציונית ל־250 אלף איש בערך. כל המפלגות הציוניות מקיימות פעילות ארגונית ותרבותית: שעורים לעברית, הרצאות, מסיבות וכדומה. קיימת כנראה פריפריה גדולה מסביב לגרעין ציוני ותיק. ההסתדרות הציונית איננה מהווה גורם פוליטי או ציבורי מכריע ברחוב היהודי או בציבוריות בכלל, כי אין היא למעשה אלא לשכת־הרשמה לעלייה ואיננה מייצגת את העניינים הלאומיים של היהודים ברומניה. לשבעת המיעוטים הלאומיים ברומניה אוטונומיה וחופש מרחיקי־לכת: בתי־ספר, עיתונות וכיוצא בזה. לעומת זאת מלאימה הממשלה כעת את בתי־הספר ואת בתי־החולים היהודים. ייתכן שיצליחו לשמור על קיום בית־ספר "תרבות" אחד בבוקארשט עם שפת־הוראה עברית, אולם הפעולות העוינות לקיום היהודים כמיעוט, הנתמכות כמובן על־ידי הקומוניסטים היהודים, אינן נתקלות בתגובה פעילה כלשהי מצד ההסתדרות הציונית.

ו. [.....][3]

נראה לי שהנימוק הראשי [ש]הניע את ממשלת רומניה ל"הבטחות אנה פאוקר" היתה הכרתה בצורך לפתוח וָנטיל לאי־שביעות רצונם של היהודים מהמשטר הנוכחי. הם הבינו שעלייתם של כמה אלפי יהודים תעודד את הנותרים לגישה יותר חיובית למשטר (מתוך אותו השיקול הודיע לפני כ־3 חודשים ראש־ממשלת צ׳כוסלובקיה, שכל נתין צ׳כוסלובקיה — בין אם הוא יהודי או לאו — הרוצה לעזוב את המדינה, יוכל לעשות זאת ויקבל דרכון. למעשה ניתנו פחות מתריסר דרכונים מאז הודעה זו, אבל גניבת הגבול הצטמצמה, כי אנשים אומרים לעצמם שמקום שאפשר לצאת ממנו אפשר גם לחיות בו). כמו־כן מעריכה ממשלת רומניה ששומה עליה להשתתף כלשהו בהגשת עזרה למדינת ישראל על־ידי מדינות הדמוקרטיה העממית.

ז. מלבד הממשלה הרומנית מטפל גם הוועד היהודי הדמוקרטי בעלייה. כוונותיו הן פחות מרחיקות־לכת. הוא מסתפק בנטילת זכות העלייה מההסתדרות הציונית ומקווה שבדרך זו יאבדו היהודים את אמונם בהסתדרות הציונית, שתאבד את ערכה בזה שלא תוכל עוד להעלותם לישראל. הוועד היהודי הדמוקרטי רוצה אף להוכיח שחברות בהסתדרות הציונית היא גורם מפריע לעלייה. לשם תחבולה זו מספיק לוועד, שארגון בלתי־ציוני יארגן לפחות משלוח אחד של עולים. יודעי־דבר בבוקארשט טוענים, שמשלוח אחד מורכב על־ידי איזה מוסד בלתי־ציוני שהוא יהפוך את התנועה הציונית לכלי ריק, ואלפי חברים יעזבוה.

ח. בבואי לבוקארשט, לנוכח הבעיות המפורטות להלן, היצגנו בפני סגן שר־החוץ, שאתו נפגשנו יום לאחר בואי, שלוש תביעות כדלקמן:

1. בא־כוח ממשלת ישראל, בהתייעצות ושיתוף־פעולה עם הגופים היהודים הנוגעים בדבר (הכוונה לוועד היהודי הדמוקרטי ולהסתדרות הציונית), קובע את רשימת העולים.
2. זכות־קדימה תינתן לאנשים בגיל העבודה והצבא, לחברי "החלוץ" הנמצאים בהכשרה ולחברים הנמצאים בארגונים פוליטיים לפחות שנה אחת.

3. חלקה הראשון של פסקה ו׳ לא הודפס כאן.

3. בא־כוח ממשלת ישראל ישתף פעולה הדוקה עם משרד־החוץ הרומני, ובאמצעותו גם עם משרד־הפנים, באישור הסופי של המועמדים לעלייה. למשרד־הפנים הרומני הזכות המובנת מאליה לפסול מתוך הרשימות אנשים ששלטונות רומניה מתנגדים ליציאתם מסיבות חוקיות.

הבענו את חששותינו, שהעובדה שהעלייה מאורגנת על־ידי ברית הקהילות היהודיות, כלומר, על־ידי השלטונות עצמם, והרעש הרב הנגרם על־ידי התוהו־ובוהו בהרשמת המועמדים, ינוצלו באופן תעמולתי רב באנגליה ובאמריקה.

בפגישה השנייה, שנתקיימה כשבוע ימים אחרי זו, הצגנו את כל הבעיה שוב בפני הגב׳ אנה תומא, המזכירה הכללית של משרד־החוץ, שהשתתפה בשיחות נמיר עם הגב׳ אנה פאוקר. בשלב זה היינו מוכנים לוותר על הרשמה בפני בא־כוח ממשלת ישראל והשתדלנו להגיע להסכם שיבטיח את עלייתם של חברי ההסתדרות הציונית. נוכחנו לדעת שבשביל ממשלת רומניה עלייתם של הרשומים בקהילה היא שאלת פרסטיג׳ה ממדרגה ראשונה. כעבור יומיים נתקבלה התשובה הידועה לך כבר, האומרת: היות והמועמדים לעלייה נשארים נתיני רומניה עד לעלייתם, שומרת ממשלת רומניה לעצמה את הזכות לקבוע מי ראוי ומי פסול לעזרה שניתן למדינת ישראל. בא־כוח ממשלת ישראל יוכל להביא בפני משרד־החוץ הרומני את טענותיו נגד עולים מסוימים, ואלה האחרונות תועמדנה לבירור.

ט. בהתאם לבקשת אגמי הברקתי לך את תשובת ממשלת רומניה וביקשתי הוראות. וזו לשון המברק:

הבוקר נתקבלה תשובת הממשלה הרומנית.

1. הממשלה קבעה שהמועמדים שלה נתיני רומניה. על־כן היא שומרת לה זכות־יחיד לקבוע את האנשים שיעלו [---][4]

2. לנציג ישראל רשות לערער על מועמדים. הוא יצטרך להודיע את נימוקיו, שיובאו לבירור.

3. הבעתי את צערי להיעדר הבנה מספקת לענייננו, ואמרתי שאודיע תשובה זו לממשלתי.

4. דעתי שאין להסכים לגישה זו. מבקש הוראות ברורות.

י. דעתו האישית של אגמי היא, שיש לסרב להצעות הממשלה אפילו אם בכך נסכן את המשכת העלייה. אגמי מקווה לחדש את הדיון ככל האפשר לפני סירוב סופי על־ידי פגישה עם הגב׳ פאוקר לכשתשוב. דעתי אני היא, שיש לקיים את הפגישה עם הגב׳ פאוקר אם נוכל להמתין מבלי לתת תשובה עד לשובה (דבר מפוקפק בעיני); אבל אסור לנו לדחות את רשימת הקהילה היהודית. לכשנקבלנה, נבחן אותה ונשתדל להוסיף שינויים בהתאם לאינטרסים של ההסתדרות הציונית. לדעתי סירוב פירושו חסימת העלייה לזמן ממושך, וקבלת הרשימה של 3600 העולים הראשונים היא יסוד למשא־ומתן מחודש בתנאים יותר מתקבלים על דעתנו.

יא. בהיותי בבוקארשט התעוררה שאלת היחסים בין באי־כוח הממשלה ונציגי ההסתדרות הציונית. אמנם היינו במצב מיוחד, כי השלטונות ביקשו אותנו שלא לבוא בדברים עם ארגונים מקומיים, ומיעטנו בגלל זה בקשרים גלויים עם אנשי ההסתדרות

4. שלוש מלים לא הודפסו כאן.

הציונית. אבל החלטת הוועד־הפועל הציוני על הפרדת התפקידים זרעה אי־בהירות[5] ואגמי ואנוכי מבקשים לדעת במפורש: מהו לפי החלטה זו תפקיד ההסתדרות הציונית, ומה תפקידם של באי־כוח משרד־החוץ במשא־ומתן הבינלאומי על עלייה?

יב. מזכירות משרד־החוץ הרומני קיבלה את הודעתך על מינוי ראובן[6] לציר ישראל ברומניה והבטיחה תשובה מהירה. אגמי כבר עכשיו הועלה לדרגת דיפלומט מוכר. בואה של הצירות כולה ישנה ללא ספק את מעמדנו בכללו ויאפשר את המשכת משא־ומתן יסודי וממושך [---].[7]

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שיחת ו. איתן, א. הרליץ — ג'יימס מקדונלד, צ'. נוקס
(בתל אביב, ב־28 בספטמבר 1948)

Meeting: W. Eytan, E. Herlitz — James McDonald, C. Knox
(Tel Aviv, 28 September 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 130.02/2415/1

סודי

1. הפגישה התקיימה לפי בקשת מר מקדונלד, אשר ביקש בראשונה לראות את שר־החוץ.

2. מר מקדונלד קרא לפנינו מזכר ממחלקת־המדינה אשר הכיל את ההצהרה האחרונה של מר מארשאל בעניין תכנית המתווך.[1] הוא ביקש לדעת את עמדת ממשלת ישראל להצעות המתווך, והוסיף כי פנייה דומה הופנתה אל ממשלות ערב.

3. מר מדונלד הזכיר כי לפני כשבועיים שוחח עם ראש־הממשלה ועם שר־החוץ על בעיית החלפת שטחים בלתי־פוריים בנגב תמורת שטחים פוריים בגליל, ועל בעיית ירושלים.[2] הוא מבין כי הצעת המתווך שונה מההצעות של ממשלתו באותו זמן.[3]

נאמר למר מקדונלד כי גישת ממשלת ישראל להצעות המתווך סוכמה בדברי דובר משרד־החוץ לאחר פרסומן של ההצעות. העתק דברי הדובר הובטח למר מקדונלד.[4]

5. הוועד־הפועל הציוני, במושבו בימים 22 באוגוסט — 3 בספטמבר 1948, קיבל שורת החלטות בענייני עלייה, שנסבו, בין היתר, על חלוקת התפקידים בין ההסתדרות הציונית וממשלת ישראל. נקבע שארגון העלייה יהיה בידי ההסתדרות הציונית; שמחלקת־העלייה תציע לממשלה מכסות עולים, שאישורן הסופי יהיה בידי הממשלה. חלוקת מכסות העולים לארצות תיעשה תוך התייעצות עם הממשלה. מחלקת־העלייה תקבע את סוגי העולים במסגרת המכסות שיאושרו, פרט לעולים בעלי־הון, עולים תלויים בקרוביהם תושבי הארץ, תלמידים למוסדות חינוך בארץ, מומחים וכו', שיקבלו את רשיונותיהם מאת ממשלת ישראל. (ראה נוסח ההחלטות בתיק 93.03/125/18).

6. ראובן רובין, ציר ישראל ברומניה מאמצע דצמבר 1948.

7. החלק האחרון של המשפט לא הודפס כאן.

550

1. ראה מס' 530, הערה 1.

2. ראה מס' 493.

3. ראה מס' 502, סעיף 4.

4. ראה מס' 536.

4. יחסנו לשאלת הנגב הוסבר למר מקדונלד בעזרת מפת הארץ ועל סמך ההוראות שניתנו על־ידי הממשלה למשלחתנו לאו"ם.[5] נמסר לו כי גישה זו לבעיית הנגב הוסברה על־ידי שר־החוץ למועצת־המדינה בישיבתה הסגורה.[6] גם מקדונלד וגם נוקס הראו עניין רב בחישוב הדונמים אשר הוצאו על־ידי הצעת המתווך משטח מדינת ישראל, והודגש כי קביעת הגבולות בהחלטת 29 בנובמבר 1947 באה כתוצאה של עמדת משלחת ארצות־הברית דווקא, שרצתה "חלוקה צודקת" של שטח בין שתי המדינות. הם רשמו לפניהם את המספרים לפרטיהם.

לאחר מכן שאלו בדבר הישובים בנגב — הוסבר להם כי כל 25 הישובים כלולים בשטח שהוצע עתה להוציאו משטח המדינה. מכאן שאל מקדונלד איזה חלק של הנגב נראה לנו כמתאים ליישוב ולעיבוד, הוסיף ושאל: "איזה חלק של הנגב נראה לכם חיוני ביותר?" הוא חזר ושאל על איזה חלק מן הנגב מוכנה ממשלת ישראל לוותר, התשובה שניתנה היא לפי הוראות הממשלה למשלחת.

נאמר לו, כי אף לערבים רצוי יותר כי הנגב יהיה בידינו, שכן יישובו יעסיקנו לשנים רבות, דבר העלול לשמש ערובה גם לערבים כי לא נתפשט לשטחים אחרים בארצות השכנות.

כן נאמר לו כי הנגב מהווה איזור ריק מתושבים ואילו הגליל המערבי מיושב, ויש לחשב כי הערבים אשר יצאו חלק זה לתוך הכיס הנמצא עדיין בידי קאוקג'י יחזרו לבתיהם. גם כאן רשמו לפניהם את המספרים.

כן התעניין בעניין מפרץ אילת ובעניין דרום ים המלח והקשר אליהם.

5. אשר לירושלים נאמר לו, גם זה לפי הדברים שנאמרו במועצת־המדינה, כי אין אנו מאמינים בשלטון בינלאומי לעיר. תחת לבחור בשלטון בינלאומי מעדיפה ממשלת ישראל לוותר על חלק קטן של העיר החדשה אשר יימסר לשלטון ערבי, ואילו החלק הגדול של העיר החדשה יישאר ישראלי. אנו מסכימים כי העיר העתיקה בלבד תישאר בידי שלטון בינלאומי.

כן תעמוד ממשלת ישראל על פרוזדור בין ירושלים לבין מדינת ישראל, אשר יחפוף לערך את השטח המוחזק עתה על־ידינו (כביש בורמה). הודגש כי גם הדין־וחשבון של ועדת פיל[7] קבע את הצורך בקשר בין ירושלים לבין איזור החוף. כאן שאל: "כיצד תבצעו זאת, כיצד תגיעו להר הצופים למשל?" הוצע כי אפשר למצוא גישה שנייה לאיזור זה, ללא מגע עם הצטלבות כביש רמאללה — שכם. כן התנהלה שיחה על חלוקת האיזורים היהודיים, המוסלמיים והנוצריים בעיר העתיקה והגישה אליהם.

6. מר איתן השתמש בהזדמנות להסב את תשומת־לבו של מר מקדונלד לדברים על גורל הקונסול הבריטי בחיפה שנאמרו על־ידי מר לווט למר אילת.[8] עמדתנו כלפי הקונסול הזה בחיפה הוסברה לו בפרוטרוט, סופר לו על סירובו לפנות לשלטונות ישראל הרשמיים וכיוצא.

5. מס' 502.
6. ראה מועצת המדינה הזמנית, ישיבה כ', 27.9.1948. הפרוטוקול של הישיבה פורסם לאחר זמן.
7. ראה מס' 272 והערה 9 שם.
8. ראה מס' 545.

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ש. פרידמן אל ג. מאירסון (מוסקבה)
S. Friedman to G. Meyerson (Moscow)

העתק: 130.11/2492/16

תל אביב, [כ״ד] באלול תש״ח
28 בספטמבר 1948

גולדה יקרה,

זה מכתבי השלישי אליך. בינתיים קיבלנו מכם ידיעה, שהחומר ששלחנו לכם הגיע. נבקש לאשר את כל המשלוחים עם סימון התאריך מתי בא לידכם.

אתמול התקיימה שיחה של מ[שה] ש[רתוק] עם הציר הסובייטי כאן, לפני היציאה של השר לפאריס. הוא הסביר לו את עמדתנו לגבי הצעות המתווך. מסר לו שבקשר עם פרסום הצעות אלה התקיים מגע ראשון לאחר הפסקה ארוכה עם הבריטים (הקטור מקניל),[1] וכן מסר על שיחותיו של איבן עם האמריקאים.[2] הנימוקים ועמדתנו ידועים לך ולא אחזור עליהם. אתן רק את השאלות שהוצגו על־ידי הציר הסובייטי והתשובות שקיבל: כשנמסרו לו דברי האנגלים בדבר אמצעים חמורים שיש לאחוז בהם אם הצדדים לא יסכימו להצעות, שאל אם האנגלי דיבר במפורש על סנקציות. התשובה היתה שלילית. בקשר לעמדתנו לגבי הנגב, שאל אם זו היא עמדת כל חברי הממשלה או דעתו של רוב. קיבל תשובה, שהיו אחדים שהביעו פקפוקים אם יהיה בכוחנו להגן בעצמנו על הנגב כולו ועל חלקיו המרוחקים בה בשעה שהסיכויים שלנו באותו חלק הם רחוקים ופרובלמטיים, אולם הודגש לו שהיו אלה רק פקפוקים של מעטים ודעתו של הרוב היתה התנגדות ברורה להצעה. מ[שה] ש[רתוק] סיפר על הנימוקים שהביא איבן לגבי התנגדותנו בעניין הנגב ותשובת האמריקנים, שעליהם משפיע רק הנימוק של מציאות 26 נקודות שלנו בנגב. ההסברה ניתנה לציר לפי מפת הארץ, והעובדה של התיישבותנו בנגב השפיעה גם עליו. הוסבר לו במפורט מה הם היתרונות העצומים שישנם לגליל בשבילנו, והודגשה העובדה שחבל זה נמצא בידינו ולכן אין אנו מעוררים שום שאלות אודותיו ואין אנו מסכימים לקשור את השאלה עליו עם השאלה על הנגב. הודגש כמו־כן שבעניין יפו השתנתה דעתנו באופן מוחלט אחרי 29 בנובמבר בגלל הנסיון המר על תפקידה של יפו בחודשים הראשונים למלחמה. בנוגע לירושלים נאמר לציר, שאנו נגד מסירת העיר העתיקה לערבים, בעד מסירת מרבית העיר החדשה ליהודים, ומוכנים לתיקונים בשטח העיר החדשה עם נגיע למשא־ומתן של שלום. אשר לשאלות חיפה ולוד, עמדתנו היא — איזור בינלאומי בתנאים של הדדיות ויחסי שכנות טובה. הרצאת מ[שה] ש[רתוק] היתה תמציתית וכללה את כל נקודות ההצעה. אחרי דבריו הוצגו שאלות בעניינים שלא דובר עליהם. ואלה הם: יחסנו לממשלה הערבית הפלשתינאית (עזה),[3] ומידת השפעתם של החיכוכים בין הערבים על המצב הצבאי. השאלה הראשונה היא העדינה

551

1. ראה מס׳ 533.
2. ראה מס׳ 532.
3. ראה מס׳ 537 והערה 2 שם.

ביותר ואליה חזר הציר לא פעם בשיחות הקודמות. התשובה היתה שאין אנו יכולים עכשיו לאמור דבר מוחלט. השטח הערבי של ארץ־ישראל הפך בעצם למושג גיאוגרפי גרידא. אין בו שום כוחות ציבוריים הבאים עכשיו בחשבון כמועמדים לשלטון. הממשלה בעזה היא שונאנו בנפש ואין אנו יכולים בשום פנים להסכים לה; מאידך, הצהרה על התנגדותנו הברורה לממשלה זאת עלולה להתפרש כתמיכה בסיפוח החלק הערבי לעבר־הירדן, אולם גם את זאת אין אנו יכולים לאמור. עמדתנו העקרונית היא בעד מדינה נפרדת בארץ־ישראל, [אך] הנסיבות מסובכות מאוד. עמדתנו טעונה עוד הבהרה וזה ייעשה תוך מהלך העצרת. תהיה גם התייעצות עם הנציגים הסובייטים. כפי שאת רואה, לא ניתנה תשובה בעניין זה אלא ניתן חומר רציני למחשבה לבר־השיח. על השאלה השנייה ניתנה תשובה, שמידת ההתפלגות בין הכוחות הערביים אינה ידועה לנו די צורכה, שאנו בכלל נתוקים בזמן האחרון ממקורות אינפורמציה שהיו [לנו] על ארצות ערב, ושהמצב יתברר יותר למ[שה] ש[רתוק] כשיהיה בפאריס. מ[שה] ש[רתוק] עמד על הניגודים הקיימים בין מצרים ואנגליה, על ההפסד העלול לצמוח למצרים מהקמת בסיסים בנגב, ועל מאמצים הנעשים על־ידי הבריטים להתפשר בעניין זה עם המצרים. אציין כאן שבשיחה הודגשה התנגדותנו הנמרצת להקמת איזה שהם בסיסים בנגב. שאלה נוספת של הציר היתה אם ידוע לנו משהו על נפט בנגב. ודאי קיבלת בינתיים את הידיעה על שיחותיו של איבן עם נציגי הסובייטים בפאריס.[4]

אשר ליחסינו עם הרוסים כאן, לא המשיך הציר לפי שעה בביקור חברי הממשלה. הוא ביקר בזמן הזה רק אצל רוקח,[5] וזה שלא באמצעותנו. אני קיימתי מסיבת־ערב עם העובדים העיקריים של הצירות, בלי הציר. האווירה היתה טובה וידידותית. הם גילו התעניינות בשטחים שונים של חיינו, כגון שאלת הקואופרציה הפועלית, מבנה החינוך וכן גם השאלה על החלטות המתווך, אשר בה ניתנו אותן ההסברות שדובר עליהן לעיל. מעניין שלגבי הקואופרציה יש להם גישה ביקורתית (מוחין);[6] מביעים ספק אם צורה זו עלולה להשפיע על המבנה הכלכלי בערים, ואם הקובע הוא פה לא המומנט של עבודה אלא סכומים גדולים של כסף העומדים לרשותם של המצטרפים לקואופרציה. ייתכן שזהו הד של שיחות עם אנשים שונים שנוהלו כאן בלעדינו. באותה שיחה הורגש שאין הם מייחסים ערך רב לצורת פעולתנו בכפר. העיקר לפי דבריהם מהי צורת העיר ואיך מתפתחים בה התעשייה ומעמד העובדים.

קרה אינצידנט מוזר, שאין לנו הסברה מספיקה למענו. בליל אותו היום בו נרצח ברנאדוט נעשתה על־ידי אלמונים חבלה במכונית ובמוטור של הצירות הרוסית. נשבר מקל הדגלון והדגלון עצמו נעלם. הובהלתי אליהם בלילה. אחר־כך קרה מקרה דומה עם המכונית של הצירות האמריקאית.

שמחנו לידיעה שאתם תתחילו בפעולה לחיפושי קרובים, ואנו שולחים לכם את הרשימות הראשונות. נמשיך בזה. מה ההד שפעולה זו מעוררת בין יהודי רוסיה, והרבים הם הפונים אליכם שם?

שלום וברכה,

ש.פ.

4. ראה מס' 537.

5. ישראל רוקח, ראש עיריית תל־אביב.

6. מיכאיל מוחין, יועץ בצירות הסובייטית.

552

א. אפשטיין אל מ. שרתוק וא. אבן (פאריס)
E. Epstein to M. Shertok and A. Eban (Paris)

מברק מוצפן NP 5
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/181/8

Washington, 28 September 1948 (19.38)

From long conversation Indian Ambassador[1] learn his Government desire early establishment normal relations Israel, but view situation India does not consider this moment proper for delegation or delegate come now to India. They afraid Moslem propaganda would use this to detriment India. He suggested further increase Islamic militancy against India and Israel. He expects Pakistan be more extreme Arabs themselves. Suggested you discuss matters Mr[s] Pandit[2] and his brother Shiva Rao. Nehru will also visit Paris later.

Epstein

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א. אבן אל א. לוריא (ניו יורק)
A. Eban to A. Lourie (New York)

מברק UN 107
נוסח נכנס: 93.03/130/5

Paris, 29 September 1948

For Silver, Epstein. Situation today as follows: Unmistakable signs of greater reserve by delegations, reluctance follow Americans into precipitate commitments. French took attitude utmost reserve; Canadians withdrew from previous decision announce unreserved acceptance; Australia, New Zealand, South Americans, remained silent. Americans worried this tendency, somewhat annoyed with us for our part therein. Bunche letter on assassination circulated today.[1] Our view we should react, if at all, only in Council. If matter raised, which not certain, on no account produce atmosphere of guilt. Now psychologically easier express severe criticism Mediator's territorial proposals.

Eban

552

1. בנגאל רמה ראו. ראה שיחה קודמת, מס' 446.
2. ויג'איה ל. פאנדיט, ראש המשלחת של הודו לעצרת האו"ם בפאריס.

553

1. ראה באנץ' אל המזכיר הכללי של האו"ם, 27.9.1948, מסמך או"ם S/1018. באנץ' כתב בין היתר, שהאחריות להגנת המתווך ואנשיו היתה מוטלת במלואה על ממשלת ישראל. הוא גם האשים את הממשלה שלא עשתה דבר לבלימת האירגונים המחתרתיים לפני הרצח ושלא נקטה אמצעים למניעת יצירתה של דעת־קהל עוינת כלפי שליחותו של המתווך ואישיותו, ואף תרמה להחרפתה.

554

י. הרצוג אל מ. שרתוק (פאריס)
J. Herzog to M. Shertok (Paris)

מברק

נוסח נכנס (תל אביב): 130.02/2396/15

רומא, 29 בספטמבר 1948

שוחחנו[1] עם נציגי משרד־החוץ סיג׳יסמונדי,[2] טארדיני[3] ומונסיניור אמריקאי. סיג׳יסמונדי יקיים אתנו קשר קבוע, בתנאי שהדבר יישמר בסוד. הודה כי מכתבי ורגני[4] אחרונים סותרים הדינים־וחשבונות העוינים של טסטה[5] ולפיהם אין מקום לטענות נגד ישראל. סיפר כי אסרו מאמרי הסתה נגדנו בעיתונות ואתיקן. בציינו עקרונות יסוד [ה]סדר בענייני העדות הקתוליות, הדגיש שלרגלי סיבוכים פנימיים יהיה צורך בדיון על פרטים בארץ, ביחוד שהוואתיקן מעוניין בהסדרת ענייני כל העדות הנוצריות. קיבל הצעתנו שטסטה ימונה בא־כוח בישראל לדיונים שוטפים. ייתכן כי ימונה ורגני. לדעתו יש לכבד זכויות צרפת. גילה שקיים דיון על הכרה בישראל, אך לא תבוא החלטה בטרם יתברר המצב. לדעתנו קיימת נכונות להידוק קשר מסוים. ביקורנו הבא בקונגרגציה המזרחית.[6] שגריר טרומן[7] מוסיף לעזור. דינים־וחשבונות מפורטים מתעכבים בגלל הפרעות בדואר.

הרצוג

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שיחת א. אבן — פ. פדרספיל[1] (בפאריס, ב־29 בספטמבר 1948)
Meeting: A. Eban — P. Federspiel (Paris, 29 September, 1948)

דין־וחשבון: 93.03/126/4

Mr. Federspiel informed me that he would be one of Denmark's representatives on the Political Committee on the Palestine question, and that he

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1. ראה מס׳ 512.
2. פייטרו סיג׳יסמונדי, ממזכירות המדינה של הוואתיקן.
3. דומניקו טארדיני, מזכיר־המדינה בפועל של הוואתיקן; ראה גם מס׳ 408.
4. אנטוניו ורגאני, נציג הפטריארך הלטיני של ירושלים בגליל. בקיץ 1948 ערך מספר סיורים במקומות הקדושים לקתולים בצפון הארץ ושיגר דינים־וחשבונות לרומא. (ראה התכתבות ודוחו״ת בתיק 130.02/2397/7).
5. גוסטאבו טסטה, השליח האפוסטולי של הוואתיקן בארץ־ישראל.
6. ה־Congregazione Orientale בוואתיקן מטפלת בענייני הקהילות הקתוליות במזרח.
7. מיירון טיילור, נציגו האישי של נשיא ארצות־הברית בוואתיקן.

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1. פר פדרספיל, חבר משלחת דנמרק לעצרת האו״ם, לשעבר חבר ועדת האו״ם לארץ־ישראל.

is consulted by the Scandinavian delegations as a whole as an expert on this problem.

[.....][2]

In discussing Count Bernadotte's proposals, I emphasised to Mr. Federspiel the complete unacceptability of the Negev proposal. When I told him that the Negev meant a tremendous subtraction from the Jewish State, while signifying no addition to the potentialities of the Arab State, he replied: "Yes, but it signifies bases for the British".

On the Jerusalem question Mr. Federspiel argued at length and with conviction about the impracticability of an international regime for Jerusalem. I supported him fully in this, only to find him reaching the conclusion that we ought to revert to Count Bernadotte's original proposal for the inclusion of Jerusalem in the Arab State. In the subsequent discussion it emerged that he was completely unaware of the transformation in the Jerusalem situation, and of accomplished facts in Jerusalem, such as the incorporation of the greater part of the City within the political and military system of Israel.

Mr. Federspiel thought that the small countries would be resistant to any attempt at steam-rolling the Bernadotte plan through as it stood, and would require much more mature consideration. He sounded my views on the possibility of a small group of powers negotiating with the parties with respect to changes in the plan. When I said that a difficulty would arise in the composition of such a sub-committee, he threw out the suggestion that the West European and Scandinavian countries might be acceptable to both parties as impartial. I replied that states which were in full diplomatic relations with the Arabs, but refused formally to recognise the national existence of Israel, could hardly be regarded as fully impartial. This led to a discussion of the problem of recognition, and he said that he could tell me with perfect certainty that Scandinavian recognition would be *en bloc* and would either immediately follow or immediately precede British recognition. At the same time, he had urged upon these Governments the necessity of maintaining commercial and other relations with Israel, and of preparing the way for recognition, which was obviously inevitable.

In conclusion, although Mr. Federspiel has adapted his views to some extent to the logic of the new situation, he remains entirely responsive to British official views. It is clear that we must seek among the Scandinavian Delegations contacts of more independent schools of thought.

ASE

2. פיסקה אחת לא הודפסה כאן. מסופר בה על דברים שאמר פדרספיל בעניין גישתו ופעילותו בזמן שכיהן כחבר ועדת האו"ם לארץ־ישראל לפני ה־15 במאי 1948.

הערת־עורך
Editorial Note

ב־29 בספטמבר דנה הוועדה הראשונה של עצרת האו"ם בקביעת סדר הקדימויות של הסעיפים השונים בסדר־היום של הוועדה. נציג בריטניה (מקניל) דרש, שעניין ארץ־ישראל ייקבע כסעיף ראשון בסדר־היום. ארצות־הברית תמכה בעמדה הבריטית. נציגי הגוש המזרחי הציעו לקבוע את סעיף ארץ־ישראל אחרי הסעיפים העוסקים בפירוק החימוש. הערבים דרשו לדחות את הדיון, כדי שתינתן להם שהות לעיין בדין־וחשבון של המתווך ולהתייעץ ביניהם. ההצעה הבריטית נדחתה ברוב של 22 נגד 16 והתקבלה הצעת היושב־ראש (ספאק), שסעיף ארץ־ישראל יעמוד במקום השלישי לפני הסעיפים הדנים ביוון, קוריאה ובמושבות האיטלקיות. (ראה *GAOR, Third Year*, First Committee, 143rd Meeting, 29.9.1948, pp. 1-12; אבן אל אפשטיין, 30.9.1948, 93/08/377/8).

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מזכר מאת א. אבן
Note by A. Eban

מזכר: 130.02/2425/2

Paris, 30 September 1948

Note on the Postponement of the Discussion of the Palestine Problem

1) *The British Attitude:* It emerged yesterday with unmistakable clarity that the object of the U.K. Delegation is to secure the almost immediate endorsement of the entire Bernadotte plan by the General Assembly. The death of the Mediator, the appeal of urgency, and reliance on the Mediator's prestige were to be used as a means of cutting short mature consideration. One motive for this policy is clearly the fear lest the U.S.A. attitude should be influenced in our favour through activities in New York and Washington in a congenial political atmosphere. Another motive is the increase of reserve among many Delegations with respect to Count Bernadotte's territorial proposals. It is known to us from many sources that the British Delegation regards the Mediator's proposals as the best settlement which the Arabs could obtain; therefore the passage of time is to be avoided and a snap decision achieved.

2) *The United States Attitude:* The U.S. Delegation is animated by the same motives as those which gave urgency to Mr. McNeil's efforts yesterday. For them the spectre of possible developments in the U.S.A. is even more pressing and real. It is clear that there was great deliberation in the speed of Mr. Marshall's commitment,[1] as also in its whole-hearted terms.

3) *Arab Attitude:* Despite these considerations, which would appear to

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1. ראה מס' 530 והערה 1 שם.

weigh in their favour, the Arab Delegations were also eager for postponement. But their objective was not mere postponement for one or two weeks. They are attempting, rather hopelessly, to prevent the General Assembly from coming to grips with the problem at all; fully realising that a resolution based on the central principle of the recognition of Israel is virtually inevitable, they wish to put off the evil day rather as a man postpones a visit to the dentist, on the grounds that his torture should come rather later than sooner. There is also the calculation, among some Arab Delegations, that the movement to undermine King Abdullah's position might gather momentum in the coming weeks.

4) *The U.S.S.R. Attitude:* The Soviet bloc abstained from voting, desiring neither to be associated with Mr. McNeil's steam-roller effort, nor with the tactical objectives of the Arabs. Their attitude appeared to be that the Palestine question should be discussed early, but not first. M. Manuilsky found occasion to attack the British and Arab positions with equal irony.

5) *The Latin-American Attitude:* Some Latin-American Delegations (Argentina etc.) voted for postponement, as did China, accepting the plausible Arab contention that there had been insufficient time to study the report. Another group — for which El Salvador was spokesman (supported in the voting by Panama, Uruguay, and others of our friends) — voted for postponement, while later voting in favour of fairly early consideration of the report.

6) *The President's Attitude:* M. Spaak is clearly of opinion that the Palestine question should come up in about 15 days. In this he may have been influenced by M. Loridan, who had informed our representative earlier that day that he was astonished and taken aback by the drastic nature of the Mediator's Negev proposal.

Conclusions: The delay, provided it is limited to the period M. Spaak has in mind, contains the following advantages for us:

a) It gives our American colleagues and friends time to develop the situation in New York and Washington to our advantage.

b) Almost every Delegation with which we have had contact has admitted the strength of our Negev case, either in whole or in part. As our contacts increase, it should be possible to induce a general feeling of reserve on the main territorial proposals, and to create an atmosphere with which the U.S. Delegation will have to reckon in formulating its final proposals.

c) By the time the subject comes up for discussion, the psychological effect arising from Count Bernadotte's assassination is unlikely to be a dominant factor in forming opinion in the United Nations.

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ר. שילוח אל מ. שרתוק (פאריס)
R. Shiloah to M. Shertok (Paris)

מברק מוצפן U 52/73
נוסח יוצא: 130.09/2344/1
נוסח נכנס: 93.02/182/3

Tel Aviv, 30 September 1948 (21.00)

At General Staff meeting yesterday policy outlined by Old Man:[1] 1) As long issue under discussion Paris, we must refrain action likely be interpreted aggression. 2) /Future/ action /in case/ decision against us will /depend on/ whether /U.S. ready/ send forces against us. 3) On specific issue about which he disagreed with you[2] — he intended raise it again at Government meeting, but was disuaded as experts /believe/ this operation can succeed only if simultaneous operations initiated other fronts.

Shiloah

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ש. פרידמן אל מ. שרתוק (פאריס)
S. Friedman to M. Shertok (Paris)

מקור: 93.03/64/15

תל אביב, כ"ו באלול תש"ח
30 בספטמבר 1948

למ. שרתוק שלום וברכה,

יצא לי לנהל אתמול שיחה מעניינת עם מוחין, ואני מוסר לך בקיצור את תוכנה.

השיחה נמשכה יותר משעה. המתחיל היה בר־שיחי, שפתח במאמרו של ארנבורג.[1] הם קיבלו כבר את המאמר, והוא עובר אצלם מיד ליד. אמרתי לו שטרם קראתי את המאמר ושנמשיך את השיחה אחרי שאדע את כל תוכנו.

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1. ד. בן־גוריון.
2. בישיבת הממשלה ב־26 בספטמבר, הציע בן־גוריון לפתוח בפעולה צבאית בלטרון, אף אם לא תהיה התגרות מצד הערבים; רוב חברי הממשלה ובכללם שרתוק התנגדו. (ראה ישיבת הממשלה הזמנית, 26.9.1948).

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1. ראה מס' 535, הערה 1.

לדבריו אין במאמר שום דבר שאנחנו צריכים לקבל רע, ולהיפך, יש הרבה מהחיוב לגבי דידנו, והוא אינו מבין מדוע צריכה סוכנות טלגרפית להדגיש דווקא את הנקודות השליליות: מן הסתם כדי לפעול להרעת היחסים בין שתי המדינות. הוא נאחז בהנחה אחת של ארנבורג וחזר עליה כמה פעמים, היינו: מדינת ישראל אינה יכולה לפתור את הבעיה היהודית גם כשיהיו כאן אפילו 3 מיליונים יהודים, "והן את כל עשרת המיליונים לא תביאו הנה." תהיה זו מדינה חלשה והכוחות השחורים יוכלו להשמידה. העיקר הוא להילחם בכל מקום ומקום נגד כל אפשרות של השתלטות הכוחות האלה.

אני נתתי לקח קצר של ציונות: גורמים שונים אשר בגללם הציונות היא הכרח להמוני עמנו. תשובתו היתה שהוא רואה כגורם עיקרי בתנועתנו גורם שלילי: האנטישמיות. "הן כך למדנו שנינו אצל הרצל." אולם גורם זה עלול להיעלם. הוא כבר אינו קיים בברית המועצות, והוא לא יהיה קיים בארצות ב[הן] תשלוט הדמוקרטיה.

עברתי לשאלת יהדות רוסיה, על הנסיונות השונים שעשתה ברית־המועצות בשביל לפתור את השאלה הזאת אצלה ועל התוצאות הזעומות של כל הנסיונות, וכן על האנטישמיות הקיימת גם עכשיו במקומות רבים בעולם ושהתעוררה גם בשטח הסובייטי בזמן הכיבוש הגרמני. הוא הסכים אתי שיהודי רוסיה לא השיגו מבחינה תרבותית אשר השיגו עמים אחרים, וכן סיפר שאמנם נוכח לדעת, שנסיון בירובידז'ן לא הצליח ושיהודים רוסיים מסביבתו התפלאו לשאלתו, למה אין הם נוסעים שמה. דיברתי על כך שאי־אפשר לבנות את מדינת ישראל בלי עלייה ובלי ציונות, שהיהודים מהווים בתפוצות גורם חלש למדי, אשר אין בכוחו להכריע במלחמה נגד הריאקציה בכל מדינה ומדינה. הבאתי לו את הדוגמה של יהודי גרמניה. בנקודות שונות הסכים אתי, אבל חזר להנחתו העיקרית שהביא מפי ארנבורג: השאלה היהודית לא תיפתר על־ידי הציונות. תוך השיחה דובר גם על שאלות שונות של חיינו כאן, שלא אעמוד עליהן עכשיו. השיחה כולה התנהלה בערות רבה ובנוסח ידידותי.

שלום רב

ש. פרידמן

נספחים

APPENDICES

נספח א
APPENDIX A

החלטת העצרת הכללית של האומות המאוחדות [(S-2) 186] מיום 14 במאי 1948 בדבר מינוי מתווך וקביעת סמכויותיו. (מסמך או"ם A/555)

Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly [186 (S-2)] of 14 May 1948; Appointment and Terms of Reference of United Nations Mediator. (U.N. Document A/555)

The General Assembly:
Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine.

I

Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce;

II

1. *Empowers* a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to exercise the following functions:

(a) To use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to:

- (i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population of Palestine;
- (ii) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;
- (iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 April 1948.

(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate special agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character;

2. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the members of the United Nations;

3. *Directs* the United Nations Mediator to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Mediator by the General Assembly;

III

Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

נספח ב
APPENDIX B

הצעת־החלטה של ארצות־הברית במועצת־הביטחון מיום 17 במאי 1948 בדבר הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל (מסמך או"ם S/749)

United States Draft Resolution in the Security Council on Cease-fire in Palestine, 17 May 1948 (U.N. Document S/749)

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

Orders all Governments and authorities to cease, and desist from any hostile military action and to that end issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order to their military and para-military forces, to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution;

Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with these orders.

נספח ג

APPENDIX C

הצעת תיקון בריטית מיום 19 במאי 1948 לטיוטת הצעת־ההחלטה של ארצות־הברית במועצת הביטחון בדבר הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל (מסמך או"ם S/755)

British Amendment of 19 May 1948 to United States Draft Resolution in the Security Council on Cease-fire in Palestine (U.N. Document S/755)

The Security Council.

Bearing in mind the change in the juridical status of Palestine consequent upon the termination of the mandate, and the necessity for further clarification of this status;

Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

Calls upon all parties concerned in Palestine to abstain from acts of armed force against each other, and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution;

Calls upon the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem;

Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this resolution;

Requests the Committee appointed by the General Assembly on 14 May to proceed as expeditiously as possible with the appointment of a United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and calls upon all parties concerned to avail themselves of his good offices in order to seek a solution by mediation.

נספח ד
APPENDIX D

החלטת מועצת־הביטחון מיום 22 במאי 1948 בדבר הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל (מסמך או"ם S/773)

Security Council Resolution of 22 May 1948 on Cease-fire in Palestine (U.N. Document S/773)

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine;

Calls upon all Governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after midnight New York standard time, 22 May 1948;

Calls upon the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem;

Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this resolution;

Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate by all means in their power the task of the United Nations Mediator appointed in execution of the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948.

נספח ה
APPENDIX E

החלטת מועצת־הביטחון מיום 29 במאי 1948 בדבר הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל (מסמך או"ם S/801)

Security Council Resolution of 29 May 1948 on Cease-fire in Palestine (U.N. Document S/801)

The Security Council,

Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq,

Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease fire, and

Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease fire,

Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease fire,

Urges all Governments and authorities concerned to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the City of Jerusalem, including access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them,

Instructs the United Nations Madiator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers,

Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly,

Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator,

Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease fire,

Invites the States Members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6:00 p.m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948,

Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter,

Calls upon all Governments to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

נספח ו

APPENDIX F

הצעת־החלטה של ארצות־הברית מיום 13 ביולי 1948 והחלטה של מועצת־הביטחון מיום 15 ביולי 1948 בדבר הפסקת־אש בארץ־ישראל (מסמכי או"ם S/890, S/902)

United States Draft Resolution of 13 July 1948 and Resolution Adopted by the Security Council on 15 July 1948 on Cease-fire in Palestine (U.N. Documents S/890, S/902)

1

הצעת־החלטה של ארצות־הברית

United States Draft Resolution

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948 for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

[1] *Determines* that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

[2] *Orders* the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and para-military forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

[3] *Declares* that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council;

[4] *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948;

[5] *Orders* as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem to take effect 24 hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution, and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective;

[6] *Instructs* the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem, without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem, and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

[7] *Instructs* the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce, authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action;

[8] *Decides* that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.

2
החלטה שהתקבלה
Resolution Adopted

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948 for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

1. *Determines* that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

2. *Orders* the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action and, to this end, to issue cease-fire orders to their military and para-military forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

3. *Declares* that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council;

4. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to cooperate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in

Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948;

5. *Orders* as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem to take effect 24 hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution, and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective;

6. *Instructs* the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem, without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem, and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

7. *Instructs* the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11 June 1948, authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action, and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action;

8. *Decides* that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

9. *Reiterates* the appeal to the parties contained in the last paragraph of its resolution 49 (1948) of 22 May and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession, in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under General Assembly resolution 186 (S-2) of 14 May and under this resolution; and

11. *Requests* that the Secretary-General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arising from this resolution.

נספח ז

APPENDIX G

החלטת מועצת־הביטחון מיום 19 באוגוסט 1948 בדבר קיום הפסקת־האש בירושלים (מסמך או"ם S/983)

Security Council Resolution of 19 August 1948 on the Maintenance of the Cease-fire in Jerusalem (U.N. Document S/983)

The Security Council,

Taking into account communications from the Mediator concerning the situation in Jerusalem,

1. *Directs the attention* of the Governments and authorities concerned to its resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948, and
2. *Decides* pursuant to its Resolution of 15 July 1948, and so informs the governments and authorities concerned, that:

(a) Each party is responsible for the actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control;

(b) Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control;

(c) Each party has the obligation to bring to speedy trial and in case of conviction to punishment, any and all persons within their jurisdiction who are involved in a breach of the truce;

(d) No party is permitted to violate the Truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party;

(e) No party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce.

מפתח השמות והעניינים

מפתח השמות והעניינים*

* קיצורים

הע — הערה

העע — הערת־עורך

נ. — נולד(ה)

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